It's only natural for China to possess a nuclear arsenal with the scale that conforms to her present status on the global stage.
Okay, but the idea that a massive nuclear arsenal is a symbol of great powerhood is a Western concept, born in Washington, D.C. and Moscow.
You're equating the US, USSR/Russia, UK and France's intentions with their nuclear arsenals (as swords to blackmail/coerce other countries to advance/hold onto self interests) to China's intention with her nuclear arsenal (as a shield to secure the ultimate survival of her civilizational state).
China's unique nuclear policy is only unique because of no first use and minimum deterrence. If either are dropped, it would appear as though it intends to build a force needed for coercion or blackmail.
Apart from a technological status symbol, nuclear weapons hold value because the enemy (US) fears nuclear weapons. They try and have tried to coerce China not because they can read the CPC's minds and know that China fears nuclear strikes so much it will cower under American threats, but because the US themselves fear nuclear weapons in such a way and thus would never use them lest their worst fear be realized (5 megaton detonations over LA, NYC, etc.).
Therefore China has no need to engage in the sort of esoteric, pride-measuring games that the USSR/Russia and US do. So long as its arsenal can survive long enough to launch, and break through US BMD defenses, it will never have to use it. This is why China did not widely deploy tactical nuclear weapons despite designing a small bomb for the Q-5 in the 70s. Nuclear weapons have little to no value on the battlefield, only as political messages.
If China was to abandon minimum deterrence, that would imply a transition to counterforce targeting. Nuclear weapons would not be a deterrent but an actual threat ("do as we say, because we can strike your silos, air bases, and sub bases before they can hit our cities"). It would require an enormous expense, requiring an increase in warheads everytime the US increases its arsenal, and would also be an admission that China feels threatened by nuclear weapons and can be coerced with nuclear attacks.
Who cares what the rest of the world thinks - China's ultimate survival should always be the paramount factor that leads and comes before everything else. China's first nuclear test occurred just 1 year after the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) co-sponsored by both the US and the USSR came into effect. Many countries around the world (including majority of the 3rd world) ratified the PTBT - But did China give a sh1t?
There's a certain point where China can indeed go "who cares what anyone thinks": for example, if the US somehow got the entire world to rally around Taiwan independence, that's a red line and China can take the gloves off.
I don't think the situation is there right now. China has the incentive to play the good guy. It is the US that refuses to adopt a no first use declaration, it is the US that withdrew from INF, it is the US that demands China join arms control negotiations when it has a total stockpile 5x the size of China's.
By claiming it still maintains a minimum deterrent, which it indeed does when compared to the US and Russian stockpiles, China can present itself as a protector of international stability, rather than a participant in dangerous arms races. Such an action would also help discredit the "China threat" narrative.
Needless to say, "minimal credible deterrence" from the 1980s no longer works today. Having the capability to lob 5 or 50 warheads at the enemy is completely different than having the capability to lob 500 warheads at the enemy. The enemy may be able to intercept all 5 or all 50 warheads, but can the enemy intercept all 500 warheads? That's called deterrence of proportionate response - And it's sorely needed in the present geopolitical climates in DC and Brussels, where more and more people are hallucinating that they are invincible against the "yellow peril of the 21st century".
I agree that 50 warheads is not enough, but 500 warheads is
still a minimum deterrent by the standards of Russia and the US. The US has 400 warheads deployed across its ICBMs and 1,000 or so deployed across its submarines, not to mention everything in storage and the 300 some warheads for bombers (which would be useless against China or Russia's IADS, but might as well mention them). If the US were to upload more warheads after New START expires, that would bring the ICBM warheads to 1,200~ and the sub warheads to 2,000~ or so. Russia likely has similar numbers, which will only expand as Sarmat begins to enter widespread service during the 2030s.
But does that mean China should massively expand her nuclear arsenal like what the US and USSR did during the fever of the Cold War and stationing their respective nuclear warheads aimed at each other on foreign soil, whether the government administrating said foreign soil voluntarily allows it or being forced into it? No - Beijing explicitly argues against such moves.
China indeed does not argue for such moves, but when one argues that "China deserves a stockpile commensurate with its status on the global stage, meaning close parity with the US" that implies China is going to expand its arsenal dramatically if the US does, in order to maintain close parity. China only needs an arsenal large enough to lay waste to hundreds of American countervalue targets and survive American BMD. It does not need to engage in a counterforce mission or partake in "bean counting" exercises, as the USSR/Russia and US loved to do (and sometimes still dream of doing again).
US BMD is obviously never going to expand to the point where they could intercept 500 ICBMs and 120~ SLBMs. Because of this, even if the US was to expand its operational arsenal after the complete demise of New START in 2026, China should not follow the US and Russia in expanding its arsenal to such great heights, IMO.
