China ICBM/SLBM, nuclear arms thread

[SunlitZelkova]

If you can prove to the world that you have the ability to destroy one-fifth of humanity, what else in the world cannot be obtained by the United States?
The Strait War simulation of CSIS has already shown radical behavior of attempting a full-scale nuclear attack, so it is difficult to guarantee that Washington D.C. will not have a madman who thinks they have the advantage.

Nothing is guaranteed in war. Even with strong BMD, a large survivable nuclear arsenal, and general public support against nuclear weapons use by either side, the US may use nuclear weapons. One can only do what they can to the best of their ability, and hope for the best.

If the US truly is a "madman" that will launch a full scale nuclear strike, whether China has 500 intercontinental warheads or 3,000 intercontinental warheads is not going to change that. Thus, in my opinion, efforts to dissuade the US from using nuclear weapons or intervening at all in the first place should be conducted on the assumption that the US has some sanity and has the ability to come to its senses.

Do you think that for every intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) China has, the United States can increase its ICBM count to counter? After seeing this, I just want to laugh out loud (OLO).

At the moment, the US cannot expand the number of silos, but can upload MIRVs onto existing Minuteman III ICBMs. The current number of silos is 450, each missile has a single warhead. With uploading of MIRVs, the ICBM force would be able to hit 1,350 targets.

The Ohio class SSBN currently carries 20 SLBMs, 18 of which have ~4x MIRV with a strategic warhead and 2 of which have a single tactical nuclear warhead and are not intended for strategic use. However, with uploading, the number of strategic warheads would climb to 2,304. Assuming only SSBNs deployed in the Pacific are used in a strike against China, that would leave 1,152 warheads.

The US would have a total of 2,502 warheads for use against China. Even if China's entire force of 1,500 warheads it is projected to have were all deployed on ICBMs (unlikely, many will be retained for the DF-26 and DF-27), the US would still have 1,000 left over for use against countervalue targets in China.

The United States no longer has the capability to expand the deployment of ICBMs. To be honest, it's difficult for them to even maintain their existing nuclear deterrence capabilities.

The U.S. nuclear arsenal is already too old; most of it has passed its expiration date and needs to be reproduced. The current production capacity of the United States, especially for large solid propellant rockets, is far from what it was in the 1970s to 1990s. They are facing multiple issues, including supply chain and technology gaps as well as a lack of technical personnel.

The current technical status of U.S. nuclear weapons makes it practically impossible to carry out scaled, consecutive launches, whether land-based or submarine-launched ballistic missiles (Minuteman III and Trident D5).

So, in fact, the United States has already lost the ability to conduct a scaled nuclear surprise attack on China.

The U.S. has been wanting to invest in the next generation of nuclear weapon carriers (ICBMs) for a long time (it's not just a consideration of today; it's been an issue for many years). Until now, the problem continues to worsen with no signs of improvement.

I don't think this is a credible claim. The warheads are not expired, and while development of next-generation nuclear systems is encountering difficulties, existing systems are well maintained. There is no evidence that existing systems are unreliable to the extent you claim; I have never heard such an argument before.

can they though? what is their build rate of solid fuel rockets? based on available evidence:

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So ~3.2 complete rockets per year since they're not building these and storing these for launches. Let's say their military program can work 10x faster than their civilian program (but you and I both know it is a joke to expect that). Then their max production would be something like 32 solid fuel rockets per year.

I guess the question is what time scales we are talking about. If we are talking about AR happening say, sometime between now and 2040 (my personal estimate, assuming the CPC does not allow the Taiwan question to remain unresolved by 2049, when the rejuvenation of China is to be complete, while alotting nine years for reconstruction and integration of Taiwan back into China), it doesn't really matter because Minuteman III is not expected to be retired by ~2039 anyways. Whether the Sentinel program is delayed or not doesn't matter, because the Minuteman III was extensively modernized during the early 2010s and is intended to remain operable at least until the planned date for completion of Sentinel deployment ("over the course of a decade" starting in 2029, i.e. until 2039).

Whether the US could build more ICBM silos and ICBMs, as well as SSBNs and SLBMs, only plays into much larger time scales; AR (and thus US-China conflict) not occurring until the 2050s or 2060s.

Which brings me to this: I haven't been clear about what time scale I have been referring to either. When I say "the US could build more missiles" I am referring to both uploading warheads to existing missiles and building greater numbers of launchers. I bring up this possibility to relation to the argument raised that China should try to reach parity or near-parity with the US. When I think of "reaching parity with the US" I'm thinking about something that would take decades to achieve. Not only would the DF-31s in the silos need to be replaced with MIRVed missiles, but the JL-3 would need to be replaced with an SLBM with much greater MIRV capacity. And of course, more Type 09VIs would need to be built; to have a similar number of missile tubes as the US Pacific SSBN fleet, at least 14 would need to be built (assuming the Type 09VI has 12 missile tubes).

On another note, I would like to mention that whether China has parity or not still doesn't affect whether or not the US will use nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union achieved parity with the US in the 1970s, and yet that did not result in the US backing down from its intention to confront the USSR and defend what it regarded as its core interests.

I think reaching parity is detrimental to China's calculus. China is not like the USSR or US, which both had no intention of starting a conflict over their core disagreement (status of Germany). China will indeed start conflict in Taiwan if Taipei has no intention of reunifying peacefully; whether one suscribes to the view that China desires reunification for calculated geopolitical reasons or the ideological belief that the wrongs of the Century of Humiliation must be righted makes no difference. The adoption of the goal of rejuvenating China is just to big, I don't see how the CPC could let 2049 come and go with Taiwan still ruled by the DPP or a DPP-like party. It would essentially forfeit its credibility to lead the country if it did so.

Therefore, China should look to other means to deter the US from intervening and/or using nukes rather than solely relying on the belief that if it builds enough nuclear weapons, the US will back down. If the US truly is a "madman" and values Taiwan in the same way it valued West Berlin or West Germany, no amount of nukes will stop it from intervening and then escalating the conflict all the way to a full scale nuclear exchange. So why build an excess of nukes just for the sake of "parity," when alternative methods to deterring the US could be studied/explored instead? Especially when the US has been deterred from fighting China with nukes in the past, even when China had no nukes at all?

 

[Biscuits]

Nothing is guaranteed in war. Even with strong BMD, a large survivable nuclear arsenal, and general public support against nuclear weapons use by either side, the US may use nuclear weapons. One can only do what they can to the best of their ability, and hope for the best.

If the US truly is a "madman" that will launch a full scale nuclear strike, whether China has 500 intercontinental warheads or 3,000 intercontinental warheads is not going to change that. Thus, in my opinion, efforts to dissuade the US from using nuclear weapons or intervening at all in the first place should be conducted on the assumption that the US has some sanity and has the ability to come to its senses.



At the moment, the US cannot expand the number of silos, but can upload MIRVs onto existing Minuteman III ICBMs. The current number of silos is 450, each missile has a single warhead. With uploading of MIRVs, the ICBM force would be able to hit 1,350 targets.

The Ohio class SSBN currently carries 20 SLBMs, 18 of which have ~4x MIRV with a strategic warhead and 2 of which have a single tactical nuclear warhead and are not intended for strategic use. However, with uploading, the number of strategic warheads would climb to 2,304. Assuming only SSBNs deployed in the Pacific are used in a strike against China, that would leave 1,152 warheads.

The US would have a total of 2,502 warheads for use against China. Even if China's entire force of 1,500 warheads it is projected to have were all deployed on ICBMs (unlikely, many will be retained for the DF-26 and DF-27), the US would still have 1,000 left over for use against countervalue targets in China.



I don't think this is a credible claim. The warheads are not expired, and while development of next-generation nuclear systems is encountering difficulties, existing systems are well maintained. There is no evidence that existing systems are unreliable to the extent you claim; I have never heard such an argument before.



I guess the question is what time scales we are talking about. If we are talking about AR happening say, sometime between now and 2040 (my personal estimate, assuming the CPC does not allow the Taiwan question to remain unresolved by 2049, when the rejuvenation of China is to be complete, while alotting nine years for reconstruction and integration of Taiwan back into China), it doesn't really matter because Minuteman III is not expected to be retired by ~2039 anyways. Whether the Sentinel program is delayed or not doesn't matter, because the Minuteman III was extensively modernized during the early 2010s and is intended to remain operable at least until the planned date for completion of Sentinel deployment ("over the course of a decade" starting in 2029, i.e. until 2039).

Whether the US could build more ICBM silos and ICBMs, as well as SSBNs and SLBMs, only plays into much larger time scales; AR (and thus US-China conflict) not occurring until the 2050s or 2060s.

Which brings me to this: I haven't been clear about what time scale I have been referring to either. When I say "the US could build more missiles" I am referring to both uploading warheads to existing missiles and building greater numbers of launchers. I bring up this possibility to relation to the argument raised that China should try to reach parity or near-parity with the US. When I think of "reaching parity with the US" I'm thinking about something that would take decades to achieve. Not only would the DF-31s in the silos need to be replaced with MIRVed missiles, but the JL-3 would need to be replaced with an SLBM with much greater MIRV capacity. And of course, more Type 09VIs would need to be built; to have a similar number of missile tubes as the US Pacific SSBN fleet, at least 14 would need to be built (assuming the Type 09VI has 12 missile tubes).

On another note, I would like to mention that whether China has parity or not still doesn't affect whether or not the US will use nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union achieved parity with the US in the 1970s, and yet that did not result in the US backing down from its intention to confront the USSR and defend what it regarded as its core interests.

I think reaching parity is detrimental to China's calculus. China is not like the USSR or US, which both had no intention of starting a conflict over their core disagreement (status of Germany). China will indeed start conflict in Taiwan if Taipei has no intention of reunifying peacefully; whether one suscribes to the view that China desires reunification for calculated geopolitical reasons or the ideological belief that the wrongs of the Century of Humiliation must be righted makes no difference. The adoption of the goal of rejuvenating China is just to big, I don't see how the CPC could let 2049 come and go with Taiwan still ruled by the DPP or a DPP-like party. It would essentially forfeit its credibility to lead the country if it did so.

Therefore, China should look to other means to deter the US from intervening and/or using nukes rather than solely relying on the belief that if it builds enough nuclear weapons, the US will back down. If the US truly is a "madman" and values Taiwan in the same way it valued West Berlin or West Germany, no amount of nukes will stop it from intervening and then escalating the conflict all the way to a full scale nuclear exchange. So why build an excess of nukes just for the sake of "parity," when alternative methods to deterring the US could be studied/explored instead? Especially when the US has been deterred from fighting China with nukes in the past, even when China had no nukes at all?

China's behavior is assuming that US doesn't really have the capability to pull off MAD right now, much less some hypothetical surprise strike (which is a complete fantasy due to how warning systems work). Yes, on paper they have more than enough warheads to commit mutual suicide, but as I explained earlier, US would not just nuke China only, but every major nation. Even the ~2000 warheads US claims they have active will not truly suffice for it.

Of course if China pressures US even worse than whatever imagined fate US believes will happen after they're destroyed and Mexico/Russia whoever moves in to annex the wasteland, they will commit MAD. Such as if a war started and China declared an intent to annex vast swathes of mainland US or genocide Americans. But that isn't something China is interested in.

If US wants to use nukes to invade Taiwan, that would just put them in the same dilemma as described above. There is only a very very low chance. Russia didn't use nukes against Ukraine, and Ukraine isn't even a nuclear state, let alone a nuclear superpower. There is no point in using nukes to support an US assault on Taiwan, because China will just nuke back with larger nukes and shorter reaction time on HGV/Fobs.

And then US is better off using all their arsenal at once, rather than let China have an excuse to destroy their arsenal after they launch a small number of nukes at Taiwan.

 

[nativechicken]

If the US truly is a "madman" that will launch a full scale nuclear strike, whether China has 500 intercontinental warheads or 3,000 intercontinental warheads is not going to change that. Thus, in my opinion, efforts to dissuade the US from using nuclear weapons or intervening at all in the first place should be conducted on the assumption that the US has some sanity and has the ability to come to its senses.

Chinese people do not hold out hope that the U.S. government can act rationally.

At the moment, the US cannot expand the number of silos, but can upload MIRVs onto existing Minuteman III ICBMs. The current number of silos is 450, each missile has a single warhead. With uploading of MIRVs, the ICBM force would be able to hit 1,350 targets.

The United States currently has about 400 Minuteman III ICBMs. This missile is relatively small, weighing around 33-35 tons. It is smaller than the DF31/31A (the DF31 is a 40-ton class ICBM) and is technologically older. At full load, it has the range of a standard U.S. ICBM. At maximum range, the payload capacity is reduced by at least half, and at this point, MIRV (Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles) cannot be deployed. It is essentially a single warhead with a larger yield.

As for the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, I don't want to say much. Nuclear submarines cannot continuously launch submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). This is because launching a ballistic missile requires precise calibration of the course beforehand and accurate self-positioning; otherwise, the theoretical CEP (Circular Error Probable) will become very large, reducing the effectiveness of destroying nuclear targets. After a submarine launches a missile, it needs some time to reposition itself (including the submarine's own stabilization again, which will determine whether the missile can emerge from the water and its attitude at the moment of emergence). This is different from the launch of land-based ICBMs. A submarine launching 18-24 ballistic missiles in succession takes a long time. It's not like firing rockets or anti-aircraft missiles, which can be launched in succession within seconds.

So, in reality, the possibility of destroying all of China's nuclear counterstrike capabilities with the first wave of attack does not exist.

War is not determined by simply counting the number of warheads on both sides. If victory or defeat were based solely on the quantity and quality of weapons, the United States would not have lost to the Houthi rebels, in Afghanistan, Vietnam, or North Korea.

In fact, the real nuclear deterrence lies in whether the person who first attempts to use nuclear weapons can confirm whether they can withstand the opponent's retaliation. If the opponent's retaliatory capability exceeds their own threshold of endurance, and they destroy themselves along with their opponent, such a choice makes the so-called victory meaningless.

What China prevents is the opponent's misjudgment of China's counterstrike capabilities. In reality, China's issue is singular; the information China presents is clear and accurate to normal strategists. Traditional politicians and strategists who have experienced World War II would not make the wrong choices. However, unfortunately, such politicians and strategists have ceased to exist in Western politics with the change of times.

The US would have a total of 2,502 warheads for use against China. Even if China's entire force of 1,500 warheads it is projected to have were all deployed on ICBMs (unlikely, many will be retained for the DF-26 and DF-27), the US would still have 1,000 left over for use against countervalue targets in China.

Let me remind you again, the so-called notion that China will equip itself with 1500 nuclear warheads by 2030 is merely a unilateral guess by the United States. China's currently disclosed civilian nuclear processing capability is sufficient to produce 1000 nuclear warheads within just three months.

Furthermore, China's warfare theory has never been about killing people; there is not much difference for China in killing an opponent once or ten times. The war damage China inflicts, as long as it exceeds the critical point of American social cohesion, will suffice, and the rest can be left to human nature (liberalism).

I don't think this is a credible claim. The warheads are not expired, and while development of next-generation nuclear systems is encountering difficulties, existing systems are well maintained. There is no evidence that existing systems are unreliable to the extent you claim; I have never heard such an argument before.

You probably don't have a concept of how technology works. In fact, over the past decade, both the Minuteman III and Trident D5 have had a significant probability of failure in their test launches. You just haven't been paying attention.

If the system were well-maintained, there wouldn't be the need for the recent modernization upgrades to the Minuteman III launch system that only started in the last two years. Did you know that a few years ago, Minuteman III was still using 8-inch floppy disks? The extended service of such antiquated hardware represents a technical system maintenance and upgrade that has been halted for 30 years. Thirty years ago, the 3.5-inch floppy disk was almost obsolete. You probably aren't aware of the various scandals involving the U.S. strategic missile forces, such as marijuana cultivation, drug use, rape, and homosexuality. In Chinese military enthusiast circles, these are taken as jokes. Chinese people are also puzzled; how can a military with such lax discipline and a force that treats equipment maintenance and updates so casually, believe they can prevail in an Armageddon war? Relying on absolute and blind confidence?

Let me tell you, both the Minuteman III and Trident D5 have lost the value of technical upgrades (meaning that adding MIRV and other technical modifications are pointless). Such technological improvements are tantamount to redeveloping from scratch. The problem is that making significant technological upgrades within a decaying, soon-to-be-obsolete technical framework is a complete waste of money. Because even if you upgrade, they will soon be retired. Why not directly develop the next generation of products? For the United States, investing in the upgrade of Minuteman III and Trident D5 alongside the next generation of ICBM/SLBM would mean paying double the cost for the same or even worse results (because your limited resources are spread across multiple uses, and in the end, you spend money and time and still can't do anything well). If the U.S. does this, I would only be more delighted.

Therefore, China should look to other means to deter the US from intervening and/or using nukes rather than solely relying on the belief that if it builds enough nuclear weapons, the US will back down. If the US truly is a "madman" and values Taiwan in the same way it valued West Berlin or West Germany, no amount of nukes will stop it from intervening and then escalating the conflict all the way to a full scale nuclear exchange. So why build an excess of nukes just for the sake of "parity," when alternative methods to deterring the US could be studied/explored instead? Especially when the US has been deterred from fighting China with nukes in the past, even when China had no nukes at all?

China's increase in nuclear deterrence capabilities, establishing a nuclear arsenal on par with the United States, and developing more strategic conflict resolution capabilities are not mutually exclusive. This includes means in economic, conventional military strength, diplomatic, and geopolitical fields, among others.

 

[bustead]

Just adding to my 2 cents to the discussions here. I think the Chinese nuclear forces are far more difficult to destroy than one may think. Remember that according to RAND, it takes 2 warheads to achieve a Pk of 0.9 against a silo.

The US will have to launch 700 warheads to target all Chinese silos in a first strike. Even then, there will be a few dozen silos surviving the attack. And that is assuming no faulty intelligence and no launch on warning policies.
Chinese mobile ICBMs are even more likely to survive, as they can move underground or hide under camouflage netting. IIRC, the American SIOP against Russia does not call for targeting road mobile ICBM launchers individually, but instead focus fire on their bases. Applying the same logic to a hypothetical American first strike against China, all Chinese silos will be targeted, but it is possible for most (if not all) Chinese road mobile ICBM to survive.
The main thing is, the US knows about this. It knows that a first strike even when executed perfectly cannot destroy Chinese second strike capabilities. A large scale first strike is not the sensible option as the US will only waste warheads and invite retaliation.
On the other hand, the US is far more likely to use tactical nuclear weapons out of desperation in a first island chain conflict. Remember that the US can target PLA landing zones on Taiwan with low yield warheads (W76-2s are perfect for this). The idea is to use tactical nuclear weapons as both a signal to China that things are getting serious and to attempt to defeat Chinese conventional forces.
To counter this, I think the best option is to target a US military base in Alaska, maybe Joint Base Elmendorf–Richardson given its status as a bomber base. This serves two purposes. One is to signal to the US that China is now backing down. The other is to further degrade American power projection capabilities. As the others have said in the thread, immediate cease-fire terms can be sent to DC just before the strike (as a part of a notice to DC) or just after the strike to offer an off-ramp and de-escalate.

 

[plawolf]

There are two underlying assumptions you are all making which do not stand up to scrutiny at all.

The first is assuming that the US will act rationally at a time when desperation has pushed it to actually use nukes. Just look at all the spiteful, delusional and frankly childish acts of petulance American administrations cross the political spectrum have done at even minor setbacks and inconveniences over the decades to see how fragile that hope is.

The second is that MAD is a worthwhile goal for China to pursue. This is linked to the first point. What good is MAD if the other side acts wilfully irrationally and irresponsibly? MAD doesn’t do what you want it to do if the other side is actually clinically mad.

Chinese nuclear policy throughout its history can be neatly summed up in one sentence: ‘Do what is necessary to make sure we don’t get nuked. Failing that, ensure Chinese civilisation endures.’

In that sense, I don’t think pursuing a silly number of warheads and ICBMs is really a goal China would see as worth the cost and effort. Since that doesn’t actually address the core concern of Chinese nuclear policy - to not get nuked.

Instead, what I see China doing is stopping offensive warhead and missile procurement after achieving the ability to glass CONUS 1.5-2 times over for insurance, and then pivot hard to missile defence. This may be something they pursue publicly or in secret, depending on what they feel is optimal at the time. An open arms race will be geared to bankrupting the U.S. like what happened to the USSR, while a covert build up would be more aimed at actual use.

An interesting variation of the classic silo shell game would be to mix in interceptors alongside offensive ICBMs. So just because China builds tens of thousands of missile silos doesn’t automatically mean they want that many ICBMs with nuclear warheads.

China racing to 6th gen would also be in keeping with seeking to break the MAD equilibrium by neutralising opfor’s ability to achieve MAD.

 

[nativechicken]

The second is that MAD is a worthwhile goal for China to pursue. This is linked to the first point. What good is MAD if the other side acts wilfully irrationally and irresponsibly? MAD doesn’t do what you want it to do if the other side is actually clinically mad.

Chinese nuclear policy throughout its history can be neatly summed up in one sentence: ‘Do what is necessary to make sure we don’t get nuked. Failing that, ensure Chinese civilisation endures.’

In that sense, I don’t think pursuing a silly number of warheads and ICBMs is really a goal China would see as worth the cost and effort. Since that doesn’t actually address the core concern of Chinese nuclear policy - to not get nuked.

I agree with the statement you made: "Do what is necessary to make sure we don’t get nuked. Failing that, ensure Chinese civilization endures."
But it is precisely because of the existence of this statement that China has no choice but to embark on the construction of a vast nuclear arsenal. This is not solely for MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction). That is, to slaughter the opponent.

The reason is simple: there are not only China and the United States in the world, but also other major powers.

Between China and the United States, due to the absolute confidence in their own strength, once a conflict begins, it is almost inevitable to fall into the trap of nuclear war. Here, China is not the party that provokes the conflict and is always willing to avoid the worst outcome, but our concern is the irrationality of the opponent, misjudging their own strength, leading to the worst choice.

China naturally also has the confidence to recover to the greatest extent after a large-scale nuclear war. However, the premise is:

1. The opponent, after enduring the first round of nuclear strikes, is no longer capable or willing to launch another nuclear strike.

2. Neighboring third countries do not take advantage of the situation, attempting to invade China's frontiers when China is heavily struck by war.

Regarding point 2, one can refer to the recent events in Syria.

Therefore, a vast nuclear arsenal, in addition to deterring the opponent from provoking the situation and leading both sides into MAD, is also to ensure that after a nuclear war, the remaining strength can still effectively curb the ambitions of neighboring countries, preventing them from launching aggressive wars that would cause long-term division and turmoil within the nation.

The difference between China and the United States is that the United States' geopolitical strategy has isolated the possibility of being invaded by neighboring major powers. However, this issue has long existed for China, with countries such as India, Vietnam, South Korea, Japan, and Russia potentially being tempted by internal or regional external forces (NATO group) to participate in the carve-up of a weakened China after war.

Therefore, the scale of the nuclear arsenal needed to cope with a major war is hard to be small. It is necessary to have a sufficient number of tactical nuclear weapons in multiple directions to block the opponent's attacks.

An interesting variation of the classic silo shell game would be to mix in interceptors alongside offensive ICBMs. So just because China builds tens of thousands of missile silos doesn’t automatically mean they want that many ICBMs with nuclear warheads.

If people here could understand the true scale of China's economy, to be honest, the cost of this nuclear deterrence is no challenge at all for China's current national strength.

Although from the GDP perspective, China's defense budget is less than one-fourth of that of the United States, in terms of purchasing power parity, the visible achievements in national defense construction, the actual effectiveness of China's military expenditure, exceeds the capabilities of the United States.

Currently, China's military spending accounts for less than 2% of its GDP (one data point suggests 1.35%), and China can do this effortlessly.

So, why doesn't China build a military capability that is on par with that of the United States or the former Soviet Union? Now, whether it is the navy, air force, or rocket force, China has sufficient military technology and financial resources to pay this price.

Today, China is a country with a GDP that is about two-thirds that of the United States, and if calculated by purchasing power parity GDP, it even exceeds the GDP of the United States. This country cannot afford the failure of war, or rather, the risk of nuclear war. Even if we can indeed bear such outcomes, they are still the worst choices.

Establishing a MAD-level nuclear arsenal can maximize the deterrence of an opponent's madness in dragging us into the risk of nuclear destruction. Isn't that a more cost-effective choice?

It's important to know that China is now a superpower with accumulated assets worth tens of trillions of dollars. Building a nuclear arsenal with 5,000 warheads and supporting ICBMs would cost approximately between 50 billion to 200 billion US dollars. Spending 200 billion dollars to prevent the destruction of tens of trillions of dollars in assets, as well as the death of hundreds of millions of people (losing more than 50% of the population), is not a bad choice or decision.

More importantly, the development of advanced technology requires continuous investment. Continuous investment and cost reduction both require large-scale application and continuous transformation. China's nuclear industry (as well as the space industry) has reached a new stage in terms of industry scale and technical capabilities, requiring relevant cyclical investment to maintain the operation of related systems.

Therefore, I do not believe that the Chinese government is merely creating hundreds of fake targets for strategic deception and maintaining the concept of a smaller nuclear arsenal. The Chinese people love peace, but they are even clearer that peace is built on strength. The West only recognizes strength; without strength, no matter how much you love peace or how peaceful and rational you are, the other party will only trample you underfoot. So, now is the stage to fully possess strength.

PS: ICBMs are not that expensive, and neither are nuclear warheads. Building 1 km of high-speed rail (200 million RMB/km), there is more than enough to buy a multi-warhead DF31AG. China has built 40,000 km of high-speed rail in 10 years; maintaining a nuclear arsenal of 5,000 warheads is not too difficult.

 

[antiterror13]

I agree with the statement you made: "Do what is necessary to make sure we don’t get nuked. Failing that, ensure Chinese civilization endures."
But it is precisely because of the existence of this statement that China has no choice but to embark on the construction of a vast nuclear arsenal. This is not solely for MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction). That is, to slaughter the opponent.

The reason is simple: there are not only China and the United States in the world, but also other major powers.

Between China and the United States, due to the absolute confidence in their own strength, once a conflict begins, it is almost inevitable to fall into the trap of nuclear war. Here, China is not the party that provokes the conflict and is always willing to avoid the worst outcome, but our concern is the irrationality of the opponent, misjudging their own strength, leading to the worst choice.

China naturally also has the confidence to recover to the greatest extent after a large-scale nuclear war. However, the premise is:

1. The opponent, after enduring the first round of nuclear strikes, is no longer capable or willing to launch another nuclear strike.

2. Neighboring third countries do not take advantage of the situation, attempting to invade China's frontiers when China is heavily struck by war.

Regarding point 2, one can refer to the recent events in Syria.

Therefore, a vast nuclear arsenal, in addition to deterring the opponent from provoking the situation and leading both sides into MAD, is also to ensure that after a nuclear war, the remaining strength can still effectively curb the ambitions of neighboring countries, preventing them from launching aggressive wars that would cause long-term division and turmoil within the nation.

The difference between China and the United States is that the United States' geopolitical strategy has isolated the possibility of being invaded by neighboring major powers. However, this issue has long existed for China, with countries such as India, Vietnam, South Korea, Japan, and Russia potentially being tempted by internal or regional external forces (NATO group) to participate in the carve-up of a weakened China after war.

Therefore, the scale of the nuclear arsenal needed to cope with a major war is hard to be small. It is necessary to have a sufficient number of tactical nuclear weapons in multiple directions to block the opponent's attacks.


If people here could understand the true scale of China's economy, to be honest, the cost of this nuclear deterrence is no challenge at all for China's current national strength.

Although from the GDP perspective, China's defense budget is less than one-fourth of that of the United States, in terms of purchasing power parity, the visible achievements in national defense construction, the actual effectiveness of China's military expenditure, exceeds the capabilities of the United States.

Currently, China's military spending accounts for less than 2% of its GDP (one data point suggests 1.35%), and China can do this effortlessly.

So, why doesn't China build a military capability that is on par with that of the United States or the former Soviet Union? Now, whether it is the navy, air force, or rocket force, China has sufficient military technology and financial resources to pay this price.

Today, China is a country with a GDP that is about two-thirds that of the United States, and if calculated by purchasing power parity GDP, it even exceeds the GDP of the United States. This country cannot afford the failure of war, or rather, the risk of nuclear war. Even if we can indeed bear such outcomes, they are still the worst choices.

Establishing a MAD-level nuclear arsenal can maximize the deterrence of an opponent's madness in dragging us into the risk of nuclear destruction. Isn't that a more cost-effective choice?

It's important to know that China is now a superpower with accumulated assets worth tens of trillions of dollars. Building a nuclear arsenal with 5,000 warheads and supporting ICBMs would cost approximately between 50 billion to 200 billion US dollars. Spending 200 billion dollars to prevent the destruction of tens of trillions of dollars in assets, as well as the death of hundreds of millions of people (losing more than 50% of the population), is not a bad choice or decision.

More importantly, the development of advanced technology requires continuous investment. Continuous investment and cost reduction both require large-scale application and continuous transformation. China's nuclear industry (as well as the space industry) has reached a new stage in terms of industry scale and technical capabilities, requiring relevant cyclical investment to maintain the operation of related systems.

Therefore, I do not believe that the Chinese government is merely creating hundreds of fake targets for strategic deception and maintaining the concept of a smaller nuclear arsenal. The Chinese people love peace, but they are even clearer that peace is built on strength. The West only recognizes strength; without strength, no matter how much you love peace or how peaceful and rational you are, the other party will only trample you underfoot. So, now is the stage to fully possess strength.

PS: ICBMs are not that expensive, and neither are nuclear warheads. Building 1 km of high-speed rail (200 million RMB/km), there is more than enough to buy a multi-warhead DF31AG. China has built 40,000 km of high-speed rail in 10 years; maintaining a nuclear arsenal of 5,000 warheads is not too difficult.

Do you believe China is pursuing 5,000 warheads? if you do, when do you think will be achieved?

I personally believe 5,000 warheads is needed for China. I agree with you the cost is negligible for China to absorb ... my main question is whether China has enough WgPu as I believe it is needed to build small warhead for MIRV ICBM

Another question for you, do you think will produce low yield warhead (<10kt) like W76-2 in high number ?

 

[Biscuits]

Do you believe China is pursuing 5,000 warheads? if you do, when do you think will be achieved?

I personally believe 5,000 warheads is needed for China. I agree with you the cost is negligible for China to absorb ... my main question is whether China has enough WgPu as I believe it is needed to build small warhead for MIRV ICBM

Another question for you, do you think will produce low yield warhead (<10kt) like W76-2 in high number ?

Much like US, China doesn't enrich a huge amoint of HEU/WgPu by itself, but it has had such long time to consistently refine some amounts it that it sits on functionally unlimited levels.

Nukes do not cost a lot, even the long ranged delivery platforms are not extremely expensive. Digging vast armored tunnels or creating DN3 or HQ-19 batteries is far more expensive.

China says it keeps most of its warheads separated from its missiles, it wouldn't surprise me if the number of warheads in storage exceed high 1000s. They just slap them on delivery platforms and hire new rocket troops to expand China's nuclear readiness level. So for example to deal with neutral neighbors (which only India is concerning) in the midst of highly escalatory ww3, they can just mount stored devices on very cheap missiles like DF16.

 

[nativechicken]

Do you believe China is pursuing 5,000 warheads? if you do, when do you think will be achieved?

I personally believe 5,000 warheads is needed for China. I agree with you the cost is negligible for China to absorb ... my main question is whether China has enough WgPu as I believe it is needed to build small warhead for MIRV ICBM

Another question for you, do you think will produce low yield warhead (<10kt) like W76-2 in high number ?

China is definitely preparing a large nuclear arsenal, but the physical ammunition might not be in the form of finished products, but rather as semi-finished goods. That is to say, China's strategy should involve having several hundred nuclear warheads in finished reserve, and preparing thousands of semi-finished products and kits that do not include enriched uranium, along with a stockpile of enriched uranium for at least 1000 nuclear warheads (12-25 tons in total), with the remainder stored as processable minerals (which can be quickly converted into thousands of nuclear warheads within a year if necessary).

I have collected limited information on plutonium related to China's nuclear weapons, which is obtained from the production in nuclear reactors. This does not seem to be a focus for China. I do not believe that plutonium is the only choice for the miniaturization of nuclear weapons; 12-15kg of uranium is enough to make a small nuclear weapon warhead (100KT yield), and the volume of nuclear fuel charge is actually quite small. Multiple warheads for ICBMs are more than sufficient.

The information I have suggests that general scientific materials in China explain that 1kg of uranium-235, when completely converted, can release the energy equivalent to 20,000 to 30,000 tons of TNT. For an average level of warhead design, human technology can probably achieve the release of 3000-4000 tons of TNT energy from 1kg of uranium-235, and before China ceased nuclear testing at the end of the last century, it had achieved a level where 1kg of uranium-235 could release the energy equivalent to 6000-8000 tons of TNT.

That is to say, about 12-15kg of highly enriched uranium-235 can achieve a nuclear warhead with a yield of 100,000 tons of TNT. Of course, if the design level of your nuclear bomb is poor, you might need 25kg to achieve the same level of nuclear explosion.

In Chinese literature, there are many documents regarding the measurement of the lifespan of uranium hemispheres. By looking at the data of uranium hemispheres in these documents, one can deduce the types of warheads China has and the approximate levels of their power (not counting thermonuclear weapons).