Fair enough. This aligns with the "US withdraws from the Pacific unilaterally" scenario I mentioned. It's definitely the ideal outcome.
Lessons for China to learn from Ukraine conflict for Taiwan scenario
- Thread starter tphuang
- Start date
- Status
Fair enough. This aligns with the "US withdraws from the Pacific unilaterally" scenario I mentioned. It's definitely the ideal outcome.
I like the recent direction the discussion has taken, from bean-counting ROROs in a Taiwan landing (as if the ROC remnants are anything more than a pebble) to grand strategy over the Pacific.
I think it would be helpful to make some projections about China's trajectory over the coming quarter century. At least in my case, it helps me orient my thoughts about what capabilities China will be able to field at that time. I'll construct a table where the rows are percentages of GDP spent on defense and the columns are average growth rates over the period, again with three projections. I'll take the IMF's estimate of China's PPP adjusted GDP of $30 trillion in 2022 as the starting point.
In the absolute worst case scenario, China's defense expenditure is still around a trillion dollars. In a baseline scenario, it's well over one trillion, perhaps approaching or even crossing two trillion. I think a dozen CSGs by ~2045 is an absolute rock bottom estimate unless China actively demilitarizes (i.e., drops defense expenditure below even its current anemic rate), for which I see no reason.
The number 20-25 was bandied about earlier, and I think that's feasible given both decent economic performance and the political will to raise the defense budget once China's immediate developmental goals are met. It's not a sure thing of course, but I'd take the bet that China's economy will grow between 4.0-4.5% per annum on average over the next 25 years and the deteriorating security environment will compel the government to raise expenditures well north of 2%.
The remaining question is whether Chinese shipbuilding is capable of cranking out that many carriers (20+ in 25 years). Given China's overall share of global shipbuilding, as well as how little of that capacity is used for naval shipbuilding, I think the answer is clear.
I think it would be helpful to make some projections about China's trajectory over the coming quarter century. At least in my case, it helps me orient my thoughts about what capabilities China will be able to field at that time. I'll construct a table where the rows are percentages of GDP spent on defense and the columns are average growth rates over the period, again with three projections. I'll take the IMF's estimate of China's PPP adjusted GDP of $30 trillion in 2022 as the starting point.
| Economic growth rate/ Defense expenditure | 3.5% ($70 trillion) | 4.5% ($90 trillion) | 5.5% ($115 trillion) |
| 1.4% of GDP | $980 billion | $1.26 trillion | $1.61 trillion |
| 2.5% of GDP | $1.75 trillion | $2.25 trillion | $2.875 trillion |
| 3.5% of GDP | $2.45 trillion | $3.15 trillion | $4.025 trillion |
The number 20-25 was bandied about earlier, and I think that's feasible given both decent economic performance and the political will to raise the defense budget once China's immediate developmental goals are met. It's not a sure thing of course, but I'd take the bet that China's economy will grow between 4.0-4.5% per annum on average over the next 25 years and the deteriorating security environment will compel the government to raise expenditures well north of 2%.
The remaining question is whether Chinese shipbuilding is capable of cranking out that many carriers (20+ in 25 years). Given China's overall share of global shipbuilding, as well as how little of that capacity is used for naval shipbuilding, I think the answer is clear.
solarz
Brigadier
There's no reason for China to follow in the US' footsteps. The US is a Pacific and Atlantic power because it is geographically isolated from the rest of the world.
China, on the other hand, is connected by land to the Eurasian and African continents. China's Pacific strategy will be mostly defensive.
I think OBOR spells out quite clearly the direction of China's growth in the next fifty years.
China, on the other hand, is connected by land to the Eurasian and African continents. China's Pacific strategy will be mostly defensive.
I think OBOR spells out quite clearly the direction of China's growth in the next fifty years.
Broccoli
Senior Member
Russian MIC is so good that even basic tanks in Russian military can act as space launch vehicles.
No need for something like Long-March 6.
Land transport is inherently far more expensive than seaborne transport, which effectively plugs into the global transport network and global markets.
Given that China is already the world's largest trading nation, it's logical to build a global Navy to protect this trade.
solarz
Brigadier
If you look at the BRI, you will see that it does not need access to the Pacific.
The problem with sea transportation is that there is only a limited amount of coastal land. A rail trade network can develop markets that were previously deemed inaccessible.
The only sea regions that are important is the Western / Southern Pacific and maybe along the coast of Africa. Like why bother sailing warships in the Atlantic Ocean or off the coast of South America? It doesn’t do China any good beside waste precious resources that could be used else where.
I suspect that the current plan is simply to match the US Navy in terms of carriers.
But that in 10 year's time, this will have been revised to at least 1.3x the US Navy.
My gut tells me that in terms of the number of Chinese carriers, they'll eventually end up somewhere between 1.5x and 1.8x the US Navy. That would mean 16-20 Chinese carriers and should be enough to deter the US.
There's some previous discussion on 20 carriers in the Orbat Thread below
sinodefenceforum.com/t/future-plan-orbat-discussion.8082/
I think China will focus on Indochina and Africa. And not bother with the Pacific that much.
We saw the performance of the M1A2 and Leopard 2A4 when they didn't have overwhelming superiority. The M1A2 failed against ISIL and the Leopard 2A4 failed in Syria against infantry with modern ATGMs. Tanks are not invulnerable.
The West also claimed the smoothbore gun in the T-62 was crap and that rifled guns were more accurate. Then the West moved to the smoothbore 120mm gun. Now, you are telling me that manual loader tanks are better than tanks with autoloaders? The whole idea of moving towards autoloaders enabled Russia to move from 4 men tank crews to 3 men crews. Every 3 tanks you get an extra tank with same crew. So with same crew you have 33% more tanks. It also enables you to make the turret smaller, 2 man vs 3 man turret, and reduce the amount of internal volume required and the overall weight of the tank. Which means you can traverse smaller bridges and be less vulnerable on river crossings. The fact is most tanks won't survive a single hit with a APFSDS or guided artillery round. It is all about getting the first shot in with regards to tank vs tank combat.
We saw the performance of the M1A2 and Leopard 2A4 when they didn't have overwhelming superiority. The M1A2 failed against ISIL and the Leopard 2A4 failed in Syria against infantry with modern ATGMs. Tanks are not invulnerable.
Last edited:
I was under the impression that an autoloader takes up more space than a manual loader?
- Status