Regarding the number of China's nuclear warheads, is this question really important?
I'm not sure if you are aware that China is currently the world's second-largest country in processing enriched uranium (in terms of production capacity), with Russia being the first and Europe and China ranking second and third respectively.
Russia's processing capacity is approximately 30 KT SWU per year, China's in 2020 was about 20 KT SWU. The total capacity for Europe is 24 KT SWU.
China plans to surpass Russia's enriched uranium processing capacity (in terms of production) by 2030. It should have already exceeded Europe's enriched uranium production scale.
China is likely already the largest producer of enriched uranium in fact, as over the past 20 years, only China's demand for nuclear power plants has increased.
China has long studied the conversion capability of upgrading civilian uranium enrichment capacity to weapon-grade uranium enrichment capability.
Approximately 1 KT of civilian low-enriched uranium enrichment capacity, when converted to 90% concentration weapon-grade uranium, is roughly over 9 tons (without changing the process and production line). If the process and production line are adjusted, and energy consumption is regulated, it is possible to achieve a yield of less than 17 tons.
Therefore, with a production capacity of 20 KT SWU, China can actually produce 4,000 small nuclear warheads of 100 KT yield at any time within a year. China can also import enriched uranium from Russia if necessary.
What is truly weak is the United States' enriched uranium processing capacity. After the Russia-Ukraine war, it is now Europe that is helping the United States build factories to restore its nuclear material production capabilities.
The number of warheads or their capacity to produce fissile material? And in what context do you mean "important"?
Assuming this context is related to accurate detailed accounting of Chinese military forces, it is very important.
If we're talking about a wider political context, devoid of minute details, I'd say it isn't important. China has enough nuclear warheads that are too far for any US left of launch air campaign to destroy (assuming US aircraft could even get through the coastal IADS in the first place) and thus under existing Chinese thinking about how nuclear deterrence works, it has a
sufficient deterrent. Not ideal, but sufficient.
Uranium alone is not enough. Although China's first atomic bomb was a pure HEU device, building modern, safe, combat-capable hydrogen bombs requires plutonium. They could do it but it would come with many risks and probably require full scale nuclear testing.
China keeps much of their warheads stored away from their missiles anyways. The ones that are usually reported on is when they occasionally reveal about roughly how many nukes are on a launch on warning posture. Probably in the 2000s this number was ~300 and now it is ~600.
It can surge a lot just from China returning stored warheads to their launch platforms.
That said, not all launch platforms are high quality ones able to reach all of US. The numbers being floated now with 600-1000 likely represent a majority of China's high quality launch platforms. In peacetime or during a regional war, there's no point in mounting nukes on DF26 for example, but in a nuclear war, the stored warheads will be mounted on cheap missiles so they can be used on enemies in Asia/East Europe, rather than wasting a DF41 or DF5C.
China does not have a launch on warning posture. The only source for this claim is the US. I think such claims should be treated with a mountain of salt until we see new equipment associated with an LOW posture; an IL-86/E-4 style NC3 plane, Sirena-style C2 missile, Y-9-based TACAMO plane, etc.
It's been speculated on this forum that DF-26 brigades converted from the DF-21 on a nuclear-for-nuclear, conventional-for-conventional basis. Nuclear DF-26s are useful for striking regional targets.
DF-27 is not listed in the report table so it may be part of the OTHER group within the ICBM section.
However, DF-26 is listed exclusively under IRBM group (CSS18) so i find it unlikely that some other variants would also be listed under OTHER group in the ICBM section. Even more so because DF26 is simply too small to be able to reach 5500 km.
It is too bad they used the OTHER within the ICBM, so now we don't know if they included SLBMs in that group as well.
Listing DF-4 is also silly, but we know the whole report is out of date in some aspects.
DF-26 is considered an IRBM and DF-27 is considered an ICBM by the DOD. I've never heard any serious claims made that the DF-26 can reach intercontinental ranges.
The biggest omission in CMPR24 was details on whatever is going into the northern silo fields. We've seen what appears to be a mobile ICBM that is somewhat larger than DF-41 (and on a TEL with 2 additional axles to the DF41 TEL, i.e. 10 instead of 8), and this may be a derivative of a new solid fuel silo ICBM tentatively dubbed DF-45 (or maybe DF-51, although that name suggests a DF-5 derivative or replacement). According to the Washington Times (yeah, yeah...
) this has 7 x 650kT MIRV.
Edit: Link to new TEL/ICBM -
China ICBM/SLBM, nuclear arms thread
I'm skeptical of that analysis because it was done by a guy who interviewed Steve Bannon and called for banning Chinese tourists from the Marianas in a LinkedIn post.
The early DF series were developed sequentially; DF-1, then DF-2, then DF-3, then DF-4, finally DF-5. In the 1980s they apparently switched to a new naming scheme, where the first number defines how many stages it has and the second one either the number in the series or some other characteristic. DF-21 and DF-26 are two stage missiles, DF-31 is a 3 stage missile. DF-41 likely has four stages, which makes sense given its immense range. DF-51 would imply a five stage missile. If the DF-45/51 is intended to be a larger missile capable of housing a large number of MIRVs or a high yield warhead, this might make sense.
650kT MIRV is a really random number, probably pulled from historical Soviet weapon yields. Most estimates for the DF-31's warhead are 200-500 kilotons, but this was a large warhead that lacked advanced miniturization due to having been developed in the early 1990s.
Such a large number of MIRVs would either require a smaller warhead (probably the DF-31's primary) with a yield of 90-95 kilotons, or an entirely new warhead design. The only missile that would have the ability to carry MIRVs using the same warhead as the DF-31 is the DF-5, others are simply too small and don't have a high enough throw weight.
IMO, I think it makes more sense for China to develop missiles with a single high yield warhead than smaller MIRVs. China's approach to deterrence is centered around pure countervalue targets, in which MIRVs aren't really necessary. Only a small number of MIRVed missiles are needed for significant targets like Washington, D.C. and New York City, which are oddly shaped targets that would require multiple high yield warheads to destroy. For large, sprawling metropolitan areas like Los Angeles, the very high yield (5 megaton) warhead developed for the DF-5 is best. This is apparently what the DF-5C will be equipped with. If the DF-45/DF-51 is a DF-5 replacement, I would think that the DF-5C is an interim replacement for the DF-5A (which also carried a 5 megaton warhead), similar to how the DF-5B was an interim MIRV-capable silo ICBM, and the DF-45/51 will definitively replace both missiles and be capable of carrying either MIRVs or a 5 megaton warhead. 5 stages would track with ensuring a throw weight capable of such heavy payloads.
Of course, the calculus regarding targeting will completely change if China switches to a dual counterforce-countervalue targeting methodology, but that would require a serious change in Chinese thinking about nuclear warfare and bigger expansion of the arsenal. Perhaps that's their long-term goal, but at the moment the Chinese force is best geared for the historical countervalue mission they have always prepared for.
