China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread

[sunnymaxi]

The three new silo fields (Ordo, Hami, Yumen) and expansion at Jilantai are a great start, but I surmise we will see evidences of further nuclear buildup in the near future.

 

[no_name]

Could be a signal to both CN and RU.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1582857149843091456

India: You guys keep forgetting about me.

 

[Totoro]

Is it possible to keep this thread clear of so many different discussions? Is it possible to perhaps divide this thread into three separate threads?
1. Non-nuclear Ballistic missiles
2. Nuclear weapons and their delivery and support systems
3. Nuclear strategy thread

 

[TK3600]

As Blitzo pointed out, there isn't a neat and simple number. The answer is very much a nuanced one.

And for the record, it is my personal opinion that any direct pursuit of counter force capabilities are a fools errand.

Nonetheless, I would like to draw a comparison to historical U.S/Russian arms control treaties. The Russians signed the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty(SORT) in 2002, which capped Russian deployed warhead count at 2200. Note that Russian nuclear retaliation plan likely accounted for both European and North American NATO members. I believe this number should form the minimum floor of China's deployed counter-value warhead count

However, times have changed. SORT was the last arms reduction treaty signed prior to unilateral U.S withdrawal from ABM treaty.

And with the implosion of both ABM and INF treaties in the following two decade, one can argue the minimum number of warhead required for a "robust" counter-value/second-strike capability against U.S/NATO allies had increased significantly.

U.S procurement of ABM systems like GBI and near future procurement of IRBM/HGVs are especially detrimental to Chinese/Russian Mutually Assured Destruction capabilities. Factoring in potentially game changing space based capabilities in the medium term future, the minimum number of deployed warhead count to provide robust counter value/retaliatory strike will soon be far higher than the floor amount discussed earlier.

I have a feeling that the PLA had came to similar conclusions.

The three new silo fields (Ordo, Hami, Yumen) and expansion at Jilantai are a great start, but I surmise we will see evidences of further nuclear buildup in the near future.

​

Yes ABM has improved. But you know what has improved even more? Delivery platform like hypersonics. ABM is a fools errand against any nuclear state better than North Korea. For a fraction of the cost it is easier to improve delivery platform or build more of them than it is to build ABM.

 

[Untoldpain]

ABM is a fools errand against any nuclear state better than North Korea.

I disagree entirely with that assessment.

Here's the thing. The reason why China and Russia are so vehemently against U.S ABM efforts, is that ABM systems are never meant to be used in a purely defensive manner. As everyone already know, it will do little against a full on, undegraded nuclear retaliation from major nuclear powers.

Instead, ABM should be viewed as a vital component of U.S first strike complex. ie. A counter-force strike with little warning against unalerted/ undispersed/ low readiness enemy nuclear forces. Followed up with ABM interceptions to catch any remaining missiles that survived the initial bombardment, to achieve a acceptable damage limitation. It would not be a overstatement to say the U.S had a splendid first strike option against China until the very recent past.

Systems like the GBI and SM3 are major threats to Chinese nuclear deterrence. The Chinese military leadership certainly sees thing this way. They are not satisfied with the current nuclear force balance. Instead, they are heavily invested in nuclear expansion in the form of mobile and silo based ICBMs/HGV + Development of new generation of SLBM, in a comprehensive early warning system to timely detect a decapacitating nuclear first-strike, and in raising the peace time alertness of it's nuclear forces.

 

[Kalec]

Here are some of my thoughts.

1. Nuclear HGV doesn’t make sense to me.

The expectation of interception by US ABM system won’t change as long as there are still conventional nukes in China’s arsenal. Suppose GBI has a 50% interception rate, then it will nullify 22 Chinese/Russian projectiles. The number won't change whether you launch 50 nukes or 5,000 nukes.

50 HGV + 50 conventional nukes have the same intercepted rate as 100 conventional nukes, so why waste money with little upside?

2. Silo ICBM choice.

Both of Heavy ICBM and DF-41 have their upsides and downsides.

Heavy ICBM, rumored DF-45, is way more cost-efficient than DF-41. Heavy ICBM is always cheaper in warhead/price ratio than lighter ICBM. China can easily break the ceiling of current treaty limit by deploying DF-45, which is expected to carry 6 warheads per launcher. Even if China agrees to the 1,550 limit later on, it still maintains re-deployability like Ohio SSBN and MMIII in a nuclear showdown.

DF-41, which can carry 3 warheads, is a mature technology with a 100% successful test-fly rate. It is also categorically safer than Heavy ICBM in the silo, after it was designed under mobile, volatile background. The U.S. needs 2 warheads to destroy a silo with 95% confidence interval, meaning China can withhold a first strike without losing majority of its nuclear arsenal. It costs 2 of its own warheads in exchange for 3 Chinese warheads.

3. China doesn't need that much of counter-force ability.

It costs 2 warheads to obliterate 1 Minuteman III silo, which has only one warheads. Suppose MM3 has a probability of k to launch before being attacked, China is using 2 of its nukes in exchange for (1-k) U.S. nuke.

China should only strike U.S. nuclear stockpile, namely Pantex plant, Los Alamos etcs and SSBNs naval base/strategic airfields.

4. A surprise first strike in unlikely, or even impossible.

You have to disperse SSBN fleets/non-deployed nuclear stockpiles, which takes days if not weeks. It is not as simple as pressing a button then all nukes simultaneously fly towards the targets. U.S. keeps saying it sees no change in Russian nuclear posture, meaning it has a way to find out if Russia is going to conduct nuclear strike, so do Russia and China.

5. LoW posture is the trump card to deter against a first strike.

Arm control nerds give low credit to LoW posture simply because they see it as a destabilizing factor. Suppose China has a probability of k to launch before being attacked and the missile in silo is DF-41.

Probability	k	1-k
U.S. nuke	2	2
Chinese nuke	0	3

Simple math, U.S. has a net loss of warheads when k > 1/3. It means China needs a merely 33% credibility on LoW to persuade U.S. away from launching a first strike in hope of winning a nuclear war. China can increase the LoW credibility by increasing EW capabilities, silo ICBM readiness.

 

[vincent]

I disagree entirely with that assessment.

Here's the thing. The reason why China and Russia are so vehemently against U.S ABM efforts, is that ABM systems are never meant to be used in a purely defensive manner. As everyone already know, it will do little against a full on, undegraded nuclear retaliation from major nuclear powers.

Instead, ABM should be viewed as a vital component of U.S first strike complex. ie. A counter-force strike with little warning against unalerted/ undispersed/ low readiness enemy nuclear forces. Followed up with ABM interceptions to catch any remaining missiles that survived the initial bombardment, to achieve a acceptable damage limitation. It would not be a overstatement to say the U.S had a splendid first strike option against China until the very recent past.

Systems like the GBI and SM3 are major threats to Chinese nuclear deterrence. The Chinese military leadership certainly sees thing this way. They are not satisfied with the current nuclear force balance. Instead, they are heavily invested in nuclear expansion in the form of mobile and silo based ICBMs/HGV + Development of new generation of SLBM, in a comprehensive early warning system to timely detect a decapacitating nuclear first-strike, and in raising the peace time alertness of it's nuclear forces.

The main reason China was so pissed at the THAAD deployment in the South Korea. The radar system can track Chinese missiles much earlier, thus increase the success interception rate of the GBI

 

[montyp165]

There is no viable method in the near to medium term future for that no.
To do so would either require the US (and UK and France) to have a substantially smaller SSBN fleet and overall nuclear arsenal -- and/or for China to replace the US as the global maritime and military power with extensive basing of ships and aircraft around the world, and geopolitical containment of the US in its own hemisphere.
Needless to say that is well beyond China's capabilities and is not even worth dreaming about.

The current balance of nuclear balance of power is one where China is at a significant nuclear disadvantage if strategic nuclear exchange were to happen, and there is no way of escaping it in the near term, and it's important to accept and come to terms with that.
Indeed, that should be one of the first things that any new PLA watcher should understand and learn, so that the geopolitical and strategic nuclear context can be accepted. .



The only strategy China has available in the short to medium term, is to increase the costs of a nuclear first strike by having a robust capability to conduct counter-value (and potentially eventually counter-force) nuclear retaliation to deter adversaries from conducting a nuclear first strike to begin with.



I call this "How I learned to stop worrying and accept the fact that China will be at a strategic nuclear disadvantage in the foreseeable future".

Parity in deployable units is absolutely doable in 5 years time if not sooner, as the Soviets managed to achieve the necessary numbers China would need at the height of the Cold War from a far greater economic and numerical deficit. China mainly needs to be willing to devote the necessary resources to do so, especially with an increasingly unstable American political leadership body.

 

[Blitzo]

Parity in deployable units is absolutely doable in 5 years time if not sooner, as the Soviets managed to achieve the necessary numbers China would need at the height of the Cold War from a far greater economic and numerical deficit. China mainly needs to be willing to devote the necessary resources to do so, especially with an increasingly unstable American political leadership body.

Opportunity cost is a thing.

What China is willing to plow into a large scale nuclear build up means less money for other military procurement (and more importantly, civilian development).


Frankly I dislike the entire way that the discussion about Chinese nuclear procurement is framed.

It seems to be that there is a persistent degree of insecurity by some users (not you specifically), who are unaware that China faces a stark nuclear disadvantage and want to rectify this as soon as possible without recognizing the reason why China's nuclear arsenal up to this point has been relatively constrained to begin with.


Instead of looking at the question as "what's the biggest nuclear arsenal that China should have and how fast can they get it" -- the right way of asking it imo is:

What's the smallest nuclear arsenal China needs and what's the slowest they can procure it, to be able to prosecute a successful national strategy in the near term, medium term and long term?


Instead of dreaming big, it is better to first see what the compulsory prerequisites are, rather than the Robert Baratheon style demanding of "MOAR WINE NUKES".

 

[ZeEa5KPul]

Opportunity cost is a thing.

What China is willing to plow into a large scale nuclear build up means less money for other military procurement (and more importantly, civilian development).

Even if a large scale nuclear build up would cut into other military procurement - and there's no reason to think it would - it should take priority because it's indispensable to China's security. A conventional build up increases China's insecurity in the short term because it forces the choice on America to use or lose its conventional superiority. Now or never. China being weaker at the nuclear level only makes America's choice to launch a war more appealing. I needn't add that China can kiss civilian development goodbye if it's at war with America.

By contrast, America wouldn't ever contemplate getting into any kind of war with Russia because of nuclear parity.

It seems to be that there is a persistent degree of insecurity by some users (not you specifically), who are unaware that China faces a stark nuclear disadvantage and want to rectify this as soon as possible without recognizing the reason why China's nuclear arsenal up to this point has been relatively constrained to begin with.

I'll put my hand up as one of the people who think China should move with a much heightened urgency on this issue. There's only one reason China's arsenal up to this point has been constrained: it was dirt poor. That is emphatically no longer the case. The threat it's under has increased significantly as have its means to address this threat.

What's the smallest nuclear arsenal China needs and what's the slowest they can procure it, to be able to prosecute a successful national strategy in the near term, medium term and long term?

No matter which way the question is framed, the answer is identical: Much larger than what it has now and it should procure it yesterday. MOAR NUKES a la Robert Baratheon is indeed the rational, measured, even miserly response needed at the present time.