Sad times. Please if you can, I'd love to pick his brain on his subject of expertise and he seems all but willing to write out complete novels for responses. From what I can recall from his posts, in the case of open US/China hostilies, the US would be hard-pressed to match Chinese capabilities and fires with the current amount of basing and assets in the region, at least within the first island chain. My question would be wouldn't the US' current advantage in SSN's and SSBN's change the equation? Does the shallow depth of the sea shelves of China really make US submarine action within the first island chain untenable or is it overstated.
PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC
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Rather than getting into a battle of egos in the western Pacific I think the smarter strategy would be to pick up where there USSR left off and try and gain nuclear supremacy. Be able to ensure the destruction of American nuclear strike capability without retaliation.
Whether it's through hypersonic missiles, a space based anti ballistic system, or some other future technology that should be the number one priority. China has a slight advantage right now, and it will only increase as America deals with Russia, terrorism and so on.
It may take decades to reach that point, but once it's achieved China gets to be the sole superpower.
Whether it's through hypersonic missiles, a space based anti ballistic system, or some other future technology that should be the number one priority. China has a slight advantage right now, and it will only increase as America deals with Russia, terrorism and so on.
It may take decades to reach that point, but once it's achieved China gets to be the sole superpower.
@Patchwork_Chimera, nice to see you here, guy. We haven't interacted on Reddit, but I thoroughly enjoyed watching you dunk on the tards there. I hope the alphabet soups didn't put a muzzle on you and you'll share more of the good stuff here. I find your material very encouraging... and Type 09-V and H-20 aren't even out yet!
On the subject of subs, it's not so much about whether they can or can't operate close (within 1000nm) to Chinese shores, it's about harassing Chinese shipping and attacking CSGs/SAGs further out. China needs a symmetric capability, which is what this is all about
On the subject of subs, it's not so much about whether they can or can't operate close (within 1000nm) to Chinese shores, it's about harassing Chinese shipping and attacking CSGs/SAGs further out. China needs a symmetric capability, which is what this is all about
Glad you're here. Frankly, I'm shocked (and somewhat disconcerted) that someone of your intellectual calibre works for the US defense establishment. I didn't think someone like you could even exist in Thinktankia.
That's how things would work in a limited duration conflict confined to Taiwan and its environs, but I don't think that's how a war in the western Pacific would play out. I'm something of an outlier in that I think China's war aim would be far more expansive than just taking Taiwan quickly - it would be the total expulsion of the US from the western Pacific and the dissolution of all security arrangements the US has with Japan, Korea, Australia, et al. Likewise, I think the US war aims would be far more expansive than just defeating a Chinese invasion of Taiwan - its aim would be the destruction of China as a functioning state.
Given my fundamental view that "Taiwan" is nothing more than a misleading shorthand for a struggle about who's going to rule the roost in Asia, I foresee both China and the US operating much farther than just 600-700nm from China's shores. The US would try to interdict Chinese trade with Europe, Africa, and the Middle East and slowly attrite Chinese forces, and China would be trying to destroy US reinforcements marshalling in Hawaii as well as any capacity for the US to operate beyond Hawaii, if not even farther back than that. In short, WWIII.
Anyway, that's just, like, my opinion, man, and I certainly don't want a disagreement of views to overshadow the fact that I am very happy to have you here and look forward to picking your brain.
Oh hey welcome back! Glad you see you starting to post again! When you put it that way, it seems like any US SSN/SSGNs operating in the first island chain is very low probability. That makes me wonder what exactly would the role of US submarines be in the onset of a theoretical hot war between the US and China. If they can't immediately operate within the first island chain, and I assume engaging a CSG is equally suicidal, then what vulnerable Chinese military or civilian assets would they be able to hit in the onset of such a war? Or would they wait until PLA ASW capabilities were sufficiently degraded enough before acting in full force?
Oh I wanted to ask about future possible PLAN supremacy in the Pacific
Is that a forgone conclusion at this point based on current and future procurements of both US and Chinese navies? I recall one of your posts mentioning that the period of 2026-2029 would be the absolute nadir of USN capabilities relative the PLAN (or the PLA as a whole?) in the Pacific because of previous and ongoing procurement blunders by the US and the state of US shipyards, leaving the US with a gap in capability that won't be filled until after 2030. I would have thought that 2040 would be when the PLAN is able to challenge the US in the Pacific, since by that point they'll have 2-3 nuclear carriers and a sizeable number of 09V's.
How much of this is marketing versus actual capability though? If diesel subs can sneak through the defensive rings of US CVNs and pop their periscopes, how effective are MADs in the real world?
Even with total air supremacy, to cover the ocean with airborne MADs is a massive task. And who knows what their actual detection ranges at depth are (it'll be classified.)
For silently hunting high value targets, like carrier groups, I'd think that subs will remain a challenge (for all sides.) Although, this threat will probably be displaced by bigger threat vectors in the coming decade(s).
There is no way that this is for the PLA. Probably even not for the PLAN as well.
China is rapidly closing (still a way to go though) the military gap with the US. With keeping the current balance of power (near China) in mind at 2022, imagine what the 2026-29 period would be.
The most recent peak of US power relative to China's was probably about 10-15 years ago. Since then, its a going downhill. Even with the renewed US focus on China, it can't compete 1-to-1 due to the vast distances involved in a potential battle space next to China
Nothing like this can be predicted because the PLA's procurement can't be projected beyond a couple of years, if that. A relative US "recovery" post 2030 assumes the PLA's budget itself wouldn't rise further as a percentage of China's GDP, not to mention the enormous growth of that GDP itself.
While we're on the subject, our friends at Harbin have been up to some interesting things...
Guess this hasn't had the desired effect.
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15 years ago, the stock of advanced Chinese weapons was negligible compared to the US.
That was because Chinese military spending was really low AND how the US had a large stock of advanced weapons which typically have a 30 year service life.
Today, I would say that China's current military procurement/spending is roughly comparable to that of the US military.
So given enough time, China would converge to the same stock of advanced weapons that the US has.
But in the coming years, Chinese economic growth should still be significantly faster than the US.
Presumably Chinese military spending will track this.
So in 2040, I wouldn't be surprised if the Chinese military had a significantly larger budget every year than the US military.
EDIT.
Cumulative 30 year military spending in China as of 2021 was $3876 Billion by my figures.
Using the same methodology, cumulative military spending in China would double by 2030, even assuming a low China growth rate of 4% and that military spending remains at a modest 1.7% of GDP. US military spending isn't going to be doubling by 2030.
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