War game scenario's

The_Zergling said:

There is a reason why Taiwan is intimidated by China's new carrier, and that's because it can launch attacks from the east coast. They are fully prepared to defend against the west as best they can with what they have (which may or may not be enough), but not the east.

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Just some thoughts about the tactical situation regarding Taiwan's east coast.

The east coast is extremely mountanous with very few good landing areas and very limited ability to manuever or transit over the mountains to the western side of the island where the main commerce, manufacturing, and population centers are.

Maintaining a beachhead there, even if the landing in froce could be accomplished because now you are adding significantly to the invasion forces transit and vulnerability, would be extremely difficult, and would probably be bottled up very quickly. ROCAF's abilities there would be maximized because they would be flying away from PLAAF sorties and the PLAAF efforts would take more time and expend more fuel.

The mountain along the Eastern Coast and a little further inland reach up to approximately 4,000 meters. As I say, any attempt to land on the east coast is likely to be bottled up, even if the landing forces can get there. Many of the same troubles apply to an attempted invasion of the southern tip.



Just my thoughts on that part of the discussion.

If the PLA actually landed on the east coat of Taiwan, the defending ROC forces can easily blow up roads (trigger landslide?), bridges, and tunnels to hamper their movement. If anyone cares to look at the road map, I think it's near impossible for the invading PLA to effectively secure the road network quickly and prevent its destruction..

I just finsihed reading through about 3 pages of this thread, and have to say some of the scenarios are just unrealistic. Sorry but entire divisions of ROC army isn't going to just surrender and joint he PLA. It's possible that you might have some soliders surrendering, and even fewer defecting, but not entire divisions. Even if the battle is lost and the commander opts of order its troops to lay down its arms to prevent further bloodshed, I doubt the troops would just defect to the other side.

Taiwan's military posture only changed in the 1990s. I attended school in Taiwan from 1970s to 1980s, back then the general mentality was still stuck in Korean-war era where the Chang-led KMT government insists that the ROC would "invade China" and defeat the communists with popular support. An example of how silly that thought went, we donated funds at school to buy hot air ballons to air drop pictures of Chiang Ching Kuo to the mainland to celebrate President Chiang's re-election (not like he was going to lose anyway), along with gifts like tooth brush/paste, cookies, etc. We were going to invade Mainland "any day now" and liberate its people.

I think it wasn't until the late 1980's to early 1990's that they finally dropped the idea that ROC would be invading Mainland China "sometime soon" using Kinmen and Matsu as the "springboards" to invasion/liberation. After that the general mentality/expecation moved toward a more realistic position of defensive posture, something that the military brass prolly already knew decades ago but maintained apperances with their frogman shows. Funny thing is when I saw Ma Yin Jou attending a military display few months back on TV, it was the frogman marines again. LoL.

Personally I don't believe the PRC has the capability to invade Taiwan conventionally at this time. It's more likely that they'd take the outer islands in a show of force, or "face saving" move by the PLA if Taiwan goes TI. But if the PLA does somehow manage to mount an invasion, it's very unlikely that they could do a surprise attack. As soon as we see large troop/ship build ups, klaxons will be ringing from Taibei to Washington. Taiwan will have some time to deploy its active force, activate reserves, and consider preemptive strike options (assuming the PLA didn't start raining SRBM's first).

If the PLA manage to make landing in Taiwan, they'd be facing a large ROC army. Assuming the PLA fails to 'shock and awe" the ROC forces will be shooting and not running away. In urban areas they'd be faced with a hostile populace and very well trained ROC marines (they replaced military police with marines to defend military and government centers). I do not expect the ROC marine corp to simply surrender or defect.

Now, what is to the PLA's advantage, is Taiwan's limited infrascture targets. If the PLA's goal is to cause mass unrest, it's just too easy for them to blow the heck out of Taiwan's water reseviors, water treatment plates, power stations, petro tanks, transportation links, and so on. Taiwan is not a big place and it shouldn't be very hard for the PLA to put the whole island in the dark, if they wish to do so. A few weeks of no running water, power, gas, utilities, and you'd have people rioting in the streets, and the ROC military will end up being deployed to maintain martial law.

In comparison, ROC's counter-strike options against the PRC is very limited. Even if they manage to stockpile 50 HF-2E's, it won't dent the PRC much, and I seriously doubt they have any hope of winning with a "nuclear card".

Hmm... what makes you assert so strongly that the central west coast of Taiwan is weak? The fact that that Chiayi and Hsinchu seem so far away from Ching Chuan Kang/Taichung?

Here's a hint. Flying a straight line...

Hsinchu is less than 50 miles away from Taichung.
Chiayi is roughly 50 miles away from Taichung.
Hualien is 60 miles away from Taichung.

Sparsely defended, I say.

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I state it from the fact that Taipei and southern Taiwan both have several airbases nearby and are where most of the air defenses are centered. I'm not referring to Taichung though, but more like Chiayi, Yunlin, or Changhua county.

How long does it take for an F-16 or Mirage 2000 to be within firing range of their AIM-120s and Micas? As you noted many times, Taiwan is friggin' small. That means you can't expect to attack a "weak point" by air and not expect a response and backup from other airfields, unless you already knocked all of them out. The map you have without distance is deceptive.

Or were you not talking about overwhelming the "weak point" by air?

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I was talking about landing troops away from large areas of air support, in low-populated regions and where it would be a surprise, giving China the ability to effectively cut the island in half. This would also be to allow aircraft providing support for the landing as little as resistance as possible.

Those maps you linked to... notice something missing? Yeah. Army bases. Primarily situated on the west coast. But then again in your scenario the ROCA isn't even worth talking about.

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Army bases are missing because I'm pretty sure there's no definitive information on them with regards to the main island. Also their reaction times are going to be significantly lower than those of an airbase. I also don't consider the ROCA worth talking about because from what I hear of their war games, their tactics aren't all that involved. Also, given their size and the nature of it being a compulsory force, I have my doubts about their training level.

There is a reason why Taiwan is intimidated by China's new carrier, and that's because it can launch attacks from the east coast. They are fully prepared to defend against the west as best they can with what they have (which may or may not be enough), but not the east.

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I think they're worried about China's new carrier because it effectively rules out any help from outside Taiwan. I mention a blockade, albeit fleetingly, and for the east coast that consisted mainly of a few subs, because that would be the safest bet, however, a carrier group would be able to operate off of the East coast for some time.

People are telling you that "maybe they won't" deserves a bit more credit than you give. Your scenarios are good up to the point where they assume that the morale of Taiwanese troops is disgustingly low. Maybe that's true and your scenario will be validated. Maybe that's false and our beliefs will be validated. Just don't try to keep pushing it as gospel truth. There's a probability that your scenario is correct, but is is definitely not 1, neither is it zero.

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Except, I'm not saying it's disgustingly low. I'm simply saying I think there are some, albeit not a large amount, but some who may defect to China in the event of a war over independence. I certainly think surrenders are possible. You don't have to have horribly bad morale or disloyalty to surrender. Some simply dropping their weapons is also possible, I think.

Obviously it would be stupid and unlikely for any soldier to say that he would defect, surrender, or desert in the event of war privately or publicly. It's certainly possible some leaders in the military would harbor such beliefs, though not expressing them. Under the scenario I gave there'd be massive blow to morale right out.

Now, another interesting thing I realized, looking over it again, is where all the fighters are deployed:



Now Hsinchu is essentailly where all the Mirages are based. Chiayi is were 80 F-16s are based, with another 60 based in Hualien. Tainan has 60 IDFs, and Taichung has another 70.

Those five airbases essentially hold the ROCAF. China nearly 1,000 ballistic missiles in range of these bases. Just 250 of these missiles focused on these airbases would mean 50 missiles per air field. Its inaccuracy becomes largely an academic problem at those numbers.

What's more, what happens if one or more of the airfields is seized by special ops? That's about a fifth of the ROCA's fourth-gen fighters out of combat without a single ballistic missile or bomb.

@Zergling: Well, I was indeed exercising somewhat inverse thinking here since a comprehensive analysis includes stenghts and weaknesses in mutual equivalence but of course I appreciate your knowledgeable comment.

War is a function of the will of the political leaders of a state intending to achieve an ultimately political objective with military force. Unfourtunately the political scene of Taiwan is notoriously unstable and my own predictions during the last months of Ma Jing Yeoh becoming Taiwan's new president in '08 are already obsolete since he fell over a ludicrous corruption scandal. Meanwhile the CPC on the mainland is busy preparing for the XV. Congress which will cement Hu Jintao's leadership but will also give a first meaningful indication who could be the new leader of the fifth leadership generation after 2012/13.

Next year around this time we will know whether there can be real negotiations between the straits since an established and concilliatory Hu Jintao will be able to make substantial concessions and a new pan-blue president will terminate any separatist lunacies in reciprocal cordiality. Nevertheless things can also go dramatically wrong and both sides miscalculate (perhaps about the olympics?) resulting in severe crisis or even war.

After all I am in no mood for speculation anymore because taiwanese politics is so irrational and unpredictable and it is possible that most of our members have not heard anything about the man who will be president of Taiwan in 12 months time. Nevertheless one very decisive question remains: How many honourable soldiers of the Republic of China are willing to risk their life obeying orders form a man calling for a desperate sacrifice?

Violet Oboe

It's probable that we have no idea what will happen until the Taiwanese Presidential elections of 2008. I still wouldn't completely cross out Ma as a candidate, and it seems that regardless the DPP will lose executive power even if Ma isn't the President.

That said, chances for talks seem more likely because China has refused to talk to the elected government of Taiwan while it's controlled by the DPP. They have shown some willingness to talk with pan-blue members because they accept the terms set by China. While that's not the best way to go about doing negotiations, the positive side is that there's more dialogue.

I think we often make the assumption of the state being a unitary actor... however oftentimes this is generalizing and may have quite a few assumptions that may turn out to be false. In Bureaucratic Politics there are three perspectives: (1) Rational Policy, (2) Organizational Process, and (3) Bureaucratic Policy. In a nutshell, (1) refers to the state as a whole, (2) refers to internal organizations, and (3) refers to individuals. These individuals determine the preferences of the organizations which in turn view to influence state decisions. Given time it, starting from (3) tends to be the most accurate, though because exact personnel is unstable as of this time in Taiwanese politics (2) is worth looking at.

Frankly, both major Taiwanese political parties have taken more moderate stances, and this is no more stark than the DPP. Examining precedent, actions have generally been very cautious and pragmatic considering that the President was elected on a pro-independence platform. This does bring hope that at least the Taiwanese side will not intentionally provoke a conflict.

How many Taiwanese soldiers will be willing to fight? I honestly can't say. Like I said before, my friends are college students. Of course they say they will fight back if Taiwan is invaded, and I believe them. I would do the same if I were still over there, because the attitude is that there's little to lose. But I make no claims stating that this is a definitive sample of the Taiwanese population as a whole, so each will have to make their own guesses. Calling for pointless sacrifice in all probability will not work. However, it can be argued that a tangible external threat will be sufficient motivation. As stated above, maybe so, maybe not.

Vlad

I state it from the fact that Taipei and southern Taiwan both have several airbases nearby and are where most of the air defenses are centered. I'm not referring to Taichung though, but more like Chiayi, Yunlin, or Changhua county.

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Hmm, I may have misunderstood. So you're saying it's not CCK that's vulnerable, it's Chiayi, Yunlin, or Changhua? (And are you referring to cities or airfields?)

What's more, what happens if one or more of the airfields is seized by special ops? That's about a fifth of the ROCA's fourth-gen fighters out of combat without a single ballistic missile or bomb.

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I skipped over (didn't respond to) your points regarding army bases because I honestly cannot say whether you're right or wrong regarding response time and effectiveness. If you're talking about cities then yes, most major cities have an army base by them. I can only say with some confidence that if Taiwan puts of a weak resistance it will be mostly because of technical problems, strategic ineptness, and logistics.

What if the PLA takes over an airfield with special ops? Well, Taiwan's chances of resistance are dealt a heavy blow. What if the PLA spec ops infiltrate the 'Green House' and capture the President? Well, Taiwan's chances of resistance are dealt a heavy blow. What if all the airfields are rendered inoperable by ballistic missiles? Well, Taiwan's chances of resistance are dealt a heavy blow.

Is that what you're trying to concede? Well, sure I agree with that. What if China gets stealth bombers with precision-guided munitions? Then Taiwan's chances of resistance are dealt a heavy blow. It's hypothetical, so assume all you want - just may be right. (or wrong)

Hmm, I may have misunderstood. So you're saying it's not CCK that's vulnerable, it's Chiayi, Yunlin, or Changhua? (And are you referring to cities or airfields?)

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I'm referring more to it a long the lines of gaining air supremacy. The whole idea there being that the PLAAF will be the only air force in that area. I'm saying the central areas are deficient.

In terms of a landing in an amphibious invasion there are several prime motivations for where to land. A landing point must be far from major population centers, in a place the ROCA will not expect it and also an area where air and naval supremacy can be guaranteed, at least in a limited area.

Under those conditions the central coast is clearly the best area to strike.

I skipped over (didn't respond to) your points regarding army bases because I honestly cannot say whether you're right or wrong regarding response time and effectiveness. If you're talking about cities then yes, most major cities have an army base by them. I can only say with some confidence that if Taiwan puts of a weak resistance it will be mostly because of technical problems, strategic ineptness, and logistics.

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I'd go with strategic ineptness.

What if the PLA takes over an airfield with special ops? Well, Taiwan's chances of resistance are dealt a heavy blow. What if the PLA spec ops infiltrate the 'Green House' and capture the President? Well, Taiwan's chances of resistance are dealt a heavy blow. What if all the airfields are rendered inoperable by ballistic missiles? Well, Taiwan's chances of resistance are dealt a heavy blow.

Is that what you're trying to concede? Well, sure I agree with that. What if China gets stealth bombers with precision-guided munitions? Then Taiwan's chances of resistance are dealt a heavy blow. It's hypothetical, so assume all you want - just may be right. (or wrong)

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Well, the problem is, I'm not operating on a hypothetical with regards to damaging the airbases. However, people seem to assume I'm only talking about ballistic missiles here, which I'm not.

Ballistic missiles are just the opening salvo, intended more to prevent the use of aircraft in the initial strikes. Glide bombs will also be used to take out many of these airbases.