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Bltizo said:

I think countering Japanese intervention would still be better categorized with the overall "Counter Intervention" mission, even though the biggest difference is one of geography and distance. That is to say, I think countering a JSDF intervention would actually be somewhat easier for the PLA given the closer distance of JSDF forces from the Chinese mainland and their land based air and missile forces, relative to countering the US.

Of course, such a great difference in geography and distance for other scenarios would usually be sufficient to be given its own individual geographical theater of conflict, but in the scope of an overall Taiwan contingency, the capabilities and requirements to counter JSDF and US intervention (while being very different in distance and geography) are still fundamentally about air superiority and sea control.

OTOH, for the Taiwan centric mission, it is more comprehensive as it requires air superiority, sea control, SEAD/DEAD, amphibious assault/invasion, ground warfare, potentially urban combat, and follow on resupply as well -- albeit in a much more well defined geographical area than the others.

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It's easier because it's closer, but it's in an inconvenient "middle" sort of close: distance from mainland is significant.
It's also more difficult because it has a political problem of escalation(do we escalate beyond involved territories), as well as of geography (Ryukyu island chain).

Also, I'd argue that the instantaneous(available on theatre) potential of Japanese forces is pretty comparable to the American one, and it reinforces American capabilities, too.
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Thus, the island of Taiwan, from the Chinese perspective, is an OtH ground to ground amphibious assault, broadly comparable to, say, Sicilian landings. Island campaign with absolute results - because the aim is absolute surrender(annihilation) of the opposing forces and destruction of the Republic of China.
It's a battle in direct view of the Chinese mainland, primarily relying on the escort forces of the navy, army/marines, and [tactical] air power.
Opponent - Taiwanese forces in their entirety. Nothing to add here, good half of this thread is on this topic.
Likely to be one of the largest amphibious invasions in history+significant land campaign.

South-Eastern axis is a pure Mahanian decisive battle - clash of blue water forces, involving land and space elements on both sides. Analogy - great carrier battles of the Pacific. Geographically far from the Asian mainland, cut off by numerous obstacles from direct support(1st Island chain). Curiously - in this particular case, defeat at sea doesn't mean failure of the whole enterprise for China, but defeat, tie or even inconclusive victory does mean exactly that for the US side. This is a huge pressure
Almost pure navy&naval aviation fight, with significant (but secondary!) support from mainland-based recon&strike assets(infrastructure, OtH radars, IRBM force).
Opponent - USN, maybe JMSDF&Australian Royal navy, depending on the political picture; USAF long-range anti-ship assets.

North Eastern axis - while also naval, it's a Corbett-ish -style sea engagement over superior position, with limited goals (for both sides actually). Air-sea-land battle. Analogy - Solomon Islands campaign.
Characterized by intermediate ranges involved(at the outer edge of what tactical airpower can do), beyond any land-to-land amphibious maneuver. Also characterized by the need to somehow deal with these islands - because achieving isolation of Taiwan on this axis will be hard w/o dealing with at least the southern portion of the island chain(and disabling its underwater listening arrays).
This time there is no significant role for army, but all others will be at full play. Traditional grab&hold style naval assault is unlikely, because Japanese ASuW firepower within the reach of its aviation is immense, so time within its range shall be limited. Perfect place for amphibious assault ships to shine, though.
Opponents: all branches of JSDF(sans army heavy units), probably US land-based units, and, importantly, "updated" USMC; RoCAF and ROCN.
Of particular note are JGSDF missile units - since they're, ironically, key battlefield shapers, and it's because of them that we're talking about large-scale amphibious operations.

This discussion right here is why I favour deferring a Taiwan conflict for as long as possible, preferably until at least mid-century. The reason is that I don't see "Taiwan reunification" as having anything to do with Taiwan except superficially; I see the true aim of this national goal to be the complete remaking of the post-WWII security architecture in Asia.

If the PRC were to take Taiwan in the near or medium term and no one were to intervene, well then that's the end of that. Despite American hand-wringing to the contrary, that would leave its security architecture intact. Any ambitions beyond that like expelling the US from the western Pacific would be explicitly expansionary, which would have a much higher political bar to clear. Accomplishing all that ostensibly as part of taking Taiwan is much more readily acceptable, as such Taiwan should be a cover for much broader goals.

This is why I kind of chortle at discussions of perhaps escalating to the Diaoyu Islands or play-fighting a Japanese intervention. No. How tiny and petty that would be. The goal should not be to take the Diaoyu Islands, but to take Tokyo. The goal should be to conquer Japan in its entirety and install a puppet government at the very least, if not directly rule it. The goal shouldn't just be to defeat a US intervention, but to seize Guam and other US holdings in the Second Island Chain. Hell, take Hawaii.

Obviously, China isn't strong enough yet to contemplate any of this in the short term, which is why peace is the order of the day. Peace to allow China to build up enough power to credibly threaten to launch and win WWIII if its ultimatums aren't obeyed.

FangYuan said:

I thought of another theory, which is MAD[...]

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Think again.

plawolf said:

I am pretty sure the Japanese are being manoeuvred in to act as guanine pigs for the USN.

If conflict breaks out, the US will insist Japanese naval forces move in first and independently as ‘first responder’ forces, probably with a pretext that American forces still need time to mass before they can commit, and that Taiwan would have fallen before sufficient critical mass could be accumulated if the Japanese didn’t move in to bolster their defences first.

But the real reason would be to test just how effective Chinese missile tech, specifically its AShBMs are in real combat scenarios.

If the Japanese looks to be able to hold their own, the USN will of course pile in. But if the Japanese get absolutely slaughtered, and slaughtered badly, the Americans will magically find a reason why none of this is any of their business.

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That's a good strategy, only a very small problem: the Japanese have the exact same mindset and would like to see the Americans get into the action first before they follow.

Temstar said:

That's a good strategy, only a very small problem: the Japanese have the exact same mindset and would like to see the Americans get into the action first before they follow.

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True, but the dog does as the master commands, not the other way around.

“a wise monkey sitting on top of the mountain to watch the two tigers fight in the valley below.”

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The weakening and collapse of the two superpowers is an opportunity for Japan to rise again.

Japan hopes for a conflict between China and the United States and they will benefit from it. But China and the United States are not stupid.

The way that Japan acts , I don't ever get the impression that they are "playing both sides". They are sycophantic as heck.

weig2000 said:

UAVs and missiles are not going to be enough if you're dealing with several CVGs. You'll also run out of missile quickly.

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If the PRC controlled Taiwan, its carriers would have nearly unlimited numbers of missiles. The PRC would ship massive tonnages of weapons to the island, and the weapons could then be shipped from Taiwan's eastern shore to the Liaoning, 003s, 055s, and whatever other ships are protecting the island's eastern flank from US or Japanese attack.

In the scenario that I talked about above. You have 2 CATOBARs + 2 STOBARs + the Gigantic Asian Continental Carrier as your carrier groups to counter adversary CVGs.

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IMHO, the most likely scenario is that millions of PRC troops (and their supplies) will be dominating the Gigantic Asian Continental Carrier, so its usefulness against the PRC will be minimal.

Gloire_bb said:

It's easier because it's closer, but it's in an inconvenient "middle" sort of close: distance from mainland is significant.
It's also more difficult because it has a political problem of escalation(do we escalate beyond involved territories), as well as of geography (Ryukyu island chain).

Also, I'd argue that the instantaneous(available on theatre) potential of Japanese forces is pretty comparable to the American one, and it reinforces American capabilities, too.

Click to expand...

I know where you are coming from, but I think for the purposes of understanding a Taiwan contingency from the priorities of the PLA and Chinese leadership, the PLA strategy towards potential Japanese intervention is best categorized in the overall Counter Intervention requirement, both in terms of political objectives and military capabilities.

Gloire_bb said:

---
Thus, the island of Taiwan, from the Chinese perspective, is an OtH ground to ground amphibious assault, broadly comparable to, say, Sicilian landings. Island campaign with absolute results - because the aim is absolute surrender(annihilation) of the opposing forces and destruction of the Republic of China.
It's a battle in direct view of the Chinese mainland, primarily relying on the escort forces of the navy, army/marines, and [tactical] air power.
Opponent - Taiwanese forces in their entirety. Nothing to add here, good half of this thread is on this topic.
Likely to be one of the largest amphibious invasions in history+significant land campaign.

South-Eastern axis is a pure Mahanian decisive battle - clash of blue water forces, involving land and space elements on both sides. Analogy - great carrier battles of the Pacific. Geographically far from the Asian mainland, cut off by numerous obstacles from direct support(1st Island chain). Curiously - in this particular case, defeat at sea doesn't mean failure of the whole enterprise for China, but defeat, tie or even inconclusive victory does mean exactly that for the US side. This is a huge pressure
Almost pure navy&naval aviation fight, with significant (but secondary!) support from mainland-based recon&strike assets(infrastructure, OtH radars, IRBM force).
Opponent - USN, maybe JMSDF&Australian Royal navy, depending on the political picture; USAF long-range anti-ship assets.

North Eastern axis - while also naval, it's a Corbett-ish -style sea engagement over superior position, with limited goals (for both sides actually). Air-sea-land battle. Analogy - Solomon Islands campaign.
Characterized by intermediate ranges involved(at the outer edge of what tactical airpower can do), beyond any land-to-land amphibious maneuver. Also characterized by the need to somehow deal with these islands - because achieving isolation of Taiwan on this axis will be hard w/o dealing with at least the southern portion of the island chain(and disabling its underwater listening arrays).
This time there is no significant role for army, but all others will be at full play. Traditional grab&hold style naval assault is unlikely, because Japanese ASuW firepower within the reach of its aviation is immense, so time within its range shall be limited. Perfect place for amphibious assault ships to shine, though.
Opponents: all branches of JSDF(sans army heavy units), probably US land-based units, and, importantly, "updated" USMC; RoCAF and ROCN.
Of particular note are JGSDF missile units - since they're, ironically, key battlefield shapers, and it's because of them that we're talking about large-scale amphibious operations.

Click to expand...

I don't disagree with you, I just think it is easier to think of the South-eastern axis and North-eastern axis as part of the same overall political goal, with significant overlap in terms of military systems -- that is quite a bit more distinct than the Taiwan centric theater itself.