antiterror13
Brigadier
Not really good idea to fight if you know/believe to lose ... just idiot would do that ... unless if it is a matter of life of death and you had no other options
Taiwan Military News, Reports, Data, etc.
- Thread starter Gollevainen
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Not really good idea to fight if you know/believe to lose ... just idiot would do that ... unless if it is a matter of life of death and you had no other options
antiterror13
Brigadier
I think the rate of Y-20 is quite "okay" and not impressive because the bottleneck of engine D-30 engine, soon (or already happening) the rate will be much higher if needed with indigenous engine WS-20
30 Y-20 is okay for now, remember China also have many other similar smaller planes. But ideally should be 200-300 Y-20 like what the US have for C-17 Globemaster III (~275)
I don't understand the use of indigenous here, is it pointing to the indigenous islanders of Taiwan or the indigenous mainland Chinese that moved over during the Civil War? I would understand the pro-unification in the latter, but don't understand why aboriginals Taiwanese would be pro-reunification
In terms of China's ideal and hardware and capability requirements for a Taiwan contingency, those can be separated broadly into "Taiwan centric" and "Counter Intervention". There is some overlap, but much of the hardware and operational requirements are separate.
For the Taiwan centric mission, there is of course a requirement for air and naval and missile capabilities that are sufficient to defeat and and counter the air, naval, air defense and interdict the relevant ground forces on the island. Supporting battle management, EW, ASW, MCM capabilities of course will be important, as well as ISR. Air Forces and surface and subsurface naval forces will also be needed to ensure sea control in the immediate waters around the island as well as having a sufficiently capable amphibious assault fleet to conduct an amphibious invasion once air superiority, sea control in the immediate periphery has been secured, and once sufficient fires and ISR are in place to soften up and be in place to support the invasion.
For the Counter Intervention mission, it would involve essentially quarantining and/or blockading Taiwan from outside intervention at operationally useful distances against likely other nations, particularly the US and Japan, with a minimum requirement to have forces that are capable of at minimum engaging, ideally, defeating, forces that those nations might bring to bear, before they are able to operate in a manner that allows them to effect how a Taiwan conflict occurs and the PLA's operations in the Taiwan centric mission.
In other words, there is a requirement to have long range air forces and naval forces and missile forces that can robustly operate at distances in the first to second island chains (at minimum), well beyond the immediate periphery of Taiwan itself.
For this mission, carrier battlegroups, large destroyers and destroyers, long range fighters with bombers and stand off weapons, long range land based weapons, long range ISR (manned and unmanned), submarines, etc will all be important. And of course also future systems including future large UAVs, USVs, stealth bombers, hypersonics etc.
In other words -- in a comprehensive, and "ideal" Taiwan contingency, the mission will not only be about the military actions in the immediate vicinity of Taiwan (i.e.: Taiwan island, and 100km around Taiwan), but will also include having forces that are able to roam, monitor and deter from outside forces intervening at 1500km+ away from the Chinese mainland as well.
Very much agreed. It's a very clear and conceptually clean way of thinking about the military strategy for such a contingency. That is, the two distinct but closely related missions, with their respective platform and weapon requirements.
(Somehow, the ancient Chinese stratagem of "围点打援"- encircle an enemy post in order to attack reinforcements coming to its aid - comes to mind.)
There is no similar example in modern military history, which would only be possible with the advances in military technologies. It would be extremely complex and highly coordinated joint operations, much more so than the Battle of Midway, Guadalcanal Campaign or Normandy Landings. It's quite interesting to just think about the military aspect and the various technologies and platforms involved.
\ would also like to note, that Japan intervention adds a different problem altogether - so different, that maybe it's worth splitting the counter-intervention mission into two separate ones, between Eastern("US") and North-eastern (Jp) vectors.
Distinction doesn't come solely out of different force setups (we're talking navies and air forces here, after all, both are inherently mobile), but because these two problems are geographically different.
But force setups matter, too - 2020s JSDF is an annoying force to counter.
Uhm, much of Pacific war was more or less comparable - air/naval engagements in protection of amphibious invasions were in dozens. Some of its most notable(and comparable!) events even happened in the vicinity.
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fftop: I would also like to note, that Japan intervention adds a different problem altogether - so different, that maybe it's worth splitting the counter-intervention mission into two separate ones, between Eastern("US") and North-eastern (Jp) vectors.
Distinction doesn't come solely out of different force setups (we're talking navies and air forces here, after all, both are inherently mobile), but because these two problems are geographically different.
But force setups matter, too - JSDF is an annoying force to counter.
I think countering Japanese intervention would still be better categorized with the overall "Counter Intervention" mission, even though the biggest difference is one of geography and distance. That is to say, I think countering a JSDF intervention would actually be somewhat easier for the PLA given the closer distance of JSDF forces from the Chinese mainland and their land based air and missile forces, relative to countering the US.
Of course, such a great difference in geography and distance for other scenarios would usually be sufficient to be given its own individual geographical theater of conflict, but in the scope of an overall Taiwan contingency, the capabilities and requirements to counter JSDF and US intervention (while being very different in distance and geography) are still fundamentally about air superiority and sea control.
OTOH, for the Taiwan centric mission, it is more comprehensive as it requires air superiority, sea control, SEAD/DEAD, amphibious assault/invasion, ground warfare, potentially urban combat, and follow on resupply as well -- albeit in a much more well defined geographical area than the others.
plawolf
Lieutenant General
I am pretty sure the Japanese are being manoeuvred in to act as guanine pigs for the USN.
If conflict breaks out, the US will insist Japanese naval forces move in first and independently as ‘first responder’ forces, probably with a pretext that American forces still need time to mass before they can commit, and that Taiwan would have fallen before sufficient critical mass could be accumulated if the Japanese didn’t move in to bolster their defences first.
But the real reason would be to test just how effective Chinese missile tech, specifically its AShBMs are in real combat scenarios.
If the Japanese looks to be able to hold their own, the USN will of course pile in. But if the Japanese get absolutely slaughtered, and slaughtered badly, the Americans will magically find a reason why none of this is any of their business.
If conflict breaks out, the US will insist Japanese naval forces move in first and independently as ‘first responder’ forces, probably with a pretext that American forces still need time to mass before they can commit, and that Taiwan would have fallen before sufficient critical mass could be accumulated if the Japanese didn’t move in to bolster their defences first.
But the real reason would be to test just how effective Chinese missile tech, specifically its AShBMs are in real combat scenarios.
If the Japanese looks to be able to hold their own, the USN will of course pile in. But if the Japanese get absolutely slaughtered, and slaughtered badly, the Americans will magically find a reason why none of this is any of their business.
A slightly off-topic part, but if Japan somehow decided to intervene in the Taiwan scenario, what is the chance China use that as an excuse to land on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands? Those islands are uninhabited, pretty close to northern Taiwan, and more importantly are being claimed by Japan (current controller), China (heavily disputing Japanese control), and Taiwan.
I'd say if China finally came after Taiwan militarily and Japan intervened, It probably makes sense to take Senkaku/Diaoyu as well, both as a target of opportunity and "punishment" for "interfering in China's internal affairs". That said, I'm not sure how much force would China need to divert in order to de-facto control those islands, so I'll watch any development with interest.
China can buy Tu-95 and Tu-22 from Russia with TOT. It will equip ALBMs to attack targets on Japanese territory at a distance of thousands of kilometers and Japan has no way to counterattack.