as well as help them keep fit. I think majority of western people are overweight anyway. Oh for the third world, why did you get into the middle of a fight between "fat people" anyway? For the rest with sanity, China should help.
Ukrainian War Developments
- Thread starter james smith esq
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you can watch the combined exercises in Syria. They have AWACS in the them. Russians has very low opinion about Ukranian . Russia spend way more time extracting people from Ukraine. thats why all that talks with Israelis, Turks, Indian, French etc.
by extracting all those people they think Ukraine will not function.
DJI just dropped price for Mavic 3, you can now get a new Mavic 3 for less than a Mavic 2.
Rumor is due to its process of deAmericanization of criticial parts it went with a different GPS sensor supplier and only found out after shipping the Mavic 3 that the QC is not up to par, it takes far more time to get a gps lock on Mavic 3 than all previous dji drones. They tried to fix this via firmware updates but the root problem is a hardware issue. Getting a gps lock prior to flight is critical for modern smart drones, but its taking more than five minutes vs 30 seconds for the Mavic 3 to get a lock...
Anyway deAmericanization is necessary but there will be bumps along the road but in the long term its the only way, Huawei learned this lesson
Putin is winning. Every war in history, from the beginning to the end, is political. Outsiders, particularly westerners, may see a bleeding Russia bogged down in Ukraine, but I suspect once again they underestimate the fighting spirit of the Russian people, called “战斗民族“ inside China. If Putin can continue checking inflation and holding rouble, he is going to win hands-down. So from this angle, EU will surrender one way or another if EU does not want to get directly involved in this fight agains the Russians in Ukraine.
Does Motor Sich still owe 天骄航空 $2billion?
Indeed, but I wonder what's are the military objectives for this operation? It think Russia is settling to creating Novorossiya and dealing with Ukraine's government and EU later, so after Phase II, Liberation of Donbass is done, likely we'll see the other region being the next targets. Its going to be a long war.
Ukraine has claimed more outrageous things, why wouldn't they claim this? They could even claim that the Ghost of Kiev did it. If he could shoot down 6 modern Flankers with a 80s MiG-29, then he probably could also fly a Mi-24.
Recents Comments from Strelkov
Reflections on the situation in the Kiev-Chernigov area
I note right away: I DO NOT HAVE reliable operational information from there (unlike Donbass) (although, of course, I have some from direct participants, but it is "late" for several days in time and does not always have value in terms of "presenting the overall picture").
At the same time, some general considerations were "drawn" with a fairly high degree of confidence.
1. As I have repeatedly noted - the operation with a "throw to Kiev" (both on the Right Bank - landing on Gostomel and a strike group through the "Chernobyl zone", and on the Left Bank - past Chernigov and Sumy in the "guts" - on Brovary) - was built on the basis of the initially and fundamentally incorrect calculation for panic and rapid surrender of the Kiev authorities when threatening their military and political center, as well as on the belief that "the Armed Forces of Ukraine will behave like in the 14th".
Based on this, the troops were tasked with "going forward as quickly as possible without looking back at the rear." And the troops were going. Which in the first few days of the operation led to large and unjustified losses in people and equipment - as a result of enemy strikes on unguarded rear columns on unprotected communications.
Having reached the suburbs of Kiev and "getten down" in heavy urban battles in its "computies" - Russian troops quickly lost both the "tempo of operation" and - over time - the ability to move forward in general.
It was not possible to complete the blockade of Kiev - the available forces and means for this were acutely insufficient. The enemy's resistance was increasing, forcing them to form a more or less continuous front line to cover the rear from enemy raid operations (weakening, at the same time, strike groups). In fact, the groups of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (both west of Kiev and east) became like "mushrooms" - with massive hats on thin fragile legs. At the same time - the Right Bank (western) group does not have a real logistics connection with the Left Bank - due to the lack of bridges across the Dnieper. - Some bridges (in Kiev) - could not be captured, others - remained in the deep rear in Gomel. In such a situation, the maneuver of forces between the groups was impossible, which weakens their striking capabilities and creates threats of defeat from the enemy, able to maneuver forces through the most powerful Kiev transport hub (at one time - near Moscow, in the winter of 1941 - the Wehrmacht faced the same problem).
Meanwhile, the area of operations of the Right-Bank group itself is located in a wooded-swampy region, relatively poor by normal roads and other means of infrastructure, which seriously complicates the supply of Russian troops bogged down in heavy battles.
2. Now - when the calculation of "success with a rapid attack" turned out to be untenable - the Russian command faced a natural question: "what to do next in a situation where there is no forces to successfully advance, and there is no strength to successfully defend the captured huge area either"? Especially since in 2-3 weeks (depending on the weather) - all this wooded area will "green" and the enemy's DRG will greatly increase their impact on communications?
Two answers could be made to this question:
1) "We will hold on to what we took in the hope of an imminent approach of reserves!"
2) Since it "did not work out" with the offensive - on time (without waiting for the enemy to take advantage of the mistakes and organize a counteroffensive) - to withdraw the "deadlocked" troops from the formed "bag" to use them in other - more promising - directions.
Political arguments "squee" for the first option (in civil wars - very, very significant): the retreat of the Russian Armed Forces from Kiev inevitably means a sharp rise in the morale of the enemy, the emergence of confidence that "Russians can be beaten".
For the second - military expediency reaching an urgent need. After all, the reserves necessary to reverse the operation in their favor, which could be additionally transferred "from the big ground" are not available to the command. THEY JUST DON'T EXIST. It is impossible to withdraw troops from other directions (where the "adfurance with spread fingers" was carried out in the same way). And the preparation of new units and formations - in any case will take a considerable time (from 2 or more weeks - and this is with the most primitive approach, such as: "catched, samped, put into service and driven into battle without the slightest training and combat coagration").
In the current situation, in my opinion, the command of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation made the only right decision. Because if the abandonment of occupied territory is still inevitable, it is better to do so without the preliminary defeat of your troops by the enemy.
The troops will still be useful to us - the war will be long...
Well, the fact that defeat (forced withdrawal of troops with previously expensively paid for the lives of soldiers and officers of the liberated territory) still "has a place to be" is a bitter fact, but not fatal. There are very few wars in the history of Russia in which such "casuses" were not present because of the outstanding supefiness of the general. The main thing is that the defeats do not go "non-stop" and are replaced by victories again.
Reflections on the situation in the Kiev-Chernigov area
I note right away: I DO NOT HAVE reliable operational information from there (unlike Donbass) (although, of course, I have some from direct participants, but it is "late" for several days in time and does not always have value in terms of "presenting the overall picture").
At the same time, some general considerations were "drawn" with a fairly high degree of confidence.
1. As I have repeatedly noted - the operation with a "throw to Kiev" (both on the Right Bank - landing on Gostomel and a strike group through the "Chernobyl zone", and on the Left Bank - past Chernigov and Sumy in the "guts" - on Brovary) - was built on the basis of the initially and fundamentally incorrect calculation for panic and rapid surrender of the Kiev authorities when threatening their military and political center, as well as on the belief that "the Armed Forces of Ukraine will behave like in the 14th".
Based on this, the troops were tasked with "going forward as quickly as possible without looking back at the rear." And the troops were going. Which in the first few days of the operation led to large and unjustified losses in people and equipment - as a result of enemy strikes on unguarded rear columns on unprotected communications.
Having reached the suburbs of Kiev and "getten down" in heavy urban battles in its "computies" - Russian troops quickly lost both the "tempo of operation" and - over time - the ability to move forward in general.
It was not possible to complete the blockade of Kiev - the available forces and means for this were acutely insufficient. The enemy's resistance was increasing, forcing them to form a more or less continuous front line to cover the rear from enemy raid operations (weakening, at the same time, strike groups). In fact, the groups of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (both west of Kiev and east) became like "mushrooms" - with massive hats on thin fragile legs. At the same time - the Right Bank (western) group does not have a real logistics connection with the Left Bank - due to the lack of bridges across the Dnieper. - Some bridges (in Kiev) - could not be captured, others - remained in the deep rear in Gomel. In such a situation, the maneuver of forces between the groups was impossible, which weakens their striking capabilities and creates threats of defeat from the enemy, able to maneuver forces through the most powerful Kiev transport hub (at one time - near Moscow, in the winter of 1941 - the Wehrmacht faced the same problem).
Meanwhile, the area of operations of the Right-Bank group itself is located in a wooded-swampy region, relatively poor by normal roads and other means of infrastructure, which seriously complicates the supply of Russian troops bogged down in heavy battles.
2. Now - when the calculation of "success with a rapid attack" turned out to be untenable - the Russian command faced a natural question: "what to do next in a situation where there is no forces to successfully advance, and there is no strength to successfully defend the captured huge area either"? Especially since in 2-3 weeks (depending on the weather) - all this wooded area will "green" and the enemy's DRG will greatly increase their impact on communications?
Two answers could be made to this question:
1) "We will hold on to what we took in the hope of an imminent approach of reserves!"
2) Since it "did not work out" with the offensive - on time (without waiting for the enemy to take advantage of the mistakes and organize a counteroffensive) - to withdraw the "deadlocked" troops from the formed "bag" to use them in other - more promising - directions.
Political arguments "squee" for the first option (in civil wars - very, very significant): the retreat of the Russian Armed Forces from Kiev inevitably means a sharp rise in the morale of the enemy, the emergence of confidence that "Russians can be beaten".
For the second - military expediency reaching an urgent need. After all, the reserves necessary to reverse the operation in their favor, which could be additionally transferred "from the big ground" are not available to the command. THEY JUST DON'T EXIST. It is impossible to withdraw troops from other directions (where the "adfurance with spread fingers" was carried out in the same way). And the preparation of new units and formations - in any case will take a considerable time (from 2 or more weeks - and this is with the most primitive approach, such as: "catched, samped, put into service and driven into battle without the slightest training and combat coagration").
In the current situation, in my opinion, the command of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation made the only right decision. Because if the abandonment of occupied territory is still inevitable, it is better to do so without the preliminary defeat of your troops by the enemy.
The troops will still be useful to us - the war will be long...
Well, the fact that defeat (forced withdrawal of troops with previously expensively paid for the lives of soldiers and officers of the liberated territory) still "has a place to be" is a bitter fact, but not fatal. There are very few wars in the history of Russia in which such "casuses" were not present because of the outstanding supefiness of the general. The main thing is that the defeats do not go "non-stop" and are replaced by victories again.
Russia doesn’t really need the pro-war gestures now as much as mobilization. The manpower limitations have severely restricted the Russian advance on Kiev and Kharkov. Now they pull out of Kiev, which they could’ve taken if they they had sufficient troops to both attack and guard the rear.
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