Really? … and in return it is surprising taht the Russian Forces were not able to implement countermeasures against Javelins!
No it is not.
The Javelin is an autonomous, shoot-and-forget, infra-red homing system, with a range of 2-4km at a speed of 300m/sec.
So you can't really jam it.
It's the exact opposite.
Javelins are very easy to disrupt in technical terms. "Cope cages" are the sign of desperation of the crews which can only do so much in field conditions to improve their defenses.
Proper counter-measures would require passive optical/IR sensors to detect approaching missiles and trigger multispectral smokescreens as well as multispectral camouflage to reduce IR signature. Russia couldn't do even before the war as part of their modernization program which limited the scope of modernization of tanks in favour of quantity of modernized vehicles. Now it's completely out of reach, both in material and technological terms.
But while this may seem as willful neglect there is ruthless logic behind this decision of Russian MoD because
Javelins and ATGMS in general are correctly seen as not the main threat to tanks.
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During a public debate in the Polish Bureau of National Security (BBN - a cabinet-level agency under the Presidents office) a military publicist Jaroslaw Wolski in his presentation cited figures of tank and armoured vehicle losses in the war which present a very different picture, but which align with overall findings in the field of military history.
If I remember his statement correctly
almost 70% of all losses are caused by artillery, and
almost 20% are caused by mines, the rest are caused by direct engagement: tanks, ATGMs, etc.
"Artillery" includes instances of vehicles or entire units finding itself under artillery fire, being stopped in maneuver and their crews deciding to abandon them. Similarly if tanks are in need of resupply and their logistical support is destroyed by artillery and crews decide to abandon them that counts as "artillery".
To put things in perspective let's say that we use Oryx figure of ~1950 tanks lost in combat since 24 February 2022. If we apply the above statistics of those 1950 tanks lost 1365 would be due to "artillery", 390 due to "mines" and
only 195 due to other causes including tank on tank combat and ATGMs.
So while "cope cages" are a desperate measure it makes sense why Russian MoD would not commit extremely scarce resources to address an issue that is responsible for perhaps 5% of all tank losses. That's logic of war. A much bigger problem is Russia's inability to address the other 90% of losses which are also to a large degree preventable.
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What most people are not aware of is that ATGMs were never intended to be "tank-killers". ATGMs were created as
substitutes for anti-tank guns in infantry formations. In the 1960s tank armour became to strong for anything other than very heavy guns and that simply hit the barrier of mobility.
Tanks or self-propelled anti-tank guns were too expensive, and towed anti-tank guns were too vulnerable. ATGMs were the solution. They were cheaper than towed guns and had sufficient (if still very low) effectiveness during the 60s and 70s but then composite and reactive armour caught up. If ATGMs were so effective then US Army wouldn't push for MLRS loaded with anti-armour cluster munitions. M26 with DCPIM was the real tank killer in AirLand Battle, not TOW or even Hellfire.
Javelins are great if the goal of the narrative is to sell the idea that popular mass mobilisation armed with ATGMs can stop combined-arms formations. It is as insane as it is infuriating because the intial phase of Russian invasion had real examples of properly "heroic" defenses that could be used for shoring up of support that didn't involve semi-suicidal tactics.
The best example was
defense of Chernihiv done by
1st Armoured Brigade. The 1st Armoured kept within the boundary of the urban settlement and repeatedly attacked both the advancing Russian units and the supply lines once the units moved toward Kiyv. They've done this for over a month and were almost single-handedly responsible for collapsing of the eastern wing of the push to Kiyv. But it was all done by
combined arms raids with tanks and artillery by the best tank unit in the Ukrainian Army and
not partisans with Javelins.
This is end of March 2022, shortly before the withdrawal. The shortest and safest supply route for western flank had to be supported along the unstable extended network of roads because Chernihiv prevented the two forces from connecting. Compare with consolidated flank east of Kiyv.
At least one major route to Kiyv was blocked. Overextended force was stopped at Brovary and couldn't get through. Confirmed Ru losses:
The push from the east was stopped by flooding and losses of VDV.
Javelins and Bayraktars got the credit in the media because that was a
marketing campaign.
As for the halting of armour near Kharkiv:
The frontline stabilised along the boundary of those forests which run along the rivers. Many key areas were devended by Ukrainian Airborne which means that it was terrain and logistics that stopped it, not ATGMs or tanks like in Chernihiv.
Meanwhile the Lancet is a TV-guided system, with a range of about 30km and a slow flight speed of about 100km/h, there is more time to detect it. All indications are that the final guidance phase is done using a third drone as a repeater.
Lancets are very resilient to countermeasures because of the architecture of their guidance system. Currently there isn't a more reliable solution. For example Poland works on its own long-range drone combat and recon system under "Gladius" program and it will use that type of architecture. Other similar programs all do the same.
TV guidance means it's being optically guided by the operator using visual reference. Only direct physical blinding of the camera or concealment can disrupt it. There's no machine algorithm to be deceived just the operator aided by AI.
Disrupting communications is also very hard if it's done by narrow beam frequency hopping communication using other drones as translators. It would require the ability to efficiently detect and locate emissions which is difficult because the fighting is not taking place in a vacuum but along a massive frontline with hundreds of thousands of soldiers. It's a massive EW effort, incomparable to anything that we've seen before probably even during Desert Storm when you consider that both sides also use civilian infrastructure all the time.
Ukraine also doesn't have nowhere nearly enough of basic communication equipment, let alone sufficient counter-measures. The war is turned static to a large extent because Ukraine lacks sufficient C2 so they can't coordinate maneuver. Being able to move is more important than being able to counter enemy drones.The primary defense is always movement. If you stand still you may as well start counting down. The reason why NATO armies are not packed with anti-drone jammers is because they're instead packed with C2/C3/C4 systems and their doctrine emphasises
movement. There's no need to disrupt Lancets if you're just about to threaten the rear and supply lines with direct fire.
And then there's the obvious fact that
Lancets are not relevant. They are Russia's "Saint Javelin" or "Bayraktar" except without a song.
And if some Russian mobik wrote a song about Lancets it would probably go something like that:
ланцет ланцет неостанавливаемый
унеси меня отсюда на хуй
In other words, despite the billions of euros provided, neither the lancet nor the target detection/signal repeater drone is being interfered with.
That's because I have yet to see a single report which lists Lancets as a serious threat that needs to be addressed as a priority. While they may consume the attention of keyboard warriors they barely register in the optics of war planners.
Furthermore, we have seen the T-90Ms make use of these thermal blankets in large numbers to camouflage the heat/infrared footprint and therefore it is a countermeasure that seems to be successful considering that the tank seems to have a high survival rate on the front line.
According to The Military Balance 2023 by International Institute for Strategic Studies at the end of 2022 Russian ground forces had approximately 100 T-90M/AM in service.
Oryx lists 19 T-90M as lost in Ukraine. This is ~20% unrecoverable loss rate which usually translates to 30-40% of total short-term loss of equipment from all causes. And that occurs in the static phase of war.
However my numbers based off updates to Oryx list indicate that it's indeed lower rate of losses compared to other types of vehicles, only slightly below T-72B3 (26%) but much lower than the T-80s which were wiped out at rates of 40% (BVM) or 100% (other).
Tanks need good support to be effective and Russia invaded without it - hence the results.
