Ukrainian War Developments

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Abominable

Major
Registered Member
Only one seen crashing, they look like grey like Ukrainian ones. Oldvid ? I don't see how they have still airoplanes in the air if the Russian are doing their job.
It's definitely new.

Someone here a few months ago in the context of a Taiwan invasion said it's near impossible to disable airfields with bombardment alone. Looks like they were right.

If you crater the runway damage can be repaired quickly. Even with auxiliary buildings and infrastructure destroyed people will probably find a way to fly some sorties.
 

KYli

Brigadier
MSM was trying to paint a picture that Russia is cornered and China has abandoned Russia. The reality is nothing has changed. As both China and India are working a way to circumvent the sanctions and continue to trade with Russia.
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Beijing was combative in the Rome talks, people briefed on the interactions say. One U.S.-based person briefed on the meeting described Chinese officials' response as "tough" and "offensive." Another said simply that the talks did not go well.

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Mirabo

Junior Member
Registered Member
And what is that actual rate? Provide a good source with relative comparisons.

The source is my ass.

We see a lot of abandoned Russian equipment for unknown reasons. Could be because of fuel, or mechanical failure, or maybe the crew went to take a shit and got lost. Nobody has a good source for you at this stage in the war. Wait for historians to do the work later on.

I'm not comparing Russian losses to Ukranian losses. There is no reasonable way to estimate Ukranian losses because Russian troops don't have smartphones, and Ukranian civilians are less likely to photograph their own abandoned or damaged equipment, and the uncertainty is compounded by loudmouths who make shit up and call it "OSINT".

Whatever the case, if a vehicle has not been lost to combat, then it could only have been lost to logistics. Either it has no fuel, or it broke down and there are no recovery vehicles nearby, which is also part of logistics. The fact remains that abandoned Russian vehicles, including fuel trucks and supply convoys, are photographed every day by Ukranian civilians behind Russian lines. This is indicative of a significant level of attrition, i.e. more than just a few vehicles getting stuck or running out of fuel.

For comparison, see the American ground operation in the Gulf War (
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Out of 23 Abrams lost, 9 were destroyed. The remaining 14 were lost to other reasons including deliberate damage after being disabled. (p. 24). Even if we generously assume that all 14 damaged tanks were disabled out of combat, that is still far fewer than the number of Russian tanks disabled out of combat.

From the start of the ground war on February 24 to a week later on March 1, the percentage of combat-ready M1s only dropped from 93% to 91%. The percentage of combat-ready M1A1s actually increased from 93% to 95%. (p. 22).

Part of the reason why there were so few tanks lost to attrition despite the infamous gas consumption of the turbine engine is because Americans placed a huge emphasis on logistical support, with tanks getting refueled every 3 to 5 hours. (p. 25).

In fact, logistics supply in Desert Storm was actually too slow to keep up with the armor, but the Americans made the wise decision to slow down the offensive according to the pace of supply columns. Generally, tanks and IFVs did not push ahead or leave their fuel trucks behind. (p. 2).

The Russians did not appear to do any of this. They YOLO'd in with BTGs, tried to push 50 km a day, and now they are scrambling to straighten things out. But it's already week 3, whereas a good commander could have sorted this out in week 1.
 

Weaasel

Senior Member
Registered Member
I think there was a failure of Russian intelligence to consider that part of the Ukrainian army would defect to the Russian side or lay down their weapons when the war started.

Whereas the use of Russian troops at the beginning to employ front-line recruits was a giant operational flaw of Russian war planning, this changed even in the first week of the war, but it was a gradual change, as was the much smaller number of troops. On the whole, the Russian advance could have been much greater had it not been planned and executed as it happened, which could certainly have set the stage that the Russians were considering in terms of the Ukrainians' defection and willingness to fight. This was so impactful in the war that Ukraine even managed to get volunteers and mercenaries from all over the world to fight the Russians, so the initial planning of the Russian war was terrible and can be considered an intelligence and operational failure without fear of falling into error of being a flawed argument.
Hubris of the highest order. The Russians should have executed the extensive and thorough precautions that they used in the 2nd Chechen War. Always overestimate the enemy.
 

Zichan

Junior Member
Registered Member
"15 by one count"

That's funny. Do the Ukrainians know how to count? I see at most 4 or 5 destroyed choppers.
That's because one of those photos captured only the initial phase of the attack.

Here's the aftermath of the damage on the main parking area:
FODaHeGaIAE4KEA

Add to that the 5 choppers from the other part of the airbase and you get a total of 15 destroyed.
 

Weaasel

Senior Member
Registered Member
The source is my ass.

We see a lot of abandoned Russian equipment for unknown reasons. Could be because of fuel, or mechanical failure, or maybe the crew went to take a shit and got lost. Nobody has a good source for you at this stage in the war. Wait for historians to do the work later on.

I'm not comparing Russian losses to Ukranian losses. There is no reasonable way to estimate Ukranian losses because Russian troops don't have smartphones, and Ukranian civilians are less likely to photograph their own abandoned or damaged equipment, and the uncertainty is compounded by loudmouths who make shit up and call it "OSINT".

Whatever the case, if a vehicle has not been lost to combat, then it could only have been lost to logistics. Either it has no fuel, or it broke down and there are no recovery vehicles nearby, which is also part of logistics. The fact remains that abandoned Russian vehicles, including fuel trucks and supply convoys, are photographed every day by Ukranian civilians behind Russian lines. This is indicative of a significant level of attrition, i.e. more than just a few vehicles getting stuck or running out of fuel.

For comparison, see the American ground operation in the Gulf War (
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
).

Out of 23 Abrams lost, 9 were destroyed. The remaining 14 were lost to other reasons including deliberate damage after being disabled. (p. 24). Even if we generously assume that all 14 damaged tanks were disabled out of combat, that is still far fewer than the number of Russian tanks disabled out of combat.

From the start of the ground war on February 24 to a week later on March 1, the percentage of combat-ready M1s only dropped from 93% to 91%. The percentage of combat-ready M1A1s actually increased from 93% to 95%. (p. 22).

Part of the reason why there were so few tanks lost to attrition despite the infamous gas consumption of the turbine engine is because Americans placed a huge emphasis on logistical support, with tanks getting refueled every 3 to 5 hours. (p. 25).

In fact, logistics supply in Desert Storm was actually too slow to keep up with the armor, but the Americans made the wise decision to slow down the offensive according to the pace of supply columns. Generally, tanks and IFVs did not push ahead or leave their fuel trucks behind. (p. 2).

The Russians did not appear to do any of this. They YOLO'd in with BTGs, tried to push 50 km a day, and now they are scrambling to straighten things out. But it's already week 3, whereas a good commander could have sorted this out in week 1.
The Russians are paying greatly for failing to apply the tactics, strategy, and logistics management that they used during the 2nd Chechen War. They were very cautious and thoroughly deliberate in their approach and advances against any known enemy positions back then. Because of the the 1st Chechen War, the Russians gained great respect for the fighting abilities of the Chechen Rebels.

It is obvious that the Russians had no respect for the Ukrainian Army, despite knowing full well their possession of extensive amounts of anti armour weaponry and drones, which should have made them even more cautious than before. It looks like in the North, the Ukrainians allowed their armoured columns to advance dozens to scores of km into Ukraine unimpeded, before eventually fanning with their own infantry, armour, artillery, and air power (especially drones) to pick away Russian units that advanced far ahead of logistics and support of artillery and air power. The Russians undertook very little to probing.

This is the complete opposite of what the strategy, tactics, and logistics management that the Russians used in the 2nd Chechen War, but instead in many ways like the 1st battle of Grozny, in which a few tank battalions, with little supporting infantry, air support, and artillery rode into the centre of Grozny - they were allowed to - before the defenders sprang up on the with all manner of well prepared small arms and heavy arms fire, and the Russian deaths were 80% of that force on the first day of the fighting in Grozny.

Thorough hubris and incompetence due to lacking any respect for their opponents. The Russians have since the first week been extremely chastened. Veterans of the Chechnya campaign are completely livid at their successors. It is obvious that the approach to Ukraine should be that of the 2nd Chechnya War, but undertake on multiple fronts.
 
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