I've read some excellent posts by the experts on this forum and jotted down some of my own thoughts. I hope to receive some constructive criticism.
1. The Root Cause of Sino-American Conflict
There is a narrative known as the Thucydides Trap, used to spread rumors that China seeks to disrupt peace in the Asia-Pacific region and invade Taiwan. Specifically, it suggests that when a challenger rises to threaten the status of an incumbent power, the two nations become more likely to engage in direct military conflict. However, in reality, the United States is the current challenger to the international order, while China is the incumbent power.
The peaceful, free-trade, globalized world order that existed from the end of the Cold War until the mid-2010s. China has no reason to actively undermine its own interests by destroying an international order from which it has gained the most benefits. China will prevail over the United States within this very order that America itself established. Therefore, the rational grand strategy for the United States is to alter the previous world order of peace, free trade, and globalization, using military means to counterbalance China's development. China, with no other choice, must also employ military means to defend peace and an international order favorable to itself.
2. Paths to Victory for China and the United States
I contend that China's path to victory (merely one possibility, not a guarantee of capability) lies in preventing the United States and its allies from penetrating the Second Island Chain, the South China Sea, and Central Asia. China can leverage its surplus industrial capacity to deplete allies' military assets—which are difficult to replenish—through protracted warfare, while expanding its area of denial through ground occupation. This strategy aims to compensate for tactical disadvantages with strategic superiority.
America's path to victory (similarly) involves penetrating these regions as deeply as possible. By disrupting raw material supply chains and conducting strategic bombing campaigns, the United States aims to reduce China's production capacity below its own level. This strategy seeks to reverse strategic disadvantages through a series of tactical victories.
The core debate centers on the contest between China's denial capabilities and allied invasion capabilities.
I broadly agree, but wish to add the following points:
a. U.S. production capacity is underestimated. If the U.S. were to forcibly requisition EU production capacity and manpower, these entities lack both the political will and defensive capabilities to resist. As long as vassal states lack the capacity to confront their overlords, disrupting ties with them incurs no net loss. A rational U.S. has every reason to pursue this approach—and indeed has already begun doing so. Under such circumstances, production capacity between the two sides may converge toward greater parity.
b. Tactical victories can compensate for strategic disadvantages. Early in WWII, Allied production capacity and troop strength vastly exceeded Germany's, yet Germany ultimately conquered Europe, significantly offsetting its resource and manpower shortfalls. If the U.S. launches a decisive surprise attack against China's land, sea, space, financial systems, and networks, it could severely weaken China's anti-access capabilities and military assets. This would facilitate U.S. blockade and strategic bombing campaigns against China, thereby undermining America's own production capacity advantage. A decisive surprise attack at war's outset would be catastrophic for China.
3. Timelines and Preparations Based on Paths to Victory
Militarily, Taiwan is not the root cause of conflict in the Western Pacific—merely the trigger. The fundamental cause lies in differing world order perceptions: America's political goal is maintaining unipolar hegemony, while China's is development.
Consider a model where East Asia's relative military strength against the U.S. grows over time. Define:
D = Time of conflict onset
Phase 1 = China lacks first island chain denial capability against the U.S. (Before mid-2010s)
Phase 2 = China achieves reliable first island chain denial but lacks second island chain capability.
Phase 3 = China achieves reliable second island chain denial but lacks 2.5 island chain capability.
Phase 4 = China reliably denies the U.S. within the 2.5th island chain but still lacks the capability to deny the U.S. in the 3rd island chain.
Phase 5 = China's naval power surpasses the U.S. on the high seas.
My personal assessment is that China is in the late Phase 2 or early Phase 3. Given that Dongda's relative military strength against the U.S. increases over time, the rational approach is to indefinitely delay war until the latest possible phase—until its military strength reaches its peak or achieves Phase 5.
America's “rational” approach is to provoke conflict with China as early as possible. However, the U.S. is not yet prepared for war and does not wish to engage directly. Before it is ready, America needs to weaken China through two means—or prepare for conflict:
Weaken China through hard power: Suppose China's military strength grows at a rate v0 relative to the United States. A rational strategy would be to employ non-war military actions, organize allies, and deteriorate China's military environment—offset China's military progress at a rate v1 greater than v0.
Weaken China through soft power (order): Shape an unstable Asia-Pacific order.
The U.S. can act on hard power to worsen China's military environment. Since China's military strength is insufficient to deter the U.S., China must intervene directly, using force to defend peace. The U.S. can then accuse China of undermining Asia-Pacific peace, amplify regional instability narratives, and weaken China through soft power. This cycle repeats.
For example, the Philippines, at U.S. urging, violates China's sovereignty. China finds itself unable to persuade them to cease such actions and must resort to non-war military means to uphold its rights (hard power). The U.S. and Philippines then hype tensions in the South China Sea, undermining the existing order of peace and development (order). Some Southeast Asian nations might then be swayed by this narrative, permitting the U.S. to establish more military bases and provoking increased maritime law enforcement clashes with China (hard power). Consequently, Southeast Asia's stability would further deteriorate (order).
The sovereignty, law enforcement, and diplomatic battles surrounding Taiwan follow a similar pattern.
China must enhance its capacity to counter U.S. non-war military operations. Once China achieves this, and the U.S. realizes that non-war military means cannot contain China—that China's military strength will irreversibly rise relative to its own—the U.S. may become less resistant to war. If they don't, that's even better, as it means China can delay further and accumulate strength.
4. The Logic of the Trigger
Personally, I believe it may resemble World War I. Facing a rising Russia, Germany perceived time as working against them. They judged that launching war now still offered a chance of victory, while further delay would inevitably disadvantage them. They did not desire war, but they desired peace even less. Though they did not actively provoke the conflict, they did not resist it either. In the crisis, they chose a hardline response, even knowing it essentially meant war.
In a specific crisis—such as a maritime law enforcement clash or the downing of a government official's aircraft—the United States could very well adopt a similar stance. There would undoubtedly be a period of diplomatic maneuvering, but both sides would simultaneously engage in mobilization and preparations for war. When hostilities commence, each side would launch surprise attacks while also being prepared to defend against the other's surprise assault.
