Yes, but being capable of defending itself and having the full-on advanced AAW suite found in ships like the Burke and the 052D are not the same thing. I think the 054A is already a pretty effective frigate in terms of AAW if we are talking about defending itself or a nearby ship. But if you want to provide fleetwide air defense, you will need far more capability than what the 054A has on hand. And this is what I'm saying a frigate in a navy like the modern day PLAN does not need.
Yes, I agree. But I think we disagree as to what capabilities a frigate needs to be capable of "defending itself" means in this day and age.
In terms of the AAW suite, I'm not sure how you can have fewer consoles or a less sophisticated combat system, or can demonstrate significant cost savings with these degradations of capability. Perhaps you can give me an example of a tiered capability combat data system.
Well in my mind a new PLAN frigate would use a completely new combat system to 055 and 052D in the sense that it will be deliberately less capable. I.e.: not simply a scaled down "aegis+SPY-1" that various other nations have done for their ships like bazan or Nansen, which have slightly smaller arrays and less VLS compared to a burke or tico, but that is about where there combat system difference ends. A new PLAN FFG should deliberately use a less powerful radar, a different combat system (different software especially. I imagine they could use the same console designs as on 055 or 052D if they wish, but maybe with less powerful processing power and fewer total console number).
OHP is an example of a ship that gave up various capabilities seen on larger ships. For instance when it entered service lacked 3d air radar, it lacked the advanced EW suite of its contemporaries of the time (I forget the exact designation), it used a single arm missile launcher rather than dual. OHP is a great example of a lower cost ship with weaker combat systems and weaker combat capabilities compared to larger destroyers or frigates of its time, while simultaneously having credible capabilities in all domains enough for a medium threat environment or able to support in a larger task group.
For a future PLAN frigate, it might have a shorter range radar less capable against stealth targets and maybe a combat system less capable against a high volume of targets (as a modern day "loss in capability" compared to the OHPs lower capability 2D radar of the day). The lower capability single arm versus two arm launcher can be also present allegorically via a smaller number of VLS cells on a future frigate versus a destroyer.
It is not necessarily easy to compare different fleets with different budgets, different technological levels and different missions. The PLAN resembles, or at least in the future will most closely resemble, the USN. There can be no doubt that this is where the PLAN is heading. We are talking about suitable escorts for carriers and surface action groups. We are not talking about misrepresenting a destroyer as a frigate or a carrier as a destroyer in the manner of other navies. By which I mean that the PLAN is not building European-type 6,000ton "frigates" that are destroyers in everything but name, and which are appropriately multirole because they act as destroyers in smaller navies should act, responsible for AAW because they are (mostly) the largest ships in those navies, and responsible for ASW and ASuW because they are one of the few ships in those navies. I'm talking about ships like the Zeven Provincien, F100, etc, those ships I mentioned earlier.
I never said the PLAN should seek a frigate like the euro frigates, but that doesn't mean they can simply skimp on AAW and ASuW for their own future frigates.
Even other navies like Russia or India have frigates of the 4000-5000 ton range with multirole capabilities. Type 26 sits there as well, along with many others.
And just because the PLAN is seeking to emulate the USN doesn't mean it should make the same force structure decisions as the USN.
When we look at the USN, we see a frigate whose capabilities have been allowed to atrophy so that it is essentially only capable of ASW. We see its replacement whose capabilities include ASW but definitely not any real AAW (or ASuW for that matter). While we can agree that probably most people viewing the LCS from outside the USN think these ships are irresponsibly undergunned, this does not mean we would all agree that the solution is to slap some SPY-1's on there and go to town with VLS modules.
... Wait are you using the LCS as a possible example of what the PLAN should seek to emulate? (I kid)
And of course I'm not saying LCS would be better with some SPY-1s and chunks of VLS. But as it is now, lacking even ASHMs, lacking any meaningful air defence beyond point defence, and at a not-quite-corvette, not-quite-frigate displacement of 3000 tons, it definitely needs to be rethought. And that is exactly what the USN is doing by calling production at 32 boats and asking for proposals for a new replacement to LCS meant to be more like a traditional frigate capable of higher intensity operations than LCS (but considering LCS is only about as well armed as a coast guard cutter, that isn't saying much)
If anything, the LCS is an anomaly among the world's navies, for being simultaneously underarmed, trying to be modular, and small, all at the same time.
Cost is always measured against need. If they felt that the need was there for a frigate like the Perry to retain AAW and ASuW capability, the cost would have been borne. Also, the big ship fetish has to be judged from the lens of Cold War big budget days, not from our current post-Great Recession viewpoint. They obviously felt that to fight the Soviets you needed big ships with big capabilities, and that multirole half-pints weren't really needed. And they obviously didn't think Ticos and Burkes were meant to do every job out there since they have retained the services of the Perrys to this very day. Also, both Ticos and Burkes have nowadays essentially ceded the role of ASuW to the carrier air wing, and are mainly AAW ships with some land attack and ASW capability remaining.
Even now the USN's conception of the LCS belies the belief that the USN has somehow changed its views about the need for multirole frigates. As I said before, the LCS is indeed 'multirole', but AAW and ASuW is certainly not included in any of those multiple roles. But lo and behold, ASW is.
Yes, and we all see how successful of a programme LCS is turning out. The lack of credible air and anti surface capability is one of the constant criticisms of it, and that among other factors was enough to cap LCS production at 32 boats and incentivised the USN to seek a new LCS successor which has been clearly stated by Hagel to want a ship more in line with a "frigate" and able to survive in a higher intensity environment. This is all fairly recent news, but you could practically hear USN watchers breathe a collective sigh of relief as the LCS train wreck is at least being mitigated and that there are nascent plans for a ship that hopefully has some real anti air and anti surface combat capability.
The USN probably thought it could retire OHPs Mk-13 launcher because they knew they'd have more than enough missiles on their burkes and ticos. But they effectively stripped OHPs of any ability to defend themselves in a medium threat environment independently.
Actually I can't even remember the last time I saw a perry sail with a CSG either. Can anyone provide info on what roles the 11 remaining Perrys have in the USN. Anti drug smuggling? After the Perrys had their Mk-13s removed, castrating them, did they even undertake medium operations at all?
