Ukrainian War Developments

vincent said:

Well, different people place different values on the costs and benefits. People who argue against in the forum provided some very valid points. One can’t accuse them to be unpatriotic because of that.

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My point in that post was to point out exactly what you’re doing now! I’ll make it very simple:

DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS THE AUTHORITY TO DICTATE TO CHINA WHICH FOREIGN, OR DOMESTIC, POLICIES ARE IN CHINA’S BEST INTEREST? YES, OR NO?

Is that sufficiently clear?

enroger said:

Fair enough. I'd still say my guess is more reasonable along the lines of possible geopolitical thinking, what you're saying is a bit more tabloidy..... But again you're right I'm just guessing as much as you were

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Dude, posing with no shirt on is tabloidy!

I’m simply questioning whether, or not Putin is acting in Russia’s interests, or his own! I doubt I’d be scrutinized so thoroughly we’re I questioning Drumpf’s strategic assessments, at least by most in this forum. Am I correct?

Part 2:

"SP": - That is, we are talking about a much longer armed conflict than the one planned in Moscow at the beginning?

- Yes, definitely.

"SP": - I see. And how do you assess the pace of the operation?

- It was not a discovery for me that the Ukrainian army would offer us fierce resistance. For me, it was not news that a significant part of the population of Ukraine, which in 2014 was ready to meet us with flowers, either turned away from the Russian Federation, or took a clearly hostile position, or gloomy-neutral-passive perceives the arrival of Russian troops.

This, I repeat, is not a discovery for me. Why was it a discovery for the Kremlin? It turns out that the picture given to the highest military and political leadership of the country by our relevant specialists turned out to be, let's say, not too reliable. And on the basis of this unreliable information, a military operation is planned. Which at first was not aimed at classic military tasks - the priority defeat and destruction of enemy manpower and equipment, rapid advance in some key areas.

As a result, the forces at our disposal are now advancing in five main directions. Northern - to Kiev, immediately on both banks of the Dnieper. Then to Kharkiv, to Mariupol on the southern flank. And from Crimea in two divergent directions.

"SP": - To Nikolaev and Kherson?

- Yes, on the one hand. On the other hand, to the same Mariupol. And on the curve - in Zaporozhye.

Now, most likely, we are making a belated regrouping. We form impact fists. But it's much more difficult to do than it would be originally.
Frankly speaking, I assumed, based on the usual military expediency, that the main goal in Ukraine would be the early encirclement and defeat of the main enemy forces, which are concentrated in Donbass. And in the first week of the operation, if it were not scattered like we did, such a goal could have been achieved quite easily.

In the same Crimean direction, our troops met very weak resistance. And they could not go to Mariupol, but immediately hit through Gulyaipole to the north. To cut off enemy communications on the way to the Dnieper (former Dnepropetrovsk). And the group that is coming south of Kharkiv could break through to meet them. And if these groups are sufficiently strengthened, the task of creating a huge "boiler" in the Donetsk region would probably be solved in the first week.

Now that the enemy's Donbass group has not retreated, but continues to fight on heavily fortified borders, ours are trying to attack it head-on.

Our troops storm heavily fortified enemy fortress cities. And in fact, undividedly owning the initiative on the front line, unconditionally dominating the air, we nevertheless play according to the rules proposed by the opponent. That's how it happened?

The Ukrainian military understands that in the open field, when Russian aviation constantly "hangs" over their heads and missile troops strike, nothing good "shines" in a combined arms battle. Therefore, they bet on retaining the most important cities. And in general, all cities where you can defend yourself for a long time. With a gradual retreat in all other directions.

The bet is on the fight in residential buildings, where our advantage in aviation, artillery, missiles is leveled very much. Plus - where there are a lot of civilians, which, of course, strongly restrain Russia in the use of firepower.

This is both Mariupol and Volnovakha, during which there were fierce battles for seven days. This is Severodonetsk and the Severodonetsk-Rubezhny defensive knot, which defends as a real fortress. This is Gulyaipole, this is Nikolaev.

And there is still Odessa ahead, which will be feverishly strengthened for a month. Ahead - Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozhye, Krivoy Rog.
In all these cities, the enemy creates fortresses. Brings troops there and prepares them in advance for the fight surrounded. Sets the task of defending as long as possible. I repeat: now in fact we are playing according to the rules of the opponent. The enemy very competently chose passive defense.

"SP": - Does he play black?

- Yes, black. But there is a time factor. To delay the course of hostilities in all possible is a conscious strategy not only of the Ukrainian side, but also of its curators.

"SP": - So the bet is on the exhaustion of Russia?

- Of course. They want to leave the Russian Federation completely destroyed cities, the restoration of which will fall on the economy of our country with additional burdens. And the population is completely ruined, angry, cursing everything in the world. And that's what they plan to do in every city.

What can the Russian Federation oppose in this situation? Should there be a way out of this deadlock? Apparently, it may consist in a sharp increase in the number of the fighting Russian group.

Hoping on an easy hike to Ukraine within a maximum of a few weeks, the Russian authorities were not prepared for the current situation. Anyone can clearly see it. The quality of the Russian state apparatus may not be lower than the skirting board. But somewhere in the area. Therefore, I don't know how to mobilize him quickly, conditionally speaking. "United Russia" does not even closely resemble the CPSU (b), which in the most difficult conditions of 1941 managed to ensure order and raise the whole country on alarm.

Based on this, I repeat once again: we have no years in reserve in Ukraine. We have months at best. And in order to win during these months and at least smooth out the consequences of a powerful blow to our economy and social sphere, it is necessary not to bring water with glasses, but to establish normal mobilization work. Both in the economy and in the military sense of the word.

"SP": - Igor Vsevolodovich, I will bring you back to our November conversation. Then I invited you to introduce yourself as our military leadership. And I asked to answer how you would have acted if the current special operation had started at that time. You said then: "After the defeat of the Ukrainian army, I would establish a line from Kharkov to Tiraspol, thus depriving Kiev of half of the population and all access to the sea. And then he would say, "Let's put up or goodbye." Is this a real forecast today?

- Not anymore.

"SP": - So time is missed or what?

- A year ago, I was too optimistic about the situation. The chances of such an outcome have already been missed.

If in 2014 the case ended with the defeat of the Ukrainian army, and our troops reached Odessa, Kiev would simply dream of making peace on any terms. As long as we don't take Kiev and kick them out.

If the Russian army now stops on the line along the Dnieper, Ukraine, even if it goes to some truce, it will be a truce only for a month or two. For which they will pump up forces, receive weapons, master them, retrain and prepare new combat-ready units. And before that, the enemy won't just sit in defense. He will attack us continuously and everywhere with sabotage and reconnaissance groups.

In this war, we have only one alternative: either to completely eliminate this regime. Without any denamification, it will happen by itself. Or we'll feel bad.

So we'll have to go to Lviv. To the very border. That's the only thing you need to plan in Moscow.


Source:

I want to put this translation here because it’s a good analysis of Russian shortcomings. Hope you guys read it.

zgx09t said:

First off, weapons sales are still fake news, so that's a lot of air for nothing.
Second, your entire point of contention here that time is on China side is a straight line assumption, China must have a plan to use her resources effectively and efficiently at any given time, as the world keeps changing every day, domestically and internationally.
Third, a chick in bed already is worth 10 chicks in a fancy bar, so I'd keep the one in bed as opposed to your 10 more, which, by the way, would be a welcome bonus.

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What about 70 virgins?

Maikeru said:

For some reason the Russian MoD declined to tell me when I asked. Probably they didn't really know themselves.

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Or you just pulling things out of the blue. That is not a good way to do analysis. you cannot make up the facts that in order to know whether they are low on ammo or not, you have to know the amount of weapons they possessed in the first place. Otherwise it's a wishful thinking.

You know, let me share a story on Corruption and how it goes in Indonesian armed forces. The way people do their thing here is to mark-up the price or to use cheaper materials but never fudging the amount being procured, instead they may try to gouge the manufacturer by ordering more items with less budget.

james smith esq said:

What about 70 virgins?

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you don't say man or woman.

zgx09t said:

First off, weapons sales are still fake news, so that's a lot of air for nothing.
Second, your entire point of contention here that time is on China side is a straight line assumption, China must have a plan to use her resources effectively and efficiently at any given time, as the world keeps changing every day, domestically and internationally.
Third, a chick in bed already is worth 10 chicks in a fancy bar, so I'd keep the one in bed as opposed to your 10 more, which, by the way, would be a welcome bonus.

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1: I only addressed weapons sales because the possibility of weapons sales is what everyone else talked about in the last few pages. I am well aware that there's been no proof of Russia seeking China to provide arms for its war on Ukraine -- I am talking about what China should do if Russia has requested it, or if Russia requests it in the near future.

2: Obviously it goes without saying that China will adjust to dynamic changes in the world. I am not saying that "time will always be on China's side for all eternity" -- I am saying that at present and into the foreseeable future, it is in China's interest to delay a future confrontation in economic and technological domains.

3: I have no idea what this means in relation to the discussion about Chinese interests for economic and technological competition and geopolitical strategy.

zgx09t said:

you don't say man or woman.

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Does it matter?

Bltizo said:

1: I only addressed weapons sales because the possibility of weapons sales is what everyone else talked about in the last few pages. I am well aware that there's been no proof of Russia seeking China to provide arms for its war on Ukraine -- I am talking about what China should do if Russia has requested it, or if Russia requests it in the near future.

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Are you certain that this is what we were talking about?

Because, as a, very active, participant in that discussion, myself and most of the others (if I’m not mistaken) thought it was about whether, or not, the US had the right, standing, or authority to impose that decision upon, and to require a statement, thereto, upon the Chinese leadership.

Bltizo said:

Geopolitical competition involves multiple domains yes -- included in that are proxy conflicts and supporting one's own economic and technological growth/advancement, among others.

But the weighting of various domains is not always equal, and some domains (at any given point in time) may have significantly greater bearing on one's ability to wage geopolitical competition.

All of this, leads me to a few questions which I don't think have been addressed here by proponents of the idea of providing Russia with military arms/military support during active warfighting in Ukraine:
1. If Russia has requested -- or if Russia does request (in future) -- military arms from China, does such a request actually reflect on how Russia's current war in Ukraine is progressing in terms of Russia's political goals in waging this war, in terms of failure or success?
2. Does a Russian failure to achieve some or all of its political goals in Ukraine, pose an existential threat to Russia as a nation or security, and thus pose a risk to China's security?
3. Does a Russian success to achieve some or all of its political goals in Ukraine, significantly enhance Russia's security trajectory as a nation, and thus similarly enhance China's security?

Given the balance of power, it is impossible for Russia to "lose" a war against Ukraine through conventional military means -- it basically becomes a question of how many of Russia's political objectives in Ukraine can actually be attained.

My belief is that if Russia is unable to achieve all of its stated political objectives in Ukraine and have to settle for some sort of "negotiated peace," that Russia's overall security situation does not greatly change compared to if Russia was somehow able to achieve all of its stated political objectives in Ukraine.
This is because Russia's future national security and the threat to it as a nation is no longer whether Ukraine is or isn't going to be a major staging area for the US/NATO, but rather it is because of US, European and US client state sanctions against Russia, and the impact it will have on Russia's economy, and in turn its civilian and military technological industries -- and US/European/client state sanctions are going to continue against Russia regardless of how much Russia "wins" or "loses".


So, I would pose this set of counterarguments to everyone freaking out over Russia's war in Ukraine and saying that China needs to supply Russia with arms so Russia can "win" in Ukraine:
A) It is of significant interest to China to ensure that Russia remains a stable nation that is able to maintain a trajectory where its future as a nation is not under existential threat, and China should be willing to make proportionate sacrifices and endure proportionate pain to ensure that Russia is not under existential threat of collapsing.
B) Regardless of how much Russia "wins" in a war in Ukraine, its economic consequences from the US/Europe/client states is already sealed and unlikely to be lifted.
C) The greatest existential threat to Russia is not how much Russia "wins" in Ukraine, but rather the economic and technological threats that it faces going forwards. How much Russia "wins" in Ukraine will not change those aforementioned economic and technological threats.
D) If China did provide Russia with military arms in the short term, it will only influence how much Russia "wins" in its war in Ukraine, but it will not change the economic and technological threats that Russia faces. However, China providing Russia with military arms will almost certainly result in greater economic and technological decoupling from the US/Europe/client states, in a manner that may be sooner and more destabilizing than China wishes.
E) Therefore, because Russia not being able to attain all of its political aims in Ukraine is not an existential threat to Russia, it does not make sense for China to provide military arms to Russia on the basis that China's interests for seeking Russia remains stable and not under threat of collapse. China providing military arms does not change Russia's own domestic stability.
F) Instead, the best thing China can do for Russia, is to provide Russia with economic and technological support in the short, medium and long term -- which China can best achieve, by further economically and technologically developing and advancing itself, which benefits from continued trade and somewhat stable relationships with the US/Europe/client states. China's trade and relationships with the US/Europe/client states therefore are only worth being degraded or sacrificed if there is a sufficient gain or risk that requires it to be done (for example, in event of a conflict over Taiwan).

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Russia has only committed a fraction of it's total force to Ukraine war. If facing extreme difficulty, Russia should call up reservists, mandatory conscription, strategic bombers, and even tactical and strategic nukes, expend all domestic resources to win in Ukraine, before expecting China to save her ass. Because if we already in a nuclear WW3 situation, China will provide military aid to Russia, because GDP growth is no longer a factor, we all gonna die from nuclear winter anyways.

In other words, China is not required to win Ukraine. Russia hasn't even expended all her strength and energy and nukes to win in Ukraine, why bother to expect China to save her ass when it's not even required yet or necessary? If it gets to nuclear exchange, China has nothing to lose at that point to give military aid.