If the alternative is a nuclear war between NATO and Russia, then china may well be forced to do something.
China cannot allow a complete Russia collapse.
PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC
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China cannot allow a complete Russia collapse.
This is nonsense.
Mackinder: "Who rules the World Island commands the world"
If Russia becomes unstable then nothing in WestPac will matter. In terms of strategic balance between US and China WestPac is a relative pivot point but Russia is the absolute pivot point. WestPac is fundamental only because Russia is not available as a theater. But the failed invasion of Ukraine opened up that possibility in the mid-to-long term. Once that is available Japan, Korea, Taiwan and the rest will become unimportant islands on the sidelines of the core strategic contest.
Russia is also the absolute priority for China because of geography. Russia is to China what Canada is to the US except that it protects China from three sides, and not just one. While northern flank is obvious note that Russia also secures Central Asia for China and denies access to land infrastructure on Pacific coast forcing the US to rely on 1&2IC and Korea.
Due to Russia's nuclear arsenal a full-scale conflict between Russia and NATO remains extremely unlikely however sub-threshold or "hybrid" warfare is already being prepared and NATO has geographical advantage.
Russia has structural and political vulnerability as a federation created on top of territory acquired through imperial conquest. Russia's authoritarian regime exists to secure the state in its current form against external influence that could undermine political control in sparsely populated but energy-rich regions in the north and east.
Without access to resources from those rich peripheries Russia can't sustain itself economically. Those regions have very low population:
- Nenets AOkr. - 50k(70% Rus)
- Komi Rep - 850k (65% Rus)
- Yamalo Nenets AOkr. - 500k (60% Rus)
- Khanty-Mansi AOkr. - 1 500k (70% Rus)
- Krasnoyarsk Kr. - 2900k (90% Rus) of which ~1m in Krasnoyarsk
- Sakha/Yakutia Rep. - 1 000k (30% Rus)
- Magadan Obl - 150k (80% Rus)
- Kamchatka Kr. - 300k (90% Rus)
- Chukotka AOkr. - 50k (55% Rus)
- Sakhalin Obl. - 500k (90% Rus)
This is Russia's main road and rail network. No it's not a joke.
All of Russia's periphery that is open to NATO sea and air power projection is devoid of infrastructure that could support defensive action.
At the same time all of these areas are on average ~2000-3000km from China and are accessible primarily by air, especially in rapid deployment.
In such a scenario stabilization of potential breakaway regions is the primary concern. Time of reaction will be decisive and heavy airlift capability and aerial refueling will be of infinitely more value than VLO bombers.
The US will trade current WestPac territory for Siberia because capturing those regions gives it leverage over European Russia and foothold in Asia that opens northern and eastern flank to China.
In such scenario China will have to secure all of Siberia all the way to Urals to either maintain favourable regime in Moscow or prepare Beijing-friendly separatist entities in case of total collapse of Russian Federation.
The Russian scenario is also very dangerous to China for another reason - it is the only scenario where US and EU can cooperate with equal interest in the outcome. It would effectively be the continuation of the failed intervention in the Russian civil war.
While the EU will do as little as possible in any WestPac scenario it will join the US if Russia is on the table so that is something that definitely must be under consideration in Washington. And furthermore there is a point in the future at which it becomes also a beneficial scenario for China for many reasons that I won't get into here.
The dismantling of Russian Federation is in China's strategic long-term interest. The preservation of Russian Federation is in China's strategic short-term interest only because it can't afford to realize its long-term interest at current moment.
Increasing production consumes financial resources. The main problem with H-20 will not be design maturation but production capacity. My comment from 29/12/22 on B-21 vs H-20:
H-20 bomber (with H-X, JH-XX)
Well indeed. I can envisage a situation where Japan gets its own nukes (to the extent it doesn't already have them) and asks US forces to leave. However, that doesn't solve the problem of H20 having to cross neutral territory to attack CONUS. We can assume Japan will be either on the US side...
www.sinodefenceforum.com
It does little good for China to have a working design if it can't maintain sufficiently high production rate from the start. That is also part of R&D in this case because of the unique nature of the airframe. H-20 is J-20 quality at Y-20 scale. It's not something that China is currently capable of mass-producing.
It has some advantages but volume is still decisive. What works in WestPac fantasy scenarios on SDF doesn't work in others in real world.
H-20 is not B-21. B-21 plays a greater role as a C4 node due to distance. The US has to overcome distance to enter theater. China is already here. VLO and other capabilities come as addition to range + volume. H-20 in the near term will be primarily a payload delivery system and in that it can be replaced by H-6 in multiple scenarios particularly over land.
Russia is just one possible scenario. Also: India-Pakistan, Central Asia and Iran, Myanmar etc. The paradox of H-20 is that until it arrives in greater numbers it is at a disadvantage vs more numerous and cheaper systems like H-6 + YY-20 with the exception of a few specific scenarios that happen to be in SDF's field of view to the exception of everything else.
plawolf
Lieutenant General
Russian is effectively already fighting a NATO army in all but name.
The most decisive advantage that NATO has not yet brought to bare is its TacAir. But the thing is, without the USAF, EU TacAir isn’t really going to shift the dial in a decisive way. Best case for EU, they end up in the relative position Russia currently finds itself in, where it can launch long range attacks nearly at will and with minimal risks to aircraft, but cannot press home the advantage on the frontlines due to significant opfor AD capabilities and CAP. Worst case, EU TacAir end up helping to massively paying off all the investment the Russians made into air combat at the expensive of ground attack and gets their TacAir decimated for little to no practical gains.
If the USAF deploys significant TacAir assets to Europe in a direct NATO-Russia War, the PLAAF would also deploy accordingly to support Russia.
The key logistical consideration in such a war won’t be transportation speeds or volumes, but rather production. This is where Russia enjoys a significant advantage by itself. With open Chinese industrial support, that advantage is going to rapidly become overwhelming.
That basically puts NATO in the same bad spot as the Germans during WWII with Barbarossa - they need to crush the Russians quickly, before the Russian and Chinese industrial might kicks in at a meaningful level, or they are steamrolled by an unstoppable and exponentially growing juggernaut.
If there is a direct NATO-Russia war, it’s the US, not China, who is far more likely to initiate a westpac theatre to try to relieve pressure on the European theatre. But at that point, we are basically in WWIII territory.
Yes, China would have to transfer enough equipment for a complete kill-chain, if they want to go after mobile targets.
But consider if China transfers just 200 TELs capable of launching Shaheed-136s. That's 1000 per salvo.
They could be based all the way back in Moscow, yet still cover all of Ukraine for example.
So we could be looking at 10000 missiles per day launched at Ukraine.
In terms of soft, fixed targets, my guestimate is that there are <20K aimpoints in terms of electricity substations, fuel tanks, petrol stations and broadband/telephone exchanges. So call it a maximum of 4 days for all this infrastructure to be destroyed, and then kept destroyed.
Going after these sorts of targets requires very little in the way of supporting systems. They just need the coordinates.
Then you've got all the fixed military infrastructure, airports, seaports etc etc
Agree. If China is really worried about this potential conflict then the best thing to do is beef up Russian industry especially in electronics sector, sort of like a reverse of Soviet-Sino assistance. Russia has the mass to defend against NATO by themselves, they just need to get their industrial shit together.
You know what it is also devoid of? Infrastructure needed to do anything except drill for oil, including simply having enough fuel and food to live. Yes, fuel, because crude oil isn't usable fuel yet.
Said fuel and food is shipped in at great expense to support operations there.
1. Remember that Makinder's Pivot Area is actually sparely/uninhabited land.
And that in a previous age, it was the Mongol steppe nomads who controlled the Pivot Area all the way to Europe.
Plus these days, China can potentially exceed the combined [entire West + Russia]
2. I don't see the US being willing "trade current WestPac territory for Siberia" as you put it.
Siberia is literally uninhabited and sparesly populated land, although it does have some natural resources. How would the US even supply/connect to Siberia? And could the US ever hope to win in a China-Siberia land war?
In comparison, if the US gives up Japan, Korea, Taiwan to a Chinese sphere of influence - that is roughly equivalent to half or two-thirds of an entire USA, and the vast majority of the world's semiconductor production.
3. On "dismantling the Russia Federation as China's strategic long-term interest", I would point to the Canadian example. Given that Russia will be locked into a competition over Ukraine with Europe/USA for decades, Russia will become ever more dependent on China, particularly as China continues to grow larger. Any dismantling of Russia will likely cause chaos and will definitely interrupt trade/energy flows. So China can live with Russia, like the US can live with Canada.
4. And what is a high production rate for the H-20?
If we use the B-21 as a comparison, they are currently planning:
10 Years
10 per year
$690 Mn each
Personally, I think the PLAAF would go for about 6 per year. That is still a respectable production rate and should be affordable.
And crucially, the H-20 would primarily be tasked for targets beyond the Second Island Chain.
You would see the H-20 being used as a C4 node and also a payload delivery mechanism.
Remember that by 2030, the 1IC and 2IC will almost certainly be secured.
Then we should see a shift towards global power projection like the H-20 and aircraft carriers.
And that in a previous age, it was the Mongol steppe nomads who controlled the Pivot Area all the way to Europe.
Plus these days, China can potentially exceed the combined [entire West + Russia]
2. I don't see the US being willing "trade current WestPac territory for Siberia" as you put it.
Siberia is literally uninhabited and sparesly populated land, although it does have some natural resources. How would the US even supply/connect to Siberia? And could the US ever hope to win in a China-Siberia land war?
In comparison, if the US gives up Japan, Korea, Taiwan to a Chinese sphere of influence - that is roughly equivalent to half or two-thirds of an entire USA, and the vast majority of the world's semiconductor production.
3. On "dismantling the Russia Federation as China's strategic long-term interest", I would point to the Canadian example. Given that Russia will be locked into a competition over Ukraine with Europe/USA for decades, Russia will become ever more dependent on China, particularly as China continues to grow larger. Any dismantling of Russia will likely cause chaos and will definitely interrupt trade/energy flows. So China can live with Russia, like the US can live with Canada.
4. And what is a high production rate for the H-20?
If we use the B-21 as a comparison, they are currently planning:
10 Years
10 per year
$690 Mn each
Personally, I think the PLAAF would go for about 6 per year. That is still a respectable production rate and should be affordable.
And crucially, the H-20 would primarily be tasked for targets beyond the Second Island Chain.
You would see the H-20 being used as a C4 node and also a payload delivery mechanism.
Remember that by 2030, the 1IC and 2IC will almost certainly be secured.
Then we should see a shift towards global power projection like the H-20 and aircraft carriers.
While I'm utterly impressed with your content, I have to respond much shorter.
I think that a westpac conflict where H-20 can make bombing runs into Alaska & possibly even attack Pearl Harbour (with YY-20 refueling Sea of Okhotsk or through 095s) would be treated as the main conflict to be concerned about by American politicians. Especially after a carrier gets sunk.
I entirely expect H-20 to be built close to B-21 numbers over its life time. China has shown it is entirely capable of mass producing military aircraft or anything at comparable rates to America. It is the manufacturing power house of this generation
I also do expect H-20 to play a great role in C4 since it will be expected to do bombing runs into Darwin, Diego Garcia & Alaska. It will also be expect to fly over Japan (after hypersonic missiles overcome initial air defense) and keep Japanese defenses off line.
It seems like you are arguing for the need to procure large number of H-6s.
The great Patch explained to me in the past on why having a fleet of H-20 would make longer ranged attack missions so much easier to plan and accomplish than any combo with H-6
If Russia is threatened with the prospect of total collapse due to direct war with NATO (i.e. NATO invading Russia proper and the Russian armed forces is unable to effectively halt NATO's advances), Moscow WILL USE NUKES.
If else, why would Russia holds 6000-7000 nukes in the first place? The paranoia from the Great Patriotic War (where the USSR lost 25 million of their countrymen to N4z1 Germany) is still freshly in the minds of the Moscow leadership and their people.
Even still, Russia could be using only tactical/counterforce nuclear warheads as means to:
1. Blunt NATO advances into Russia;
2. Direct warning shots to NATO; and
3. Forcing NATO to negotiate for a ceasefire settlement with Russia.
Only once those 3 fails would Russia resort to strategic/countervalue nukes against NATO population centers.
In the meantime, whether China is willing or not, Beijing will have to help Moscow to defend the territorial integrity of Russia - In order to secure the absolute survival of the Chinese civilizational state. Losing Russia to NATO means that the remaining northern and western frontiers would become treacherous to China, in addition to the eastern (US + Japan + South Korea + Australia + Wanwan) and southern (India) frontiers right now.
In the meantime, Russia being crucial to China's national security can be evidently showcased by the Third Front Project enacted by the Mao Zedong administration in the 1960s and through the 1970s, which is when Sino-Soviet relations turned to the worst.
Here's a very good thread by Zhao Dashuai (yes, I know he's a Chinese variant of Jai Hind) on the Third Front Project:
The Third Front Project is the primary reason why some Chinese military aircraft manufacturers (Chengdu, Guizhou, Xi'an, Shaanxi), military shipyards (Wuchang) and rocket launch sites (Jiuquan, Xichang) are located so far inland, instead of what we laymen usually expect such facilities to be located at, i.e. near or at the coast.
Therefore, unless China is willing to reactivate the Third Front project once again (or, invade and occupy Siberia + Russian Far East + Central Asia in case of Russia's collapse), the only way left for Beijing to deal with such existential threat is to help Moscow directly in a WW3 against NATO.
If else, why would Russia holds 6000-7000 nukes in the first place? The paranoia from the Great Patriotic War (where the USSR lost 25 million of their countrymen to N4z1 Germany) is still freshly in the minds of the Moscow leadership and their people.
Even still, Russia could be using only tactical/counterforce nuclear warheads as means to:
1. Blunt NATO advances into Russia;
2. Direct warning shots to NATO; and
3. Forcing NATO to negotiate for a ceasefire settlement with Russia.
Only once those 3 fails would Russia resort to strategic/countervalue nukes against NATO population centers.
In the meantime, whether China is willing or not, Beijing will have to help Moscow to defend the territorial integrity of Russia - In order to secure the absolute survival of the Chinese civilizational state. Losing Russia to NATO means that the remaining northern and western frontiers would become treacherous to China, in addition to the eastern (US + Japan + South Korea + Australia + Wanwan) and southern (India) frontiers right now.
In the meantime, Russia being crucial to China's national security can be evidently showcased by the Third Front Project enacted by the Mao Zedong administration in the 1960s and through the 1970s, which is when Sino-Soviet relations turned to the worst.
Here's a very good thread by Zhao Dashuai (yes, I know he's a Chinese variant of Jai Hind) on the Third Front Project:
The Third Front Project is the primary reason why some Chinese military aircraft manufacturers (Chengdu, Guizhou, Xi'an, Shaanxi), military shipyards (Wuchang) and rocket launch sites (Jiuquan, Xichang) are located so far inland, instead of what we laymen usually expect such facilities to be located at, i.e. near or at the coast.
Therefore, unless China is willing to reactivate the Third Front project once again (or, invade and occupy Siberia + Russian Far East + Central Asia in case of Russia's collapse), the only way left for Beijing to deal with such existential threat is to help Moscow directly in a WW3 against NATO.
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