China ICBM/SLBM, nuclear arms thread

[vincent]

It depends on how the CMC/CPC decides to perceive the strike.

If they mainly perceive it as a nuclear strike on military forces, I would find hitting US naval facilities in Japan to make sense: namely USFA Sasebo and USFA Yokosuka.

Let's say the US specifically targets Yulin and Qingdao, Shandong and Liaoning's respective homeports, in what they view as a proportional response to the sinking of the two CSGs (even if say, Fujian also ends up being based in Yulin).

USFA Sasebo and USFA Yokosuka would make sense due to them being the primary regional US naval facilities. Their validity as retaliatory targets could be stretched further if USN amphibious assault ships are considered to be aircraft carriers, making Sasebo and Yokosuka both (formerly) home to one American carrier.

If the US is targeting more facilities, this could be expanded to other regional facilities. Okinawa is home to a multiple docks capable of handling LHAs. JMSDF bases could be included as well, assuming the JMSDF is fighting on the side of the US and American ships have begun using JMSDF facilities.

If they mainly perceive it as a nuclear strike on the Chinese mainland, it would be difficult to respond proportionately.

The best option, in my opinion, would be to strike US territory other than CONUS. Only one regional target is a good match; Naval Base Guam. If the DF-27 has the range to reach Hawaii, Pearl Harbor could be targeted as well. Diego Garcia may not be a viable target because it would involve firing in the direction of India. It is also British territory, making it a poor choice for retaliation specifically against US territory.

These two targeting options could be combined to fulfill both perceptions of the strike: retaliation for nuclear strikes on PLA forces and retaliation for nuclear strikes on the mainland.

I do not think the US would target naval formations out at sea, because all of their weapons apart from gravity bombs are designed for use against fixed targets, and realistically an F-35 with a B61 is not going to make it in range of a PLAN CSG or SAG. In my scenario I'm assuming they used Trident IIs with the low-yield W76-2 warhead.

I would like to highlight that this is my own opinion of one possibility. Apart from doctrine, individual CMC officials and Xi himself may have a different views about how to best respond and how to deter further escalation. As the actual military (and in the case of Xi, political) leaders of China, it is their prerogotative about how to respond.

I highlighted specific scenarios in previous posts not to suggest they are the one strategy that China "must" use to prevent armageddon and win the war, but rather to highlight how the possibilities of US reaction could vary and thus to meet those possibilities and achieve the best outcome, as well as to better fulfill the modern CMC/CPC's requirement for what retaliation might look like, it makes sense for China to have a variety of options at hand.

I can’t imagine a nuclear strike on Chinese ports aren’t answered with a megaton strike on CONUS targets. Failure to do that will simply invite more nuclear attacks on Chinese mainland targets. American are delusional if they think China will not strike back at CONUS.

As for striking American bases on the First Island Chain. Those are on other people’s soils, nuclear attack on them will nuke (pun intended) Chinese relationships with them for many years to come.

Guam and Pearl Habour are worthy targets, but why use kiloton class warheads when China could and should use megaton class warheads.

Look, the whole reason for having nuclear weapons is not to use them in war but to discourage their usage. China is building up her nuclear arsenal because PLA can match the American conventional forces and likely defeat them in a conventional fight, but afraid of the Americans being sore losers start to use nukes. China has a lot more to lose than the Americans in a nuclear fight. It is supremely stupid to follow the so called ”escalation ladder” when China needs to discourage the usage of the ladder in the first place. If the Chinese leaderships are smart, they should communicate to the Americans that any use of nuclear weapons will be answered with strategic strikes.

 

[nativechicken]

Guam? Diego Garcia?

No. Reciprocal Strikes Against U.S. Homeland Naval Bases
China does not engage in proxy wars, nor does it view issues through the lens of Western logic.
If the U.S. military attacks Chinese mainland naval bases, China will naturally retaliate by striking U.S. homeland naval bases.
If the U.S. destroys Chinese fleets, China will respond by eliminating U.S. fleets.

China will not target U.S. military bases in Japan or South Korea unless those bases directly launch attacks against China.
It is essential to understand Chinese strategic thinking: China does not care about the calculations of American proxies.

Why U.S. Vassal States Provoke China
These nations act on the assumption that China either fears confronting the U.S. or will inevitably lose in such a conflict.
By aligning themselves militarily with the U.S., they believe they can exploit American military dominance to extract undue gains from China.

China’s Strategic Logic
Attacking U.S. proxies is meaningless. Instead, China aims to decisively defeat the U.S. itself—inflicting enough pain to force surrender.
Only then will these vassal states realize:

Their "master" (the U.S.) cannot protect them even with full commitment.
China disdains wasting resources on punishing minor players.
They must face China based on their own capabilities and interests, abandoning futile confrontations.
This is China’s Approach: "Punish the Master to Warn the Dogs"
It is the reverse of "killing a chicken to scare the monkeys." By directly confronting the dominant power (the U.S.), China demonstrates that subordinate states gain nothing from alignment.

 

[nativechicken]

Historical Wisdom: A Civilization-State’s Strategic Discipline
China, as a civilizational-state with millennia of warfare experience, has long understood a fundamental truth: war must never be lightly provoked, for its consequences spiral beyond control.
When facing threats, China’s doctrine prioritizes two imperatives:

Absorb the initial blow (regardless of scale).
Retaliate decisively until mutual exhaustion forces all parties to the negotiating table.
China’s Preparations: War-Fighting to War-Ending
Chinese strategy is designed not merely to survive conflict but to grind down adversaries through prolonged engagement, erasing any delusions of victory.
For modern China, there is no concept of "collapse after one strike" or "strategic surrender." Western fantasies of coercing China into retreat through unilateral threats (military or psychological) are naively detached from reality.

A Glimpse into China’s Nuclear-Resilient Infrastructure
Recent foreign observers have noted a striking feature in Chinese cities:

High-rise parking structures built to nuclear-resistant standards, equipped with blast-resistant doors.
Reinforced concrete communities widely adopted, with civil defense infrastructure surpassing U.S. capabilities (as evidenced by the vulnerability exposed in the 2024 Los Angeles wildfires).
Nuclear Deterrence: China’s Restraint vs. America’s Delusion
China adheres to its No-First-Use nuclear policy, yet U.S. strategists gamble on two flawed assumptions:

China would hesitate to retaliate against the U.S. homeland, limiting strikes to peripheral proxies (e.g., bases in Japan).
China might unilaterally concede after limited exchanges, allowing the U.S. to dictate terms.
China’s Response: "Eating Soft Rice with a Tough Attitude"
This phrase (软饭硬吃) mocks U.S. brinkmanship: claiming dominance without the capacity to back it up, then demanding others comply.
China has repeatedly warned that such tactics fail. Yet, as the West clings to colonial-era hubris, only reality can teach the lesson: The era of colonialism and Western superiority is over.

 

[montyp165]

If the current level of technological development proceeds on pace, I can definitely see options for China that could effectively upend the standard nuclear MAD model, stuff that would seem like something out of a scifi story but fully technically feasible. As I've mentioned before, the US is operating on a Cold War nuclear model vs a Chinese model that will more resemble a Gundam-tech level force, especially after 2030.

 

[Dante80]

Generally speaking, the possession of tactical nuclear weapons is a tool that can give specific options and agency to an administration.

Whether said options fit doctrinal or theoretical norms is strictly irrelevant. You simply choose to lose those specific options if you do not have them.

It's that simple, I don't see the need for over-complicating this.

 

[vincent]

Generally speaking, the possession of tactical nuclear weapons is a tool that can give specific options and agency to an administration.

Whether said options fit doctrinal or theoretical norms is strictly irrelevant. You simply choose to lose those specific options if you do not have them.

It's that simple, I don't see the need for over-complicating this.

Nope, not simple. Resources available to the PLA is finite. Investing in tactical nukes will take away resources from somewhere else. It is better to invest in something else instead of tactical nukes because China should strongly discourage their use by the Hegemon.

 

[Dante80]

Nope, not simple. Resources available to the PLA is finite. Investing in tactical nukes will take away resources from somewhere else. It is better to invest in something else instead of tactical nukes because China should strongly discourage their use by the Hegemon.

I don't think I can speak on behalf of the PLA, or know how or why they structure their priorities and resources.

But still, what I think is irrelevant. My argument is that "you simply choose to lose those specific options if you do not have them".
And then your post simply describes why you think PLA chooses to lose said options.

Again, it is that simple.

 

[SunlitZelkova]

As for striking American bases on the First Island Chain. Those are on other people’s soils, nuclear attack on them will nuke (pun intended) Chinese relationships with them for many years to come.

It's very possible the relationship would be already damaged for years to come simply by way of the conventional war.

My understanding is that China has long accepted the possibility of nuclear strikes on Japan or South Korea given the past development of the DF-21A and its deployment in the eastern half of the country (i.e. not for use against India).

But I have heard this sentiment earlier in the thread. I'm curious, is this idea that nuclear attacks in the 1IC would be unacceptable common among Chinese officials, analysts, PLA watchers, etc.?

Look, the whole reason for having nuclear weapons is not to use them in war but to discourage their usage. China is building up her nuclear arsenal because PLA can match the American conventional forces and likely defeat them in a conventional fight, but afraid of the Americans being sore losers start to use nukes. China has a lot more to lose than the Americans in a nuclear fight. It is supremely stupid to follow the so called ”escalation ladder” when China needs to discourage the usage of the ladder in the first place. If the Chinese leaderships are smart, they should communicate to the Americans that any use of nuclear weapons will be answered with strategic strikes.

If China gives itself the mere option to follow the escalation ladder (as I stated, they can still respond with megaton strikes if they wish to), then they can climb back down.

Limiting itself to a single response option, and one whose next step is armageddon at that, would be like having no choice but to back down or jump off the roof.

I understand that rationale, but I have a very hard time believing the CPC would force itself into such a situation with no way out.

Especially if it is moving away from legacy military thinking like people's war, and trying to adapt such concepts to modern conditions, departing from sole emphasis on the psychological nature of nuclear weapons and their relation to imperialist strategy and instead creating a nuclear arsenal more in line with the demands of modern geopolitics would make sense.

Tactical nuclear weapons can have the same deterrence effect as strategic weapons. Note that NATO was successfully deterred from giving Ukraine F-16, ATACMS, etc. for so long by the threat of Russian tactical strikes (that Putin and others in the Russian government made very clear) that by the time they actually transferred them, they were useless and made no difference on the battlefield. Ukrainian officials have spoken of this issue, specifically blaming NATO for its cowardice. This shows tactical nuclear weapons can have a deterrence effect, and do not necessarily encourage escalation.

Nope, not simple. Resources available to the PLA is finite. Investing in tactical nukes will take away resources from somewhere else. It is better to invest in something else instead of tactical nukes because China should strongly discourage their use by the Hegemon.

No one is suggesting that the PLA build 1,000-3,000 tactical nukes like Russia has, nor even the 500 some tactical weapons the US has. I do not believe this is what they should do, would do, or need to do. China's strategic arsenal itself continues to follow the minimum deterrence posture- the 1,500 warheads will be entirely operational, whereas the US and Russian arsenals are bloated with large numbers of stockpiled warheads (hence them still being double China's projected increased arsenal).

At the cheapest level, the DF-31 warhead's primary has a yield of 20-50~ kilotons. An entirely new warhead does not have to be developed, a small number of the warhead design China is currently producing (same yield as the DF-31's and likely a similar primary) can simply be built and not have the secondary activated, making it a decent tactical weapon for low yield response. While in my opinion, dialable yield would be ideal, even just notching it down from 500 to 50 kilotons would still suffice for a proportionate response.

At the end of the day though we will just have to wait and see. If we don't hear anything about it in the next decade, perhaps the assertion from US analysis that China intends to develop low yield warheads can be thrown in the bin with other past over-estimates of the nuclear arsenal, and your assertion will have been proven correct.

I'd like to make clear that I would not criticize China for doing so. I am sure they would only do that after properly weighing the benefits and costs of such weapons, from the political, to economic, to logistical, and then making a decision in line with the priorities and strategy they have set for the country.

I only have made statements in favor of tactical nukes to illustrate the possibility of different outcomes. I think that the CPC properly weighing possibilities in conflict and the decision to create a military capable of diverse actions are what have made the PLA such a strong conventional force. Replicating this capability in the PLA's nuclear force would be beneficial to China, and help it achieve its strategic aims.

Relying on the all-or-nothing deterrence theory, hydrogen bombs for cities-only thinking of Mao's time is no better than having a hierarchichal, Soviet-style conventional force focused on core territorial defense and nothing else: the PLA that was great for defeating the US in Korea or deterring the Soviets but frankly, had no capability to successfully retake Taiwan, which is what the PLA is now focused on doing. It is because the CPC has recognized this for conventional forces that I am inclined to take the rumor the nuclear force is also changing seriously, and can understand the benefits of that decision.

As I said at the top of this post though, I understand the rationale for megaton-level retaliation too. But in my own personal view, if the CPC really does decide to retain this strategy then AR hindered by American intervention will be far more risky than is often thought of on this forum, and the outcome will not be assured. Thus I state my opinion in favor of what I view as less risky.

On different note, these types of discussions are very intertwined with a broader Taiwan contingency and regional war, and don't always exclusively pertain to nuclear weapons themselves. I wonder if a PLA Nuclear Deterrence Strategy thread or something might be warranted, similar to how there is a Taiwan Contingency Strategy thread and PLA WestPac Strike Strategy thread.

 

[nativechicken]

I understand that rationale, but I have a very hard time believing the CPC would force itself into such a situation with no way out.

On Tactical Nuclear Weapons
You misunderstand: China’s tactical nuclear weapons were primarily designed to counter Soviet tank blitzkriegs during the Cold War—meant for large-scale ground conflicts. In a defensive war on home soil, China would avoid using strategic nuclear weapons that could cause long-term contamination. Tactical nuclear strikes would only be employed as a last resort.

If the U.S. launches a strategic nuclear attack (e.g., targeting Chinese fleets or mainland ports), China will respond with reciprocal strategic retaliation.

Misconceptions About Chinese Compromise
Your analysis assumes that China, when confronted with aggressive Western provocations, would adopt a weak, compromising stance—downplaying its position to avoid escalation while hoping adversaries show mercy.

This is pure delusion. To the Chinese, such Western thinking reflects a colonial mindset: **"White nations commit atrocities, then seek forgiveness through hollow rituals (e.g., church confessions), pretending their crimes are absolved—only to repeat the cycle."**

China believes in power, not platitudes. Modern China compromises only when utterly outmatched or as a final effort to avert irreversible disaster. Once harm is inflicted, all bets are off. With today’s strength, China will not retreat. It will retaliate equally or escalate unless the aggressor admits fault and offers sufficient reparations.

For example, if the U.S. nukes China, acceptable "reparations" would include:

The U.S. abandoning global hegemony.
Complete withdrawal from Asia (including transferring control of Japan and South Korea to China, with Chinese troops stationed there).
A 20-year U.S. commitment to non-interference.
If rejected, China will escalate nuclear war until mutual annihilation.
China’s War Philosophy
China fights wars on its own terms, not by the enemy’s rules. It prioritizes preventing conflict, as war is the worst outcome. But once war begins, China will mobilize all resources—including nuclear options—to maximize victory. When the U.S. uses nukes, do not assume China will follow Western-defined "limits." It will retaliate in kind.

Taiwan: The Red Line
The West labels China’s reunification with Taiwan as "aggression." But in China’s view, U.S.-led Western interference 70+ years ago disrupted unification. If the U.S. intervenes again, China will settle both historical and current grievances—even if it means confronting NATO.

The Korean War (中国立国之战, "War of National Foundation") secured China’s security and status for decades. Now, after 40 years of peace, the world assumes China only protests but won’t act. The West, inflated by Cold War victories, disrespects major powers like China and Russia. China now needs a "War of Deterrence" to secure peace for the next century.

This war would mark:

China’s ascent to global leadership.
The collapse of 400 years of Western-dominated world order.
A multipolar era with no single hegemon.
The U.S. can avoid this by pushing for Taiwan’s peaceful reunification—its only chance to preserve power for 30+ years.

Survival or Annihilation
If China loses this war, the U.S.-West alliance will dismantle China (as they did post-USSR Russia), ensuring its permanent fragmentation. If China wins, the U.S. and Europe (if aligned against China) will decline, but China has no interest in destroying or partitioning the U.S.

For China, the next war is existential: total nuclear war with the U.S. is survivable. The U.S. would collapse irreversibly, while China’s post-war resilience would ensure revival.

 

[nativechicken]

No one is suggesting that the PLA build 1,000-3,000 tactical nukes like Russia has, nor even the 500 some tactical weapons the US has. I do not believe this is what they should do, would do, or need to do. China's strategic arsenal itself continues to follow the minimum deterrence posture- the 1,500 warheads will be entirely operational, whereas the US and Russian arsenals are bloated with large numbers of stockpiled warheads (hence them still being double China's projected increased arsenal).

At the cheapest level, the DF-31 warhead's primary has a yield of 20-50~ kilotons. An entirely new warhead does not have to be developed, a small number of the warhead design China is currently producing (same yield as the DF-31's and likely a similar primary) can simply be built and not have the secondary activated, making it a decent tactical weapon for low yield response. While in my opinion, dialable yield would be ideal, even just notching it down from 500 to 50 kilotons would still suffice for a proportionate response.

At the end of the day though we will just have to wait and see. If we don't hear anything about it in the next decade, perhaps the assertion from US analysis that China intends to develop low yield warheads can be thrown in the bin with other past over-estimates of the nuclear arsenal, and your assertion will have been proven correct.

I'd like to make clear that I would not criticize China for doing so. I am sure they would only do that after properly weighing the benefits and costs of such weapons, from the political, to economic, to logistical, and then making a decision in line with the priorities and strategy they have set for the country.

I only have made statements in favor of tactical nukes to illustrate the possibility of different outcomes. I think that the CPC properly weighing possibilities in conflict and the decision to create a military capable of diverse actions are what have made the PLA such a strong conventional force. Replicating this capability in the PLA's nuclear force would be beneficial to China, and help it achieve its strategic aims.

Relying on the all-or-nothing deterrence theory, hydrogen bombs for cities-only thinking of Mao's time is no better than having a hierarchichal, Soviet-style conventional force focused on core territorial defense and nothing else: the PLA that was great for defeating the US in Korea or deterring the Soviets but frankly, had no capability to successfully retake Taiwan, which is what the PLA is now focused on doing. It is because the CPC has recognized this for conventional forces that I am inclined to take the rumor the nuclear force is also changing seriously, and can understand the benefits of that decision.

As I said at the top of this post though, I understand the rationale for megaton-level retaliation too. But in my own personal view, if the CPC really does decide to retain this strategy then AR hindered by American intervention will be far more risky than is often thought of on this forum, and the outcome will not be assured. Thus I state my opinion in favor of what I view as less risky.

On different note, these types of discussions are very intertwined with a broader Taiwan contingency and regional war, and don't always exclusively pertain to nuclear weapons themselves. I wonder if a PLA Nuclear Deterrence Strategy thread or something might be warranted, similar to how there is a Taiwan Contingency Strategy thread and PLA WestPac Strike Strategy thread.

The difference between Chinese and Western thinking lies in this: From our perspective, most Westerners are overly short-sighted. China, with its long history and experience of warfare, understands the true nature and consequences of war deeply. Only in a state of extreme foolishness would China isolate the consequences of war—focusing solely on short-term gains while ignoring the collective interests of the nation and its people.

The most fundamental divergence is this:
China has no inherent interest in obstructing the development of other nations, provided they do not interfere with China’s own progress. Peaceful competition between nations is acceptable, but China detests and opposes zero-sum mentalities and hegemonic practices (i.e., "winner-takes-all"). For the Chinese, the long-term development of a nation must be rooted in peaceful coexistence and mutual benefit. Pursuing hegemony, in China’s view, is the primary cause of a powerful nation’s rapid decline.

The Chinese are acutely aware of the differences between themselves and the West, recognizing that Westerners fail to grasp their perspective. Westerners tend to frame the consequences of their own mistakes as temporary concessions, portraying them as "magnanimity" or "goodwill" toward adversaries. Yet, whenever new opportunities arise, they repeat aggressive strategies. Look at the Russia-Ukraine conflict: from the first Minsk Agreement to recent so-called ceasefires, each has served as a pause to regroup for even harsher attacks (eroding Russia’s core security interests).

The West treats China the same way. Thus, China harbors no illusions that compromise will buy respite before history repeats.

A Pivotal Military Doctrine: "One War to Decide Everything"
Within Chinese military circles, a prevailing view holds that a single decisive war must secure peace for decades. Limited or temporary conflicts cannot deter the U.S. and Western alliances (like NATO) from continued provocations.

Understand this: China and the West approach future wars from entirely different premises. The U.S. seeks to "test" China opportunistically, retreating after failure to wait for the next chance. China aims to resolve issues permanently, fighting until the U.S. dares not provoke China’s periphery again.

Key Clarifications:

**"China does not fight proxy wars"** and **"One war to decide the outcome"** are not mere slogans coined by netizens. These are formal national defense strategies, explicitly explained by senior military figures via public channels.
"No proxy wars" means China is prepared to strike directly at the mastermind behind regional provocations—the U.S.
"One war to decide the outcome" signifies China’s readiness to wage high-intensity, crippling warfare, ensuring the adversary (the U.S.) refrains from挑衅 for decades. This implies:
The total annihilation of the U.S. Pacific Fleet in conventional warfare.
Global targeting of U.S. naval forces until it retreats to North America.
Asian participants (e.g., Japan) facing severe consequences. Post-war, Japan might regain true independence (free from U.S. control) only if it remains neutral.
On Nuclear War:

China will not initiate nuclear conflict, as its conventional forces can already ensure U.S. defeat.
If the U.S. launches nuclear strikes, China will retaliate with absolute proportionality:
Nuclear attacks on Chinese fleets ➔ Nuclear eradication of U.S. naval forces.
Nuclear strikes on Chinese mainland bases ➔ Nuclear strikes on U.S. homeland bases.
Escalation to all-out nuclear war ➔ China guarantees the U.S. is destroyed in the exchange.
This is the resolve behind China’s Foreign Minister declaring, "We will match any form of warfare." China has always operated under this logic.

A Final Note:
The world should be grateful China is a relatively restrained power. If China treated the U.S. the way the U.S. treats China today—and possessed America’s current industrial and technological might—it would have already started a hot war.