Sorry, I typed this before you posted #3336 and didn't see it.
It is very plausible.
The case for urgent deployment of a strategic VLO bomber by PLAAF mirrors the case for PLAN's aircraft carriers. It is mainly based on emotional reasoning rooted in the instinct behind animal threat displays: "my opponent has X therefore I must have X to match his display".
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People want the H-20 because they want the confidence that it will give them. Not necessarily the payload.
First off, I agree with the idea that there are valid reasons and arguments for why H-20 (i.e.; a VLO heavy strategic bomber) may not be at the highest level of priority in context of overall PLA strategic procurement decisions in terms of opportunity cost and so forth.
However, it is also not a good way to start an argument by suggesting that "everyone who thinks XYZ is doing so because they are emotional and just want to keep up with the joneses".
The logic for delaying H-20 is based on understanding how geography shapes the battlespace.
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From this perspective H-20 is not a priority because China does not need to strike CONUS or US bases in Australia or Hawaii. China doesn't need to attack US at all because the US will damage itself just by entering the war.
I agree with elements of this and disagree with others.
I absolutely agree that I do not think the PLA at present has a requirement to strike CONUS with a bomber aircraft.
However, I do believe that the PLA has a requirement to be able to comprehensively strike US bases at the second island chain distances and very shortly would have requirements to be capable of striking at US bases beyond that, such as Australia and Hawaii (if they don't already).
This is partly a reflection of what I envision PLA strategy to be between now and the next couple of decades, my view of a westpac high intensity conflict and how the PLA will want to prosecute it, is essentially two phased.
The 1st phase would be characterized by a very intense air-naval-missile conflict largely relegated to the 1st island chain and up to 2nd island chain distances, where the PLA's goal of course would be to attain air superiority and sea control through the pursuit of superior fires, ISR and force generation and employment. Part of that goal would be to significantly neutralize if not permanently cripple US et al's bases, nodes and large naval formations (including CSGs) at those distances. However the problem for the PLA is that the further out they get from the Chinese mainland, the more difficult it is to get good ISR, and the lower their fires bandwidth gets.
The 2nd phase would be dependent upon PLA success in the 1st phase. That is to say, if the PLA is capable of attaining significant air and sea control at distance from the 1st island chain up to the 2nd island chain, without incurring significant losses, their goal should be to pursue a limited offensive to preempt and deny the US et al from being able to resupply and reshore up their ability to retrench at the second island chain and first island chain.
- That would require the ability to conduct relatively frequent re-attack against existing large US bases in the first and second island chains -- and the PLA's fires bandwidth against the second island chain is far smaller than that against the first island chain and is likely to remain smaller into the future even as both grows.
- One other additional capability that would be very useful is the ability to conduct attacks against "third island chain" staging areas that would be key to project power to the second island chain, namely locations such as Hawaii and Australia. Now, I certainly do not envision or predict the PLA as wanting to comprehensively strike all military facilities on Hawaii and Australia, however key logistics and support facilities in Hawaii and Northern Australia would be high value targets to aim to greatly hinder and delay US ability to sustain operations into the western pacific.
My view, is that the primary requirement of H-20 (if it exists), would be to provide significant augmentation to the fires (via ALCMs or air launched hypersonics, or potentially wingkit PGMs) bandwidth to the re-attack requirement against degraded US bases at second island chain distances, as well as to provide the capability to conduct strikes against key logistical/support nodes in the "third island chain" (primarily via ALCMs or air launched hypersonics only).
Such a strategy would naturally require a relatively large number of H-20s, and would need to be supported by additional fires from other sources (long range HGVs, conventional IRBMs, missiles from survivable SSNs/SSGNs) and is dependent upon success in the 1st phase of conflict and the ability to continue to project air and sea power a reasonable distance post-1st phase, to give H-20s room to enter the more open expanses of the western pacific without detection. But I also believe that a requirement to conduct comprehensive re-attack at 2IC distances and surgical strikes at "3IC" distances exist (or will exist), and H-20 will be a major part of that.
The US is an overleveraged entity that has its current position explicitly due to its power projection which is facilitated primarily by its navy.
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Furthermore:
- J-20 and YY-20 are both necessary for air superiority - USAF operates 450-500 heavy aerial refuelers (KC-135/KC-10/KC-46) for ~2000 combat jets and ~300 heavy aux planes.
- Y-20 is a general heavy lifter in 65+ t range which provides rapid logistical capacity at long range - USAF operates over 270.
- C-5 equivalent is for transporting oversize cargo - necessary for sustaining distant bases in the theater at short notice.
Logistics always trumps tactics in war. Just
starting super-lifter program will make Pentagon think of allocation of resources.
I agree that both J-20 and YY-20 are very important, as is Y-20.
However I do not necessarily see a C-5 equivalent as vital to the PLA at present. The PLA does not yet have a global strategic oversize transport need, and I certainly wouldn't see a C-5 equivalent as being more important than H-20 (if the two are even in competition for resources to begin with, which we have no credible indicator of yet).
This is why I don't see either H-20 or CV/CVNs becoming a priority in the next five years. The fundamentals must be addressed first. The YY-20 alone is the single most important asset - even more so than J-20.
You need to test the reliability of said follower, but he may be onto something. I'd like to see H-20 as anyone here but I don't think it's good deterrence investment, especially right now.
I personally agree that commissioning additional CVs/CVNs probably are not a wise investment on this side of 2030, however I view H-20 somewhat differently.
I believe additional CVs/CVNs only make sense to buy if the PLA are sufficiently confident in their ability to neutralize large parts of US et al ISR and air/sea/naval power in the western pacific relatively quickly if war is joined -- i.e.: the PLA should be relatively confident to mitigate theater and operational threats to their carriers. I don't think that such a state will occur until 2030 onwards, which is why I think any additional carriers the PLA buys will be on a timetable for entry into service at 2030 or onwards only.
But I think H-20 is a little different, as the requirements for H-20 to be defended (i.e.: defending Chinese airspace, which is something that the PLA would already be having to do to enable the vast majority of their other capabilities) are far less than that of CVs/CVNs, and thus their survivability and relevance is significantly increased.
All of which is to say I think there are reasonable arguments to be made that H-20 may not be an immediate high priority, but that also doesn't mean that the idea of "H-20 not being unveiled within 5 years" is necessarily reasonable, because I think there are reasonable arguments for both.
What we only have to fall on are the existing credible rumour base for H-20, and over the past few years is that H-20 has definitely been worked on and in advanced stages of development, with rumours that the first prototype was under assembly most recently. This has coincided with PRC aviation industry and PLA state media indicators towards H-20 as well, which is rarely done for projects that they have yet to significantly buy into.
Most recently, the only reliable statement about H-20 possibly being delayed is something from Yankee stating that in their personal opinion, the 6th gen project might emerge earlier than H-20, but it's unclear if that is a reflection of the speed of the 6th gen project or the delay of H-20 or both.
The message Deino received is unclear as to the credibility of the individual, and without knowing their past track record or online handle we can't really take it seriously at all.
If we get more credible news that H-20 is being significantly pushed back, that would change things, but as it stands I don't think there is either the rumour-base nor the logical requirement for us to view that the H-20's timetable/priority has been significantly altered from what we've been assuming.
