China ICBM/SLBM, nuclear arms thread

[nativechicken]

You seem know very well regarding Chinese HEU, so according to you there is no HEU & WgPu bottleneck for China in regard to warhead production. I somehow always thought China had a bottleneck due to the limitation of HEU/WgPu that always reported by most westerns media reports

China's nuclear industry's enrichment capability, which was 20 KT SWU in processing capacity in 2020, is public information and not a secret. This information is widely available, and I remember someone on this forum has provided detailed capabilities down to the enrichment plant level.
The information I found only slightly elaborates on how civilian SWU capacity can be converted into weapon-grade nuclear fuel (that is, without changing equipment and energy consumption, 1 KT SWU can achieve the conversion of more than 9 tons of weapon-grade nuclear material annually, and by improving processes and reducing energy consumption, it is possible to produce less than 17 tons of weapon-grade uranium material per 1 KT SWU, which is the most core information). Indeed, this kind of information is very scarce. However, based on the information I have collected, the Chinese government (nuclear industry department) has studied related issues for a long time.
For me, China can produce nuclear weapons at any time, at a speed exceeding any country during the Cold War era, and rapidly arm itself with nuclear weapons. China loves peace but is not averse to using force. So the answer to your question is, it's not that China lacks the ability or conditions to produce nuclear weapons; it's China's own cultural and moral constraints. There is simply no need to do so at present.
The difference between Chinese culture and Western culture lies in how they deal with weaker countries. The United States, Israel, and other Western countries use advanced weapons to bomb and suppress their opponents into accepting their decisions, thinking this is civilization and progress. China would rather use cold weapons against weaker nations. This actually makes weaker nations more clearly understand that even if China chooses to use weapons at the same level as you to confront you, it can easily overwhelm you, so don't provoke me, I am not willing to use my true strength to suppress you into accepting, and I am still willing to communicate with you, because I really have no interest in using force to fight you. Of course, I do not expect non-Chinese to understand this. This is due to cultural differences. Only if you understand these differences can you understand why China is not what you think.
As for Western media reports, what value do they have? They can't even predict the polls for the U.S. elections. Can they predict China's highly classified military secrets?
There are many reasons why you might not believe in China's capabilities. In essence, it's because you do not truly understand China. China's achievements in the industrial field today were not achieved overnight; they are the result of the continuous efforts of several generations over decades, with countless stories and lessons. For those who have been observing, recording, and analyzing this information over a long period of 10 to 20 years, all of this is not unfamiliar and almost taken for granted. Of course, if you only understand all of this from Western media, you will find that China has been in a stagnant and collapsing state for decades. I cannot prove or refute anything because what I see is not what you see. What you see determines your judgment. If we see differently, it is normal to have different conclusions.

 

[zhangjim]

It is too bad they used the OTHER within the ICBM, so now we don't know if they included SLBMs in that group as well.
Listing DF-4 is also silly, but we know the whole report is out of date in some aspects.

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Although what he said may not be true, we can at least think that the accuracy of American intelligence is worse under the strict confidentiality system.

 

[nativechicken]

China keeps much of their warheads stored away from their missiles anyways. The ones that are usually reported on is when they occasionally reveal about roughly how many nukes are on a launch on warning posture. Probably in the 2000s this number was ~300 and now it is ~600.

It can surge a lot just from China returning stored warheads to their launch platforms.

That said, not all launch platforms are high quality ones able to reach all of US. The numbers being floated now with 600-1000 likely represent a majority of China's high quality launch platforms. In peacetime or during a regional war, there's no point in mounting nukes on DF26 for example, but in a nuclear war, the stored warheads will be mounted on cheap missiles so they can be used on enemies in Asia/East Europe, rather than wasting a DF41 or DF5C.

China has never publicly disclosed the number of nuclear warheads. There was a rumor a long time ago, around 1984-1986, that in response to calls for a comprehensive cessation of nuclear testing, China once submitted data on its weapon-grade nuclear material to the outside world, which was approximately 16 tons of weapon-grade enriched uranium reserves. Personally, I have heard that China has stockpiled tens of thousands of tons of preliminarily processed uranium ore as a nuclear strategic reserve (meaning that the reserves are of crude ore rather than refined ore).

 

[ACuriousPLAFan]

China does not have a launch on warning posture. The only source for this claim is the US. I think such claims should be treated with a mountain of salt until we see new equipment associated with an LOW posture; an IL-86/E-4 style NC3 plane, Sirena-style C2 missile, Y-9-based TACAMO plane, etc.

There is the GX-14 which is likely to be China's TACOMA aircraft, per @huitong. Allegedly the photographer went to jail because of this photograph.



China also has two ACP aircrafts that are based on the 737-300, which can be seen as the Chinese counterpart to the E-4.

The early DF series were developed sequentially; DF-1, then DF-2, then DF-3, then DF-4, finally DF-5. In the 1980s they apparently switched to a new naming scheme, where the first number defines how many stages it has and the second one either the number in the series or some other characteristic. DF-21 and DF-26 are two stage missiles, DF-31 is a 3 stage missile. DF-41 likely has four stages, which makes sense given its immense range. DF-51 would imply a five stage missile. If the DF-45/51 is intended to be a larger missile capable of housing a large number of MIRVs or a high yield warhead, this might make sense.

Lmao no.

ICBMs do not have more than 3 stages because each individual stages with engine(s) at the bottom means less volume for fuel storage. Even if you can design the missile to be longer, how long can the missile even get before it becomes technically and financially unfeasible for transportation, operational and maintenance works?

There is also the consideration of weight with more than three stages, as more stages added on top means more work is required from the bottom stages' engines to push the ICBM up into the sky and against gravity.

Instead of more stages, countries with ICBMs always go with more engines per stage and/or more powerful engines.

 

[Maikeru]

There is the GX-14 which is likely to be China's TACOMA. Allegedly the photographer went to jail because of this photograph.

View attachment 141249

China also has two ACPs E-4 that are based on the 737-300, which can be seen as the Chinese counterpart to the E-4.

View attachment 141251



Lmao no.

ICBMs do not have more than 3 stages because each individual stages with engine(s) at the bottom means less volume for fuel storage. Even if you can design the missile to be longer, how long can the missile even get before it becomes technically and financially unfeasible for transportation, operational and maintenance works?

There is also the consideration of weight with more than three stages, as more stages added on top means more work is required from the bottom stages' engines to push the ICBM up.

Instead of more stages, countries with ICBMs always go with more engines per stage and/or more powerful engines.

TACAMO aircraft is Y-9T. From Huitong's blog:

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Y-9T High New 14

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It was first rumored in mid-2020 that a new communication relay variant of Y-9 (High New 14?) was being developed at SAC for PLAN. This special purpose variant, probably named

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, has been speculated as a survivable TACAMO aircraft similar to American EC-130Q. Therefore it is thought to be capable of providing secure digital communications between the Central Military Commission (CMC) and PLAN's nuclear submarine fleet including Type 093 SSN and more importantly, Type 094 SSBN, during a possible nuclear warfare scenario. Like EC-130Q,

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may have a VLF transmitter onboard and carry a short trailing wire antenna (STWA) released from a short tail sting. A second long VLF trailing wire antenna (LTWA) was installed below on the bottom of the tail section. Large conformal ESM antennas can be seen on both sides of the rear fuselage with additional ones at the wingtips. An oval dish shaped ESM antenna is also seen on top of the vertical fin. At least one prototype of Y-9T already flew in 2020. A newly built

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was spotted at SAC by a satellite in August 2024, suggesting that the aircraft is likely to enter the service with PLAN in the near future.

Interestingly, the new USN TACAMO aircraft, replacing the E6 Mercury, will be C130J-30 based:

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[nativechicken]

Uranium alone is not enough. Although China's first atomic bomb was a pure HEU device, building modern, safe, combat-capable hydrogen bombs requires plutonium. They could do it but it would come with many risks and probably require full scale nuclear testing.

In China, it is not commonly said that plutonium is necessary for making hydrogen bombs. Here, it is only mentioned that plutonium is very beneficial for the miniaturization of nuclear weapons because it requires less nuclear explosive material. China does not prefer to use plutonium because its toxicity and pollution are much greater than those of uranium, which would increase costs. China does have plutonium reserves, but the quantities are uncertain.

DF-26 is considered an IRBM and DF-27 is considered an ICBM by the DOD. I've never heard any serious claims made that the DF-26 can reach intercontinental ranges.

The DF26 is officially considered a medium-range ballistic missile by China, and the range has not been explicitly stated. In China, ballistic missiles with a range of 2000-5000 km are generally regarded as medium-range ballistic missiles.

For more professional enthusiasts, one can find a wealth of information on the second-stage burnout velocities of solid-fueled ballistic missiles in Chinese literature. We can judge the approximate performance of missiles based on the technical data from these documents. As far as I can recall, the DF27 has not been officially confirmed by the authorities, nor has its range been stated. However, there is a plethora of information in relevant literature. The U.S. Department of Defense should have started recruiting people proficient in Chinese systematically to study Chinese scientific and technical literature since around 2006. The 8000 km range of the DF27 is likely understood not only through espionage but also primarily through these channels.

In the Chinese context, the classification of missile ranges is different from the West. Missiles with a range of 5000-8000 km are called long-range ballistic missiles in China, and those above 8000 km are called intercontinental ballistic missiles. In the eyes of the Chinese, both the DF26 and DF27 are considered medium to long-range ballistic missiles (medium-range ballistic missiles), not intercontinental ballistic missiles.

I believe the main reason for the difference in classification is the considerable distance between China and the U.S. The U.S. missile classification is based on the distance between Russia and the U.S. Therefore, anything above 5500 km is considered an intercontinental ballistic missile.

 

[SunlitZelkova]

Lmao no.

ICBMs do not have more than 3 stages because each individual stages with engine(s) at the bottom means less volume for fuel storage. Even if you can design the missile to be longer, how long can the missile even get before it becomes technically and financially unfeasible for transportation, operational and maintenance works?

There is also the consideration of weight with more than three stages, as more stages added on top means more work is required from the bottom stages' engines to push the ICBM up into the sky and against gravity.

Instead of more stages, countries with ICBMs always go with more engines per stage and/or more powerful engines.

This is the understanding of some Western arms control analysts, but perhaps I mistaking their statements on the DF-21 and DF-31 alone to expand to all missiles since then. Thank you for the correction.

In China, it is not commonly said that plutonium is necessary for making hydrogen bombs. Here, it is only mentioned that plutonium is very beneficial for the miniaturization of nuclear weapons because it requires less nuclear explosive material. China does not prefer to use plutonium because its toxicity and pollution are much greater than those of uranium, which would increase costs. China does have plutonium reserves, but the quantities are uncertain.

China's early devices were all-uranium, but their first operational h-bomb used plutonium as well. It's certainly possible, but considering their first operational h-bomb used plutonium it seems likely they would stick with that. In an emergency, of course, pure uranium devices could be designed.

The DF26 is officially considered a medium-range ballistic missile by China, and the range has not been explicitly stated. In China, ballistic missiles with a range of 2000-5000 km are generally regarded as medium-range ballistic missiles.

For more professional enthusiasts, one can find a wealth of information on the second-stage burnout velocities of solid-fueled ballistic missiles in Chinese literature. We can judge the approximate performance of missiles based on the technical data from these documents. As far as I can recall, the DF27 has not been officially confirmed by the authorities, nor has its range been stated. However, there is a plethora of information in relevant literature. The U.S. Department of Defense should have started recruiting people proficient in Chinese systematically to study Chinese scientific and technical literature since around 2006. The 8000 km range of the DF27 is likely understood not only through espionage but also primarily through these channels.

In the Chinese context, the classification of missile ranges is different from the West. Missiles with a range of 5000-8000 km are called long-range ballistic missiles in China, and those above 8000 km are called intercontinental ballistic missiles. In the eyes of the Chinese, both the DF26 and DF27 are considered medium to long-range ballistic missiles (medium-range ballistic missiles), not intercontinental ballistic missiles.

I believe the main reason for the difference in classification is the considerable distance between China and the U.S. The U.S. missile classification is based on the distance between Russia and the U.S. Therefore, anything above 5500 km is considered an intercontinental ballistic missile.

I didn't know China had its own designation system, thank you for that info!

 

[ACuriousPLAFan]

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China is testing her nukes, and that can be a good thing.

Looking back, just wanna say something quite noticeable (albeit a real late one).

China in 1980: "We're only testing a space rocket! There's definitely nothing military going on with the test! We also notified all of you more than one week prior to the test and the location of the test, so don't worry!"

China in 2024: "We just tested an intercontinental ballistic missile aimed at the South Pacific, and we have already notified relevant countries hours prior to the test. Oh, I heard that you're unhappy with the test? So fvcking what?"

44 years - That's a huge difference.

 

[Maikeru]

Decker Eveleth's thoughts on CMPR24:

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[ACuriousPLAFan]

Especially this paragraph from the article:

It’s not that countervalue isn’t the mission anymore – countervalue is after all the DF-5’s bread and butter – its that its not the only mission. China’s nuclear forces and more broadly the PLARF aren’t a hammer anymore. They’re a toolbox. China is investing in more DF-5 and low yield weapons along with conventional-nuclear integration systems like the DF-26. The point of the arsenal now is to give Xi a set of options for every scenario. They seek to deter at every level of conflict, not simply deterring a major conflict, and are bolstering their capability at all those levels. This is why I raise my eyebrows every time I attempt to see people fit Chinese nuclear forces into the same existing posture frameworks we’ve been dealing with for years, like argue that China still maintains “minimum deterrence.” Their force structure cannot fit inside that box.

Honestly speaking, China definitely should (if not already) completely abandon that "minimum credible deterrence" doctrine, at least in non-public-facing settings.

"Minimum credible deterrence" no longer works against an increasingly belligerent US and its LCs. Only a close (if not absolute parity) with the US&LC's nuclear arsenal and anti-missile systems matter. This is something everyone in August 1st building and Zhongnanhai must/should (if not already) understand.