China ICBM/SLBM, nuclear arms thread

[vincent]

If China was to abandon minimum deterrence, that would imply a transition to counterforce targeting. Nuclear weapons would not be a deterrent but an actual threat ("do as we say, because we can strike your silos, air bases, and sub bases before they can hit our cities"). It would require an enormous expense, requiring an increase in warheads everytime the US increases its arsenal, and would also be an admission that China feels threatened by nuclear weapons and can be coerced with nuclear attacks.

The minimum deterrent doctrine came into existence when China was not the main targets of the two most powerful countries of the world, and China was in no condition to build and maintain a large nuclear arsenal. Things are very very different now. China is now the number one target of the Hegemon because China’s mere existence is a threat to Pax America.

American think tanks and military personnel are openly talking about using nuclear weapons against China. In the latest CSIS wargame the American side decided to send over 1000 nukes to eliminate Chinese nuclear arsenal betting it can remove enough that China will not respond in kind.

The minimum deterrent at the point in time means China can still send 500+ megatons nukes to CONUS after a surprise first strike from the Hegemon that eliminated majority of China’s nuclear arsenal. Considering the chance of misfires, malfunctions, interceptions (with greater probability due to the THAAD radar in Korea), etc, more ICBMs and warheads are preferable.

I don't think the situation is there right now. China has the incentive to play the good guy. It is the US that refuses to adopt a no first use declaration, it is the US that withdrew from INF, it is the US that demands China join arms control negotiations when it has a total stockpile 5x the size of China's.

By claiming it still maintains a minimum deterrent, which it indeed does when compared to the US and Russian stockpiles, China can present itself as a protector of international stability, rather than a participant in dangerous arms races. Such an action would also help discredit the "China threat" narrative.

Who the hell cares what other people think when the survival of the entire Chinese civilization is at stake? Putin once asked what’s the point of having the world’s continuing existence when Russian people are gone? The same applies to China. The whole point of having 1000+ nuclear warheads with corresponding number of delivery vehicles is to prevent the Hegemon from using its nukes.

Awhile ago some South Korean asked online why China spent so much on her military when she claimed to be peace loving, someone responded: to make your American dad love peace too.

 

[nativechicken]

Needless to say, "minimal credible deterrence" from the 1980s no longer works today. Having the capability to lob 5 or 50 warheads at the enemy is completely different than having the capability to lob 500 warheads at the enemy. The enemy may be able to intercept all 5 or all 50 warheads, but can the enemy intercept all 500 warheads? That's called deterrence of proportionate response - And it's sorely needed in the present geopolitical climates in DC and Brussels, where more and more people are hallucinating that they are invincible against the "yellow peril of the 21st century".

Actually, this matter is quite simple.
In the 1970s-1980s, countries around the world were not far from the dangers of World War II. Politicians who experienced World War II were still present. Therefore, the minimum deterrence theory was not a problem. This theory mainly allowed opponents (essentially the United States and the Soviet Union) to weigh the costs of attacking China. In fact, the minimum deterrence theory is not just about maximizing the slaughter of the opponent's people to achieve retaliation and deter the opponent.
The premise of the minimum deterrence theory is that there are two mutually nuclear-balanced major powers. The effect of the minimum deterrence theory is not simply to kill the opponent, but to break the tacit understanding between two nuclear powers in mutual nuclear balance, allowing one nuclear power to be severely injured and helping another nuclear power to win.
There is an old Chinese saying: The mantis stalks the cicada, unaware of the oriole behind. Only those who can laugh until the last moment are truly victorious.
China's minimum nuclear deterrence theory actually tells any opponent that before my death, I have the ability to severely injure you, and then your real opponent will take advantage of your illness and take your life. This is the true purpose of China's nuclear strategy. We call it hijacking. It is another route outside of the alliance strategy. When small countries maneuver between major powers, the main strategy of the West (the former US-Soviet confrontation, now the US-Russia confrontation) is mainly that if you do not join me, you are my enemy. This alliance loses autonomy (look at the current US-European relationship). What China adopts is actually a strategy in Chinese culture that leverages others' strength but ensures its own (that is, not relying on any side, developing independently).
I must also mention that looking at issues from China's perspective, it can only be said that you do not have enough historical information (China is the country with a truly long-term cultural heritage). In our history, it has long been proven that the alliance strategy is actually useless, especially for major powers. The alliance strategy can actually accelerate the demise of powerful countries, with no benefits. This is the real reason why China never forms alliances. China has existed for thousands of years and has experienced multiple rounds of the rise and fall of major powers. Therefore, it is too clear that alliances are useless and only harmful to powerful countries, with no benefits.
Just look at the United States. In the ten years after the Cold War and the Gulf War, the United States was the most powerful country in the world. But what is it like now? The power of the United States is tottering. Why? It's because it maintains an alliance status to try to permanently solidify interests. But it's too naive. If you understand a little more history (China's), you will know that the alliance strategy is too consuming for imperial strength. If an empire wants to last longer and slow down the process of decline, it must reduce the unnecessary consumption of its own strength. And the result of an alliance is definitely the opposite.

The transformation of China's minimum nuclear deterrence strategy is actually something China has discovered long ago. After the Gulf War, nuclear deterrence gradually lost its power. In simpler terms, Western countries believe they are the end of history, the existence of high-tech weapons, and the form of proxy wars provide a conventional warfare means that can maximize the consumption of opponents and protect themselves. Ultimately, it reduces the power of nuclear deterrence. In fact, the problem Russia is facing now is this, the actual decline of nuclear deterrence. That's why NATO can continue to expand eastward. Finally, the Russia-Ukraine war broke out. Today's situation is that no matter how Russia says it will use nuclear strikes, it is impossible to suppress NATO's actual participation in the Russia-Ukraine war, directly confronting Russia on the front line. To put it bluntly, it is a bet that Russia does not dare to use nuclear weapons to attack NATO countries. Russia, which lacks nuclear deterrence capabilities, is actually just a medium-sized power, and Russia has a long border that cannot prevent opponents from infiltrating. That's why we have today's situation.

For China, the actual adjustment of the minimum nuclear deterrence strategy and increasing the stockpile of nuclear weapons is not because China's nuclear deterrence capabilities have been weakened (we know that many European and American countries have long forgotten that China is a nuclear country), but because the premise of the minimum nuclear deterrence strategy is the nuclear deterrence balance formed by leveraging the power between two nuclear powers. When Russia's nuclear deterrence is weakened, the premise of implementing the minimum nuclear deterrence no longer exists (Russia's nuclear deterrence's ability to stop the war is gone). Therefore, China's nuclear strategy must be adjusted.

For China, it is actually different from Western thinking. China is a civilization that has existed for 5,000 years, and its historical memory has not been interrupted. China has experienced multiple rounds of the rise and fall of dynasties. In China's eyes, the real war of national extinction (a war related to the survival of the country) is not a competition to slaughter opponents, but a competition for the country's recovery ability. For some countries, they seem very powerful, and after suffering a real blow, the country is completely destroyed. But for real strong countries, no one can really destroy them because they can be reborn from the ashes. (Recently, I accidentally heard a live broadcast by a retired officer, mentioning a little bit about China's layout after facing a nuclear strike.)

To put it simply, let's make a metaphor. How does a good fighter train? It's not just about learning how to attack with fists and feet, but first learning how to withstand attacks and injuries, and minimizing the damage to the minimum in the first place, so that you have the ability to punch your opponent again.

China's minimum nuclear deterrence strategy, especially the commitment not to use nuclear weapons first, is essentially telling the opponent that if you have the ability to kill me with the first punch, if you can't kill me with the first punch, you will regret it for the rest of your life and pay a price you can't imagine.

China's nuclear strategy construction is the strategic ability to kill the opponent under the premise of withstanding the opponent's first strike. Just a few decades ago, China's strength was not enough, and it could only use leverage to achieve nuclear deterrence balance. Today, China's strength is actually trying to tell all countries that after a global nuclear war, only China can recover the fastest and restore its war capabilities (only after listening to the content of that retired officer, you will understand how early China has started various layouts and plans).

What China pursues is that after the third world war, it is not a war between stones and sticks, but the opponent only has stones and sticks. To say one more sentence, China's preparation is to ensure that the surviving society after the war will not be chaotic, can still be mobilized, and will quickly restore its war capabilities (industrial capabilities). The opponent can't do it, and it will definitely fall into infinite chaos.

We are not interested in the so-called results of the Taiwan Strait military push by the United States, and we just find it infinitely interesting. Because the results of this kind of military push are basically to repel China in a limited war through a specific plan (the war only lasts for one round, that is, one attack), and it is considered that the war has been won and can be ended and negotiated. Chinese people laugh when they see this. Just look at the Russia-Ukraine war, how can this possibility appear. The United States has been established for 250 years, and there have been wars for only 16 years. China, on the other hand, has been continuously at war in its 5,000-year history. If China doesn't understand war and can't fight, it would have been destroyed and divided long ago.

 

[ACuriousPLAFan]

Okay, but the idea that a massive nuclear arsenal is a symbol of great powerhood is a Western concept, born in Washington, D.C. and Moscow.

China's unique nuclear policy is only unique because of no first use and minimum deterrence. If either are dropped, it would appear as though it intends to build a force needed for coercion or blackmail.

Apart from a technological status symbol, nuclear weapons hold value because the enemy (US) fears nuclear weapons. They try and have tried to coerce China not because they can read the CPC's minds and know that China fears nuclear strikes so much it will cower under American threats, but because the US themselves fear nuclear weapons in such a way and thus would never use them lest their worst fear be realized (5 megaton detonations over LA, NYC, etc.).

Therefore China has no need to engage in the sort of esoteric, pride-measuring games that the USSR/Russia and US do. So long as its arsenal can survive long enough to launch, and break through US BMD defenses, it will never have to use it. This is why China did not widely deploy tactical nuclear weapons despite designing a small bomb for the Q-5 in the 70s. Nuclear weapons have little to no value on the battlefield, only as political messages.

If China was to abandon minimum deterrence, that would imply a transition to counterforce targeting. Nuclear weapons would not be a deterrent but an actual threat ("do as we say, because we can strike your silos, air bases, and sub bases before they can hit our cities"). It would require an enormous expense, requiring an increase in warheads everytime the US increases its arsenal, and would also be an admission that China feels threatened by nuclear weapons and can be coerced with nuclear attacks.

There's a certain point where China can indeed go "who cares what anyone thinks": for example, if the US somehow got the entire world to rally around Taiwan independence, that's a red line and China can take the gloves off.

I don't think the situation is there right now. China has the incentive to play the good guy. It is the US that refuses to adopt a no first use declaration, it is the US that withdrew from INF, it is the US that demands China join arms control negotiations when it has a total stockpile 5x the size of China's.

By claiming it still maintains a minimum deterrent, which it indeed does when compared to the US and Russian stockpiles, China can present itself as a protector of international stability, rather than a participant in dangerous arms races. Such an action would also help discredit the "China threat" narrative.

I agree that 50 warheads is not enough, but 500 warheads is still a minimum deterrent by the standards of Russia and the US. The US has 400 warheads deployed across its ICBMs and 1,000 or so deployed across its submarines, not to mention everything in storage and the 300 some warheads for bombers (which would be useless against China or Russia's IADS, but might as well mention them). If the US were to upload more warheads after New START expires, that would bring the ICBM warheads to 1,200~ and the sub warheads to 2,000~ or so. Russia likely has similar numbers, which will only expand as Sarmat begins to enter widespread service during the 2030s.

China indeed does not argue for such moves, but when one argues that "China deserves a stockpile commensurate with its status on the global stage, meaning close parity with the US" that implies China is going to expand its arsenal dramatically if the US does, in order to maintain close parity. China only needs an arsenal large enough to lay waste to hundreds of American countervalue targets and survive American BMD. It does not need to engage in a counterforce mission or partake in "bean counting" exercises, as the USSR/Russia and US loved to do (and sometimes still dream of doing again).

US BMD is obviously never going to expand to the point where they could intercept 500 ICBMs and 120~ SLBMs. Because of this, even if the US was to expand its operational arsenal after the complete demise of New START in 2026, China should not follow the US and Russia in expanding its arsenal to such great heights, IMO.

What you are trying to explain/imply above is very much revolving around the "Oh, China should be a role model as a responsible Global South superpower, therefore she shouldn't appear mighty and brutish like the US and Russia, so that everyone can definitely feel good about China and turns to like China" mindset.

Unfortunately, real-life geopolitics doesn't work that way.

Those 300+ new missile silos in northern China + The recently-upgraded nuclear weapons enrichment and production facilities At Lanzhou, Emeishan and Hanzhong + The just-completed expansion of Huludao certainly aren't for Chinese New Year decorations.

Also, there's much more at play than just simple "muh more warheads = muh focus on counterforce" and "muh more warheads = muh blackmail and coercion" mumblings.

 

[ACuriousPLAFan]

Actually, this matter is quite simple.
In the 1970s-1980s, countries around the world were not far from the dangers of World War II. Politicians who experienced World War II were still present. Therefore, the minimum deterrence theory was not a problem. This theory mainly allowed opponents (essentially the United States and the Soviet Union) to weigh the costs of attacking China. In fact, the minimum deterrence theory is not just about maximizing the slaughter of the opponent's people to achieve retaliation and deter the opponent.
[...]

(Quoted post shortened to fit within the 10000-word limit.)

Why are you equating my "China should abandon the minimum credible deterrence policy from the 1980s and pursue nuclear arsenal parity with the US in terms of active/deployed nuclear arsenal" with "China will become like Russia, who only knows how to wave the "I'll nuke you if you dare poke me!" stick countless times whenever something develops in the war"?

China is not Russia. China has a more capable and formidable conventional forces at her disposal than Russia, and is growing increasingly confident and steadfast of her capbilities to achieve her objectives in a Pacific War 2.0 against the US&LC (whether that be due to Operation AR or otherwise) with ever lower degree of reliance on her nuclear cards.

It's the US (at least in the DC circle and (thankfully) not yet fully crossing the Potomac) who's more often than not trying to signal-wave their nuclear stick in order to dissuade China from attempting Operation AR. That is partially what China's response is aimed at.

Also:

We are not interested in the so-called results of the Taiwan Strait military push by the United States, and we just find it infinitely interesting. Because the results of this kind of military push are basically to repel China in a limited war through a specific plan (the war only lasts for one round, that is, one attack), and it is considered that the war has been won and can be ended and negotiated. Chinese people laugh when they see this. Just look at the Russia-Ukraine war, how can this possibility appear. The United States has been established for 250 years, and there have been wars for only 16 years. China, on the other hand, has been continuously at war in its 5,000-year history. If China doesn't understand war and can't fight, it would have been destroyed and divided long ago.

Maybe you need to work on your Chinese <-> English translation efforts.

 

[Blitzo]

Okay, but the idea that a massive nuclear arsenal is a symbol of great powerhood is a Western concept, born in Washington, D.C. and Moscow.



China's unique nuclear policy is only unique because of no first use and minimum deterrence. If either are dropped, it would appear as though it intends to build a force needed for coercion or blackmail.

Apart from a technological status symbol, nuclear weapons hold value because the enemy (US) fears nuclear weapons. They try and have tried to coerce China not because they can read the CPC's minds and know that China fears nuclear strikes so much it will cower under American threats, but because the US themselves fear nuclear weapons in such a way and thus would never use them lest their worst fear be realized (5 megaton detonations over LA, NYC, etc.).

The question is how one defines "blackmail".

I think many who observe PRC nuclear procurement view the expansion of their nuclear arsenal as being one where they seek to be immune to nuclear blackmail, specifically vis a vis the US.

Putting it another way, the PRC is seeking both sides to be vulnerable to each other in an equal manner, from the nuclear perspective, as the PRC likely is not convinced that the US is sufficiently deterred from the PRC holding the capability to carry out a nuclear strike against the top 10-20 largest US targets from a counter-value perspective, but requires the PRC to hold the same kind of capability to effectively end US civilization in the same way that the US has held the capability to effectively end PRC civilization for many decades.

Therefore China has no need to engage in the sort of esoteric, pride-measuring games that the USSR/Russia and US do. So long as its arsenal can survive long enough to launch, and break through US BMD defenses, it will never have to use it. This is why China did not widely deploy tactical nuclear weapons despite designing a small bomb for the Q-5 in the 70s. Nuclear weapons have little to no value on the battlefield, only as political messages.

If China was to abandon minimum deterrence, that would imply a transition to counterforce targeting. Nuclear weapons would not be a deterrent but an actual threat ("do as we say, because we can strike your silos, air bases, and sub bases before they can hit our cities"). It would require an enormous expense, requiring an increase in warheads everytime the US increases its arsenal, and would also be an admission that China feels threatened by nuclear weapons and can be coerced with nuclear attacks.

Abandoning minimum deterrence does not equate to transitioning to a counterforce strategy at all.

I view minimum deterrence as countervalue where you seek to deter the enemy by holding at threat a small collection of their high value targets that if destroyed, would cause significant damage to an adversary's functioning as a nation.

The term I used in a previous post -- "comprehensive counter value" -- is a step or two above that, where you seek to hold to threat all of their valued targets in a manner which if destroyed, would end their existence as a civilization/nation. This is what I believe the PRC is aiming for vis-a-vis the US.

Counterforce is in turn a step above comprehensive counter value, which aims to target the actual military capabilities involved in waging war (including nuclear war), with the idea that one can "win" a nuclear war by preventing the other side from getting off their nukes. I do not view PRC nuclear capabilities as being intended for counterforce in nature, at least not yet. If we did, I would expect a much larger nuclear arsenal (like, 10,000+ warheads rather than 1,000+ warheads) being pursued.


Ultimately there is a difference between having the capability to nuke the top 10-20 largest cities of an adversary once each, versus being able to nuke the top 500 cities of an adversary potentially multiple times each. The former is more like minimum deterrence counter value, the latter is more like comprehensive counter value.
As to whether an adversary would be equally deterred between the former and latter.... in the past perhaps a nation might be, but in the last decade or so I believe that thinking has shifted.

 

[nativechicken]

Why are you equating my "China should abandon the minimum credible deterrence policy from the 1980s and pursue nuclear arsenal parity with the US in terms of active/deployed nuclear arsenal" with "China will become like Russia, who only knows how to wave the "I'll nuke you if you dare poke me!" stick countless times whenever something develops in the war"?

Apologies, actually, I was just quoting your words initially; most of the response is unrelated to your statement.

Maybe you need to work on your Chinese <-> English translation efforts.

Indeed, it is an issue. I am currently using AI to translate conversations, but there is a significant difference between Chinese expressions and English expressions. I am also not sure which translation would be more appropriate.

 

[Biscuits]

Why would you want 10 000 nukes for a counterforce posture?

China can end civilization on North America with just the 500-1000 high yield missiles they have on launch readiness. Doing it 10x over only causes more nuclear pollution and is not conductive to winning a nuclear war.

Conversely if just a few hundred of the US' 1000-3000 nukes that are on launch readiness can hit China, it doesn't matter if 10 000 hit America in return, they will still have ensured MAD.

Most of US' nukes are in no position to be launched and only exist as a political theater, they're the likes of air dropped, slow going LACM and even artillery shells. In high end missiles that can launch on warning, US barely has more than China. The same is true for Russia.

The nuclear posture China follows is mainly in expanding defenses and upgrading the strike speed/technology of nukes, which is wholly in line with their stated intent that the nuclear policy exists to continue China's civilization existence.

Although China would need a black swan moment to reach the level where it can neutralise all US' arsenal, it has already reached the level where arguably no smaller nuclear power can credibly threaten it.

And something that is often overlooked is that it is not required to shoot down 1000s of missiles in order to prevent US from ever responding with an apocalyptic strike, all that is needed is building enough defenses to force US to use all their 1000-3000 nukes on China. Because US in their expansionism and paranoia has pissed off so many countries, their nuclear plans need to nuke every major country in the world, including Russia, Brazil, South Africa, Mexico etc. This is why Mao was not scared of nuclear war, he knew that the US back then didn't have enough nukes to achieve their minimum deterrent level relative to the enemies they need to nuke.

If US judges that it requires every single one of its nukes to achieve MAD with China, it effectively means they will never do it, at most they would trade similar value targets if China started nuking them first. That's the minimum level of ensuring state survival China is building up for, and it's not unrealistic to achieve.

 

[nativechicken]

Counterforce is in turn a step above comprehensive counter value, which aims to target the actual military capabilities involved in waging war (including nuclear war), with the idea that one can "win" a nuclear war by preventing the other side from getting off their nukes. I do not view PRC nuclear capabilities as being intended for counterforce in nature, at least not yet. If we did, I would expect a much larger nuclear arsenal (like, 10,000+ warheads rather than 1,000+ warheads) being pursued.

In the eyes of the Chinese, the delivery vehicle is far more important than the warhead itself. Having 10,000 warheads with only 100 delivery vehicles does not constitute a deterrent.

Therefore, China has now increased to over 350 fixed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers.

The fixed ICBM launchers deployed by China are mostly at the level of the DF41/DF5.

The DF41 is a ballistic missile at the level of the Trident D5, and the DF5X is even larger. Both are generally capable of carrying more than 10 warheads.

Having 350 ICBM silos means having the capability to launch 1,000-3,500 warheads. China currently has an annual production capacity of 120 Peace Guardian-level solid rockets (80-ton class solid launch vehicles). You can compare this to the equivalent production capabilities of the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

This does not even include the nuclear ballistic missile submarine capabilities based at sea, as well as the road-mobile DF31/DF41/DF2X ICBM projection capabilities.

US reports believe that China only plans to equip itself with 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030.

I would like to ask, has the US estimated the number of China's 052D/055/076 and other equipment? Did they anticipate China's shipbuilding capacity to be over 200 times that of the United States?

Did the US anticipate the variety and production volume of Chinese drones? Why does it miss all the other guesses, yet it can guess the core of China's nuclear security secrets?

They used to say China only had 300 nuclear warheads; has the Chinese government ever acknowledged this? When has China ever stated that its minimum nuclear deterrence strategy only requires maintaining 250-300 nuclear warheads?

 

[Blitzo]

In the eyes of the Chinese, the delivery vehicle is far more important than the warhead itself. Having 10,000 warheads with only 100 delivery vehicles does not constitute a deterrent.

Obviously the distribution of the warheads on delivery vehicles matter -- the reason I didn't talk about the delivery vehicles because that is a level of additional detail which is beyond the scope of the point I was trying to make.

It goes without saying that a sensible distribution of warheads to delivery vehicles would be done, but there's no need to think too deeply about it for the purpose of the conversation that was occurring.

 

[TK3600]

Guam and Hawaii are poor targets because they are not part of the continguous US. Guam also has a small civilian population compared to the areas surrounding Chinese naval and air bases that would likely be US tactical nuke targets.

Hawaii is actually a good target retaliate against tactical nuclear on military target. It is over 1million population in a small concentration. It is an important military base. It is also not on the continent, meaning it has a chance of deescalation if as retaliation.

Hawaii is the highest you can go for retaliation if you do not want full exchange. You would be destroying a major city (1.4mil)as well as the most important base in Pacifics. It would cripple the conventional naval operation. If you respond tactical nuke on military target like Hainan base with Hawaii strike, it would even the odds.

If US does not deescalate after Hawaii, I am afraid there is no more room for proportionality. What is more important than Hawaii? Really not many. Shanghai? Taipei? New York? Once you strike that sort of target there is no coming back. So there really is no room for US to escalate with room to return either. If that does not stop eacalation, then all out strike for both side it is.