We all agree that China should expand its arsenal past its present level, where we disagree is where that expansion should stop. From reading what you wrote here and my previous discussions with you, my impression is that you think "robust counter-value" is sufficient to deter the bulk of the middle ground (implicit in that is China shouldn't pursue an arsenal of US/Russia's size). I agree with that assessment but I think China should pursue something more that just deterrence; it should be able to credibly threaten a first strike on the US. Furthermore, a retaliatory strike by China should annihilate the US as a matter of principle. The vast majority of the US population (90%+) should die in the initial strike and the land should be rendered uninhabitable for centuries to come.
Vengeance is a goal in itself independent from deterrence.
Where in my previous posts did I make any statement about where China's nuclear arsenal should "stop"?
What I described was the low ball requirement for achieving robust and comprehensive counter-value capability -- something which China even today does not have and will take some time to achieve.
I was responding to the following paragraph:
The assumption that China would not be the instigator of a nuclear war should not be taken as given. It's true today because China doesn't have the numbers to credibly threaten a first strike, but I don't think it's an assumption that should inform Chinese nuclear posture in perpetuity.
The reason the USrespectsfears Russia's nuclear arsenal is not purely a matter of numbers. There's an instinctive terror that's been instilled into generations Americans during the Cold War that resonates to this day. You can actually see on the nuclear stockpile graphs the enormous growth of the Soviet arsenal that drilled this terror into Americans' skulls. They don't have this fear of China's arsenal and won't until they see it grow very rapidly into enormous proportions.
Again, I never said anything about "in perpetuity" either.
I was saying that China has the need to achieve robust and comprehensive counter-value capability. I never said that China couldn't or shouldn't consider additional nuclear capability or strategy beyond it.
If you want to talk about counter-force or first strike capability, fine, I never stated I was against such strategies or ruling it out.
But it was not part of the scope of my discussion.