In 2014 the US hadn’t pulled out of INF treaty yet. Russia didn’t yet have an existential need to positively keep Ukraine out of NATO.
Mr Yang answered this in Alaska.My point in that post was to point out exactly what you’re doing now! I’ll make it very simple:
DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS THE AUTHORITY TO DICTATE TO CHINA WHICH FOREIGN, OR DOMESTIC, POLICIES ARE IN CHINA’S BEST INTEREST? YES, OR NO?
Is that sufficiently clear?
Talk a good look at the Alaska meeting what Mr Yang tells the American on their own land.Ever heard of the phrase “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must”?
China is still weaker than the Hegemon and the Hegemon can still inflict considerable costs to China (with some costs to itself). All countries obey the Hegemon’s diktats to some degree, the reason behind Mr. Putin‘s . China has been obeying the Hegemon’s diktats ever since Deng’s reforms. Obviously she has been obeying less and less and the day she can free herself from them is coming. However, people on this forum is debating whether it is in the best interests of China to ignore the diktat on weapon support.
And, that’s all some are!We are corporeal beings.
In 2014 the US hadn’t pulled out of INF treaty yet. Russia didn’t yet have an existential need to positively keep Ukraine out of NATO.
The source is Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, literally a CIA propaganda outlet.
If the EU did not want a war they certainly did a lot to precipitate one. Proclaiming Ukraine and Georgia would join NATO. Not enforcing Minsk agreements for almost 8 years. Not giving guarantees to Putin that Ukraine would not join NATO when he had almost 200,000 troops on Ukraine's border. Etc.EU did NOT want a war in Ukraine. And as we are seeing right now, EU is hurt the MOST economically now.
I also don't want to join that "conspiracy bandwagon", but even if people here are blaming NATO expansion (which I actually agree to be one of the main reasons that tipped Russia off), I don't think continental Europe wants to destroy their relations with Russia. France and Germany would have been braindead if they actually want to push for hard economic decoupling with Russia.
They are that braindead. Sorry. It might not have happened with the previous leadership in France and Germany in the 1990s or even 2000s but the current leadership is pure braindamage. Especially the current one in Germany which is just out of its depth.That remains to be seen though.
EU has been lacking leadership for a very long time without a center to gather around.
With Brexit and the Germans seemingly shocked into accepting that leadership (and the rest letting them) by the invasion things might change to a much stronger Franco-Germanic world view long term. If the Germans are up to it that is. No doubt the French would be delighted to "assist" such a move.
The Drive fails as usual. Iskander does not have enough range to hit a target close to the Romanian border from Russia. It has 500km range. Khinzal has 2500km range. And Russia never claimed that video was of a Khinzal strike.Drive update and article about Khinzal strike on a farm.
Like I said before. No. Shortage. Russia ordered over a thousand Kalibr missiles a couple years ago. Let alone missiles of other types.Is it realistic that Russia is currently on the shortage of their Cruise Missiles and Iskander missiles in their inventory?
China has no reasons to speed up taking back Taiwan. Or totally decoupling from the West. Taiwan for example provides China with no strategic advantage other than expanded access to the Pacific Ocean. Taking the semiconductor industry in Taiwan would provide no benefit since it is highly dependent on foreign supplies. At best taking Taiwan would deny the West access to its chip production output. For the US however it is in their interest to provoke a conflict with or within China before its economy surpasses that of the US.For China, the longer with which it can delay an economic and technological decoupling and the longer with which it can build up its own domestic warchests (in terms of finances, resources, technologies), the better it will be.
It is not "pointless procrastination" -- if anything, it is vital time. The later and longer into the future that any large scale economic and technological confrontation between China and the US/Europe occurs, the better China will be able to manage it.
Why on earth would anyone want to seek such confrontation earlier, without necessary geopolitical cause for it?
The technological gap in civil aviation and semiconductors could easily take a decade to cover yes. And who knows which technologies will be of relevance in a decade.Do you think those chokepoints can be plugged immediately?
What if "ASAP" for certain chokepoints in terms of technology or financial systems takes years or even a decade?
China will find itself pushed into a situation where conflict will be almost inevitable just like Russia did just now. I think the current change of leadership in South Korea is a good indicator towards this. There will be multiple fires in China's periphery and perhaps even within China itself.Furthermore, how does that post counter what I said at all -- what I wrote was "For China, the longer with which it can delay an economic and technological decoupling and the longer with which it can build up its own domestic warchests (in terms of finances, resources, technologies), the better it will be" --- do you think this is true, or do you think it is untrue?
Russia will only need the military-technical support of China in case the conflict expands into a wider Russia-NATO conflict.If Russia would 'only ask for something they don't need to achieve their common goal shared with China' presumes Russia expended all domestic resources (e.g., calling up reserves, mandatory conscription, martial law, tactical and strategic nukes) to achieve their Ukraine objectives, still fail, and China is the last resort option, then we already in a nuclear WW3 scenario given Putin's threat of all options on the table (including nuclear).
Exactly.In a nuclear WW3 scenario, YES, I believe China will definitely provide military help to Russia, because economic factors will be the least of our worries, the prospect of nuclear winter is bigger concern. It's not saying much to help Russia when we all going to die anyways.
It is kind of a bad idea for Russia to send too many troops into Ukraine at the same time. You would risk NATO taking advantage of that to nuke large troop formations as was the NATO plan in the Cold War. It is way better to just rotate them. Which is what I expect will happen eventually.That presumes Russia expended all domestic resources first (including mass conscription, strategic bombing, and tactical nukes), still fail, and China's help is required to avoid complete loss in Ukraine. In that case, we are already in a nuclear WW3 scenario, so this is fantasy playing into an extreme scenario.
I think at best the Russians would double the troops in Ukraine and they would not use nukes in Ukraine unless the Russian territory itself was being threatened by large NATO contingents inside Ukraine.Russia should commit it's entirely military first, then see the results, then escalate to nukes. It has so many options to dominate Ukraine and then into ashes, that Chinese military aid is not necessarily needed to win in Ukraine.
That guy is not part of the Russian government. He volunteered to join the fight in Donbass in 2014. He seems to be a Russian nationalist and monarchist. So do not expect his perspective to match that of the government or to reflect current conditions. I doubt the Russian government would not have all sorts of contingencies baked into the operational plan.Wow that’s avery sobering assessment. i hope that Russia pulls this one off but if this interview is to be believed then then the Russians are screwed?
Geopolitical competition involves multiple domains yes -- included in that are proxy conflicts and supporting one's own economic and technological growth/advancement, among others.
But the weighting of various domains is not always equal, and some domains (at any given point in time) may have significantly greater bearing on one's ability to wage geopolitical competition.
All of this, leads me to a few questions which I don't think have been addressed here by proponents of the idea of providing Russia with military arms/military support during active warfighting in Ukraine:
1. If Russia has requested -- or if Russia does request (in future) -- military arms from China, does such a request actually reflect on how Russia's current war in Ukraine is progressing in terms of Russia's political goals in waging this war, in terms of failure or success?
2. Does a Russian failure to achieve some or all of its political goals in Ukraine, pose an existential threat to Russia as a nation or security, and thus pose a risk to China's security?
3. Does a Russian success to achieve some or all of its political goals in Ukraine, significantly enhance Russia's security trajectory as a nation, and thus similarly enhance China's security?
Given the balance of power, it is impossible for Russia to "lose" a war against Ukraine through conventional military means -- it basically becomes a question of how many of Russia's political objectives in Ukraine can actually be attained.
My belief is that if Russia is unable to achieve all of its stated political objectives in Ukraine and have to settle for some sort of "negotiated peace," that Russia's overall security situation does not greatly change compared to if Russia was somehow able to achieve all of its stated political objectives in Ukraine.
This is because Russia's future national security and the threat to it as a nation is no longer whether Ukraine is or isn't going to be a major staging area for the US/NATO, but rather it is because of US, European and US client state sanctions against Russia, and the impact it will have on Russia's economy, and in turn its civilian and military technological industries -- and US/European/client state sanctions are going to continue against Russia regardless of how much Russia "wins" or "loses".
So, I would pose this set of counterarguments to everyone freaking out over Russia's war in Ukraine and saying that China needs to supply Russia with arms so Russia can "win" in Ukraine:
A) It is of significant interest to China to ensure that Russia remains a stable nation that is able to maintain a trajectory where its future as a nation is not under existential threat, and China should be willing to make proportionate sacrifices and endure proportionate pain to ensure that Russia is not under existential threat of collapsing.
B) Regardless of how much Russia "wins" in a war in Ukraine, its economic consequences from the US/Europe/client states is already sealed and unlikely to be lifted.
C) The greatest existential threat to Russia is not how much Russia "wins" in Ukraine, but rather the economic and technological threats that it faces going forwards. How much Russia "wins" in Ukraine will not change those aforementioned economic and technological threats.
D) If China did provide Russia with military arms in the short term, it will only influence how much Russia "wins" in its war in Ukraine, but it will not change the economic and technological threats that Russia faces. However, China providing Russia with military arms will almost certainly result in greater economic and technological decoupling from the US/Europe/client states, in a manner that may be sooner and more destabilizing than China wishes.
E) Therefore, because Russia not being able to attain all of its political aims in Ukraine is not an existential threat to Russia, it does not make sense for China to provide military arms to Russia on the basis that China's interests for seeking Russia remains stable and not under threat of collapse. China providing military arms does not change Russia's own domestic stability.
F) Instead, the best thing China can do for Russia, is to provide Russia with economic and technological support in the short, medium and long term -- which China can best achieve, by further economically and technologically developing and advancing itself, which benefits from continued trade and somewhat stable relationships with the US/Europe/client states. China's trade and relationships with the US/Europe/client states therefore are only worth being degraded or sacrificed if there is a sufficient gain or risk that requires it to be done (for example, in event of a conflict over Taiwan).