Self Propelled Gun/Rocket Launcher

amchan said:

Tamir are Iron Dome interceptors, and the assumption that they are as cheap as can be made seems deeply flawed given that those interceptors have their own sensors. A pure command guidance missile could potentially be cheaper. Also, anybody who claims cost effectiveness is a serious concern here is missing the point, as the cost of what the SAM is defending should also be factored in.

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Remember a really basic Shaheed is estimated at $10K, whilst the standard version is $20K?

Even if you halve the cost of a Pantsir/Iron Dome, it still comes to $25K

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You're missing the point.

Yes, the cost of the thing being defended justifies air defence.

But China can always build more low-cost missiles to overwhelm a smaller number of SAMs which are more expensive and slower to build.

So the defenders won't have enough defensive SAMs to prevent that the target from being destroyed.

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Let me spell out a graphic example to illustrate the point.

Say a US airbase has 25 stealth fighters worth a total of $2500 Mn.

So it is defended by 200 Iron Dome SAMs @ $50K each. That costs $10 Mn.

From the Chinese perspective, it just makes sense to build 300 Shaheed @ $20K each. That's only $6 Mn, which is 40% less that the Iron Dome SAMs. So China will have at least 100 Shaheed available when the US runs out of SAMs. I'm assuming the defending SAMs are 100% effective, which you know is being charitable.

So let's say the US doubles the number of Iron Dome SAMs to protect that valuable airbase. So that's 400 SAMs @ $50K which cost $20 Mn. So yes, it's worth spending $20 Mn to protect an airbase which houses $2500 Mn of aircraft.

But the logical response is for China to launch an extra 200 Shaheed. So that's 500 Shaheed @ $20K each = $10 Mn. And again, the Chinese side have 100 Shaheed left at the end to attack the airbase.

But China has only spent $10 Mn on Shaheed, compared to the US which has to spend $20 Mn on Iron Dome. China now has a 50% cost advantage, up from 40% previously.

Can you see how this response and counter-response will just keep continuing, where China keeps building more and more Shaheeds, until the US runs out of expensive SAMs?

And then that valuable airbase with 25 US stealth fighters gets destroyed.

AndrewS said:

Remember a really basic Shaheed is estimated at $10K, whilst the standard version is $20K?

Even if you halve the cost of a Pantsir/Iron Dome, it still comes to $25K

===

You're missing the point.

Yes, the cost of the thing being defended justifies air defence.

But China can always build more low-cost missiles to overwhelm a smaller number of SAMs which are more expensive and slower to build.

So the defenders won't have enough defensive SAMs to prevent that the target from being destroyed.

===

Let me spell out a graphic example to illustrate the point.

Say a US airbase has 25 stealth fighters worth a total of $2500 Mn.

So it is defended by 200 Iron Dome SAMs @ $50K each. That costs $10 Mn.

From the Chinese perspective, it just makes sense to build 300 Shaheed @ $20K each. That's only $6 Mn, which is 40% less that the Iron Dome SAMs. So China will have at least 100 Shaheed available when the US runs out of SAMs. I'm assuming the defending SAMs are 100% effective, which you know is being charitable.

So let's say the US doubles the number of Iron Dome SAMs to protect that valuable airbase. So that's 400 SAMs @ $50K which cost $20 Mn. So yes, it's worth spending $20 Mn to protect an airbase which houses $2500 Mn of aircraft.

But the logical response is for China to launch an extra 200 Shaheed. So that's 500 Shaheed @ $20K each = $10 Mn. And again, the Chinese side have 100 Shaheed left at the end to attack the airbase.

But China has only spent $10 Mn on Shaheed, compared to the US which has to spend $20 Mn on Iron Dome. China now has a 50% cost advantage, up from 40% previously.

Can you see how this response and counter-response will just keep continuing, where China keeps building more and more Shaheeds, until the US runs out of expensive SAMs?

And then that valuable airbase with 25 US stealth fighters gets destroyed.

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For the specific case of wartime, costs can be offset by war bonds that are paid after the war, so cost effectiveness is less important. I don't take issue with the specific example here you present, but recall that the point of this conversation was the utility of air defense when protecting from counterbattery fire directed by drones when combined with shoot and scoot tactics, which I believe favors the defender since if the drones can be protected against, return counterbattery shots will not be able to hit a mobile target.

amchan said:

For the specific case of wartime, costs can be offset by war bonds that are paid after the war, so cost effectiveness is less important. I don't take issue with the specific example here you present, but recall that the point of this conversation was the utility of air defense when protecting from counterbattery fire directed by drones when combined with shoot and scoot tactics, which I believe favors the defender since if the drones can be protected against, return counterbattery shots will not be able to hit a mobile target.

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My point is that if it becomes a competition between cheap Chinese offensive drones versus expensive defensive SAMs, the defender can expect to "lose" in such an arms race. Even if it is the USA.

Remember that it is China which has:

1. an economy which is 25%+ larger in real terms
2. has twice the overall industrial output, and can produce more stuff
3. has lower debt levels, so they can borrow or print even more money

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This is directly relevant to a discussion on "shoot and scoot" tactics, because it means China has control of the medium and high altitudes.
This means Chinese surveillance drones can track all those vehicles trying to "shoot and scoot"

Jason_ said:

Yes. If you can't protect your airspace from propeller-driven non-stealth UAVs, you failed at air defense.

SAMs most certainly can be made cheaper than drones and most are. Against small quadrotor drones there are options such as EW, AAA and directed energy weapons.

Yes, which is why mobility is critical. You can't serious argue that it is better to be a literal sitting duck.

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Actually we're going to the reverse. We are seeing both sides of the conflict take out more and more towed artillery and putting them inside protected fortifications. Old sorts of antique artillery are being rediscovered from M198s to M-46 guns. These protected or ground submerged firing points makes it difficult for the artillery to be destroyed by fragmentation, like those used by HIMARS, Grads and it's variants, and Uragans. The fortifications makes it better to hide and protect from drones, though not perfect. And even if the gun gets taken out, it's much cheaper than an entire SPG. Towed artillery still has its place.

Air defense isn't perfect. SHORAD is limited by its name, short ranged defense. Drones often fly near tree top level, makes it difficult for radar. Radar is often filtered against slow flying objects, such as birds. However this means drones will go through this filter. By filter I mean the radar still detects it's, buts it's algorithm says to ignore the detection because it's too slow.

As often AD systems themselves fall victims to drones. By the time a SAM is fired at a drone, the drone already have sent target coordinates and either a loitering drone, a guided shell or rocket is on its way.

One cannot assume we will have perfect AD. Nature of war is one struggling in states of constant imperfection.

MT-LB for example is known, if not legendary, for its mobility. But even as an APC, as an SPG (2S1 Gvozdika) or as an AD unit (Strela-10), it suffers casualties. No armored vehicle can be mobile enough against a drone.


SAMs are definitely not cheaper than drones, no one thinks that. It comes down to whether you are willing to expend expensive SAMs to take out cheap drones. Ukraine cannot afford it but the Russians do, as they frequently pop UAVs using even Buks. You can justify it as saving even more expensive equipment and cost of human life. It's not about cost but production rate --- one side cannot physically make enough SAMs to deal with the other side's ability to make cheap UAVs.

I think the main benefit of SPGs isn't shoot and scoot but to be able to move with the changing battlefield lines. Machines with long caliber guns don't move as well. Instead, for survival, they have to hide in the forests. I can see that with tactics used on 155mm artillery like the Bogdana, DANA-S, CAESAR, MSTA-S and Pzh2000. But they are still found by drones using thermal imagers, and attacked even while still firing.

Yet at the same time SPGs have become more lethal and returned to relevance due to drone adjusted and guided artillery. If it's not another drone that kills you, it's another SPG.

Krab SPG gets taken out by drone adjusted artillery.


Two Leopards knocked out. One by Lancet drone and the other via Krasnopol fired from a MSTA-S. A MSTA-S also claimed an Abrams kill using a Krasnopol.


Should be noted the first Leopard gets knocked out while scooting. As often in this war, tanks are often shooting and scooting.

The other thing to note is because of the shortened response times, a heavily time compressed kill loop, you don't even have time to scoot. The second tank gets knocked out while it is still shooting, just as the Krab was destroyed while still shooting.

But then we arrive to another point. The tank was destroyed by an SPG, and a good chance the Krab was destroyed by another. While shoot and scoot is not as effective as it once was, the SPG itself is made more lethal well beyond it's original specifications with drone adjusted and guided ammunition. Self Propelled Guns need to work within this new realization of simultaneously vastly increased lethality and vulnerability.

amchan said:

For the specific case of wartime, costs can be offset by war bonds that are paid after the war, so cost effectiveness is less important. I don't take issue with the specific example here you present, but recall that the point of this conversation was the utility of air defense when protecting from counterbattery fire directed by drones when combined with shoot and scoot tactics, which I believe favors the defender since if the drones can be protected against, return counterbattery shots will not be able to hit a mobile target.

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In a skirmish, there will not be grand pay off after the war. Neither is gaining much out of it, only tactical losses. The one that lose least come out on top. Not unless you escalate the skirmish into a total war, which has its own difficulties.

Tam said:

Actually we're going to the reverse. We are seeing both sides of the conflict take out more and more towed artillery and putting them inside protected fortifications. Old sorts of antique artillery are being rediscovered from M198s to M-46 guns. These protected or ground submerged firing points makes it difficult for the artillery to be destroyed by fragmentation, like those used by HIMARS, Grads and it's variants, and Uragans. The fortifications makes it better to hide and protect from drones, though not perfect. And even if the gun gets taken out, it's much cheaper than an entire SPG. Towed artillery still has its place.

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Who is we? Russia and Ukraine are using towed artillery because they are at war and that is what they have.

Tam said:

Air defense isn't perfect. SHORAD is limited by its name, short ranged defense. Drones often fly near tree top level, makes it difficult for radar. Radar is often filtered against slow flying objects, such as birds. However this means drones will go through this filter. By filter I mean the radar still detects it's, buts it's algorithm says to ignore the detection because it's too slow.

As often AD systems themselves fall victims to drones. By the time a SAM is fired at a drone, the drone already have sent target coordinates and either a loitering drone, a guided shell or rocket is on its way.

One cannot assume we will have perfect AD. Nature of war is one struggling in states of constant imperfection.

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There is a fundamental difference between having an enemy drone occasionally penetrate your frontlines before being shot down, versus having a persistent enemy drone presence at medium altitude over your conveys deep in your territory.

Indeed, the fact that the former is to some extent unavoidable accentuates the need to be mobile. Even when detected, mobile targets can move outside of range and can only be targeted with a smaller subset of weapons that tend to be less available and more expensive.

Jason_ said:

Who is we? Russia and Ukraine are using towed artillery because they are at war and that is what they have.

There is a fundamental difference between having an enemy drone occasionally penetrate your frontlines before being shot down, versus having a persistent enemy drone presence at medium altitude over your conveys deep in your territory.

Indeed, the fact that the former is to some extent unavoidable accentuates the need to be mobile. Even when detected, mobile targets can move outside of range and can only be targeted with a smaller subset of weapons that tend to be less available and more expensive.

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Drones are persistent over your territory is because they are that many to shoot down. They vastly outnumber the assets that can shoot them down. And at the same time, drones also kill your AD assets. They have been shown time and time again, a more persistent and consistent killer of AD equipment including anti aircraft guns and search radars. They either do it themselves, or send out the target positions so some missile or rocket will take care of it.

It is because the targets are mobile that is why they are found and targeted in the first place. They are spotted as they move, their heat signatures given them away to drones with thermal imagers, and they are attacked on the road. The instances where for example, HIMARS were detected and successfully attacked, they were spotted on the road while moving. The roads in Ukraine are littered with dead vehicles, SPGs frequently among them, destroyed on the road. If anything mobility makes them even more vulnerable. Both Russia and Ukraine now heavily cover their SPGs with layers of camouflage over drone cages, then hide them deep in the forests.

On top of that, Russia should be the gold standard of SHORAD in both quality and quantity, yet drones and UAVs continue to penetrate defenses with regularity. Ukraine, who inherited one of the best SHORAD forces from the Soviet Union, saw these forces depleted or decimated by UAVs, either by causing them to expend missiles against Gerans, or have AD units, from Strelas to S-300s, taken out by Lancets.

The worst happens when an SPG on the move, detected by a UAV, and is allowed to track the SPG back to it's base hanger where other vehicles reside. Then comes a ballistic rocket or glide bomb arriving at that hanger.

You talk about out of range. An Orlan-30 is as cheap as as a car, but it's range is literally hundreds of kilometers. They came be launched from Crimea and spotting targets in Odessa. Lancets have struck air bases, as far as 80km from the front (Russians obviously lie about the true ranges of their weapons). Guided artillery like Krasnopol have ranges up to 43km+. An SPG with general purpose shells, which is the main staple for shelling infantry locations, to be about 20km to 30km. You're not going to move away that fast against a laser guided projectile that can hit and do hit in the past achieved tense, targets on the move.

As SPGs become bigger thanks to increasing gun calibers, they also become slower and unwieldy. An MSTA-S for example is a beast, compared to say, a Gvozdika which is practically nimble. Trailer based SPGs are also not as nimble, they are still massive trucks. A CAESAR trying to avoid a drone attack ended up overturning into a ditch last year. So much for mobility. It is the earliest SPGs, the Gvozdikas, the Akasyas, the M109s, that are more nimble than the latest SPGs, yet they suffer the most from Lancets and Krasnopols.

This leads to a range race, leading to longer and longer calibers. But the longer the gun becomes, the less bigger and the less scootier the platform becomes. And yet over time, drone development means mini UAVs continue to grow in range and capability.

Policy in the development of tactics in the use of SPGs must assume that it is a given, a default nature, that you're always vulnerable from drone attacks and AD will not provide a sufficient defensive umbrella.

I think we may see a return of heavy tanks or assault guns like in WWII. They will be defined by a high caliber gun for assaulting fortified positions, protection on par with current MBT, with additional top protections against drones. If it has a turret, then it is a heavy tank. If not, then it is an assault gun.

Range and mobility becomes insufficient against drones. All vehicle needs some degree of heavy protection if it want to operate under artillery.

The vehicle would be large and heavy due to the top protection, so there may be a reduction of direct fire protection.

Reduction of direct fire protections means the vehicle must farther away from frontline, which necessitate a large calibre gun for more range for fire support. This allows vehicle to be safe from direct fire but remain helpful.

The large caliber gun may require a casemate to save cost. Casemate shrinks the vehicle, and the less the area to protect, the better. This creates a cost effective, general purpose long range vehicle.

Alternatively, the vehicle retains current direct fire protecton of MBT, retains the turret, it would become a heavier tank. A heavy tank.

Here is another example, rather typical and only happened yesterday.

SPG on the move, rather big one could be a PzH-2000. Detected and tracked on the move. You can assume once the SPG is detected, the Lancet is on its way. The Lancet doesn't fly towards a fixed location, rather it can be redirected in real time as the SPG finds a new location. But the Lancet follows and strikes it.


All the time, another drone records the event, likely the same drone that discovered the SPG and followed, then confirmed it's termination.

Is the UAV capturing the footage something big and expensive? No.

It's something like this.


It's something that can be carried and assembled by hand. It's can be made in numbers greater and cheaper than even MANPADS.

TK3600 said:

I think we may see a return of heavy tanks or assault guns like in WWII. They will be defined by a high caliber gun for assaulting fortified positions, protection on par with current MBT, with additional top protections against drones. If it has a turret, then it is a heavy tank. If not, then it is an assault gun.

Range and mobility becomes insufficient against drones. All vehicle needs some degree of heavy protection if it want to operate under artillery.

The vehicle would be large and heavy due to the top protection, so there may be a reduction of direct fire protection.

Reduction of direct fire protections means the vehicle must farther away from frontline, which necessitate a large calibre gun for more range for fire support. This allows vehicle to be safe from direct fire but remain helpful.

The large caliber gun may require a casemate to save cost. Casemate shrinks the vehicle, and the less the area to protect, the better. This creates a cost effective, general purpose long range vehicle.

Alternatively, the vehicle retains current direct fire protecton of MBT, retains the turret, it would become a heavier tank. A heavy tank.

Click to expand...

That's what we're starting to see now. Although there is still a niche for short to medium ranged artillery that can supply the fire power in volume. Drones alone cannot take up that slack.

Urban battles, we also see use of mortars. Lots of mortars. 240mm Tyulpans always show up where there's a Bakhmut style city battle going on.

TK3600 said:

I think we may see a return of heavy tanks or assault guns like in WWII. They will be defined by a high caliber gun for assaulting fortified positions, protection on par with current MBT, with additional top protections against drones. If it has a turret, then it is a heavy tank. If not, then it is an assault gun.

Range and mobility becomes insufficient against drones. All vehicle needs some degree of heavy protection if it want to operate under artillery.

The vehicle would be large and heavy due to the top protection, so there may be a reduction of direct fire protection.

Reduction of direct fire protections means the vehicle must farther away from frontline, which necessitate a large calibre gun for more range for fire support. This allows vehicle to be safe from direct fire but remain helpful.

The large caliber gun may require a casemate to save cost. Casemate shrinks the vehicle, and the less the area to protect, the better. This creates a cost effective, general purpose long range vehicle.

Alternatively, the vehicle retains current direct fire protecton of MBT, retains the turret, it would become a heavier tank. A heavy tank.

Click to expand...

i would not be surprised if tanks in that environment eventually have a trailer attached on the rear. it could be used to store extra supplies, or even soldiers.