Part 2:
"SP": - That is, we are talking about a much longer armed conflict than the one planned in Moscow at the beginning?
- Yes, definitely.
"SP": - I see. And how do you assess the pace of the operation?
- It was not a discovery for me that the Ukrainian army would offer us fierce resistance. For me, it was not news that a significant part of the population of Ukraine, which in 2014 was ready to meet us with flowers, either turned away from the Russian Federation, or took a clearly hostile position, or gloomy-neutral-passive perceives the arrival of Russian troops.
This, I repeat, is not a discovery for me. Why was it a discovery for the Kremlin? It turns out that the picture given to the highest military and political leadership of the country by our relevant specialists turned out to be, let's say, not too reliable. And on the basis of this unreliable information, a military operation is planned. Which at first was not aimed at classic military tasks - the priority defeat and destruction of enemy manpower and equipment, rapid advance in some key areas.
As a result, the forces at our disposal are now advancing in five main directions. Northern - to Kiev, immediately on both banks of the Dnieper. Then to Kharkiv, to Mariupol on the southern flank. And from Crimea in two divergent directions.
"SP": - To Nikolaev and Kherson?
- Yes, on the one hand. On the other hand, to the same Mariupol. And on the curve - in Zaporozhye.
Now, most likely, we are making a belated regrouping. We form impact fists. But it's much more difficult to do than it would be originally.
Frankly speaking, I assumed, based on the usual military expediency, that the main goal in Ukraine would be the early encirclement and defeat of the main enemy forces, which are concentrated in Donbass. And in the first week of the operation, if it were not scattered like we did, such a goal could have been achieved quite easily.
In the same Crimean direction, our troops met very weak resistance. And they could not go to Mariupol, but immediately hit through Gulyaipole to the north. To cut off enemy communications on the way to the Dnieper (former Dnepropetrovsk). And the group that is coming south of Kharkiv could break through to meet them. And if these groups are sufficiently strengthened, the task of creating a huge "boiler" in the Donetsk region would probably be solved in the first week.
Now that the enemy's Donbass group has not retreated, but continues to fight on heavily fortified borders, ours are trying to attack it head-on.
Our troops storm heavily fortified enemy fortress cities. And in fact, undividedly owning the initiative on the front line, unconditionally dominating the air, we nevertheless play according to the rules proposed by the opponent. That's how it happened?
The Ukrainian military understands that in the open field, when Russian aviation constantly "hangs" over their heads and missile troops strike, nothing good "shines" in a combined arms battle. Therefore, they bet on retaining the most important cities. And in general, all cities where you can defend yourself for a long time. With a gradual retreat in all other directions.
The bet is on the fight in residential buildings, where our advantage in aviation, artillery, missiles is leveled very much. Plus - where there are a lot of civilians, which, of course, strongly restrain Russia in the use of firepower.
This is both Mariupol and Volnovakha, during which there were fierce battles for seven days. This is Severodonetsk and the Severodonetsk-Rubezhny defensive knot, which defends as a real fortress. This is Gulyaipole, this is Nikolaev.
And there is still Odessa ahead, which will be feverishly strengthened for a month. Ahead - Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhye, Krivoy Rog.
In all these cities, the enemy creates fortresses. Brings troops there and prepares them in advance for the fight surrounded. Sets the task of defending as long as possible. I repeat: now in fact we are playing according to the rules of the opponent. The enemy very competently chose passive defense.
"SP": - Does he play black?
- Yes, black. But there is a time factor. To delay the course of hostilities in all possible is a conscious strategy not only of the Ukrainian side, but also of its curators.
"SP": - So the bet is on the exhaustion of Russia?
- Of course. They want to leave the Russian Federation completely destroyed cities, the restoration of which will fall on the economy of our country with additional burdens. And the population is completely ruined, angry, cursing everything in the world. And that's what they plan to do in every city.
What can the Russian Federation oppose in this situation? Should there be a way out of this deadlock? Apparently, it may consist in a sharp increase in the number of the fighting Russian group.
Hoping on an easy hike to Ukraine within a maximum of a few weeks, the Russian authorities were not prepared for the current situation. Anyone can clearly see it. The quality of the Russian state apparatus may not be lower than the skirting board. But somewhere in the area. Therefore, I don't know how to mobilize him quickly, conditionally speaking. "United Russia" does not even closely resemble the CPSU (b), which in the most difficult conditions of 1941 managed to ensure order and raise the whole country on alarm.
Based on this, I repeat once again: we have no years in reserve in Ukraine. We have months at best. And in order to win during these months and at least smooth out the consequences of a powerful blow to our economy and social sphere, it is necessary not to bring water with glasses, but to establish normal mobilization work. Both in the economy and in the military sense of the word.
"SP": - Igor Vsevolodovich, I will bring you back to our November conversation.
Then I invited you to introduce yourself as our military leadership.
And I asked to answer how you would have acted if the current special operation had started at that time. You said then: "After the defeat of the Ukrainian army, I would establish a line from Kharkov to Tiraspol, thus depriving Kiev of half of the population and all access to the sea. And then he would say, "Let's put up or goodbye." Is this a real forecast today?
- Not anymore.
"SP": - So time is missed or what?
- A year ago, I was too optimistic about the situation. The chances of such an outcome have already been missed.
If in 2014 the case ended with the defeat of the Ukrainian army, and our troops reached Odessa, Kiev would simply dream of making peace on any terms. As long as we don't take Kiev and kick them out.
If the Russian army now stops on the line along the Dnieper, Ukraine, even if it goes to some truce, it will be a truce only for a month or two. For which they will pump up forces, receive weapons, master them, retrain and prepare new combat-ready units. And before that, the enemy won't just sit in defense. He will attack us continuously and everywhere with sabotage and reconnaissance groups.
In this war, we have only one alternative: either to completely eliminate this regime. Without any denamification, it will happen by itself. Or we'll feel bad.
So we'll have to go to Lviv. To the very border. That's the only thing you need to plan in Moscow.
Source:
I want to put this translation here because it’s a good analysis of Russian shortcomings. Hope you guys read it.
