Yes, I'm aware that along the Indian border, they're not allowed to carry guns because that prevents greater escalation. Which is why that the ability for two sides to get into hand to hand brawls isn't an indication of logistical capabilities. Anyone can march 1000 men into the staging area and put them into tents. This doesn't demonstrate that they can sustain a high tempo operation with the necessary ammunition and engineering support (at the minimum).
Take this example:
- The Russians didn't think to rotate their vehicle tires in the norther region of the Ukrainian border and as such, they found that vehicles left out for 4 months in the open had degraded tires that quickly broke down when they were oscar mike.
- As a result of this, the Russians were stuck in the mud, which limited them to roads, which opened them up to getting ambushed en masse.
And the root cause of this one single incident comes down to the unsexy science of maintaining tires in the winter. Nothing more, nothing less.
And that's precisely my point. The PLA has historically--due to their guerilla roots--paid little attention to logistics because they were always prepared to fight a defensive war against an aggressor. In Korea, this logistical deficit on the offense came to full view and resulted in the multiple failed offensives to push beyond the DMZ (毛主席 wanted to push the Americans all the way into the ocean after the successful initial offensive), where the PLA was incapable of surrounding and destroying UN forces like they did against the KMT. Almost every PLA paper written on the Korean War concluded that "他们坐在车里,我们两腿追着,你他妈的能追上吗“ (they sat in cars while we pursued on our two legs, you think we could've fucking caught them?).