China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread

[Kalec]

I created a google spread sheet to help everyone get a better understanding of the nuke without either overestimating or underestimating its power.

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Around 900 to 1,000 nukes can either instantly kill or seriously injure 70% of the US population, and destroy all major cities with a 100,000+ population. One should note that the original author assumed PLARF could switch between 150kt and 650kt nukes at a whim, which is simply untrue. Historical reasons (DF-31A single warhead deployment) and the very counter-value nature of Chinese deterrence both lead to 650 kt nukes as China's nuclear backbone. The silo base would very likely be deployed with 650 kt warheads. Ultimately, it will take fewer warheads than 900 for China to achieve the same strategic goal.

There is nothing wrong with stopping at 1,550 nuclear stockpile since it suffices to ensure a MAD with the US and more nukes don't bring much more counter-value capability with diminishing returns. Russia and the US put their treaty limit at 1,550 after their own calculations about "How many nukes are enough?"

The bottom line is that 1,550 nukes make a guarantee of a counter-value plan, which can deter the US from live-fire aggression.

But WHAT IF, the deterrence fails? Either some lunatics think they can disarm China by launching a first strike against silo fields or inadvertent escalation. Though very unlikely to happen, here comes the general second strike.

1. A 1,000-warhead counter-value plan(Silo-based ICBMs alone can do this.)

2. Naval bases and shipyards for US SSBNs

3. US Strategic bomber airfields

4. The US non-deployed nuclear stockpile

It will still leave about one hundred warheads as negotiating bargaining chips after the first salvo.

 

[clockwork]

Around 900 to 1,000 nuke can either instantly kill or seriously injure 70% of US population

That's way off lol, unless you're using ridiculous average yield assumptions. There's been plenty of work done on this, look at the Open RISOP full countervalue laydown causalty estimates for instance.

Tho personally I doubt the number of prompt fatalities makes a huge difference after a point, anything more than some threshold destroying most of their largest cities would probably collapse society/supply chains and see americans killing each other till there were only like <5% of them left.

 

[sunnymaxi]

I see two problems with the view @Blitzo presented here:

1. It assumes there's some calculable level or range of damage that any rational US leader would find unacceptable. The issue is that this level of damage is highly subjective and depends both on the temperament of the US leader and what how much he values the goal that provoked the retaliation. President Biden might not value destroying China enough to be sufficiently deterred by China's current arsenal, but does that same calculation hold for a President Trump or a President Cotton or a President Carlson?

Furthermore, as China itself grows wealthier and stronger and it finally dawns on the US that it's going to be eclipsed by China forever and will never again have the power it once held (to put in Biden's phraseology, once the US realizes that it's "best days" are in fact not ahead), destroying China becomes an intrinsically more valuable and desirable goal. President Biden today might be deterred, but if he accepted that America's best days are behind it and China is the reason why, would his calculation change?

2. A minimal/moderate counter-value strategy + NFU is intrinsically reactive. By definition it sets the level of China's arsenal at just enough to deter a nuclear war and cedes all initiative to the enemy. Why should the onus of stopping a first strike be placed on China? Why should Chinese leaders stay awake at night worrying about what the US might do with its superior arsenal? The ball should be put in America's court. Let their leaders stay up at night worrying about stopping a Chinese first strike.

Minimal counter-value and NFU are policies ultimately born out of poverty and, to my dismay, they have ossified into a religion. China is no longer poor and it can and should build an arsenal that provides it with the security it's due. In my view, nothing less than parity with the US is acceptable.

Chinese leaders are very smart. when they build great wall and banned all Western internet giants. people criticized. and look what happened during Russian-Ukraine war. probably the best decision by CPC in 21st century.

they know, US is the their biggest enemy. hence nuke build up has started in 2019 as we all know that. silos build up , ICBM force , bomber and next generation SSBN.

president Xi speech during 20th national congress basically stamped on this.

bye bye minimum deterrence and welcome MAD

 

[ZeEa5KPul]

Chinese leaders are very smart. when they build great wall and banned all Western internet giants. people criticized. and look what happened during Russian-Ukraine war. probably the best decision by CPC in 21st century.

they know, US is the their biggest enemy. hence nuke build up has started in 2019 as we all know that. silos build up , ICBM force , bomber and next generation SSBN.

president Xi speech during 20th national congress basically stamped on this.

bye bye minimum deterrence and welcome MAD

Then some diplomat comes along a day later and undermines the President's message. It's part of the strategy to keep the enemy guessing and chasing his own tail, but an unfortunate side effect is that it raises my anxiety lol.

 

[OppositeDay]

One has to take Japanese targets into account. There's no circumstance under which China will allow Japan to emerge unscratched from a nuclear conflict. Australian and British targets also belong to the list. China need to deter Indian adventurism during a Sino-US conflict too. 1,500 warheads are simply not enough.

Mass producing mature technologies like ICBMs, nuclear warheads and silos is China's comparative strength. China should at least have 3,000 deliverable warheads.

 

[sunnymaxi]

Then some diplomat comes along a day later and undermines the President's message. It's part of the strategy to keep the enemy guessing and chasing his own tail, but an unfortunate side effect is that it raises my anxiety lol.

spot on.

action speaks louder than words.

 

[Blitzo]

I see two problems with the view @Blitzo presented here:

1. It assumes there's some calculable level or range of damage that any rational US leader would find unacceptable. The issue is that this level of damage is highly subjective and depends both on the temperament of the US leader and what how much he values the goal that provoked the retaliation. President Biden might not value destroying China enough to be sufficiently deterred by China's current arsenal, but does that same calculation hold for a President Trump or a President Cotton or a President Carlson?

Furthermore, as China itself grows wealthier and stronger and it finally dawns on the US that it's going to be eclipsed by China forever and will never again have the power it once held (to put in Biden's phraseology, once the US realizes that it's "best days" are in fact not ahead), destroying China becomes an intrinsically more valuable and desirable goal. President Biden today might be deterred, but if he accepted that America's best days are behind it and China is the reason why, would his calculation change?

2. A minimal/moderate counter-value strategy + NFU is intrinsically reactive. By definition it sets the level of China's arsenal at just enough to deter a nuclear war and cedes all initiative to the enemy. Why should the onus of stopping a first strike be placed on China? Why should Chinese leaders stay awake at night worrying about what the US might do with its superior arsenal? The ball should be put in America's court. Let their leaders stay up at night worrying about stopping a Chinese first strike.

Minimal counter-value and NFU are policies ultimately born out of poverty and, to my dismay, they have ossified into a religion. China is no longer poor and it can and should build an arsenal that provides it with the security it's due. In my view, nothing less than parity with the US is acceptable.

Re: 1

Obviously you cannot deter the far edges of risk tolerance -- I.e. you cannot deter insanity.
However being able to deter the bulk of the middle ground of the decision making spectrum -- the same parts -- is still very valuable and that is something which China obviously is currently still unable to do.

Re: 2
Where did I ever say that China's nuclear deterrence should be one of "minimal/moderate NFU"?
My last few posts have made it all very clear that I view the minimum nuclear requirements for China as being one of "robust and comprehensive counter-value" in capability, and that China's nuclear arsenal requires expansion.

 

[Kalec]

That's way off lol, unless you're using ridiculous average yield assumptions. There's been plenty of work done on this, look at the Open RISOP full countervalue laydown causalty estimates for instance.

Tho personally I doubt the number of prompt fatalities makes a huge difference after a point, anything more than some threshold destroying most of their largest cities would probably collapse society/supply chains and see americans killing each other till there were only like <5% of them left.

I saw the simulation project long ago and had a look at it again. And we only discussed counter-value plans here.

Here is my understanding:

1. The plan consists of 533 * 100kt, 547 * 200kt, 155 * 250kt and 370 * 800kt warheads, for a total yield of 498 megatons. But it also includes Non-CONUS targets like Guam and frequently use ground burst to maximize fall out effect.

2. I modified the original plan made by 能吃能睡, total yield is only around 314 megatons but use air burst only to maximize 5 psi range.

3. My seriously injured & immediate fatalities figure are around 200 - 230 million whereas RISOP plan results in 104 million deaths instantly. I don't really see significant difference between these calculations since death/injured ratio is about from 35/65 to 40/60.

At the end of day, all counter-value plans come to similar conclusion because you just can't find any human concentration to target after bombing all major cities. A 650kt nuclear bomb in the heart of Manhattan could hurt or kill 4 million while the same bomb injures fewer than 50,000 ppl in a sub 100,000 city.

 

[ZeEa5KPul]

Re: 1

Obviously you cannot deter the far edges of risk tolerance -- I.e. you cannot deter insanity.
However being able to deter the bulk of the middle ground of the decision making spectrum -- the same parts -- is still very valuable and that is something which China obviously is currently still unable to do.

We all agree that China should expand its arsenal past its present level, where we disagree is where that expansion should stop. From reading what you wrote here and my previous discussions with you, my impression is that you think "robust counter-value" is sufficient to deter the bulk of the middle ground (implicit in that is China shouldn't pursue an arsenal of US/Russia's size). I agree with that assessment but I think China should pursue something more that just deterrence; it should be able to credibly threaten a first strike on the US. Furthermore, a retaliatory strike by China should annihilate the US as a matter of principle. The vast majority of the US population (90%+) should die in the initial strike and the land should be rendered uninhabitable for centuries to come.

Vengeance is a goal in itself independent from deterrence.

Re: 2
Where did I ever say that China's nuclear deterrence should be one of "minimal/moderate NFU"?
My last few posts have made it all very clear that I view the minimum nuclear requirements for China as being one of "robust and comprehensive counter-value" in capability, and that China's nuclear arsenal requires expansion.

I was responding to the following paragraph:

As China would not be an instigator in a nuclear war, the goal is thus simply to deter the adversary from launching a nuclear first strike.
And to deter a nuclear first strike, requires you to be able to hold to threat the things that they value with retaliatory capabilities -- that is the basis on which counter-value strategies work.

The assumption that China would not be the instigator of a nuclear war should not be taken as given. It's true today because China doesn't have the numbers to credibly threaten a first strike, but I don't think it's an assumption that should inform Chinese nuclear posture in perpetuity.

The reason the US respects fears Russia's nuclear arsenal is not purely a matter of numbers. There's an instinctive terror that's been instilled into generations Americans during the Cold War that resonates to this day. You can actually see on the nuclear stockpile graphs the enormous growth of the Soviet arsenal that drilled this terror into Americans' skulls. They don't have this fear of China's arsenal and won't until they see it grow very rapidly into enormous proportions.

 

[TK3600]

I saw the simulation project long ago and had a look at it again. And we only discussed counter-value plans here.

Here is my understanding:

1. The plan consists of 533 * 100kt, 547 * 200kt, 155 * 250kt and 370 * 800kt warheads, for a total yield of 498 megatons. But it also includes Non-CONUS targets like Guam and frequently use ground burst to maximize fall out effect.

2. I modified the original plan made by 能吃能睡, total yield is only around 314 megatons but use air burst only to maximize 5 psi range.

3. My seriously injured & immediate fatalities figure are around 200 - 230 million whereas RISOP plan results in 104 million deaths instantly. I don't really see significant difference between these calculations since death/injured ratio is about from 35/65 to 40/60.

At the end of day, all counter-value plans come to similar conclusion because you just can't find any human concentration to target after bombing all major cities. A 650kt nuclear bomb in the heart of Manhattan could hurt or kill 4 million while the same bomb injures fewer than 50,000 ppl in a sub 100,000 city.

North Korea lost more than 10% population and still carried on to exist today. WW2 USSR lost about 14% the population but still carried on to be a super power. Although it is a terrible fate to have, the nation will not be actually crippled beyond will to fight. If minimum deterrent just means stopping rational player wanting to launch nukes, I propose an intermediate solution between minimum deterrent and total annihilation. I will call it minimum deterrent to fight on.


I think at very minimum you want enemy to lose more than 20% the population with potential to be more to force a collapse of society. With that in mind, your counter value should be able to achieve that on US, its nuclear armed allies, and still have enough nukes left for negotiation and to deter likes of India and Japan, if you didn't nuke them already. This is what I consider sufficient deterrent beyond minimum. This would still be around 1000.

This doesn't mean China should not expand further than this. I merely listed this as the next threshold should they want to go beyond minimum deterrence. And to show around 1000 nukes is a moderate proposal.

I do think past a certain point there needs to be a shift in thinking beyond just "kill 99% of Americans for revenge". There is a point of diminishing return. Population area are less dense as you run out of rich targets. At that point if enemy is hell bent on fighting you inspite of society collapse, you should start worry about counter force now. Stopping enemy from storing, producing and deliver more nukes is the next goal. And perhaps have enough to cripple ability to use conventional force.

Anything more than that becomes relatively meaningless and well past diminishing return. It would cause undue burden on the viability of state during peace time.