Well its obviously been a disappointing few days for many here.
We however are not here for the benefit of emotion, but to try and look through the fog of war and try to see what is being concealed.
The first thing I have to note is surprise. Compare the last few days to the effective campaigns in Kherson and the intelligence led defeat of the Commando raids on the ZNPP. Its a completely different story, or so it seems, despite the intelligence having been there for all to see for weeks.
Something clearly doesn't quite add up.
SO are there any takeways from this yet. Well I think so
1) The Southern Front trumps all others as the defense and security of the Crimea remains priority number 1.
Hardly a surprise as the Crimea is a major Strategic territory, the loss of which would constitute a very major defeat for the Russian federation.
2) Russia is unwilling to mobilise at this time.
This time being the transition to Autumn and the then rapid slide into Continental Winter.
The Ukraine is now fully mobilised and is facing the task of keeping a massive amount of manpower in the field over these cold months. It will be quite an undertaking and demobilisation seems an unlikely option as very many of the now conscripted troops would simply take the opportunity to disappear.
Russia by contrast seems to want to keep its forces at this same constant level to minimise the strain of field support this winter.
If mobilisation were to start, I would anticipate it being started during the mid winter to have new forces ready for deployment in the spring.
This means that I see the Russians largely going into a defensive mode across the entire front and starting to baton down the hatches against the worst of the weather. The army that can keep its men in the best condition through the winter will be the one with the advantage next year,
The gap in response you can almost certainly chalk it up to the rebels not being able to fight as well as Russia thought they would, along with NATO sending extra manpower for a larger than expected push.
Some people here acting like this is proof that Ukraine will win now are putting the cart way, way, before the horse. Ground can be taken back, losses can't, and by all indications, Russia lost very few regulars and the rebels didn't lose too much either. They played very safe.
Fundamentally, Russia just doesn't have enough units committed, and the ones they have are lacking in some key capabilities such as drones and air ISR support. Of course, the nato/Ukraine volunteer army formation lacks even more capabilities, but that doesn't matter when there's total 500 000+ of them vs 200 000 at best.
American nationalists often try to compare this war with the Iraq war, what they don't mention is that the invaders outnumbered the Iraqis. If Russia mobilized and started a limited draft, then sent 600 000 troops into Ukraine, the war would shape itself far differently.
Honestly, with Putin expanding the army by 175 000, that might be the playbook Russia is going for. The attacks since February 24, mobilizing the rebels, inflicting high casualties on the AFU, serve as an equivalent to the months of air terror campaign over Iraq. So once they mobilize and send an equal/larger sized army to Ukraine, a total collapse happens as a Kiev that's become accustomed to Russian inactivity, undermanned RU units and refusal to bomb dual use facilities suddenly gets everything thrown at them.
Russians likely expected to hold the lines indefintely until they could declare war, but Ukraine is also an actor and here they proved with a succesful offensive that Russia is on a timer too.
