China ICBM/SLBM, nuclear arms thread

[plawolf]

It's very possible the relationship would be already damaged for years to come simply by way of the conventional war.

My understanding is that China has long accepted the possibility of nuclear strikes on Japan or South Korea given the past development of the DF-21A and its deployment in the eastern half of the country (i.e. not for use against India).

But I have heard this sentiment earlier in the thread. I'm curious, is this idea that nuclear attacks in the 1IC would be unacceptable common among Chinese officials, analysts, PLA watchers, etc.?



If China gives itself the mere option to follow the escalation ladder (as I stated, they can still respond with megaton strikes if they wish to), then they can climb back down.

Limiting itself to a single response option, and one whose next step is armageddon at that, would be like having no choice but to back down or jump off the roof.

I understand that rationale, but I have a very hard time believing the CPC would force itself into such a situation with no way out.

Especially if it is moving away from legacy military thinking like people's war, and trying to adapt such concepts to modern conditions, departing from sole emphasis on the psychological nature of nuclear weapons and their relation to imperialist strategy and instead creating a nuclear arsenal more in line with the demands of modern geopolitics would make sense.

Tactical nuclear weapons can have the same deterrence effect as strategic weapons. Note that NATO was successfully deterred from giving Ukraine F-16, ATACMS, etc. for so long by the threat of Russian tactical strikes (that Putin and others in the Russian government made very clear) that by the time they actually transferred them, they were useless and made no difference on the battlefield. Ukrainian officials have spoken of this issue, specifically blaming NATO for its cowardice. This shows tactical nuclear weapons can have a deterrence effect, and do not necessarily encourage escalation.



No one is suggesting that the PLA build 1,000-3,000 tactical nukes like Russia has, nor even the 500 some tactical weapons the US has. I do not believe this is what they should do, would do, or need to do. China's strategic arsenal itself continues to follow the minimum deterrence posture- the 1,500 warheads will be entirely operational, whereas the US and Russian arsenals are bloated with large numbers of stockpiled warheads (hence them still being double China's projected increased arsenal).

At the cheapest level, the DF-31 warhead's primary has a yield of 20-50~ kilotons. An entirely new warhead does not have to be developed, a small number of the warhead design China is currently producing (same yield as the DF-31's and likely a similar primary) can simply be built and not have the secondary activated, making it a decent tactical weapon for low yield response. While in my opinion, dialable yield would be ideal, even just notching it down from 500 to 50 kilotons would still suffice for a proportionate response.

At the end of the day though we will just have to wait and see. If we don't hear anything about it in the next decade, perhaps the assertion from US analysis that China intends to develop low yield warheads can be thrown in the bin with other past over-estimates of the nuclear arsenal, and your assertion will have been proven correct.

I'd like to make clear that I would not criticize China for doing so. I am sure they would only do that after properly weighing the benefits and costs of such weapons, from the political, to economic, to logistical, and then making a decision in line with the priorities and strategy they have set for the country.

I only have made statements in favor of tactical nukes to illustrate the possibility of different outcomes. I think that the CPC properly weighing possibilities in conflict and the decision to create a military capable of diverse actions are what have made the PLA such a strong conventional force. Replicating this capability in the PLA's nuclear force would be beneficial to China, and help it achieve its strategic aims.

Relying on the all-or-nothing deterrence theory, hydrogen bombs for cities-only thinking of Mao's time is no better than having a hierarchichal, Soviet-style conventional force focused on core territorial defense and nothing else: the PLA that was great for defeating the US in Korea or deterring the Soviets but frankly, had no capability to successfully retake Taiwan, which is what the PLA is now focused on doing. It is because the CPC has recognized this for conventional forces that I am inclined to take the rumor the nuclear force is also changing seriously, and can understand the benefits of that decision.

As I said at the top of this post though, I understand the rationale for megaton-level retaliation too. But in my own personal view, if the CPC really does decide to retain this strategy then AR hindered by American intervention will be far more risky than is often thought of on this forum, and the outcome will not be assured. Thus I state my opinion in favor of what I view as less risky.

On different note, these types of discussions are very intertwined with a broader Taiwan contingency and regional war, and don't always exclusively pertain to nuclear weapons themselves. I wonder if a PLA Nuclear Deterrence Strategy thread or something might be warranted, similar to how there is a Taiwan Contingency Strategy thread and PLA WestPac Strike Strategy thread.

Chinese thinking on nuclear weapons is clear and simple, and has been for decades.

Nuclear weapons should not be used under any circumstances short of a hard reset of the entire human race back to the Stone Age.

The entirety of Chinese nuclear doctrine and investment is thus focused around this single objective of effectively deterring hostile forces from ever thinking about using nuclear weapons against Chinese targets.

In the past, China made do with minimal credible deterrence when it believed American leaders thought and behaved rationally. Now that the American leaders have successfully pursued China that they are neither intelligence nor rational, Chinese nuclear procurement has skyrocketed to aim to achieve overkill in MAD, with the last hope that even if American leaders are stupid and irrational, at least they are not suicidal.

This is why China doesn’t bother with tactical nuclear weapons. The whole point is to not play those stupid games at all. You use tactical nukes on China, you eat multiple strategic ones back in response. The whole point is to make it beyond any possible doubt that the next step is total global nuclear MAD. No ‘it’s’ or ‘but’s’. That’s your one and only off-ramp if you are truly moronic enough to cross that Rubicon, take the L and fuck off with the nukes, or China glasses your entire continent and bet that it’s own nuclear survival countermeasures are better than yours so the Chinese civilisation survives to rule the nuclear wasteland.

This may seem crude, but that is because Chinese strategic thinkers have already concluded that every nuclear exchange between nuclear powers inevitably leads to total global nuclear MAD no matter how many steps you have in between. If either side thinks they can ‘win’ a limited nuclear exchange without going full MAD, then they will keep pushing the envelope until full MAD happens.

The only way to off-ramp global MAD after the first nuke has exploded is to respond with such overwhelming overkill that the only response the other guy has left is to either stop there and then, or go to full MAD.

Tactical nukes adds zero value to that strategy, which is why China has zero interest in them.

The only exception would be truly terrifying. Because the only value tactical nukes would have for China is as first strike weapons for counterforce applications. That means that China would have concluded American leaders have achieved the unholy trifecta if being stupid, irrational and suicidal. Meaning given the choice between taking the L and going out in a nuclear blaze if glory, they would choose MAD and death over defeat. If that was the consensus, then the only viable option for China is to develop and deploy basically Star Wars, national BMD, and full counterforce first strike capabilities to minimise the damage it will sustain from a full global nuclear MAD exchange. So I hope you can agree with me that I desperately hope China never develops tactical nukes.

 

[chlosy]

China is to develop and deploy basically Star Wars, national BMD, and full counterforce first strike capabilities

Chinese thinking on nuclear weapons is clear and simple, and has been for decades.

Nuclear weapons should not be used under any circumstances short of a hard reset of the entire human race back to the Stone Age.

The entirety of Chinese nuclear doctrine and investment is thus focused around this single objective of effectively deterring hostile forces from ever thinking about using nuclear weapons against Chinese targets.

In the past, China made do with minimal credible deterrence when it believed American leaders thought and behaved rationally. Now that the American leaders have successfully pursued China that they are neither intelligence nor rational, Chinese nuclear procurement has skyrocketed to aim to achieve overkill in MAD, with the last hope that even if American leaders are stupid and irrational, at least they are not suicidal.

This is why China doesn’t bother with tactical nuclear weapons. The whole point is to not play those stupid games at all. You use tactical nukes on China, you eat multiple strategic ones back in response. The whole point is to make it beyond any possible doubt that the next step is total global nuclear MAD. No ‘it’s’ or ‘but’s’. That’s your one and only off-ramp if you are truly moronic enough to cross that Rubicon, take the L and fuck off with the nukes, or China glasses your entire continent and bet that it’s own nuclear survival countermeasures are better than yours so the Chinese civilisation survives to rule the nuclear wasteland.

This may seem crude, but that is because Chinese strategic thinkers have already concluded that every nuclear exchange between nuclear powers inevitably leads to total global nuclear MAD no matter how many steps you have in between. If either side thinks they can ‘win’ a limited nuclear exchange without going full MAD, then they will keep pushing the envelope until full MAD happens.

The only way to off-ramp global MAD after the first nuke has exploded is to respond with such overwhelming overkill that the only response the other guy has left is to either stop there and then, or go to full MAD.

Tactical nukes adds zero value to that strategy, which is why China has zero interest in them.

The only exception would be truly terrifying. Because the only value tactical nukes would have for China is as first strike weapons for counterforce applications. That means that China would have concluded American leaders have achieved the unholy trifecta if being stupid, irrational and suicidal. Meaning given the choice between taking the L and going out in a nuclear blaze if glory, they would choose MAD and death over defeat. If that was the consensus, then the only viable option for China is to develop and deploy basically Star Wars, national BMD, and full counterforce first strike capabilities to minimise the damage it will sustain from a full global nuclear MAD exchange. So I hope you can agree with me that I desperately hope China never develops tactical nukes.

"China is to develop and deploy basically Star Wars, national BMD, and full counterforce first strike capabilities"
If whichever country "wins" a nuclear war, can it survive the ensuing nuclear winter? Or a nuclear winter is just science fiction?

 

[plawolf]

China is to develop and deploy basically Star Wars, national BMD, and full counterforce first strike capabilities

"China is to develop and deploy basically Star Wars, national BMD, and full counterforce first strike capabilities"
If whichever country "wins" a nuclear war, can it survive the ensuing nuclear winter? Or a nuclear winter is just science fiction?

Nuclear winter isn’t sci-fi, but the question on how likely to survive it is not straight forwards, since that’s directly dependent on the severity of the global nuclear exchanges, the amount of damage you suffered from those exchanges, and the extent to which you prepared for the nuclear winter beforehand.

But I think the primary objective, if China was to go full counterforce, would be to minimise enemy retaliatory strikes by destroying their nukes on the ground/under water or in space, before they detonate. If China can achieve actual effective counterforce, then there might not be a nuclear winter if China limits the extent of its own counter value nuclear strikes.

But even this is a highly dangerous line of thought, as its basically falling into the same logical fallacy as I warned about before, where any serious plan to use nukes, no matter how limited, against another nuclear power, basically ends up at global nuclear MAD before you even know it.

Under the very best possible scenario, you might win and not trigger a global nuclear winter, but that’s basically winning the lottery jackpot level of odds where everything goes according to plan and even Lady Luck favours you on every 50-50.

Personally, I would argue that if you find yourself in the nightmare scenario where you think opfor will actually choose MAD over not using nukes, then the only logical choice is to build underground fallout cities and plan to spend the next thousand years underground until the nuclear winter and radiation all fucks off so life on the surface is viable again. Or you wait out the crazies to have the fight when more rational opfor leaders are in power.

In a sense, I am relatively relaxed about the prospect of China launching AR unprovoked within the next 4 years, since Trump is enough of a wildcard that I don’t think Beijing can say with any degree of confidence that they find remotely acceptable that Trump won’t choose MAD over loosing a conventional war against China.

Yes, Trump isn’t a true believer fanatic, but he does have a habit of living in his own alternative reality to everyone else. So while he may not actively choose nuclear MAD, it’s too easy to see him blundering into it through sheer arrogance and ignorance.

 

[SunlitZelkova]

You misunderstand

I seek to understand, but find your explanation a bit confusing.

China believes in power, not platitudes. Modern China compromises only when utterly outmatched or as a final effort to avert irreversible disaster. Once harm is inflicted, all bets are off. With today’s strength, China will not retreat. It will retaliate equally or escalate unless the aggressor admits fault and offers sufficient reparations.

For example, if the U.S. nukes China, acceptable "reparations" would include:
[...]
China’s War Philosophy
China fights wars on its own terms, not by the enemy’s rules. It prioritizes preventing conflict, as war is the worst outcome. But once war begins, China will mobilize all resources—including nuclear options—to maximize victory. When the U.S. uses nukes, do not assume China will follow Western-defined "limits." It will retaliate in kind.

China has no inherent interest in obstructing the development of other nations, provided they do not interfere with China’s own progress. Peaceful competition between nations is acceptable, but China detests and opposes zero-sum mentalities and hegemonic practices (i.e., "winner-takes-all"). For the Chinese, the long-term development of a nation must be rooted in peaceful coexistence and mutual benefit.

These statements seem conflicting. Does China's opposition to zero-sum mentality and hegemonic practices end if a shooting war begins? I am asking this sincerely. I do not doubt your convictions or the truth of what you say, my understanding is simply hindered by this contradiction.

Transfer of "control" of Japan and South Korea to China would itself be a hegemonic act, and fighting wars by its term alone, with no consideration of the enemy, is a zero-sum mentality.

If that is truly the Chinese war philosophy, I can't imagine a war with the US being won unless the PLAGF rolls into Washington D.C.

China will not initiate nuclear conflict, as its conventional forces can already ensure U.S. defeat.
If the U.S. launches nuclear strikes, China will retaliate with absolute proportionality:
[...]
This is the resolve behind China’s Foreign Minister declaring, "We will match any form of warfare." China has always operated under this logic.

If China does desire to match any form of warfare, developing a smaller number of low yield warheads would benefit the execution of this strategy.

If a 500 kiloton warhead is used on San Diego Naval Base in retaliation for a 50 kiloton warhead used on Zhanjiang Naval Base, that is not matching the enemy form of warfare; it is surpassing it.

There is nothing wrong with surpassing the enemy actions in the course of retaliation, but it should be recognized that this could have the opposite effect on the enemy- hardening their resolve and inviting further strikes on China.

Note that this dynamic is already in play with the hypothetical American decision to use tactical nuclear weapons: Instead of the massive Chinese conventional victory persuading the US to sue for peace, it instead has caused it to use tactical nuclear weapons. An overwhelming response will not necessarily be conducive to forcing surrender.

It is hard to fathom, but there is a difference between a tactical weapon destroying Pearl Harbor, and a megaton weapon destroying that base but taking Honolulu along with it. China can do that if it wishes to, but as a matter of fact, such an action would not constitute "matching any form of warfare."

The entirety of Chinese nuclear doctrine and investment is thus focused around this single objective of effectively deterring hostile forces from ever thinking about using nuclear weapons against Chinese targets.

This is true, but this doctrine was developed at the same time that China was focused on defensive warfare and deterrence against land incursions, potentially coming from the direction of Korea, Vietnam, India, and the Soviet Union.

China now intends to go on the offensive to retake territory that is still under nominal Western-control. A strategy designed to prevent an enemy offensive into China, specifically areas actually controlled by the CPC, will not be effective if the goal is to prevent certain enemy defensive actions, carried out in the context of a Chinese offensive against this enemy (which has been occupying Chinese territory that shall be liberated).

This is why China doesn’t bother with tactical nuclear weapons. [...]

This may seem crude, but that is because Chinese strategic thinkers have already concluded that every nuclear exchange between nuclear powers inevitably leads to total global nuclear MAD no matter how many steps you have in between. [...]

What you have described does not sound like a change in strategy at all. The same strategy was used from the creation of China's nuclear arsenal until now, but simply with a smaller force that was deemed sufficient to deter the enemy. It's not like during the days of the 250-warhead arsenal, China's plan was to launch all of their weapons just because of a single tactical nuclear strike from the US.

If the enemy was not deterred by China's 250 some weapons, employed with a strategy of "one large-scale strike as a final warning, then a full-exchange," neither would they be deterred with the same employment method but 1,500 weapons. Realistically, the US population and economy is concentrated in such small areas American society would not have survived a strike from 200~ weapons anyways. If they truly intend to fight China directly, 1,500 makes no difference to them.

Increasing the size of the arsenal is an effective peace-time deterrence strategy. But the number of nukes alone will not ensure deterrence in the midst of a conventional war. This is why the Soviets and Americans possessed tactical nuclear weapons; to have a battlefield deterrent complimentary to the strategic deterrent.

I am not saying China needs a tactical arsenal the same size as the American one, rather that any tactical arsenal, even if miniscule, does have utility as a deterrent.

Finally, there is no "one deterrence strategy to rule them all." If the minimum deterrence doctrine (250-400~ warheads) was not effective in deterring the US, then so too is it possible that the doctrine with 1,500 strategic-size-only warheads will not be effective in deterring the US.

In this case, it may make sense to further procure nuclear weapons by developing tactical ones. Note that Russia has been shown to have effectively deterred NATO in the Ukraine conflict with both its tactical and strategic weapons, despite intense calls for direct intervention among American and European hawks. This is evidence that tactical nuclear weapons do not inherently invite escalation, and can be an effective part of deterrence.

Chinese thinking on nuclear weapons is clear and simple, and has been for decades.

This is a separate issue from the tactical nuclear weapons discussion, but I disagree on this point. Apart from minimum deterrence doctrine and the no first use policy, not much is "known" in the sense of being supported by concrete evidence. A Science of Military Campaigns (I think that is the title) document from the Second Artillery Corps gives more details, but apart from that a lot of what you, I, and everyone else in this thread says is speculation.

I recall visiting this forum when the rumors of silo construction began, mainly from American sources, and it was downplayed as wind farms and Western fear-mongering. Even many Western analysts rejected the claim as hysteria. Then when the claim that they were silos become more credible, rationale was inferred and the construction was accepted- not only by pro-China PLA watchers, but by Western arms control analysts too.

Such speculation seems to be the nature of PLA watching. For example, I have seen discussion of the tactical role of certain naval vessels split between those who think mainly in terms of utility to a Taiwan contingency, and those who think mainly in terms of global power projection (especially in discussions about the vulnerability/cost effectiveness of the 075). Those who adopt both positions exist as well.

As I have stated before, my intention in defending tactical nuclear weapons is not to argue that China needs them, but rather that if they do wind up actually making some, there is a rationale behind it besides going all in on a nuclear exchange or accepting the inevitability of nuclear war. China still expects to retake Taiwan without blowing up half the Northern Hemisphere, even if they procure a certain weapon system.

But as much as we can argue in favor or against tactical nukes, we won't actually know China's intentions until the systems appear... or they don't. As with every other rumored PLA system. I just don't think the possibility of tactical nukes should be discarded simply because it doesn't match with pre-existing doctrine and theory.

 

[nativechicken]

I seek to understand, but find your explanation a bit confusing.

These statements seem conflicting. Does China's opposition to zero-sum mentality and hegemonic practices end if a shooting war begins? I am asking this sincerely. I do not doubt your convictions or the truth of what you say, my understanding is simply hindered by this contradiction.

Transfer of "control" of Japan and South Korea to China would itself be a hegemonic act, and fighting wars by its term alone, with no consideration of the enemy, is a zero-sum mentality.

If that is truly the Chinese war philosophy, I can't imagine a war with the US being won unless the PLAGF rolls into Washington D.C.

China has always had a win-win mindset. The zero-sum mindset mainly belongs to the US now. The war between China and the US is a direct contest of strength. If control can be maintained during the process with manageable sunk costs for both sides, there's still a chance for win-win cooperation after the war. If uncontrolled, the consequences between China and the US would likely be extinction-level.

Regarding whether China taking control of Japan and South Korea constitutes hegemony - this reflects East-West cultural differences. China needs postwar control mainly to prevent their governments from continuing to be manipulated by the US and the West to provoke regional conflicts against China. This follows the same logic as Russia needing to control Ukraine and neighboring countries, or the US controlling Canada and Mexico. These are protective measures to prevent geopolitical crises being forcibly escalated by external powers, similar to how the US handled the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Japan and South Korea serve as America's tools for intervention and stirring regional conflicts in Asia. As long as US influence exists, under Western geopolitical theories, China's periphery will forever face contradictions and conflicts. Therefore, China must completely eliminate US influence in Japan, South Korea and Asia.

The US operates oppositely. As a continental power (essentially a super-island), it forcibly controls Eurasia (since controlling Eurasia means controlling the world). For maritime powers to penetrate land powers, they need vassal states as proxies. When necessary to maintain hegemony, these proxies become America's war agents to confront regional powers.

Thus Japan and South Korea have always been US tools to contain China and Asian powers - disposable pieces for exhausting China when needed. The US wants these countries to wage wars of attrition, enabling arms sales while forcing vassals to surrender more national interests and bind tighter to America's war machine - exactly Ukraine's current situation.

China's control of Japan/South Korea aims for Asian stability and joint development (the China-Japan-South Korea economic integration concept originated from Japan, not Chinese economic colonization). US control treats them as economic blood bags and war pawns. Therefore US control embodies hegemony while Chinese control represents peace and win-win.

Westerners misunderstanding Chinese intentions as global domination using Japan/Korea as springboards reflects cultural differences. China's cultural core stems from agricultural civilization, forming a family-nation concept focused on cultivating and developing one's own land - hence concepts like "Middle Kingdom" and "returning to roots". Wherever China develops, it engages in productive cultivation and local development, fundamentally different from Western colonial plunder culture.

China's 2000-year feudal society shaped big-government governance concepts - good governance means people developing through the state which cares for everyone. These concepts don't exist in Western societies that historically favor small governments. Chinese netizens extensively discuss these differences.

China inherently lacks expansionist desires. Firstly, its massive size already maintains internal balance - further expansion would bring instability risks. Secondly, traditional Chinese governance requires massive long-term investments in new frontiers to achieve true stability - needing century-long support and multi-generational efforts to form national consensus. Otherwise, conquered lands become sources of chaos and internal consumption. With its long history and current universal education, virtually every Chinese understands this.

Thus China has no need to invade neighbors. Domestic public would never agree to subsidize backward neighboring countries through cultural assimilation and economic aid. Excessive resource allocation to occupied territories would destabilize China. China's current demands simply claim what was affirmed post-WWII - not one inch less. Anyone interfering will face China's life-and-death resistance.

You must understand Chinese people's sentiments. Do you know about China's WWI history? Though a victor, China continued to be carved up by powers - this remains one of modern China's greatest humiliations. For WWII's fruits - China's victory bought with 30 million lives - anyone attempting secession today will face total Chinese resistance. Otherwise it would repeat the WWI humiliation.

After all this, I hope you understand China's national sentiments. It's two sides of a coin: we'll strive maximally for peace, but once war becomes unavoidable, a century's accumulated fury will completely unleash on our opponents. We'll ensure opponents endure immense suffering (America should prepare for hundreds of thousands of military losses, even national destruction) to engrave this lesson in global memory for a century - showing the consequences of challenging China.

This Sino-US war will reshape the world. We don't fear fighting it - we worry America will hide remotely while pushing proxies to provoke. China doesn't want to fight US proxies (pointless), but to confront America directly. The US knows this well, hence recent deployments. America's global conduct shows besides the Middle East, without nuclear weapons it couldn't directly confront China or Russia. Against China, America only clings to nuclear superiority illusions.

 

[nativechicken]

If China does desire to match any form of warfare, developing a smaller number of low yield warheads would benefit the execution of this strategy.

If a 500 kiloton warhead is used on San Diego Naval Base in retaliation for a 50 kiloton warhead used on Zhanjiang Naval Base, that is not matching the enemy form of warfare; it is surpassing it.

There is nothing wrong with surpassing the enemy actions in the course of retaliation, but it should be recognized that this could have the opposite effect on the enemy- hardening their resolve and inviting further strikes on China.

Note that this dynamic is already in play with the hypothetical American decision to use tactical nuclear weapons: Instead of the massive Chinese conventional victory persuading the US to sue for peace, it instead has caused it to use tactical nuclear weapons. An overwhelming response will not necessarily be conducive to forcing surrender.

It is hard to fathom, but there is a difference between a tactical weapon destroying Pearl Harbor, and a megaton weapon destroying that base but taking Honolulu along with it. China can do that if it wishes to, but as a matter of fact, such an action would not constitute "matching any form of warfare."

Let me reiterate. Your way of thinking is not China's. China will never think according to the Western logic you represent.

First, regarding wars instigated by the US and Western countries - China's current theater-available conventional forces already surpass America's deployable military resources. China has verbally pledged never to use nuclear weapons first under any circumstances. So whoever escalates to nuclear war isn't China. Chinese people would be astonished by your question: Why should we, when you keep provoking and attacking, be restricted to limited counterattacks without expanding retaliation?

You're overcomplicating things (and misunderstanding Chinese). Many think Russia is the "fighting nation." Have you heard what Russian scholars say? They tell Chinese: Compared to you, Chinese are the real fighting nation.

China strives for peace whenever possible. If peace fails, that's fine too - all rules will be redefined through force. Whether China's word counts will be proven through fighting. If America punches China, China will punch back equally. It's your stupidity. China has no interest in playing children's war games. Once China dares flip the table, consequences won't be considered. You didn't grasp my previous message: This is China's survival war. America still thinks it can play its old tricks - advance three steps, retreat two, then repeat? Want to dictate war intensity? You're utterly wrong. If America uses only conventional force, China might play along. But with nuclear weapons, the war's nature changes completely: Unless America immediately abandons all Asian/global interests and retreats home, China will retaliate beyond America's wildest imagination. China fears no escalation - nuclear war means total annihilation. If China must perish, America will perish too.

Let me spell it out: The China-US contest is about rule-making, including rules of war escalation. The Western "rule" is "we can provoke you anytime, but you can't overreact." China's new rule is "fighting is bad - let's coexist and prosper together. If you insist on fighting, I'll make you regret it."

There's a military anecdote reflecting Chinese thinking: When China was first invited to UN peacekeeping (during financial hardship), Chinese military proposed sending one or two divisions. The UN panicked: "What are you doing?" Chinese were confused: "Aren't we supposed to separate warring sides? Shouldn't we position troops between them, suppress whoever fires first, and force negotiations?" This shows China's peacekeeping philosophy. Hence China detests Western Cold War-era practices - not peacekeeping, but unilaterally funding troublemakers for geopolitical gains.

Chinese society deeply resents this, but benefited from US-led globalization so tolerated it. Now everything's changed: America won't allow China's continued development, seeking to exclude China from global economy. Chinese know clearly - if defeated, America would economically blockade and militarily threaten China, forcing regression to 1960s-70s conditions. China fully understands the devastation if this succeeds.

I restate: China's 5,000-year civilization has endured constant wars. Western attempts to inflict similar damage (as they did to Russia and others) risk triggering China's internal collapse. Do you know the historical consequences of such turmoil? Halving or losing 80% of population.

Do you comprehend? Western pirate-colonial mentality only seeks short-term gains, while China considers long-term consequences. This scale of chaos equals nuclear strike on China (reiterating: 50-80% population loss). Now understand why China will fight desperately, even with nukes? Because losing means death.

America faces similar stakes. At its current size and internal decay, defeating China might extend US dominance 30-50 years. Otherwise, America will collapse quickly too. If China wins, America loses global hegemony - dollar/military/financial dominance gone. The US would disintegrate or never recover. China has experienced multiple rises and falls over millennia, knowing how to resurge. But since the Age of Sail, Western power only transfers between nations - none ever regained dominance.

Finally, ancient military history: Duke Huan of Qi liked your proposed war model - it destroyed his state. To Chinese, your Western-style warfare reflects incompetent military strategy - only one word fits: childish. When China's being mild, playing chess with you, this works. On real battlefields (when tables flip), such warfare is a joke.

Westerners studying war: Don't impose your logic on opponents. First understand China's political-military traditions. Applying Western logic to Chinese war philosophy is wrong; demanding China fight by Western rules is laughable.

 

[nativechicken]

What you have described does not sound like a change in strategy at all. The same strategy was used from the creation of China's nuclear arsenal until now, but simply with a smaller force that was deemed sufficient to deter the enemy. It's not like during the days of the 250-warhead arsenal, China's plan was to launch all of their weapons just because of a single tactical nuclear strike from the US.

If the enemy was not deterred by China's 250 some weapons, employed with a strategy of "one large-scale strike as a final warning, then a full-exchange," neither would they be deterred with the same employment method but 1,500 weapons. Realistically, the US population and economy is concentrated in such small areas American society would not have survived a strike from 200~ weapons anyways. If they truly intend to fight China directly, 1,500 makes no difference to them.

Increasing the size of the arsenal is an effective peace-time deterrence strategy. But the number of nukes alone will not ensure deterrence in the midst of a conventional war. This is why the Soviets and Americans possessed tactical nuclear weapons; to have a battlefield deterrent complimentary to the strategic deterrent.

I am not saying China needs a tactical arsenal the same size as the American one, rather that any tactical arsenal, even if miniscule, does have utility as a deterrent.

Finally, there is no "one deterrence strategy to rule them all." If the minimum deterrence doctrine (250-400~ warheads) was not effective in deterring the US, then so too is it possible that the doctrine with 1,500 strategic-size-only warheads will not be effective in deterring the US.

In this case, it may make sense to further procure nuclear weapons by developing tactical ones. Note that Russia has been shown to have effectively deterred NATO in the Ukraine conflict with both its tactical and strategic weapons, despite intense calls for direct intervention among American and European hawks. This is evidence that tactical nuclear weapons do not inherently invite escalation, and can be an effective part of deterrence.

China's perspective is this: Before the 1990 Gulf War, your theory about tactical nuclear weapons' value was acceptable to us. That's why China also developed tactical nukes (miniaturized nuclear weapons like neutron bombs).

But after witnessing high-tech warfare in the Gulf War, Chinese military thinkers realized high-tech weapons could partially replace tactical nukes' roles, including deterrence. The West actually used technological superiority and new warfare forms (informationized warfare) to seize control over war intensity and initiation rights - essentially monopolizing the authority to decide when and how wars start while claiming moral justification.

Under this new warfare paradigm, tactical nukes became unnecessary. As area-of-effect weapons from the unguided bomb era, they're far less efficient than modern long-range precision-guided weapons. The political cost of using tactical nukes outweighs any benefits.

Thus in Chinese military doctrine, tactical nukes have lost significance. China focuses on developing advanced long-range precision strike systems instead. From China's view, using tactical nukes only happens when conventional forces are losing desperately - a last-ditch defensive move by the weaker side, like a cornered dog jumping the wall.

Look at the Russia-Ukraine war. Russia only threatened nukes when truly disadvantaged - when European conventional weapons flooded into Ukraine, stretching Russia's overextended forces thin against NATO-backed Ukrainian troops. Now that Russia's regained footing, it's Ukraine and Poland shouting about nukes. Simple logic: winners don't need nuclear threats.

There's persistent rumor that when Russia started the war, China's only red line was: "No nukes. Everything else is your business."

So understand this: Your hypothetical scenario where America uses tactical nukes against Chinese fleets and bases already assumes America's conventional defeat. By that point, America would be fighting obsessively to avoid loss at any cost. China can't back down here - already winning conventionally, facing a nuclear-armed opponent deluded that nuke stockpiles can compensate for battlefield failure by massacring Chinese troops and civilians. In Chinese war ethics, this is pure terrorism - state-level terrorism. Negotiations become impossible. Only total victory remains.

Look at Israel-Palestine conflicts. What did Israel achieve through extreme measures? No sane government surrenders to terrorism.

Any nuclear strike on Chinese soil - tactical or strategic - means no turning back. Most civilians don't distinguish between nuclear types. After being nuked, China would shift to underground operations while public demand for vengeance through strategic nukes (all China's US-capable nukes are strategic) targeting equivalent American assets. Whether America retaliates becomes irrelevant - China would already be planning postwar arrangements.

 

[nativechicken]

This is a separate issue from the tactical nuclear weapons discussion, but I disagree on this point. Apart from minimum deterrence doctrine and the no first use policy, not much is "known" in the sense of being supported by concrete evidence. A Science of Military Campaigns (I think that is the title) document from the Second Artillery Corps gives more details, but apart from that a lot of what you, I, and everyone else in this thread says is speculation.

I recall visiting this forum when the rumors of silo construction began, mainly from American sources, and it was downplayed as wind farms and Western fear-mongering. Even many Western analysts rejected the claim as hysteria. Then when the claim that they were silos become more credible, rationale was inferred and the construction was accepted- not only by pro-China PLA watchers, but by Western arms control analysts too.

Such speculation seems to be the nature of PLA watching. For example, I have seen discussion of the tactical role of certain naval vessels split between those who think mainly in terms of utility to a Taiwan contingency, and those who think mainly in terms of global power projection (especially in discussions about the vulnerability/cost effectiveness of the 075). Those who adopt both positions exist as well.

As I have stated before, my intention in defending tactical nuclear weapons is not to argue that China needs them, but rather that if they do wind up actually making some, there is a rationale behind it besides going all in on a nuclear exchange or accepting the inevitability of nuclear war. China still expects to retake Taiwan without blowing up half the Northern Hemisphere, even if they procure a certain weapon system.

But as much as we can argue in favor or against tactical nukes, we won't actually know China's intentions until the systems appear... or they don't. As with every other rumored PLA system. I just don't think the possibility of tactical nukes should be discarded simply because it doesn't match with pre-existing doctrine and theory.

Regarding China's domestic military research and documentation, I must point out that much of it has limited timeliness and applicability.

Over the past 20 years, China's military capabilities have undergone massive changes. Many old studies are now outdated. For instance, 20 years ago when the J-10 wasn’t even in service, you’d see theories about using swarms of J-8s to exhaust F-22 missiles before counterattacking. Today, those ideas are laughable.

China’s research on nuclear weapons naturally covers all scenarios. But since the late 20th century, Chinese leadership concluded that nuclear war (or world war) was unlikely—and indeed, China hasn’t faced serious nuclear threats for a long time. Much of China’s research followed Western frameworks for years, but I don’t find this meaningful, especially regarding hypothetical conflicts with the U.S.

As I mentioned earlier, China’s tactical nuclear weapons were originally designed to counter the Soviet Union’s potential tank blitz across our vast shared border. Back then, China’s ground forces relied mainly on Type 59 tanks, utterly inadequate against Soviet armored waves and frontline bombers like the Tu-22/Tu-154. The threat from Soviet-controlled Mongolia also left China with indefensibly long borders (similar to Russia’s current dilemma with NATO). Developing tactical nukes (missiles with 300-1,000 km ranges, plus Q-5 attack aircraft with 300 km combat radii) became inevitable.

Tactical nukes were never intended for the U.S. Japan and South Korea aren’t targets either, because China understands they’d only confront us under American coercion. The core issue is resolving the U.S. problem.

If China’s homeland suffers a U.S. nuclear strike, retaliation must directly target the U.S. mainland. All Chinese strategic weapons capable of hitting U.S. soil are precisely for this purpose. America’s reliance on proxy states for short-range nukes against China doesn’t matter—China focuses on the act’s essence: a nuclear attack on a nuclear power’s homeland. China’s proportional response would strike the U.S. mainland with yields multiplied severalfold or even dozens of times. We aim to inflict unbearable pain to prevent repetition, not play turn-based card games.

Let me add: From China’s perspective, the U.S. has a thousand ways to de-escalate peacefully—all more effective than your fantasy of attacking China while restricting retaliation. This approach reflects stubborn refusal to admit defeat. If China followed such logic, it’d mean surrendering to the opponent’s rules, leaving ourselves perpetually vulnerable to exploitation once weaknesses are exposed.

The U.S. wants controlled, minor provocations? China rejects this entirely. Why let America toy with us repeatedly?