Rather than continuing this little discussion.
In the context of a war with Taiwan I've favorably considered three possible scenarios.
The first is the most daring and difficult. It would require a substantial amount of coordination between commanders and significant pre-planning, though it could easily be carried out with not a single warning.
It would consists of waves of aircraft and significant naval attacks followed by a major ground incursion. All of this would be aimed at forcing a political resolution to the conflict, rather than requiring a full-scale war.
The first air attacks would be from ballistic missiles. The missiles would target airbases, army bases, radar sites, and naval ports. Particular attention would be given to airbases. At least ten missiles would be launched at each airbase. The aim here being to make it impossible for any air-intercepts of the incoming strike aircraft.
The second attack would be launched about the midway point of the Taiwan Straits and consist of ARM attacks. About a squadron of Su-30MKKs and another of JH-7s each armed with two ARMs each would target the dozen or so long-range radar sites and radar sites for air defense systems. There would also be possible engagement of Kidds. At least two ARMs would be aimed at each site. Removing these sites would allow the next attacks to be conducted without warning and in complete safety.
After this the third attack would come from LS-6 glide bombs, launched from any viable launching platform in theater, likely two to four bombseach. They would be using auxiliary power so they could be launched from about 100 miles inland and just about outside or slightly inside detection range of Taiwanese long-range radar. Each bomb would be targeted dominantly at air defense systems like the Patriot. There would also be targeted towards known storage facilities for weapons, spare parts, and other crucial supplies for the military. Any other targets not destroyed like radar sites would also be hit. Several hundred bombs would likely be involved in this strike.
The fourth attack would come from a few dozen long-range LACMs. These would target remaining sites and begin targeting major military HQs.
After this the next attacks will be done largely LGBs or dumb bombs against major military installations and large troops deployments. Short-range, more mobile air defense would also be targeted.
The moment the attack begins fighters would be scrambled to escort strike aircraft and then move over Taiwan to intercept any aircraft that take off. This would be as many as four squadrons and as little as two squadrons of aircraft, all equipped with long-range ARAAMs.
KJ-2000s and Y-8 AWACs would take off at the beginning to help coordinate the entire attack.
Il-76MDs would take off near the beginning of the attack or a bit before and move quickly to drop arounhd 2,500 troops on Taiwan.
The sea attacks would be launched largely in conjunction with air attacks.
On the eastern coast Yuan-class subs and 093s will be deployed to sink shipping attempting to supply Taiwan. As many as four subs would operate in the area at any time. This would be part of a wider blockade against Taiwan.
Soveremnys will launch their sunburn anti-ship missiles against Kidd destroyers and any other naval deployments. Other anti-ship missiles, launched from other ships or the air will also be used. The 8 or so Kilos in the East Sea Fleet will use their Klub-S missiles as well as torpedoes. Song class subs would move close to naval detachments and use torpedoes.
Air attacks would be used as well to enforce this attack. They would launch anti-ship missiles against any naval deployment. Emphasis would be given on the Kidds given their capacity to endanger the PLAAF's air superiority. Combined with ARM attacks, torpedoes attacks, Sunburns, and Klub-S missiles the Kidds would likely be unable to stop all of the incoming attacks. Two ARMs, four torpedoes, four Sunburns, four Klub-S missiles, and four air-launched anti-ship missiles sounds like a good minimum. That's at least 20 weapons aimed at each Kidd, some of these weapons travelling well over Mach 1, some being torpedoes, and with various different means of guidance. While possible to stop some of the attacks, the possibility that Taiwanese naval operators will be so experienced with the weapons to stop a mass attack of 80+ weapons is null. These are fairly recent acquisitions and being able to coordinate a major air defense with them without much experience is unlikely.
Other ships, less advanced than the Kidds, would ultimately stand little chance of survival. Use of 2208s operating on the coast against naval deployments on Taiwan would add more on to this attack.
The moment the attack begins, or perhaps a few hours before, the 052Cs and any amphibious assets deployed in the South Sea Fleet would begin moving towards Taiwan. In addition to the amphibious assets in the East See Fleet, they would altogether be able to mount a single landing upwards of 10,000 troops. With the possible inclusion of Zubrs and 071s that numbers gets to more like 15,000.
052Cs would deploy in the Taiwan Straits with two Soveremnys near each tip of the island. The rest of the fleet would divided between these areas. Altogether this would, with the 093s and Yuan on the eastern coast be a naval blockade enforceable for several weeks.
Attacks on land would be also launched almost at the same time.
The intial land attacks would be against outwardly-held areas. Matsu and Spratly island holdings of Taiwan would be seized in the first few minutes of the attack. Kinmen would be blockaded by sea and air, with all traffic to the area ceased and a massive artillery, air, and naval bombardment of the island ensuing. Though, the Chinese will offer to evacuate any non-military personnel.
Seizure of the Spratly islands would likely be done with some limited action by the South Sea Fleet. Possibly receiving support from 052Cs and maybe using one 071 as well as some other amphibious assets. An air landing could also be used to seize the islands from Taiwan.
Matsu would be seized first of all to remove the air defense batteries on the island. Artillery attacks against Taiwanese positions on the islands and air strikes would be used to soften up the forces.
The Penghu islands would be the last to be seized. This would be done before an attack on the main island or at the same time. Likely consisting largely or airborne troops with significant air support, army targets will be neutralized, though efforts will be made to secure the airstrips on the island. Upon seizing the island aircraft, likely J-10s and JH-7s would be landed on the airstrip. Then several SAM batteries will deployed to the island.
The invasion of the Taiwanese main island would then be launched. Thousands of troops from IL-76MDs will be dropped to the western coast, likely in a central coastal area. An amphibious invasion would be launched on the mudflats at about the same time. Due to the surprise nature and, choosing a particularly undefended landing point, the PLA forces will likely secure their positions almost right after landing. Paratroopers will already be in the process of securing some towns and airbases. The intial attack will be small, likely only around 5,000 troops. Half will be paratroopers, the other half will be marines. Depending on what the PLAN has at the time the numbers could be larger for amphibious forces. If 071s and Zubrs are equipped by PLAN at the time, the numbers for Marines could be closer to 5,000 than 2,500. However, right now 2,500 marines is current reasonable.
1,000 special forces at least will be operating on the island in the beginning of the conflict, many moved in by subs and helicopters. They would note movements by the ROCA to highlight targets for destruction by the PLAAF and/or PLAN. They would also, at the beginning of the attack, seize important airfields, army bases, and naval ports. Possibly even attempt seizing a few ROCN ships, like the Kidds.
In the next few hours amphibious assets redirected from the South Sea Fleet, some from the East Sea Fleet, and possibly North Sea Fleet will be moved into position. They will reinforce the 2,500 to 5,000 troops with another 15,000. In the middle of this, assuming 071 and Zubrs are in service, another 5,000 may quickly be moved in. From the air Y-8s, Y-7s, Y-5s, and helicopters will ad even more troops. At least 10,000 will be moved to the positions from the air in the following hours. Eventually all 30,000 of the airborne troops and 14,000 Marines should be moved onto Taiwan by the end of the day. At least 50,000 troops in all be on Taiwan proper at the end of the day. In the next few days as other troops from the RRUs become prepared a massive shipment of troops will be made. In as as many as three days China could have 250,000 or more troops on Taiwan or heading to Taiwan.
With complete air and naval dominance over Taiwan and a major force stationed on Taiwan's mainland, as well as essentially holding tens of thousands of troops on Kinmen hostage, Taiwanese leaders would be faced with a major political crisis, especially assuming this is a result of a declaration of independence. The complete destruction of the ROCAF and ROCN will keep the US from intervening in any capacity for Taiwan's sake.
Facing a desperate situation Taiwanese university students may begin protesting the government for bringing the wrath of the mainland on them. Taiwan's economy would be devastated and many soldiers in the ROCA, only in the force because it's required, would throw down arms and leave, unwilling to fight what they can see is a losing battle against fellow Chinese. Some in the ROCA may have leanings towards reunification and switch sides to the Chinese. With 50,000 ROCA troops already lost as a result of the seizure or isolation of their positions, the 170,000 troops would quickly be reduced. The ROCA could see it's force go down to 100,000 troops or maybe even lower. Many called for duty would simply refuse the call. The KMT, TSU, and PFP, would attack the DPP for rashly endangering Taiwan and its people.
Eventually Taiwan would have to concede to the Chinese or risk not only foreign invasion, but civil war.
I'll admit that's the most outlandish one, but it is well within China's capabilities right now even excluding some of the weapons I mentioned.
The second scenario I have envisioned would consist partly of this, mainly the seizure or outward territories of Taiwan.
Matsu would be seized and the Spratly Island holdings. Kinmen would be blockaded heavily and perhaps invaded. Penghu would also be seized and aircraft landed on the islands.
The airbase on Penghu is apparently capable of stationing some air forces, perhaps a squadron.
This attack would likely be made to prevent any major loss by the PLA and keep Taiwan's western systems in tact for future inspection by China.
The seizure of Penghu would be particularly crucial. Basing a few SAM batteries on the islands as well as a squadron of fighters could give China air dominance over the southern half of Taiwan. Ships could be placed to port on the island and launch attacks against the ROCN. Artillery could be placed on the islands and launch barrages against the main island.
This would also be a nice place to stage an invasion. China could build up a large ground force on the island and station large amphibious ships with 052Cs and Soveremnys serving as support and defense.
This would also involve an extended air and naval campaign, one geared more at slowly eroding Taiwan's defensive capabilites. Chinese AWACS would operate over the Taiwan Straits every hour of the day.
Penghu would also be crucial politically. The southern region being the main stronghold of the DPP would be a serious blow to morale for backers of independence. Air and naval dominance of the independence stronghold and DPP's main backers could bring significant pressure on the leaders of Taiwan.
In this scenario no actual major attacks against the main island would be launched. There would still be a blockade over all of Taiwan and the seizures of outlying islands, but much of the island would be left in tact. The PLAAF would, however, conduct air patrols over the southern tip to serve as a constant threat.
Use of ballistic missiles would also likely be limited or nonexistant. I think this is the most favorable and likely scenario for China in Taiwan right now.
The third scenario really doesn't have to be exclusionary to the other two, however, it would be a substantially different first strike.
The PLAAF would modify some 800 J-6s, 100 old J-7s, possibly 200 J-5s, into UAVs. Harpy drones could also be included in this massive attack. KJ-2000s and Y-8 AWACS would be used with other electronic warfare attacks to make this appear to be a mass air attack. ROCAF fighters would inevitably be scrambled to intercept the massive attack of 1100 aircraft, maybe appear to be more with electronic warfare.
This would be a trap to catch much of the ROCAF off of the airstrips. As soon as a large number of the ROCAF is engaging the drones, Su-30MKKs, J-10s, and J-11s will take off to conduct air intercepts. It would also be used to occupy SAM systems. The ROCAF fighters, already engaging the drones and exhausting much of their weapons would then be targeted by the PLAAF's actual fighters.
While this is going on an air strike will be launched by H-6s and JH-7s against SAM sites, airbases, and the navy. Some naval strikes could also be possible. The ROCAF, still trying to fight their way out of the PLAAF's trap will be unable to stop this other strike. ARMs, ASMs, guided and unguided bombs would strike major military installations dealing with the massive ongoing air battle.
Also, while the drone are being used as a lure they will also be used in attacks. While possibly they may engage ROCAF fighters in suicide strikes they'll more likely be used like cruise missiles to strike other military installations. This will likely be hundreds of suicide strikes by drones.
Also, with the ROCAF caught off their airbases ballistic missile strikes on the runways could be used to trap the ROCAF fighters in the air against the PLAAF.
After this initial strike, what happens is variable and could be similar to the other two scenarios. However, the attack could leave much of the ROCAF crashing into the Taiwan Straits and open the way for a massive air strike.
