Ukrainian War Developments

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FairAndUnbiased

FairAndUnbiased

Brigadier
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Phead128 said:
I'm not sure if you are serious or trolling, but Ukrainians don't have airfields to operate F-35s, much less risk getting a F-35 captured by VKS. Ukrainians aren't trained on M1A2 or M777, so you can't just give them weapons that they don't know how to use.

Also, you don't need to give them the best weapons, even a bunch of basic US weapons to Mujahideens really help mess up the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, or basic Chinese/Soviet weapons to Viet Congs help mess up the Americans.
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Vietnamese actually got fighters and tanks (Mig-21, T-64) while Ukraine's asking but no one is giving. It's even more embarrassing because Vietnam outright defeated the US with 1/10 population and 1/50 GDP while Russia is still holding on to its possessions despite Ukraine being 1/4 population and 1/8 GDP.
 
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Jingle Bells

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Anlsvrthng said:
Even if the Ukrainan units behave like an expeditionary unit of the USA by the west account China should punish Russia for her sins.

The USA leaders has very serious mental capability / congitive analiytical issues.
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Well, what can you do? People striving to further their own interest. This is as natural as a animal seeking to feed themselves.
Their job as leaders is to further the national interest of their country, are you expecting them to harm their own nation interest in order to uphold some logical consistency? Well, that's one way to get themselves prosecuted for "treason".

In crude internet Chinese, it's: " 脸是啥，能吃吗？"
 
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Weaasel

Senior Member
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Aegis21 said:
1. As I have repeatedly noted - the operation with a "throw to Kiev" (both on the Right Bank - landing on Gostomel and a strike group through the "Chernobyl zone", and on the Left Bank - past Chernigov and Sumy in the "guts" - on Brovary) - was built on the basis of the initially and fundamentally incorrect calculation for panic and rapid surrender of the Kiev authorities when threatening their military and political center, as well as on the belief that "the Armed Forces of Ukraine will behave like in the 14th".
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Aegis21 said:
Based on this, the troops were tasked with "going forward as quickly as possible without looking back at the rear." And the troops were going. Which in the first few days of the operation led to large and unjustified losses in people and equipment - as a result of enemy strikes on unguarded rear columns on unprotected communications.
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Extremely HUBRISTIC and flawed strategy that showed absolutely no respect for the enemy and throw away the fundamental necessity for exercising caution and guarding one's rear as one approaches an objective. Whoever insisted that this should be undertaken should be fired.
 
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Weaasel

Senior Member
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Aegis21 said:
Recents Comments from Strelkov

Reflections on the situation in the Kiev-Chernigov area

I note right away: I DO NOT HAVE reliable operational information from there (unlike Donbass) (although, of course, I have some from direct participants, but it is "late" for several days in time and does not always have value in terms of "presenting the overall picture").

At the same time, some general considerations were "drawn" with a fairly high degree of confidence.

1. As I have repeatedly noted - the operation with a "throw to Kiev" (both on the Right Bank - landing on Gostomel and a strike group through the "Chernobyl zone", and on the Left Bank - past Chernigov and Sumy in the "guts" - on Brovary) - was built on the basis of the initially and fundamentally incorrect calculation for panic and rapid surrender of the Kiev authorities when threatening their military and political center, as well as on the belief that "the Armed Forces of Ukraine will behave like in the 14th".

Based on this, the troops were tasked with "going forward as quickly as possible without looking back at the rear." And the troops were going. Which in the first few days of the operation led to large and unjustified losses in people and equipment - as a result of enemy strikes on unguarded rear columns on unprotected communications.

Having reached the suburbs of Kiev and "getten down" in heavy urban battles in its "computies" - Russian troops quickly lost both the "tempo of operation" and - over time - the ability to move forward in general.
It was not possible to complete the blockade of Kiev - the available forces and means for this were acutely insufficient. The enemy's resistance was increasing, forcing them to form a more or less continuous front line to cover the rear from enemy raid operations (weakening, at the same time, strike groups). In fact, the groups of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (both west of Kiev and east) became like "mushrooms" - with massive hats on thin fragile legs. At the same time - the Right Bank (western) group does not have a real logistics connection with the Left Bank - due to the lack of bridges across the Dnieper. - Some bridges (in Kiev) - could not be captured, others - remained in the deep rear in Gomel. In such a situation, the maneuver of forces between the groups was impossible, which weakens their striking capabilities and creates threats of defeat from the enemy, able to maneuver forces through the most powerful Kiev transport hub (at one time - near Moscow, in the winter of 1941 - the Wehrmacht faced the same problem).
Meanwhile, the area of operations of the Right-Bank group itself is located in a wooded-swampy region, relatively poor by normal roads and other means of infrastructure, which seriously complicates the supply of Russian troops bogged down in heavy battles.

2. Now - when the calculation of "success with a rapid attack" turned out to be untenable - the Russian command faced a natural question: "what to do next in a situation where there is no forces to successfully advance, and there is no strength to successfully defend the captured huge area either"? Especially since in 2-3 weeks (depending on the weather) - all this wooded area will "green" and the enemy's DRG will greatly increase their impact on communications?

Two answers could be made to this question:

1) "We will hold on to what we took in the hope of an imminent approach of reserves!"

2) Since it "did not work out" with the offensive - on time (without waiting for the enemy to take advantage of the mistakes and organize a counteroffensive) - to withdraw the "deadlocked" troops from the formed "bag" to use them in other - more promising - directions.

Political arguments "squee" for the first option (in civil wars - very, very significant): the retreat of the Russian Armed Forces from Kiev inevitably means a sharp rise in the morale of the enemy, the emergence of confidence that "Russians can be beaten".


For the second - military expediency reaching an urgent need. After all, the reserves necessary to reverse the operation in their favor, which could be additionally transferred "from the big ground" are not available to the command. THEY JUST DON'T EXIST. It is impossible to withdraw troops from other directions (where the "adfurance with spread fingers" was carried out in the same way). And the preparation of new units and formations - in any case will take a considerable time (from 2 or more weeks - and this is with the most primitive approach, such as: "catched, samped, put into service and driven into battle without the slightest training and combat coagration").

In the current situation, in my opinion, the command of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation made the only right decision. Because if the abandonment of occupied territory is still inevitable, it is better to do so without the preliminary defeat of your troops by the enemy.

The troops will still be useful to us - the war will be long...

Well, the fact that defeat (forced withdrawal of troops with previously expensively paid for the lives of soldiers and officers of the liberated territory) still "has a place to be" is a bitter fact, but not fatal. There are very few wars in the history of Russia in which such "casuses" were not present because of the outstanding supefiness of the general. The main thing is that the defeats do not go "non-stop" and are replaced by victories again.
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As I said myself before. The Russians had no respect for the Ukrainians, as such instead of replicating their very cautious and deliberate approach of the 2nd Chechen War, in which they absolutely never rushed into any battle and the advanced their combat units never far from logistics and supplies and ensured that they protected their rear well as well as ensured that they also protected their logistics and supply convoys well, they decided to completely throw away such caution, assuming that the Ukrainians would just capitulate entirely as soon as the Russians approached Kiev.

Those who might have asked what happens if they do not capitulate, while pointing out that their forces were far from adequate enough to surround Kiev and even storm it if the Ukrainians decided to fight probably had their opinions dismissed or told "we'll cross that bridge when we get there."

The Russians within half a week realized that the Ukrainians were indeed ready to fight and had already suffered heavy casualties and the logistical preparations were well behind combat forces and the Russians uttered the proverbial "SHIT!"

I can only imagine the extent to which the recriminations and finger pointing by those, one the one hand, who advocated a cautious approach of assuming that the enemy is very well prepared as well as those who pointed that such a rapid advance was well beyond their logistics capability, at those who insisted on a Zerg Rush and were thoroughly convinced that the Ukrainians were incapable of defending themselves and would sue for peace the moment the Russian forces showed up at the doorsteps of Kiev.

The lesson for all this is ALWAYS assume that the enemy that one is going up against is very formidable, always be accordingly well prepared, and NEVER disrespect the enemy.
 
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