FAS report on the Chinese nuclear forces just came out. What a total crap; it doesn't even mention the 10-axel TEL that we just saw in this thread. No words for df-27A, early warning radars and supporting infrastructure. I wouldn't advise anyone to read it.
China ICBM/SLBM, nuclear arms thread
- Thread starter Blitzo
- Start date
It is always cool when someone consistently underestimates your capabilities.
On the other hand, I don't think that anyone -that actually matters- really expects a public survey on this to be authoritative.
Therefore I really have trouble understanding the outrage from some (not speaking about you magmunta). FAS reports don't inform actual policy. They are somewhat useful though strictly as a public starter for interested people that want to delve more into the subject at hand.
On the other hand, I don't think that anyone -that actually matters- really expects a public survey on this to be authoritative.
Therefore I really have trouble understanding the outrage from some (not speaking about you magmunta). FAS reports don't inform actual policy. They are somewhat useful though strictly as a public starter for interested people that want to delve more into the subject at hand.
Is it possible we might see the silo-based DF-31 paraded during the parade for the 80th anniversary of the end of WWII in Asia this year?
It would mirror the parading of DF-5Bs in 2015, and be a way to show that the siloes are operational without having to actually do some sort of ceremony or PR at the silo fields.
I had originally guessed that some indication of the silo fields being operational would be given with a ceremony at the silo fields (maybe with Xi wearing PLARF fatigues lol) but I'm realizing that wouldn't track with China's security traditions. Also, if the number of operational silos is kept secret to keep alive the shell game hypothesis and make the US nervous over how many missiles China actually has, doing a ceremony at the base, which would probably involve getting all personnel out on the base parade ground, might give away how many missiles there are (assuming a silo field with 100~ missiles will need less personnel than one with 300~).
It would mirror the parading of DF-5Bs in 2015, and be a way to show that the siloes are operational without having to actually do some sort of ceremony or PR at the silo fields.
I had originally guessed that some indication of the silo fields being operational would be given with a ceremony at the silo fields (maybe with Xi wearing PLARF fatigues lol) but I'm realizing that wouldn't track with China's security traditions. Also, if the number of operational silos is kept secret to keep alive the shell game hypothesis and make the US nervous over how many missiles China actually has, doing a ceremony at the base, which would probably involve getting all personnel out on the base parade ground, might give away how many missiles there are (assuming a silo field with 100~ missiles will need less personnel than one with 300~).
I see Kristensen has finally started to use numbered designations for warheads (535, 5X5, etc.) 
Also, they seem to think a new SLBM is in the works, which is a larger and longer-range missile than JL-3. This is given more credit by the recent description of a 14-meter diameter sub hull in an ITT for the Bohai yard.
Here's to hoping that HQ-19, the Chinese KEI and GBI makes an appearance in the Sept 3rd parade this year.
Also, they seem to think a new SLBM is in the works, which is a larger and longer-range missile than JL-3. This is given more credit by the recent description of a 14-meter diameter sub hull in an ITT for the Bohai yard.
Here's to hoping that HQ-19, the Chinese KEI and GBI makes an appearance in the Sept 3rd parade this year.
What I'm most wondering is whether the TEL DF-45 we've already seen will be featured.I see Kristensen has finally started to use numbered designations for warheads (535, 5X5, etc.)
Also, they seem to think a new SLBM is in the works, which is a larger and longer-range missile than JL-3. This is given more credit by the recent description of a 14-meter diameter sub hull in an ITT for the Bohai yard.
Here's to hoping that HQ-19, the Chinese KEI and GBI makes an appearance in the Sept 3rd parade this year.
I still don't understand why FAS would say "hundreds of warheads have been produced, but not assigned to launch systems" all while claiming that there are hundreds of DF-26s and bombers. Did they assume that warheads cannot be re-assigned or something?
My understanding is that they are saying warhead production is outpacing the deployment of missiles to the new silo fields. So the warhead and launcher estimates are currently incongruent, whereas previously they were pretty much identical because most Chinese missiles carried 1 warhead and the minimum deterrence posture dictated each launcher would only have a single nuclear-capable missile.
They seem to think the production of strategic warheads for the DF-26 may have ended and the remaining expansion of the arsenal will be for new SSBNs, the silo fields, new mobile ICBMs, and new low-yield warheads for the DF-26.
antiterror13
Brigadier
In your opinion, what the definition of low-yield nukes for China, let say for DF-26 ? 10kt, 30kt or ???
It depends on what China wants to do with them.
American analysts... whether they be DOD alarmists or FAS low-key underestimating the arsenal... seem to think China purely desires low-yield warheads so as to have a way to proportionately respond to an American tactical nuclear strike.
If that is the case, it might make sense to have a variety of warheads or one with dialable yield. The lowest yield an American tactical nuclear warhead can be set to is as low as 300 tons, while the highest is 170 kilotons.
The current warhead yield on most Chinese warheads is 500 kilotons or so, which is very high for responding to a low yield nuclear strike. To give an idea of how small the yield of an American warhead can be, 300 ton airburst over Terminal 1 of Beijing Capital International Airport would not even shatter the glass of any building of Terminal 3.
If that kind of tiny yield is being delivered against a military target, or even a fully evacuated civilian target, it would not warrant completely leveling an American city or entire air base. So even very, very low yield warheads would be warranted for China.
If China actually desires to have some tactical nuclear capability... I have no idea why that would be needed, both CPC ideology and the raw strength of China's conventional forces favor nukes as a retaliatory weapon only... what yield would be best would depend on what role the PLA envisions for tactical nukes. But there is no indication China needs tactical nukes for military purposes, instead the only justification being to retaliate if any adversary uses low yield nukes on China first.
EDIT- To clarify, when I say "CPC ideology" I'm talking about the founding tenets that drove China's decision to build nukes and then maintain a minimum deterrent. It is possible this has begun to adjust given Xi's mission to build the PLA into a world-class military. If it has, I of course welcome corrections and information.
