The source is my ass.
We see a lot of abandoned Russian equipment for unknown reasons. Could be because of fuel, or mechanical failure, or maybe the crew went to take a shit and got lost. Nobody has a good source for you at this stage in the war. Wait for historians to do the work later on.
I'm not comparing Russian losses to Ukranian losses. There is no reasonable way to estimate Ukranian losses because Russian troops don't have smartphones, and Ukranian civilians are less likely to photograph their own abandoned or damaged equipment, and the uncertainty is compounded by loudmouths who make shit up and call it "OSINT".
Whatever the case, if a vehicle has not been lost to combat, then it could only have been lost to logistics. Either it has no fuel, or it broke down and there are no recovery vehicles nearby, which is also part of logistics. The fact remains that abandoned Russian vehicles, including fuel trucks and supply convoys, are photographed every day by Ukranian civilians behind Russian lines. This is indicative of a significant level of attrition, i.e. more than just a few vehicles getting stuck or running out of fuel.
For comparison, see the American ground operation in the Gulf War (
).
Out of 23 Abrams lost, 9 were destroyed. The remaining 14 were lost to other reasons including deliberate damage after being disabled. (p. 24). Even if we generously assume that all 14 damaged tanks were disabled out of combat, that is still far fewer than the number of Russian tanks disabled out of combat.
From the start of the ground war on February 24 to a week later on March 1, the percentage of combat-ready M1s only dropped from 93% to 91%. The percentage of combat-ready M1A1s actually increased from 93% to 95%. (p. 22).
Part of the reason why there were so few tanks lost to attrition despite the infamous gas consumption of the turbine engine is because Americans placed a huge emphasis on logistical support, with tanks getting refueled every 3 to 5 hours. (p. 25).
In fact, logistics supply in Desert Storm was actually too slow to keep up with the armor, but the Americans made the wise decision to slow down the offensive according to the pace of supply columns. Generally, tanks and IFVs did not push ahead or leave their fuel trucks behind. (p. 2).
The Russians did not appear to do any of this. They YOLO'd in with BTGs, tried to push 50 km a day, and now they are scrambling to straighten things out. But it's already week 3, whereas a good commander could have sorted this out in week 1.
