The minimum deterrent doctrine came into existence when China was not the main targets of the two most powerful countries of the world, and China was in no condition to build and maintain a large nuclear arsenal. Things are very very different now. China is now the number one target of the Hegemon because China’s mere existence is a threat to Pax America.
American think tanks and military personnel are openly talking about using nuclear weapons against China. In the latest CSIS wargame the American side decided to send over 1000 nukes to eliminate Chinese nuclear arsenal betting it can remove enough that China will not respond in kind.
The minimum deterrent at the point in time means China can still send 500+ megatons nukes to CONUS after a surprise first strike from the Hegemon that eliminated majority of China’s nuclear arsenal. Considering the chance of misfires, malfunctions, interceptions (with greater probability due to the THAAD radar in Korea), etc, more ICBMs and warheads are preferable.
I am of the opinion that China can build a survivable force without building an arsenal on the same scale as that of the US or Russia.
THAAD can't intercept ICBMs, only GBI can do it but it has a 25% success rate and is so problem-prone it probably couldn't even defeat a small North Korean attack. Interceptors can also be targeted by alternative methods, for example if the Type 096VI is quiet enough to safely sail outside the SCS or Bohai, it could approach close to Alaska and launch missiles to take out the GBI site prior to the first wave of ICBMs entering the GBI's DLZ.
At the moment, although there is much silly talk about the "Iron Dome" over all of CONUS, there is no threat to a strike of the size that can be expected by 2030 (500~ ICBMs, maybe 100-150~ SLBMs depending on how many 09VIs are built).
Who the hell cares what other people think when the survival of the entire Chinese civilization is at stake? Putin once asked what’s the point of having the world’s continuing existence when Russian people are gone? The same applies to China. The whole point of having 1000+ nuclear warheads with corresponding number of delivery vehicles is to prevent the Hegemon from using its nukes.
Awhile ago some South Korean asked online why China spent so much on her military when she claimed to be peace loving, someone responded: to make your American dad love peace too.
Perhaps I'm bringing up points that aren't worth discussion in a forum mainly about military technology. I think there are other ways of deterring US interference in Taiwan beyond nukes or in conjunction with nukes; economic and diplomatic means, etc.
Abandoning minimum deterrence does not equate to transitioning to a counterforce strategy at all.
I view minimum deterrence as countervalue where you seek to deter the enemy by holding at threat a small collection of their high value targets that if destroyed, would cause significant damage to an adversary's functioning as a nation.
The term I used in a previous post -- "comprehensive counter value" -- is a step or two above that, where you seek to hold to threat all of their valued targets in a manner which if destroyed, would end their existence as a civilization/nation. This is what I believe the PRC is aiming for vis-a-vis the US.
Counterforce is in turn a step above comprehensive counter value, which aims to target the actual military capabilities involved in waging war (including nuclear war), with the idea that one can "win" a nuclear war by preventing the other side from getting off their nukes. I do not view PRC nuclear capabilities as being intended for counterforce in nature, at least not yet. If we did, I would expect a much larger nuclear arsenal (like, 10,000+ warheads rather than 1,000+ warheads) being pursued.
Ultimately there is a difference between having the capability to nuke the top 10-20 largest cities of an adversary once each, versus being able to nuke the top 500 cities of an adversary potentially multiple times each. The former is more like minimum deterrence counter value, the latter is more like comprehensive counter value.
As to whether an adversary would be equally deterred between the former and latter.... in the past perhaps a nation might be, but in the last decade or so I believe that thinking has shifted.
I don't think minimum deterrence has a formal definition like that. It simply means the "minimum" amount of weapons necessary to deter an adversary. China has deliberately never defined what "minimum" constitutes for this reason, so that amount can change.
The way you describe comprehensive countervalue, it still can be defined as minimum deterrence. If and when China formally acknowledges the silo fields, I would expect them to claim that due to the international situation, the characteristics that define a minimum deterrent have changed. They would certainly also mention the much larger US arsenal, too.
Considering France and Britain have pretty token nuclear arsenals within the wider context of NATO-USSR/Russia confrontation, and essentially all of the terminology surrounding nuclear weapons and warfare was created prior to 1991, I tend to treat "normal" deterrence as a full size arsenal with both tactical, counterforce, and countervalue targeting capability: the capability both the US and Russia have. But alas, I think part of this discussion stems from differing ideas about what constitutes "minimum" and what doesn't.
From a different point of view, I would argue China still possesses some degree of a minimum deterrent even with "comprehensive countervalue," because it can't comprehensively target the US' nuclear forces. This provides incentive for the US to continually conduct tactical nuclear strikes, because China can't comprehensively target US strategic nukes. Thus if China actually decided to use its ICBMs against US cities, it could not launch that strike without ensuring its own destruction by US strategic nuclear forces.
To put this into perspective using an example from the 1970s, the USSR possessed a full deterrent. Even if it decided to use a nuke against CONUS in response to, say, a symbolic US nuclear strike on Soviet soil, it could do that while still deterring the US. The US would have to stop and think, "If we hit them back with a proportionate response, will the Soviets just launch a massive counterforce strike and destroy our ability to inflict catastrophic ("civilization ending") damage on the USSR?"
If China uses a nuke against Guam or Hawaii, the US can retaliate with confidence that China won't escalate all the way, because the US' strategic arsenal is entirely secure. From their POV, China is deterred and nukes are a viable option to bring about a ceasefire on terms favorable to the US, unless the CPC more or less decides to commit suicide (from their POV, I'm not taking into account Chinese civil defense measures, which the US is probably fairly unaware of or thinks of as not credible in ensuring "civilizational survival").
Within the context of not just one's own targeting capabilities, but the adversary's as well, a lack of counterforce capability still constitutes a minimum deterrent, IMO. It's minimal because it relies on the US having existential concern for itself, but doesn't take into account that US existential concerns
might be alleviated so long as the adversary will suffer equal damage, just as US concerns about coming under a massive Soviet nuclear attack during a conflict fought in defense of West Germany were alleviated by the assurance that the Soviets would suffer equal damage.
