PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC

ashnole

New Member
Registered Member
Came across a new, interesting report called Chinese Lessons From the Pacific War: Implications for PLA Warfighting by CSBA think tank.

"Senior Fellow Toshi Yoshihara surveys Chinese histories of the Pacific War to discern lessons that mainland analysts have drawn from the ocean-spanning struggle. He examines the extensive Chinese-language literature on the great battles at Midway, Guadalcanal, and Okinawa and pinpoints the operational insights that Chinese strategists have gleaned from them. The selected campaigns involved warfighting that will feature prominently in a future Sino-American conflict: carrier air warfare, contested amphibious landings, expeditionary logistics, and electronic warfare.

Yoshihara finds that Chinese analysts, including those affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), have scrutinized the Pacific War. Their historical accounts of the war at sea explicitly draw lessons for the future of Chinese warfighting, including warfare in the information age, modern amphibious operations, land-based maritime strike, and expeditionary logistics. Yoshihara uncovers in these analyses tantalizing hints of the PLA’s deeply held beliefs about warfare, and of the PLA’s enduring weaknesses that it is seeking to reverse. By looking at the Pacific War through Chinese eyes, Yoshihara argues, the policy community can better appraise Beijing’s evolving views of potential great power wars in the Indo-Pacific.
"

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AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
@Patchwork_Chimera

Just a thought on the submarine AShBM that was mooted with a 2500nm range.

As you've pointed out previously, the issue that the US military has is getting enough launch platforms into JASSM-ER/LRASM range of the Taiwan Straits.

Theoretically, if Alaska, Hawaii or Australia were completely safe rear area bases, then the USAF could concentrate very large numbers of bombers and tankers for strike missions. Yes, there would be tankers refuelling tankers refuelling tankers, and a lot of aborts.

It wouldn't happen often, but theoretically you could still get enough bombers into range to launch salvoes of 1000+ LRASM/JASSM-ER, as per the CSIS scenarios set in 2026.

In such a 2026 scenario, the only conventional weapons that the Chinese military could realistically counter with would be submarine launched ballistic missiles, due to the extreme distance (8000km to Hawaii/Alaska).

There are going to be a very limited number of such Chinese submarine launched ballistic missiles, so wouldn't they be more usefully employed against these distant targets, instead of being used on CSGs within the 2nd Island Chain?
 

davidau

Senior Member
Registered Member
Firstly - If that's the case, why is China pursuing the 076 LHD?

Secondly - A couple months ago, Deino posted a open tender for constructing a flat-deck testbed ship of some sort on Twitter, which I will quote below:


(RIP PLAOps' Twitter account lol)

Should the PLAN be interested in the project, there is a massive potential to derive a light carrier design which displaces around 15000-20000 tons from this testbed ship, which can deploy helicopters and drones for specializing in not just anti-submarine warfare, but also scout & recon, and early warning missions.

And @Maikeru (sorry for not responding to your question earlier): There is no mention of either a ski jump or an EMALS catapult for the flat-deck testbed ship in the open tender.

However, yesterday I did some digging through @大包CG‘s Weibo album, and this is what I found:
View attachment 104788
View attachment 104789
Seems like @大包CG has improved upon the original design and made it into a proper light carrier, equipped with an EMALS catapult as well. The flat-deck testbed ship only has a set of arresting wires.

For convenience's sake, let's name this light carrier 077.

Placing the 076M light carrier side-by-side to the flat-deck testbed ship and 071 LPD:
View attachment 104797
View attachment 104798
View attachment 104801
The build is pretty cool, to be honest. The 077 looks like a baby 076 or 076-lite to me. With smaller dimension and displacement than contemporary LHDs, the 077s definitely can be fielded in large numbers.

However, if the 077 is meant to sail on the high seas and operate alongside carrier strike group (CSG) as a dedicated scout, early warning and ASW carrier, then the stipulated top speed of the 077 must be significantly increased from the original 16 knots of the testbed ship. 16 knots ain't going to cut it when everyone else in the CSG can do 28-30 knots.

@AndrewS and @BoraTas I believe this is what you are referring to.
why thoase smoke stacks slant at those angles?
 

MarKoz81

Junior Member
Registered Member
Sorry, I typed this before you posted #3336 and didn't see it.

Not sure how reliable, but I got a PM today from a Chinese follower who noted, that I shouldn't expect the H-20 to be unveiled within the next 5 years since the PLAAF's priorities are the J-20, the Y-20/YY-20 - allegedly an even larger transport (what makes me suspicious) and development of the 6th generation fighter type, which will eventually appear quite close to the H-20.

So what do you think?

It is very plausible.

The case for urgent deployment of a strategic VLO bomber by PLAAF mirrors the case for PLAN's aircraft carriers. It is mainly based on emotional reasoning rooted in the instinct behind animal threat displays: "my opponent has X therefore I must have X to match his display".

This instinct is highly irrational, because it is governed by the limbic system (emotional part of the brain) rather than the frontal cortex (cognitive part of the brain) but at the same time it is the limbic system governing our fight/flight/etc modes which provide the basis for all behaviour. In other words even though having X is counter-productive and may cost you success in a technological war not having X may cost you the motivation to fight that the limbic system provides so you won't want to fight in the first place. It's a paradox because we are apes who haven't evolved for technological competition but ended up in it.

You can see that type of emotional reasoning even among experienced professionals. This is the issue of morale. For example CAS is not very effective in terms of target elimination but it has a massive psychological effect that often decides the outcome of the engagement on the ground. Similarly the constant overestimation of the effect of air power stems from the psychological effect of visible enemy/friendly presence in the sky which triggers an atavistic response associated with predators. This is why artillery triggers a different response than aviation. It's difficult to get PTSD from aviation because we understand enemy aircraft as predators. Artillery is meaningless so it shocks the system very quickly like motion sickness.

People want the H-20 because they want the confidence that it will give them. Not necessarily the payload.

The logic for delaying H-20 is based on understanding how geography shapes the battlespace.

The US needs a long range bomber because of distance alone. Bombers are optimal because they maximize payload per plane over distance which in turn provides for minimal cost of delivery of one missile/bomb. There's nothing magical about bombers. They're just efficient bomb trucks. This is why Rapid Dragon was developed.

The VLO aspect of B2 came from its intended role as penetrating bomber tasked with destroying ICBMs which couldn't be done with cruise missiles. B-2 was not a cruise missile carrier. The VLO aspect of B21 and H-20 comes from advancement in radar technology which puts the same restrictions on missile carriers that bomb carriers faced 20-30 years ago. There is nothing magical about VLO. It's to put present day bombers where B-52s were 40 years ago.

So when resources need to be committed the question that needs to be asked is not "how does PLAAF benefit from having a VLO bomber" but "how much will it cost me to have VLO bomber in terms of other warfighting systems."

Not chest-thumping and war-crying but pencil-pushing and penny-pinching.

From this perspective H-20 is not a priority because China does not need to strike CONUS or US bases in Australia or Hawaii. China doesn't need to attack US at all because the US will damage itself just by entering the war.

The US is an overleveraged entity that has its current position explicitly due to its power projection which is facilitated primarily by its navy. This power projection enables the US dollar which in turns enables the funding for war. If the US commits its navy to countering China it can't commit its navy to sustaining its economic position. This is the reason behind the recent pressure on allied countries to realign in economic terms. The era of globalization was the era of US global naval supremacy which made US the ultimate arbiter of all trade disputes. With the loss of naval supremacy trade and resources need to be secured by other means and the best one is moving them to areas where USN retains power projection. The US is becoming more aggressive because it's getting weaker, not stronger.

But countries at war are volatile markets so as soon as US enters the war with China capital will inevitably start to flow to more secure markets wherever they may be. The US will try to drag everyone into the war to deny safe haven status for capital but even then the US will be under pressure to force China to accept a settlement quickly because the US is incredibly overexposed so as long as China stays in the fight the US has to expend resources it no longer has - because now it plunders the global economy just to stay afloat.

For any prolonged conflict the US can't outproduce China in naval terms but it can try to outproduce China in aviation terms. Therefore bombers are US attrition strategy.

Attrition always matters.

So the question of bomber vs alternative is reduced to what is more effective in keeping China in the fight:
  • more top defensive capability to counter US and allied air power in the region
  • more top offensive capability to deliver limited and mostly psychological damage to enemy territory that may have the unintended effect of strengthening the resolve of Americans?
I think the answer is obvious.

Furthermore:
  • J-20 and YY-20 are both necessary for air superiority - USAF operates 450-500 heavy aerial refuelers (KC-135/KC-10/KC-46) for ~2000 combat jets and ~300 heavy aux planes.
  • Y-20 is a general heavy lifter in 65+ t range which provides rapid logistical capacity at long range - USAF operates over 270.
  • C-5 equivalent is for transporting oversize cargo - necessary for sustaining distant bases in the theater at short notice.
Logistics always trumps tactics in war. Just starting super-lifter program will make Pentagon think of allocation of resources.

This is why I don't see either H-20 or CV/CVNs becoming a priority in the next five years. The fundamentals must be addressed first. The YY-20 alone is the single most important asset - even more so than J-20.

You need to test the reliability of said follower, but he may be onto something. I'd like to see H-20 as anyone here but I don't think it's good deterrence investment, especially right now.
 
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