Problem is that all DF-5Bs and DF-5Cs are liquid-fueled. Would there be sufficient time for them to be fueled up and launched upon warning before US SLBMs reached over those silos? That's the important question I believe.
China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread
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Silo based DF-5s can be stored prefueled. Hypergolics can be stored for years. See Russian SLBM Sineva.
The previous fuel constraint was in the 1970s when there were no silos.
For the purposes of assessing what China's current and foreseeable future nuclear strategy and priorities are in context of China-USA geopolitical competition, no, the difference between 1700 and 10000 (actually I said 170,000 -- an even bigger number) is inconsequential.
With only 350 nukes at present, it doesn't matter whether China is nuked with 1700 warheads or 170,000 warheads, because either way China has lost the geopolitical competition if they are unable to deter a US first strike, the only question is by how much China has lost.
I'm not sure why you are so obsessed with trying to deter an insane USA, when China at present barely has the capability to deter a sane USA from a first strike.
- Dealing with a sane USA requires robust counter-value deterrence capability, which will need larger nuclear arsenal than what China has right now.
- Dealing with an insane USA requires a much much bigger nuclear arsenal to fully destroy and disarm the USA on top of a robust counter-value deterrence capability, which will need a much, much bigger nuclear arsenal than even the above.
You and others seem to have read my last few posts and interpreted my comments as if I am espousing what China's "maximum" nuclear ambitions to be -- if that is the case, then you have interpreted me incorrectly.
My last few replies have all been about arguing that it does not make sense for China to pursue a "counter-force only" nuclear doctrine without first achieving a robust counter-value deterrence capability, which requires China to have a larger nuclear arsenal than it currently has.
Nowhere have I written what the "ceiling" of China's nuclear capabilities should be, only what the "minimum floor" of it should be.
All of this talk about needing to deter a crazy USA makes me laugh --- why are we even dreaming about deterring a crazy USA, when currently China is barely able to deter a sane USA?
How about we see China develop a nuclear arsenal that is first able to deter a sane USA from a first strike, before we start thinking ahead more ambitiously?
How much counter value do you think China should have before start counter force?
That's a much more complex answer, but certainly they need to be able to achieve robust and comprehensvie counter-value capability first.
That is dependent on the assessment and projection of US estimates for risk and deterrence are, probability of success of Chinese ICBMs (in context of any US countermeasures), what extent of destruction of a given US target would be deemed "serviced" (i.e.: how many nukes per target, as not all targets are uniform in size) etc.
And after all that is calculated, the risk profiles for other adversaries would have to be calculated as well.
Certainly, with 350 nuclear warheads (estimated) at present/recent past, that is insufficient for counter-value.
The point is that at the moment it's far too early to start thinking about counter-force, and I think people are getting too ahead of themselves and reorient themselves to the first steps and time China would need to meet the minimum threshold for a robust and comprehensive counter-value capability.
Whoever said anything about needing the world to end, or whether China as a "civilization" lives on?
The role of nuclear deterrence and nuclear weapons is their ability to influence and deter the actions of adversaries in context of geopolitical competition, during peacetime and in wartime.
You should not be focusing on "disarming" the US after the US has already conducted a first strike -- instead you should be focusing on "deterring" the US from conducting a first strike to begin with.
With only 350 nuclear warheads at present/recent past, it makes even less sense to focus on "disarming" the US, when China is barely capable of credibly deterring a sane US from a first strike at present.
If you focus on "disarming" the US after the US has already conducted a first strike, then it means that you are choosing a strategy where you are actively inviting the loss of many of your most important cities to try and degrade the enemy's ability to throw further nukes at you -- while the enemy's cities remain largely unmolested.
Such a strategy does not make sense at all.
It makes no sense to pursue counter-force capabilities, without first having a robust and comprehensive counter-value capability in place.
Honestly, China should start viewing American (alongside British and French) SSBNs as the greatest "existential" threat to their civilization state, considering that the majority of their nuclear arsenal are based onboard their SLBMs.
(Using the word "existential" is just merely learning from their American counterpart.)
Is there no viable method to hunt and track their submarines down, like how the US Navy alongside their allies are doing to Russian and Chinese submarines for the past 7 decades?
Seriously, China should invest heavily in the development and entry-into-service of UUVs, near-space crafts and satellites that could monitor and track NATO SSBNs at all times, across the globe (and SSNs as well since we're at it). As soon as war breaks out, those SSBNs (and SSNs) would then be hunted down and sunk as soon as possible - With the goal of preventing as many of them from launching their onboard SLBMs as possible.
There is no viable method in the near to medium term future for that no.
To do so would either require the US (and UK and France) to have a substantially smaller SSBN fleet and overall nuclear arsenal -- and/or for China to replace the US as the global maritime and military power with extensive basing of ships and aircraft around the world, and geopolitical containment of the US in its own hemisphere.
Needless to say that is well beyond China's capabilities and is not even worth dreaming about.
The current balance of nuclear balance of power is one where China is at a significant nuclear disadvantage if strategic nuclear exchange were to happen, and there is no way of escaping it in the near term, and it's important to accept and come to terms with that.
Indeed, that should be one of the first things that any new PLA watcher should understand and learn, so that the geopolitical and strategic nuclear context can be accepted. .
The only strategy China has available in the short to medium term, is to increase the costs of a nuclear first strike by having a robust capability to conduct counter-value (and potentially eventually counter-force) nuclear retaliation to deter adversaries from conducting a nuclear first strike to begin with.
I call this "How I learned to stop worrying and accept the fact that China will be at a strategic nuclear disadvantage in the foreseeable future".
You know what?
After saying so much, I figured that we are living on different frequencies after all.
So please don't bother responding, thank you.
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As Blitzo pointed out, there isn't a neat and simple number. The answer is very much a nuanced one.
And for the record, it is my personal opinion that any direct pursuit of counter force capabilities are a fools errand.
Nonetheless, I would like to draw a comparison to historical U.S/Russian arms control treaties. The Russians signed the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty(SORT) in 2002, which capped Russian deployed warhead count at 2200. Note that Russian nuclear retaliation plan likely accounted for both European and North American NATO members. I believe this number should form the minimum floor of China's deployed counter-value warhead count
However, times have changed. SORT was the last arms reduction treaty signed prior to unilateral U.S withdrawal from ABM treaty.
And with the implosion of both ABM and INF treaties in the following two decade, one can argue the minimum number of warhead required for a "robust" counter-value/second-strike capability against U.S/NATO allies had increased significantly.
U.S procurement of ABM systems like GBI and near future procurement of IRBM/HGVs are especially detrimental to Chinese/Russian Mutually Assured Destruction capabilities. Factoring in potentially game changing space based capabilities in the medium term future, the minimum number of deployed warhead count to provide robust counter value/retaliatory strike will soon be far higher than the floor amount discussed earlier.
I have a feeling that the PLA had came to similar conclusions.
The three new silo fields (Ordo, Hami, Yumen) and expansion at Jilantai are a great start, but I surmise we will see evidences of further nuclear buildup in the near future.
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