Taiwan Military News, Reports, Data, etc.

Franklin said:

I have said this here many times before and I will say it again. The cancellation of the IDF program is THE biggest strategic mistake that the Taiwanese have ever made. These days Taiwan can't even build their own trainers!

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Taiwan’s Ten Thousand Double-Edged Swords
24 October 2014

Author: Che-Yu Ou, Waseda University

Procuring the Ten Thousand Swords missile system is a blunder for Taiwan; it aggravates the security dilemma between it and the PRC. For its own security, Taiwan should deter threats from the PRC by manufacturing weapons with exclusively defensive capabilities.

The Ten Thousand Swords missile, or the ‘Wan Chien’ missile, is an aircraft-launched standoff missile that creates a barrage to destroy enemy facilities such as air bases, runways and missile launching sites. Its accuracy is enhanced by radars and GPS, with a striking range of 300 kilometres. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense has installed the missile in 40 Indigenous Defence Fighter (IDF) aircrafts to date and intends to complete installation on all 127 IDF aircraft by the end of 2016.

Two locally made Indigenous Defense Fighters release flares during a demonstration at Chiang Chin-kuo air force base in central Taichung on January 13, 2014. (Photo: AAP)

Recent People’s Liberation Army (PLA) modernisation efforts are formidable. Taiwanese forces seem frail and vulnerable against the stronger China. In 2014, China will spend approximately US$132 billion on its defence budget; a 12.2 per cent increase from the previous year. In contrast, Taiwan merely spends around US$10 billion on its defence and is not always able to procure the arms it favours from the United States.

Taiwan insists that the new system makes an important contribution to its security. The Ten Thousand Swords missile capability is considered strategically important because it enables Taiwanese aircrafts to hit targets in mainland China from the Taiwan Strait. Taiwanese aircrafts will no longer have to risk flying deep into Chinese airspace to hit key facilities and infrastructure.

But this does not reflect the realities of China’s thinking. The PRC aims to change Taiwan’s perception of its own security so that the island will forego any aspirations to declare independence. This includes the deployment of at least 1,600 short-range missiles as an intimidation tactic. The Ten Thousand Swords missile system is likely to compel China to further accelerate its military modernisation efforts. In a contingency scenario Beijing may aim to coerce Taipei into capitulation either before US military support arrives or by preventing US troops from accessing the vicinity of Taiwan. Taiwan’s decision to deploy the Ten Thousand Swords aggravates the security dilemma and undermines the security Taipei is trying to bolster.

The security dilemma — the situation where actions by one state intended to heighten its security lead other states to respond with similar measures, producing a spiral of increased tensions — has been a longstanding feature of Cross-Strait relations. Taiwan’s previous military procurement and acquisition choices often created tensions with the PRC and destabilised regional security. In response to the increased number of PLA fighter jets and missiles deployed close to its territory, Taipei has vigorously strived to strengthen its security. In May 2000, the Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology, a military-owned research organisation in Taiwan, launched a missile project aimed at disabling Chinese military units. With similar intent, the Ten Thousand Swords missile was developed to surpass the AGM-154 air-to-surface glide missile which the United States refused to offer Taipei. As such, Taipei believes that by acquiring the capability to shell key PLA facilities, it can bolster deterrence by denial.

Taiwan’s belief is ill-founded. The deployment of the Ten Thousand Swords missiles increases the chances of Taiwan being struck first. The missiles are capable of reaching farther into PRC territory than other missiles Taiwan currently possesses. But the extended radius, coupled with the offensive capability, will give China added incentive to strike first in the case of war. To ensure the mobility of PLA aircraft, China’s Second Artillery would be likely to initiate a strike to neutralise Taiwan’s air bases. China also has the capability to deploy additional missiles from other regions to the coast of Fujian and inflict a severe bombardment on Taiwan. As a result, China’s artillery forces have the capability to pre-empt any Taiwanese IDF missile strikes.

At the politico-strategic level, the missile empowers Taiwan’s de facto independence. Predictably, Beijing will perceive the acquisition of these missiles as a threat to its unification efforts. Although President Ma Ying-jeou alleviated tensions by reiterating the ‘three no’s’ — no independence, no unification, and no use of force — the procurement of these missiles, which can theoretically be used for offensives purposes, is likely to stoke Beijing’s scepticism towards Ma’s commitment to ease Cross-Strait tensions. As such Beijing may increase its efforts to prevent Taiwan acquiring further arms in the future.

To avoid cataclysm, Taiwan should focus its efforts of defensive weapons systems. Beijing will interpret Taipei’s procurement of offensive capabilities as a move towards secession from the mainland and this will increase the likelihood of war. An exclusively defensive approach to security will help to alleviate tensions, create an exit from the vicious circle of the security dilemma, and decrease the possibility of war in the Taiwan Strait.

Che-Yu Ou is a graduate student at Waseda University, Japan. He previously attained a BA in Economics from University of Victoria, Canada.

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Bltizo said:

Without an idea of flying hours for ROCAF and PLAAF pilots it is difficult to even have a rough gauge about how they compare, and we'll have to rely on stereotypes.

However, I think we should consider that a modern air war involves bringing together many different kinds of assets together such as AEWC, EW, ELINT, incorporating offensive counter air and the various elements of strike. You can have a core of pilots who are perfectly trained in their fighters but if they lack AEWC support or are having their communications scrambled by opfor's standoff jammers, then your training in close combat or BVR is not worth as much.

Basically, I'm saying that the training and flight hours of individual pilots isn't necessarily as important as the different types of conditions in which they train under. In that sense, PLAAF has a far superior foundation to train on given their large apparatus of various force multiplier aircraft, and the sheer number of fighters, bombers, and strikers with which they can simulate large air wars with, versus ROCAF whose air fleet is more limited in both quantity and variety.


So outside of quantity, industry, and technology, it is arguably the increasing holistic complexity of PLAAF which is the biggest challenge to ROCAF.

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an extreme example demonstrating how training may not reflect capability are the various DACT scenarios pitting new pilots in F-22s against more expereinced and well trained pilots in 4th generation aircraft with F-22 kicking the backside of the better trained and more numerous, well trained pilots. Obviously, the PLAAF/ROCAF discrepancy is not quite the same as pitting 5th generation fighters against 4th generation fighters, but I'm sure I've gotten the gist across.

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Zetageist said:

1, Analysis, China, Taiwan

A Potent Vector: Assessing Chinese Cruise Missile Developments – Analysis

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Due to their superior aerodynamic flight stability compared to ballistic missiles, cruise missiles—by conservative estimates—enlarge the lethal area for biological attacks by a factor of 10.

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Zetageist said:

Back then with IDF program, Taiwanese were having problems building their own jet engines and had to buy them from the U.S., just like now the Chinese were having problems building their own jet engines for the J-20s and had to buy the engines directly from Russia. Since Taiwan cannot acquire F-35s from U.S. or any new fighters from any country, would upgrading the IDFs with F/A-18 Super Hornet engines be an option for Taiwan?

I saw some Taiwanese talk shows were saying that after the cancellation of IDF program, their engineers got headhunt by South Korea to build T-50 or TA-50. Is that right? I do see the resemblances between T-50/TA-50 and IDF.

The talk shows even dared to say that the Taiwanese engineers went over to South Korea are their second tier engineers. The best people are still remained in Taiwan. Any truth to this? Also those TV military analysts even as boldly claimed that IDFs' angled air intake design was later adopted by U.S. F-35s to improve their stealth profile.

As side notes, before Chen Shui-Bian became president, he called IDF 'I don't fly'. After he became president, he called IDF 'I do fly'. Also the little model IDF airplanes given out to the Taiwanese public had 'Made in China' stamped on them.

IDFs from side view does look pretty, especially the curved intake vents, much better looking than the Korean T-50/TA-50. As someone pointing it out its underpowered engines but could probably do well on export market wrote: 'Few could have faulted it for looks, though'.

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Zetageist said:

I guess this author doesn't understand that 'The best defense is a good offense' or according to Mao Zedong opined that "the only real defense is active defense".

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Zetageist said:

I guess this author doesn't understand that 'The best defense is a good offense' or according to Mao Zedong opined that "the only real defense is active defense".

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Zetageist said:

I guess this author doesn't understand that 'The best defense is a good offense' or according to Mao Zedong opined that "the only real defense is active defense".

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