China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread

[montyp165]

Opportunity cost is a thing.

What China is willing to plow into a large scale nuclear build up means less money for other military procurement (and more importantly, civilian development).


Frankly I dislike the entire way that the discussion about Chinese nuclear procurement is framed.

It seems to be that there is a persistent degree of insecurity by some users (not you specifically), who are unaware that China faces a stark nuclear disadvantage and want to rectify this as soon as possible without recognizing the reason why China's nuclear arsenal up to this point has been relatively constrained to begin with.


Instead of looking at the question as "what's the biggest nuclear arsenal that China should have and how fast can they get it" -- the right way of asking it imo is:

What's the smallest nuclear arsenal China needs and what's the slowest they can procure it, to be able to prosecute a successful national strategy in the near term, medium term and long term?


Instead of dreaming big, it is better to first see what the compulsory prerequisites are, rather than the Robert Baratheon style demanding of "MOAR WINE NUKES".

The point I'm trying to make is that whatever the target number needs to be, it is instructive to know what was achieved quantitatively in the past and by what means in order to ensure that whatever China's production targets can be done in the shortest possible timeframe to counter potential hostile nuclear action.

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299 ​

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18,638 ​

31,149 ​

26,008 ​

27,519 ​

23,368 ​

21,392 ​

10,904 ​

10,577 ​

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7,700 ​

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6,129 ​

11,643 ​

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30,062 ​

39,197 ​

37,000 ​

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7,500 ​

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from Wiki, both the US and Russia scaled up at comparable rates from similar numbers of deployable warheads at a given point in time (eg, 299 in 1950 to 2422 in 1955 for the US, 200 in 1955 to 1605 in 1960 for the USSR), this was despite the US having the larger industrial base and better tech. China has a far better industrial base and technology to match or exceed this rate even with the preexisting disparity in numbers with the US nuclear arsenal.

 

[FairAndUnbiased]

Even if a large scale nuclear build up would cut into other military procurement - and there's no reason to think it would - it should take priority because it's indispensable to China's security. A conventional build up increases China's insecurity in the short term because it forces the choice on America to use or lose its conventional superiority. Now or never. China being weaker at the nuclear level only makes America's choice to launch a war more appealing. I needn't add that China can kiss civilian development goodbye if it's at war with America.

By contrast, America wouldn't ever contemplate getting into any kind of war with Russia because of nuclear parity.

I'll put my hand up as one of the people who think China should move with a much heightened urgency on this issue. There's only one reason China's arsenal up to this point has been constrained: it was dirt poor. That is emphatically no longer the case. The threat it's under has increased significantly as have its means to address this threat.

No matter which way the question is framed, the answer is identical: Much larger than what it has now and it should procure it yesterday. MOAR NUKES a la Robert Baratheon is indeed the rational, measured, even miserly response needed at the present time.

It was not an economic decision IMO. Even 15 years ago China had a far larger budget than Russia and already had deployable DF31A. It was a political decision put in place by a certain clique that was in power before to appease some country . It is a well known fact that clique was weak on national security, ethnic pride and had great hopes for G2 Chimerica before Hu rejected that idea in 2009. It is no coincidence that all the major projects like J-20, DF-41, Liaoning, etc all started in the Hu era.

 

[ZeEa5KPul]

It was not an economic decision IMO. Even 15 years ago China had a far larger budget than Russia and already had deployable DF31A. It was a political decision put in place by a certain clique that was in power before to appease some country . It is a well known fact that clique was weak on national security, ethnic pride and had great hopes for G2 Chimerica before Hu rejected that idea in 2009. It is no coincidence that all the major projects like J-20, DF-41, Liaoning, etc all started in the Hu era.

One could have made an argument back then that China would be better served with a limited arsenal both because its threat environment was much more tame and its financial and technological means far more modest. Whatever political factors went into the decision, it's clear that the present situation shares absolutely nothing in common with the past. China's economy is four times larger, its industrial base is vastly more advanced and capable, its internal politics have shaped up, and its security environment has deteriorated almost as impressively as its wealth has grown.

I'll take this opportunity to state clearly exactly what I advocate China do over the short and long term so I'm not just spouting generalities. Immediately, China should build as many DF-41 missiles as its stockpile of fissile material (limited by weapons grade plutonium) will allow - roughly 1,000 new warheads - and deploy them to the new silos and on mobile launchers. The nuclear posture should be the same counter-value one it is now; not threatening a first strike but making MAD absolutely certain.

Over the longer term (2030s), China should station DF-45s (the rumoured heavier silo-based ICBM) in the silos and place the siloed DF-41s on mobile launchers. At this point the Type 09-VI SSBN should be entering service with JL-3 missiles. However, until the Taiwan issue is sorted and China gains open access to the Pacific, SSBNs are of fairly limited utility because they'll be picked up by enemy ASW. Therefore, SLBMs should be a limited part of China's nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future. China could also entertain changing its nuclear posture from counter-value to first strike at that time.

 

[Kalec]

Delete

 

[Untoldpain]

I'll take this opportunity to state clearly exactly what I advocate China do over the short and long term so I'm not just spouting generalities. Immediately, China should build as many DF-41 missiles as its stockpile of fissile material (limited by weapons grade plutonium) will allow - roughly 1,000 new warheads - and deploy them to the new silos and on mobile launchers. The nuclear posture should be the same counter-value one it is now; not threatening a first strike but making MAD absolutely certain.

Judging by the evidence we already have of multiple silo field constructions, significant expansion of PLARF brigades, and ramp-up of reprocessing facilities activities, It is rather clear that policy makers in China has all but abandoned minimal deterrence.

The warhead count is indeed likely to reach the low 1000s before the end of the decade.

 

[Blitzo]

Even if a large scale nuclear build up would cut into other military procurement - and there's no reason to think it would - it should take priority because it's indispensable to China's security. A conventional build up increases China's insecurity in the short term because it forces the choice on America to use or lose its conventional superiority. Now or never. China being weaker at the nuclear level only makes America's choice to launch a war more appealing. I needn't add that China can kiss civilian development goodbye if it's at war with America.

By contrast, America wouldn't ever contemplate getting into any kind of war with Russia because of nuclear parity.

I'll put my hand up as one of the people who think China should move with a much heightened urgency on this issue. There's only one reason China's arsenal up to this point has been constrained: it was dirt poor. That is emphatically no longer the case. The threat it's under has increased significantly as have its means to address this threat.

No matter which way the question is framed, the answer is identical: Much larger than what it has now and it should procure it yesterday. MOAR NUKES a la Robert Baratheon is indeed the rational, measured, even miserly response needed at the present time.

Yes, but we are not your run of the mill internet hovel.

We are SDF -- we are meant to have discipline and recognize the nuances of perhaps why a certain XYZ thing is not being procured, and to regulate our own emotions and expectations accordingly in context of the very secretive nature of PRC strategic nuclear procurement.



Repeatedly stating or implying "MOAR NUKES" is not educational or enlightening for everyone, all it does is preach to a choir who all moonlight as preachers themselves.

It is no better than the instances in the semiconductor thread who freak out at China's backwardness in semiconductors and think the sky is falling.


Learn to love, embrace and accept the current state of China's nuclear disadvantages as they are.
Then we can avoid wasting pages and pages of people coming up with unrealistic expectations and silly counter-force only nuclear strategies, and see things with clear eyes.

 

[Kalec]

Opportunity cost is a thing.

What China is willing to plow into a large scale nuclear build up means less money for other military procurement (and more importantly, civilian development).


Frankly I dislike the entire way that the discussion about Chinese nuclear procurement is framed.

It seems to be that there is a persistent degree of insecurity by some users (not you specifically), who are unaware that China faces a stark nuclear disadvantage and want to rectify this as soon as possible without recognizing the reason why China's nuclear arsenal up to this point has been relatively constrained to begin with.


Instead of looking at the question as "what's the biggest nuclear arsenal that China should have and how fast can they get it" -- the right way of asking it imo is:

What's the smallest nuclear arsenal China needs and what's the slowest they can procure it, to be able to prosecute a successful national strategy in the near term, medium term and long term?


Instead of dreaming big, it is better to first see what the compulsory prerequisites are, rather than the Robert Baratheon style demanding of "MOAR WINE NUKES".

Nuclear armament is less expensive than conventional weapon. It approximately costs China 15 million USD to build a MX Peacekeeper Pro Max or 8 million to build one DF-41.

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With a maximum diameter of 2.64 meters and a takeoff weight of 140 tonnes, the rocket is capable of sending a payload of 1.5 tonnes to the solar synchronous orbit at an altitude of 500 km.

To meet the large-scale commercial launch demands, the rocket's multi-satellite launch capability enables it to carry more than 20 satellites in a single mission, while the cost is just 10,000 U.S. dollars per kg, making it competitive in the market.

Since we have no data on how much it costs per warhead in China, we can calculate the figure based on US estimation adjusted by inflation.

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10 W87 300 kiloton warheads Subtotal armament ~$49 million

It costs US $5 million per warhead in 1996 USD value, which is worth $9.5 million today after inflation.

Then we can conclude
Chinese Peacekeeper: $72 million per missile with warheads, $23 billion to fill 320 silos.
DF-41: $36.5 million per missile with warheads $11.7 billion to fill 320 silos.

It is the procurement cost only, it is very difficult to precisely calculate how much it is going to take on initial training/silo construction cost/personnel recruitment & relocation. We can simply x2 the cost on missile & warheads based on Ohio overall breakdown, no way silo field costs more than submarine.

Though it looks outrageously high compare with China's $229.5 billion in budget, we should note it will be distributed over the next 5 years. It means that the nuclear program costs between $4.68 billion/2% and $9.2 billion/4% budget annually, meanwhile providing a nuclear arsenal between 1,500 ish to 2,500 ish.

 

[gelgoog]

Using the Data Table from Wiki, both the US and Russia scaled up at comparable rates from similar numbers of deployable warheads at a given point in time (eg, 299 in 1950 to 2422 in 1955 for the US, 200 in 1955 to 1605 in 1960 for the USSR), this was despite the US having the larger industrial base and better tech. China has a far better industrial base and technology to match or exceed this rate even with the preexisting disparity in numbers with the US nuclear arsenal.

The notion that the Soviet Union had worse tech than the US is flawed in several ways. The Soviet Union and the US each had different technological advantages.

For example the Soviet Union had uranium gas centrifuge technology while the US was still using uranium gas diffusion until only recently. Decades after Soviet collapse. Even today the only gas centrifuge cascade that operates in the US was built and operated by URENCO (a Western European consortium) and the US native gas centrifuge technology project was an abject failure. Because of this it was a lot cheaper for the Soviets to make both fission bombs and the fission primer in fusion bombs than in the US. It takes 100x less electricity to enrich uranium with centrifuges.

The Soviets also invented channel wall nozzle technology in the late 1960s early 1970s, which meant it was much cheaper for them to make liquid rocket engines than in the US. Basically the fuel channels in the engine are cut with circular saws and then they braze a metal jacket on top. US engines were based on the same technology used in the German V-2 and each fuel channel was an individual metal pipe which had to be bent and welded. Since most of the cost of a rocket is in the engine that also meant Soviet liquid launchers were a lot cheaper than US ones. The US only started using that technology a little over a decade ago.

The US had advantages in that they came up with their nuclear weapon designs both the fission and fusion ones earlier. The US also was ahead in terms of warhead miniaturization and solid rocket technology. The Soviets actually had better solid rocket technology than the US initially but because of lack of investment into solid rockets due to both politics and Soviet warheads still being too large back then to be carried cheaply with the solids they had available back then, it meant they simply did not invest a lot into solids.

 

[Orthan]

What China is willing to plow into a large scale nuclear build up means less money for other military procurement (and more importantly, civilian development).

What's the smallest nuclear arsenal China needs and what's the slowest they can procure it, to be able to prosecute a successful national strategy in the near term, medium term and long term?

I think that we can assume that you dont like nuclear weapons very much.

 

[ougoah]

Here are some of my thoughts.

1. Nuclear HGV doesn’t make sense to me.

The expectation of interception by US ABM system won’t change as long as there are still conventional nukes in China’s arsenal. Suppose GBI has a 50% interception rate, then it will nullify 22 Chinese/Russian projectiles. The number won't change whether you launch 50 nukes or 5,000 nukes.

50 HGV + 50 conventional nukes have the same intercepted rate as 100 conventional nukes, so why waste money with little upside?

2. Silo ICBM choice.

Both of Heavy ICBM and DF-41 have their upsides and downsides.

Heavy ICBM, rumored DF-45, is way more cost-efficient than DF-41. Heavy ICBM is always cheaper in warhead/price ratio than lighter ICBM. China can easily break the ceiling of current treaty limit by deploying DF-45, which is expected to carry 6 warheads per launcher. Even if China agrees to the 1,550 limit later on, it still maintains re-deployability like Ohio SSBN and MMIII in a nuclear showdown.

DF-41, which can carry 3 warheads, is a mature technology with a 100% successful test-fly rate. It is also categorically safer than Heavy ICBM in the silo, after it was designed under mobile, volatile background. The U.S. needs 2 warheads to destroy a silo with 95% confidence interval, meaning China can withhold a first strike without losing majority of its nuclear arsenal. It costs 2 of its own warheads in exchange for 3 Chinese warheads.

3. China doesn't need that much of counter-force ability.

It costs 2 warheads to obliterate 1 Minuteman III silo, which has only one warheads. Suppose MM3 has a probability of k to launch before being attacked, China is using 2 of its nukes in exchange for (1-k) U.S. nuke.

China should only strike U.S. nuclear stockpile, namely Pantex plant, Los Alamos etcs and SSBNs naval base/strategic airfields.

4. A surprise first strike in unlikely, or even impossible.

You have to disperse SSBN fleets/non-deployed nuclear stockpiles, which takes days if not weeks. It is not as simple as pressing a button then all nukes simultaneously fly towards the targets. U.S. keeps saying it sees no change in Russian nuclear posture, meaning it has a way to find out if Russia is going to conduct nuclear strike, so do Russia and China.

5. LoW posture is the trump card to deter against a first strike.

Arm control nerds give low credit to LoW posture simply because they see it as a destabilizing factor. Suppose China has a probability of k to launch before being attacked and the missile in silo is DF-41.

Probability	k	1-k
U.S. nuke	2	2
Chinese nuke	0	3

Simple math, U.S. has a net loss of warheads when k > 1/3. It means China needs a merely 33% credibility on LoW to persuade U.S. away from launching a first strike in hope of winning a nuclear war. China can increase the LoW credibility by increasing EW capabilities, silo ICBM readiness.

Wrong assumptions everywhere. For starters HGVs are immensely more difficult to intercept and require totally new interceptors and technologies which require decades to develop, test, and acquire in meaningful numbers. GBI and SM-3 are midcourse to terminal phase (designed for midcourse) interceptors and are 100% useless for intercepting anything during missile boost. This means there's a difference between HGV payload and conventional MIRV payload.