China ICBM/SLBM, nuclear arms thread

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
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Continued from previous thread here:


This thread will be for primarily Nuclear missiles (ICBMs, SLBMs) and nuclear weapons developments

A separate thread will be for other types of ballistic missile, including IRBMs and SRBMs, and will include weapons in this category which may have the option to fit nuclear warheads but which the primary warheads are conventional.
 

Kalec

Junior Member
Registered Member
Not entirely nuclear but still significant on their production estimation. Tl;dr the solid branch of CASC could be making 10,000t propellant mass into grain per year as of 2021.

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12月30日,在年度收官和疫情防控的关键时刻,在全院干部职工的努力和拼搏下,四院年度型号科研生产任务克服重重考验和艰巨挑战,再次创造了历史新高、书写了新的纪录

下午14时30分,四院院举行简洁庄重的纪念仪式,庆祝这一历史性时刻和里程碑事件
The annual production task of the 4th Academy overcame many tests and difficult challenges and once again created a new historical high and wrote a new record.
Well the news itself is not something new to me as they have been creating new record nearly every year for decades. But the video clip shows a "10,000" formation of their employees then the question is what exactly 10,000 means in this news.

It could be annual propellant production mass or the cumulative number of motors ever made in history.

However it is more likely to be the annual production rate because the memorial is celebrate at the year end and they are not only making ballistic missile but many other smaller guided missile and there is no problem making thousands of them in a month.
001786EBA07B2E2E9F09EE0BBFF49822.jpg
 

caohailiang

Junior Member
Registered Member
i have a question about nuclear escalation, appreciate if someone can help (if mods think this is the wrong thread, please help to move):

how to assess the risk of escalation? i think in general the risk is very low, but there are still different cases.

for example, i think the risk is very low in a taiwan scenario between China and US, which is why i think US side is actively considering get involved directly. For China side, the recent nuclear buildup actually reduce the risk of escalation initiated by US, limiting the potential conflict at conventional level. and i just dont think China has the motivation to escalate first, even if she lost the conventional war decisively.

but in Ukrain case, some people seems to think US does not get directly involved because of the risk of escalation from Russia side. if that is true, it seems to imply Russia has a larger motivation to escalate when in a conflict with US, compare to China. Is that the case? is it because of different doctrine between Russia and China? i mean when facing the threat of MAD, how could mere doctrine make nations choose completely different path?
 

ZeEa5KPul

Colonel
Registered Member
i have a question about nuclear escalation, appreciate if someone can help (if mods think this is the wrong thread, please help to move):

how to assess the risk of escalation? i think in general the risk is very low, but there are still different cases.
It's very difficult - if not impossible - to assess the risk of nuclear escalation. Not only that, even if there were an objective probability x of nuclear escalation in a certain scenario (there isn't, philosophically there can't be, the problem is compounded by the need not just to determine x, but to determine what each party thinks x is.

The better way to phrase the question is "what can [China] do to minimize the risk of nuclear escalation?" That's a far more tractable problem. The answer to that problem has been repeated ad nauseum but it remains the same: Expand and modernize the strategic nuclear arsenal as quickly as possible to a level that a Chinese retaliatory nuclear strike would delete the US from existence.
 

caohailiang

Junior Member
Registered Member
It's very difficult - if not impossible - to assess the risk of nuclear escalation. Not only that, even if there were an objective probability x of nuclear escalation in a certain scenario (there isn't, philosophically there can't be, the problem is compounded by the need not just to determine x, but to determine what each party thinks x is.

The better way to phrase the question is "what can [China] do to minimize the risk of nuclear escalation?" That's a far more tractable problem. The answer to that problem has been repeated ad nauseum but it remains the same: Expand and modernize the strategic nuclear arsenal as quickly as possible to a level that a Chinese retaliatory nuclear strike would delete the US from existence.

i dont know if my observation is correct: US rhetoric on direct intervention of tw has not been toned down even after massive silo construction is discovered in China

in future, will US be deterred from conventional intervention, by Chinese nuclear buildup? i dont see any evidence suggesting that

i guess my question is, under what condition will nuclear capability deter conventional war?
 

manqiangrexue

Brigadier
i dont know if my observation is correct: US rhetoric on direct intervention of tw has not been toned down even after massive silo construction is discovered in China

in future, will US be deterred from conventional intervention, by Chinese nuclear buildup? i dont see any evidence suggesting that
The US has a big mouth but rarely behaves like its actions are bound by its words. Whether or not they tone down the rhetoric really depends on how much they hate you, not how much they are actually planning on doing what they say. America has a political system where the more you sound like you hate China (but you can invest in it, no problem there), the more popular you are and that is mated to a culture where politicians are fully expected to lie so their mouths can write all the big checks they want knowing full well that none of them need ever be cashed.
i guess my question is, under what condition will nuclear capability deter conventional war?
Under the condition that you can obliterate their country in MAD and they know it. Talking trash and going to war are different things.
 
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FairAndUnbiased

Brigadier
Registered Member
i dont know if my observation is correct: US rhetoric on direct intervention of tw has not been toned down even after massive silo construction is discovered in China

in future, will US be deterred from conventional intervention, by Chinese nuclear buildup? i dont see any evidence suggesting that

i guess my question is, under what condition will nuclear capability deter conventional war?
historically it has done so only by declaring first use intent.

Example:

1. US declared first use intent against Warsaw Pact if it invaded West Germany with Warsaw Pact. Pact deterred.

2. Russia declared first use intent against NATO if it was involved in Ukraine. NATO deterred.

3. North Korea declared first use intent against South Korea and allies if it was invaded. SK deterred.
 

caohailiang

Junior Member
Registered Member
historically it has done so only by declaring first use intent.

Example:

1. US declared first use intent against Warsaw Pact if it invaded West Germany with Warsaw Pact. Pact deterred.

2. Russia declared first use intent against NATO if it was involved in Ukraine. NATO deterred.

3. North Korea declared first use intent against South Korea and allies if it was invaded. SK deterred.
i believe declared doctrine plays a role. But i think country obviously cannot declare that over anything.

so what kind of red line would be credible?

again take tw for example, if China declare the red line to be "any other country involve militarily" , i dont feel it is very credible. On the contrary, if the red line is bombing of 3 gorges dam, that is very credible.
 

manqiangrexue

Brigadier
i believe declared doctrine plays a role. But i think country obviously cannot declare that over anything.

so what kind of red line would be credible?

again take tw for example, if China declare the red line to be "any other country involve militarily" , i dont feel it is very credible. On the contrary, if the red line is bombing of 3 gorges dam, that is very credible.
It is credible to state the allowance of the usage of nuclear weapons to prevent the loss of any war on one's home soil (in relevence to any disputed territories, the definition of home soil would be determined by you, not your enemy). It is not credible to say that if any of your military assets deployed to international or foreign territories were attacked, you would use nuclear weapons to retaliate.
 
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