Kind of. We have a lot of pontification here. I'm asking people to make solid predictions just for this next week. Not long term.
Let's see how accurate people are.
I don't know is a perfectly acceptable answer.
Trying to anticipate upcoming events is not an easy task. Instead of describing the scenario so far of the probable Russian "invasion" in Ukraine, as reported by Western journalists and analysts, I will give you a general opinion of what I think of this crisis in Ukraine and what could eventually happen.
But there are four scenarios that I think are possible, one in which there is no use of military power and another three in which the invasion takes place:
1. Russia extracts some guarantees from the West, public or secret, and minimizes the current escalation of the crisis, presenting its population with reasons that demonstrate that it achieved its objectives and avoided a war. I think this is the most likely scenario. Military action in Ukraine would have huge consequences for the Russians, and they know it.
2. Russia adopts low-intensity military actions and in the field of hybrid warfare, acting heavily with cyber warfare and propaganda, occupying only the Luhansk and Donetsk regions (see figure below), claiming to be acting in defense of those populations, mostly ethnic Russians .
3. Russia acts militarily in a slightly more incisive way, also in the regions of Zaporizhia and Kherson (see figure below), in the southeast of the country, creating a land corridor that would unite Russia to Crimea, which would be an important gain for the geostrategic point of view for the country.
4. Russia would invade Ukraine up to the cut of the Dnieper River, which separates the country into the eastern and western portions, trying to provoke the creation of a buffer state in the eastern portion of the country.
5. Russia would carry out the capture of the entire coastal region of Ukraine, covering the territory stretching from Odessa to Zaporizhia (see figure below). Russian strategic gain is even greater, the Sea of Azov would become a Russian lake and Russia's position in the Black Sea would improve dramatically. From a military point of view, this operation I think is relatively easier for the Russians to succeed, Ukraine is relatively weak militarily in the coastal region, even larger than the other regions.
Still in the risky field of predictions, let us consider the options in which Russia decides to use its military power. I believe that, if the option chosen were number 4 or 5, there would be a strong military reaction from Ukraine, decisively supported by NATO and some other European countries, such as Sweden and Finland. The possibilities of numbers 2 and 3 would only be the worsening of the crisis already underway in Ukraine since 2014. If effective, they would provoke North American and European trade sanctions, but not much more than that.
Thus, in the case of the use of military power, I believe that options 2 and 3 are the most likely.
Of course, the assessments above are based on the information I have had access to so far. Other facts, data and information can considerably alter the course of events.
It is worth remembering that on December 17, the Russians released a proposal for an agreement, with measures to guarantee the security of the Russian Federation and the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
In the document the Russians basically listed the following requirements:
1. That NATO does not deploy troops on the territory of non-NATO countries in 1997, the date on which the Alliance and Russia celebrated the “Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Act”;
2. The commitment not to install short- and medium-range missiles capable of reaching Russian territory;
3. That NATO commits itself not to accept any new members, especially Ukraine and;
4. That NATO undertakes not to conduct any military activity on the territory of Ukraine, as well as in other States of Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Russia would make the same commitment in the corresponding territorial strip on its side of the border.
The outcome of the negotiations did not point to a solution to the impasse. The Americans proposed to the Russians to schedule new talks. The Russians spoke of a “dead end”. It was a predictable result that everyone was already expecting.
The US and NATO reiterated that the organization's "open-door" policy is non-negotiable. The Alliance considers that, as a sovereign country, it is up to Ukraine alone to decide to apply for membership in the group and only to the 30 members of the organization to decide whether or not to accept a new member. This eliminates the possibility for Russia – or any other non-NATO member country – to veto in advance any expansion of the organization in any direction.
The second non-negotiable point is the freedom that the Alliance arrogates to position troops and material for military use in the territory of any member state, at any time, in the quantities it deems necessary. This evidently includes the 14 countries, many of them former Soviet republics, that joined NATO between 1999 and 2020.
Despite taking an irreducible position on the two aspects above, NATO left some room for maneuver in relation to proposals regarding the positioning of short and medium-range missiles, as well as regarding the limitation of military exercises in the eastern part of Europe. , inviting the Russian side to schedule further rounds of negotiations on these specific points.
A curious fact draws attention to the actions of Europe and the US after the publication of the Russian demands. Then, between January 9 and 14, 2022, already knowing the Russian demands, the USA, NATO and other European countries held a series of meetings with the Russians to deal with the crisis. The format adopted to gather the powers is noteworthy. Initially, only Russians and Americans gathered. Two days later it was the turn of NATO allies and, the next day, the 57 members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) had the opportunity to participate. Interestingly, it was only at this third meeting that Ukraine and Russia sat at the same table.
The fact that negotiations were initiated between Russians and North Americans, without the presence of any European, to deal with a problem in Europe, caused a lot of discomfort in the old continent. Despite the fact that US representatives repeatedly reaffirmed that nothing would be decided without the participation of Europe and Ukraine itself, for the Europeans there was a feeling that they were being overtaken in decision-making. It will be seen, in the future, whether this episode will leave marks on relations between North Americans and Europeans. Macron's trip to Moscow only confirms this hypothesis and it is worth noting that Olaf is not Merkel, because if she were still in power, Merkel would have gone to Moscow long ago to try to minimize the situation.
The Russians, for their part, expressed their dissatisfaction with the results of the talks, saying that the negotiations had not progressed and that they were leading to “a dead end”. However, they did not close the door to future negotiations.
