China ICBM/SLBM, nuclear arms thread

[Biscuits]

Which means if you pour water into the DF-41, DF-31, and other solid fuel missiles, it will be very easy to find out. That’s why I suspect either Xi deliberately turned a blind eye to it (for whatever weird and unknown reason), or the who thing has been exaggerated by the US IC. The only rocket I can plausibly image having water replacing fuel during storage would be DF-5. But there aren’t that many DF-5 in service in the first place. And if the commissars at the DF-5 storage sites DO fill their missiles with water, it would be a serious offense, way more than simply economic corruption. Thus, I still find the whole water tank saga weird. I am not saying corruption is right, but there are so many other ways for officers to gain corrupt money and illicit favours in the PLA other than filling your own missiles with water. It is also for this reason why I think the shabby construction/tofu materials at the missile silos (which is not that hard to fix given China’s massive capacities in construction businesses) make a lot more sense than the water filling saga.

Why you would even bother to talk about something that has 0 credibility is beyond me. Now I don't frequent US defense forums, but I doubt they spend multiple pages arguing for or disproving NK or Iranian delusions on what US military systems do or what Ansarallah considers US aircraft carriers to be filled with.

It's re-election propaganda to downplay the fact that US has failed in its China invasion preparations, and that Biden has no capability to credibly threaten China in the near future.

 

[Biscuits]

Some concerns:

1. Lack of nuclear doctrine

Chinese official nuclear doctrine didn't change much between 1960s and 2020s. Come on, they are pretending business still as usual while approaching parity with US/RU in early 2030s. It is not nuclear posture works and they should change it.

2. Lack of survivable NC3

For example, airborne nuclear command is essential to flexibility and credibility of nuclear deterrence, I see no such plane yet. You can't rely on ground-based radio station in a nuclear war. And they should upgrade their strategic comms satellites soon.

3. No show of strength

Can you believe that PLARF never shows a real DF-41 apart from 2019 parade. Yeah it is what happens right now. Nuclear deterrence is to show your adversary that they have to take unacceptable loss in a nuclear war therefore you have to show they how. PLARF is hiding every advanced missiles from spotlight and roll outs old DF-11, DF-15 every time. Jesus, can someone imagine that PLAAF release J-7G and J-8F only all day long in 2024

4. No nationwide exercise

PLARF operates at a rather local stance compared to NATO/Russia who has annual nuclear exercise to practice coordinated strike/counter-strike. Meanwhile PLARF exercise is all about "I am the fastest kid in launching" or "mom I live in a tunnel for 3 weeks long" and I am not even kidding, anti-fatigue exercise in a tunnel is an essential part of their training.

In case if someone is asking "how do you know have all these stuffs, what if they have but don't show us." They should, it is their job to showcase their readiness to achieve deterrence.

What exactly should they do different then? "show of force" is for countries that need nuclear shows of force and can't rely on conventional capability. It's also for countries who are afraid of war and need to hang on to peace at any cost, even at the cost of revealing sensitive capabilities.

China launches more ballistic missiles every year than any country except Russia. Whichever drills they do are clearly sufficient to keep developing more and more platforms...

There is no point to empty huffing and puffing. That's what countries like UK or NK with only a few hundred warheads need to do, run around internationally and tell everyone how "we totally have a credible deterrent guys!!" "look at the yearly submarine patrol!". China already has assured global deterrence since many decades ago, it's not worried about looking strong, but worried about how to silently get a leg up on it's competitors.

 

[bustead]

Some concerns:

1. Lack of nuclear doctrine

Chinese official nuclear doctrine didn't change much between 1960s and 2020s. Come on, they are pretending business still as usual while approaching parity with US/RU in early 2030s. It is not nuclear posture works and they should change it.

2. Lack of survivable NC3

For example, airborne nuclear command is essential to flexibility and credibility of nuclear deterrence, I see no such plane yet. You can't rely on ground-based radio station in a nuclear war. And they should upgrade their strategic comms satellites soon.

3. No show of strength

Can you believe that PLARF never shows a real DF-41 apart from 2019 parade. Yeah it is what happens right now. Nuclear deterrence is to show your adversary that they have to take unacceptable loss in a nuclear war therefore you have to show they how. PLARF is hiding every advanced missiles from spotlight and roll outs old DF-11, DF-15 every time. Jesus, can someone imagine that PLAAF release J-7G and J-8F only all day long in 2024

4. No nationwide exercise

PLARF operates at a rather local stance compared to NATO/Russia who has annual nuclear exercise to practice coordinated strike/counter-strike. Meanwhile PLARF exercise is all about "I am the fastest kid in launching" or "mom I live in a tunnel for 3 weeks long" and I am not even kidding, anti-fatigue exercise in a tunnel is an essential part of their training.

In case if someone is asking "how do you know have all these stuffs, what if they have but don't show us." They should, it is their job to showcase their readiness to achieve deterrence.

I agree with most of these points. But I will play devils' advocate.

1. China's nuclear doctrine did change. Afterall, SAC writings in the 2000s pointed out that some missiles/warheads should be kept "in reserve" and there should be a selected target set for nuclear strikes. What that implies is that China is at least open to the idea of escalation control.

2. This is a big problem. However, a fail-deadly system may be implemented to mitigate part of the issue. For example, ground-based communications systems (telephones/optic cables) that link underground command centers and silos can be programed to send a "I am fine" message regularly. If the launch units fail to receive any messages for X amount of time, the launch crew will be alerted and a strike can be launched.

3. Show of strength is important. However, since the US clearly knows that DF-41s exist and can be used to strike CONUS, it does not really matter if you are showing real DF-41s to Biden or parading mockups on TV. As long as the US is certain that China is willing and able to launch nuclear strikes against itself in certain cases, the US will be deterred. You can argue that the punishment inflicted by X number of warheads will not be sufficient to deter the US effectively, but that is another discussion entirely.

4. China's nuclear thinking is very different that US and Russia. China believes that a delayed retaliation will just be as effective as an immediate retaliation. The idea is that the PLA will have to dig warheads and missiles out from tunnels and silos destroyed in the enemy attack. This explains why there are endurance exercises.

 

[ChongqingHotPot92]

I agree with most of these points. But I will play devils' advocate.

1. China's nuclear doctrine did change. Afterall, SAC writings in the 2000s pointed out that some missiles/warheads should be kept "in reserve" and there should be a selected target set for nuclear strikes. What that implies is that China is at least open to the idea of escalation control.

2. This is a big problem. However, a fail-deadly system may be implemented to mitigate part of the issue. For example, ground-based communications systems (telephones/optic cables) that link underground command centers and silos can be programed to send a "I am fine" message regularly. If the launch units fail to receive any messages for X amount of time, the launch crew will be alerted and a strike can be launched.

3. Show of strength is important. However, since the US clearly knows that DF-41s exist and can be used to strike CONUS, it does not really matter if you are showing real DF-41s to Biden or parading mockups on TV. As long as the US is certain that China is willing and able to launch nuclear strikes against itself in certain cases, the US will be deterred. You can argue that the punishment inflicted by X number of warheads will not be sufficient to deter the US effectively, but that is another discussion entirely.

4. China's nuclear thinking is very different that US and Russia. China believes that a delayed retaliation will just be as effective as an immediate retaliation. The idea is that the PLA will have to dig warheads and missiles out from tunnels and silos destroyed in the enemy attack. This explains why there are endurance exercises.

On point #2, I think silo-based crew would usually not be able to launch unless they receive the code sent by the commander-in-chief’s football.

On point #4, I would argue that the delayed retaliation characterised by digging warheads out of rubbles worked when China was poor and had nothing to lose. Now when China has a lot to lose and is the hegemon’s primary adversary, a LOW supported by satellites and long-range search radars is necessary. And the presence of tactical nukes at every step of the escalation ladder is necessary to deter adversaries.

 

[Kalec]

China already has assured global deterrence since many decades ago, it's not worried about looking strong, but worried about how to silently get a leg up on it's competitors.

It is really not, a big no. Chinese didn't have assured deterrence until mid-2010s with introduction of DF-31AG. The whole DF-31/A sucks and it is even worse than a water rocket.

2. This is a big problem. However, a fail-deadly system may be implemented to mitigate part of the issue. For example, ground-based communications systems (telephones/optic cables) that link underground command centers and silos can be programed to send a "I am fine" message regularly. If the launch units fail to receive any messages for X amount of time, the launch crew will be alerted and a strike can be launched.

It is more about flexibility and reliability of their comms system and their endurance under extreme pressure. They have networks of VLF radio station to transmit strategic message with SSBN and ICBM brigades but still no airborne command, something like central command train. In short it is not diverse enough to 100% assure its survivability.

 

[Biscuits]

It is really not, a big no. Chinese didn't have assured deterrence until mid-2010s with introduction of DF-31AG. The whole DF-31/A sucks and it is even worse than a water rocket.

I think US (and USSR) would beg to differ, since they've refrained from attacking or even overtly provoking China, even when the naval forces of China amounted to 4 Sovremenny... Nukes as a deterrence works.

It's only that US is very desparate now that they are behind on economy.

 

[bustead]

It is more about flexibility and reliability of their comms system and their endurance under extreme pressure. They have networks of VLF radio station to transmit strategic message with SSBN and ICBM brigades but still no airborne command, something like central command train. In short it is not diverse enough to 100% assure its survivability.

I agree. However, if China's nuclear thinking is still based on deterrence rather than warfighting, a robust NC3 system may not be a top priority. A robust NC3 system ensures that you have the flexibility needed in tactical/theater level exchanges. Or for contesting escalation dominance on a strategic scale. Yet if you are trying to build a nuclear deterrent instead of a nuclear warfighting force, then as long as you can guarantee that at least some of your warheads can be launched after a first strike, your NC3 systems are sufficient. You just have to prove to your adversaries that a nuclear strike will result in nuclear retaliation of a certain scale.

 

[bustead]

On point #2, I think silo-based crew would usually not be able to launch unless they receive the code sent by the commander-in-chief’s football.

On point #4, I would argue that the delayed retaliation characterised by digging warheads out of rubbles worked when China was poor and had nothing to lose. Now when China has a lot to lose and is the hegemon’s primary adversary, a LOW supported by satellites and long-range search radars is necessary. And the presence of tactical nukes at every step of the escalation ladder is necessary to deter adversaries.

Firstly, launch codes are not necessary for all nukes. The UK is still using the letter of last resort, which is just a piece of paper stored on a submarine. Chinese nuclear weapons did not make use of the PAL system up till at least the 80s.

Secondly, LOW is only worthwhile if your nuclear forces are vulnerable to a first strike. If you believe that your nukes (or at least a substantial number of them) can survive a first strike, there is no point in panic launching. Heck, I'd argue that a delayed retaliation can be more effective as you can plan your retaliation according to the latest situation.

 

[Biscuits]

I agree. However, if China's nuclear thinking is still based on deterrence rather than warfighting, a robust NC3 system may not be a top priority. A robust NC3 system ensures that you have the flexibility needed in tactical/theater level exchanges. Or for contesting escalation dominance on a strategic scale. Yet if you are trying to build a nuclear deterrent instead of a nuclear warfighting force, then as long as you can guarantee that at least some of your warheads can be launched after a first strike, your NC3 systems are sufficient. You just have to prove to your adversaries that a nuclear strike will result in nuclear retaliation of a certain scale.

China has the advantage of just having two scenarios which they need to coordinate nuclear warheads for, because they avoid the unnecessary escalatory risk of tactical nukes in regional wars, and don't need to threaten tiny countries/terror groups with nukes.

1. A tactical nuke is launched at the PLA. China would launch a single strategic nuke at 1 enemy target to induce deescalation through escalation.

2. Full strategical nuclear exchange where China would simply launch nuke weapons in the thousands on warning.

Both functions should logically not be a strain on the command and control capabilities of the rocket force at all.

 

[sunnymaxi]

Some concerns:

1. Lack of nuclear doctrine

Chinese official nuclear doctrine didn't change much between 1960s and 2020s. Come on, they are pretending business still as usual while approaching parity with US/RU in early 2030s. It is not nuclear posture works and they should change it.

2. Lack of survivable NC3

For example, airborne nuclear command is essential to flexibility and credibility of nuclear deterrence, I see no such plane yet. You can't rely on ground-based radio station in a nuclear war. And they should upgrade their strategic comms satellites soon.

3. No show of strength

Can you believe that PLARF never shows a real DF-41 apart from 2019 parade. Yeah it is what happens right now. Nuclear deterrence is to show your adversary that they have to take unacceptable loss in a nuclear war therefore you have to show they how. PLARF is hiding every advanced missiles from spotlight and roll outs old DF-11, DF-15 every time. Jesus, can someone imagine that PLAAF release J-7G and J-8F only all day long in 2024

4. No nationwide exercise

PLARF operates at a rather local stance compared to NATO/Russia who has annual nuclear exercise to practice coordinated strike/counter-strike. Meanwhile PLARF exercise is all about "I am the fastest kid in launching" or "mom I live in a tunnel for 3 weeks long" and I am not even kidding, anti-fatigue exercise in a tunnel is an essential part of their training.

In case if someone is asking "how do you know have all these stuffs, what if they have but don't show us." They should, it is their job to showcase their readiness to achieve deterrence.

Point1 - i somewhat disagreed with you here. there is indeed a major shift i have seen in top party leadership regarding national security and threat from western world. party leadership mentioned so many times. Nuclear policy changed now. we have seen massive build up. the issue is, there is hardly anything in public domain.

Point2 - i think you are talking about doomsday plane, a class of aircraft which is used as airborne command post in-case of nuclear event.. USA have E-4/E-6. Russia have IL-80/IL-82. since all these aircrafts are turbofan powered. now Y-20 with WS-20 came online. and there is strong rumor, Y-20 will also have variant for early command. so this there is a chance we might see something like this in near future.

Point3 and Point4 - agreed with you. but as Party leadership don't believe in show off. but this has to change.