Lessons for China to learn from Ukraine conflict for Taiwan scenario

ROCNationalist said:

I've read through all 33 pages and all I can say is: amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics. The PLA's approach to logistics is basically IJA with Chinese characteristics. If they don't fix this, they'll flounder harder than the Russkies in Ukraine when they try to go for Taiwan

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ROCNationalist said:

I've read through all 33 pages and all I can say is: amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics. The PLA's approach to logistics is basically IJA with Chinese characteristics. If they don't fix this, they'll flounder harder than the Russkies in Ukraine when they try to go for Taiwan

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ROCNationalist said:

Yes, a bunch of people clashing in the middle of the dark with hand to hand infantry weapons is evidence that logistics is good.

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ROCNationalist said:

I've read through all 33 pages and all I can say is: amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics. The PLA's approach to logistics is basically IJA with Chinese characteristics. If they don't fix this, they'll flounder harder than the Russkies in Ukraine when they try to go for Taiwan

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ROCNationalist said:

Yes, a bunch of people clashing in the middle of the dark with hand to hand infantry weapons is evidence that logistics is good.

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ROCNationalist said:

I see a lot of footage of destroyed Russian materiel, very little Ukrainian ones unless you count CIVCAS.


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ROCNationalist said:

The US dad dicked on Iraq, Afghanistan, and Serbia - every single one of those required mobilizing troops from half a world away and for more than 7 days. I don't think either of us can argue that Russian logistics is anything other than abysmal.

Which is why in a Taiwan scenario, China must absolutely shore up logistics or else they'll hit the same problems. It's unsexy to think about getting materiel from factory to staging to frontlines, but it has to be done. And likewise, you need to secure SLOC from raw material to factories. All of these things fall under logistics and the PLA has not given much thought into logistics, considering they published a paper in the 90s talking about the importance of logistics, published a paper in the 2000s that suggested they fixed it, and then published the same paper in the 2010s talking about the very issue they allegedly fixed in the 90s.

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ROCNationalist said:

PLA high command conducts operations (and plans everything) in “great captain” fashion - officers issue orders on the fly based on estimates and incomplete information. There is no emphasis placed on detailed staff work and logistics has never been a strong suit. Partly because they believe they can salvage everything via looting the enemy, and partly because this was how the PLA was held together.

You see this in peacetimes as well - the latest rounds of RED SWORD exercises had issues where not enough vehicles were brought to field maneuvers, yet commanders were expected to improvise around these problems. And herein lies the rub: in the PLA, the ability to improvise and remain aggressive is the PLA definition of “initiative” and logistics, not the actual practice and art of logistics.

Under such a system, officers who lack “initiative” (rather, aggression) are kicked upstairs quickly to a position where they postulate on theory rather than actively lead troops. This is why you see a lot of PLA officers (mostly of colonel or major rank) writing papers but not much else, because this is where most of the PLA command believes they'll do the "least amount of damage". The overarching culture of the PLA is instituationalized insubordination, where each "great captain" more or less operates independently and ignores each other--as well as both their staff and commanding officers save for final objective. The only barometer for an effective commander is the Commissar, and his only job is to ensure morale is high among the enlisted and that the brigade commander exhibits appropriate amount of "initiative"

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ROCNationalist said:

Has the PLA made significant changes to their military culture which is heavily rooted in guerilla warfare? No.

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ROCNationalist said:

The truth is, we don't have a full picture for just how fragile the PLA logistics branch is. It, being a new branch formed under Xi by his allies on the CMC, means that there's a LOT of stuff to iron out. And rather than focusing on shiny new toys like drones and tanks, I'm much more inclined to focus on the ability for the unsexy stuff to influence the op tempo of the sexy stuff - i.e. can you bring in enough munitions on time to sustain an attack? Can you bring in enough supplies to feed and clothe and arm your frontline troopers? Can you ensure that a surge of supplies in sector won't deprive another sector of the front? All of these questions are boring and difficult to answer, but they are what wins wars. Not who has more of some new drone system.

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ROCNationalist said:

Yes, I'm aware that along the Indian border, they're not allowed to carry guns because that prevents greater escalation. Which is why that the ability for two sides to get into hand to hand brawls isn't an indication of logistical capabilities. Anyone can march 1000 men into the staging area and put them into tents. This doesn't demonstrate that they can sustain a high tempo operation with the necessary ammunition and engineering support (at the minimum).

Take this example:

• The Russians didn't think to rotate their vehicle tires in the norther region of the Ukrainian border and as such, they found that vehicles left out for 4 months in the open had degraded tires that quickly broke down when they were oscar mike.
• As a result of this, the Russians were stuck in the mud, which limited them to roads, which opened them up to getting ambushed en masse.

And the root cause of this one single incident comes down to the unsexy science of maintaining tires in the winter. Nothing more, nothing less.

And that's precisely my point. The PLA has historically--due to their guerilla roots--paid little attention to logistics because they were always prepared to fight a defensive war against an aggressor. In Korea, this logistical deficit on the offense came to full view and resulted in the multiple failed offensives to push beyond the DMZ (毛主席 wanted to push the Americans all the way into the ocean after the successful initial offensive), where the PLA was incapable of surrounding and destroying UN forces like they did against the KMT. Almost every PLA paper written on the Korean War concluded that "他们坐在车里，我们两腿追着，你他妈的能追上吗“ (they sat in cars while we pursued on our two legs, you think we could've fucking caught them?).

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The truth is, we don't have a full picture for just how fragile the PLA logistics branch is. It, being a new branch formed under Xi by his allies on the CMC, means that

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FairAndUnbiased said:

in Korea, it was logistical deficit due to some supposed PLA incompetence because of guerilla roots? that the PLA didn't have cars because they were too incompetent to have vehicles or something?

not the fact that China didn't even produce 1000 tons of steel in 1949?

not the fact that China had no oil until Daqing oil field was discovered long after Korea?

not the fact that China had no rubber to even make tires?

it was PLA incompetence at logistics?? fk really???

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