In late 2020s, 003 + 004 plus Liaoning + Shandong deployed east of Taiwan to deter foreign CVG intervention. They would be backstopped by land-based ASBMs, H-6K/N, UCAVs, and J-16/J-20 plus a fleet of Y-20Us.
Taiwan Military News, Reports, Data, etc.
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In late 2020s, 003 + 004 plus Liaoning + Shandong deployed east of Taiwan to deter foreign CVG intervention. They would be backstopped by land-based ASBMs, H-6K/N, UCAVs, and J-16/J-20 plus a fleet of Y-20Us.
If the idea is to fill Pacific with missiles to the point ships won't be able to sail - I think it won't work. It's quite deep there.
Taiwan is far enough and annoying enough to prevent effective sea control to the east of the Island w/o direct naval presence.
For mainland-based platforms problem is targeting data, for others - loitering time and vulnerability when so far from bases.
The single most reliable way to prevent transport from reaching its destination is to put a surface ship onto its path. It may sound counterintuitive, but relatively few things changed in this regard since Mahan.
Furthermore, it's important to note that such a fleet isn't only an obstacle by itself - it also conveniently solves all problems listed in the second paragraph - i.e. it also massively improves combat capabilities of stand-off, continent-based assets.
Seems a bit overkill. I don't think Chinese Aircraft Carriers would be involved in a Taiwan scenario ( they'd be moored in the Bohai or in the vicinity of Hainan, I guess).
This issue around the Straits can be handled using UAVs and missiles.
The idea is to stop US from transporting assets from Okinawa and Guam to land in Taiwan.
Ofcourse for actual elimination of threats, I'm not talking about missiles THAT Cheap. DF-21D and DF-26 for example. But cheap ballistics or cruise missiles can be used to expend the ABM batteries of US Aegis ships (along with Taiwanese batteries). These "cheap" missiles need not have high targeting accuracies.
For actual precise targeting, the Targeting information can be collected using Pseudosatellites or systems like Divine Eagle or other HALE UAVs.
UAVs and missiles are not going to be enough if you're dealing with several CVGs. You'll also run out of missile quickly.
In the scenario that I talked about above. You have 2 CATOBARs + 2 STOBARs + the Gigantic Asian Continental Carrier as your carrier groups to counter adversary CVGs.
Technically you can but its far too much work for the military. All the ISR capabilities and having US interference is going to make a blockade by long range missiles a mess. Plus loitering time is not ideal if you are flying aircraft from the coast
Much better to drop a carrier (normal warships could also do some work) nearby and having planes enforcing the blockade. Sometimes you need boots on the ground (sea).
If not a carrier then I guess that a Type 76 could also work (if it is ready by then)
ASBMs require precise and actual targeting data - it gets outdated very quickly. Thus, the traditional way of countering standoff weapons is ensuring targeting data won't reach the shooter, reach him degraded, or reach him too late.
Carrier-based fighters leave them few chances to survive, frankly speaking.
It was my understanding that threat identification for Ballistic missiles happen during the ascend phase itself and the adversary's ( US and Co) systems are incapable of assessing the targeting capability of the missile ( aside from calculating the ballistic trajectory). The intercept would happen at the mid course itself.
Given this, what I envisioned are volleys of missiles that are no far better than the most capable Scuds. Old version of short-medium range Dongfengs should do it.
Maybe, I'm insisting on all this because I can't accept a fighter aircraft battle and would rather reserve them for something big later. I have also discounted US undersea force ( which I think would come into play primarily to stop a Chinese landing on Taiwan). Also assuming here that US won't target mainland China because of the big Kabooms.
I end my Taiwan crisis musings here.
I was only counting the cost of building the landing boat, and I think @Henrik_2000 was too when he mentioned $200 million per ship. You replied that the cost would be more like $5 billion each -- without specifying that you were including everything, even janitor salaries. You were being deceptive.
For the short 180 km trip to Taiwan, a PRC landing boat doesn't need to cost much more than a largish ferry, for which $200 million seems reasonable.
As for the total lifecycle and manpower costs of each landing boat, the PRC may want to pay it. From mainland China's point of view, if fighting with Taiwan is necessary, better do it fast, before the US can react. So the PLA must be ready at all times, which means (among a lot of other things) maintaining a fleet of landing boats in instant readiness. So even if your inflated prices were applicable, it could be worthwhile.
New experience with your deceptive argumentation prompts the question: just what are you counting in that $10 billion? For how many landing boats?
I addressed this in my my reply to Puff Dragon.
Why would a large fleet of landing boats be necessary? I'm no military expert, but as far as I can see, after suppressing the defenses of Taiwan, the mainland only needs enough such boats to take and hold some beachheads, then install some prefabricated docks. Thereafter, the PRC can use its huge collection of commercial ships to bring a few million soldiers over.
antiterror13
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well, that's true that Taiwan don't have the CORE technologies, but heyyy, TSMC is the only company that could managed to get 7nm working and now working on 3nm, nobody else can (but somewhat Samsung), even Intel and GF still stuck on 14nm for almost a decade and only recently starting producing 10nm for laptop. Global Foundry even gave up its EUV development for 7nm and stuck with 14nm