Is MAD-EX based on SQUID magnetometers? I saw a figure of 6km mooted back in 2017.
PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC
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Is MAD-EX based on SQUID magnetometers? I saw a figure of 6km mooted back in 2017.
Have to see if the upcoming economic recession in the US for the later half of this year and into 2023 could buy more time for the PLAN to play an even greater catchup race to the USN. Or that the PLA catching up with the US military as a whole.
The Trident II D5's maximum range is one-third of the earth's circumference carrying either 4 x 455kt W88 warheads or 8 x 90kt W76-1 warheads.
Ok. Here are the published specifications for the CAE MAD-XR being installed on helicopters
Range: Approx 1200 metres
Weight: 1.5kg
Power requirement: 30W
Given that size, it's got to be using SQUID magnetometers.
I also see a Korean company advertising a 3D magnetometer being used in a mine/torpedo
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So thinking through the implications of widespread deployment of lightweight MAD systems based on SQUID magnetometers, you've got a large increase in MAD detection range and the number of possible airborne platforms. You could install one on a TB-2/CH-4 class drone (which costs $2 Million) and it could probably fly for 24hour at low altitude.
1. Yes, US submarine operations within the 1st Island Chain in Chinese bastion areas will be highly risky. Submarines can't dive deep enough to avoid detection by a much larger number of airborne MAD sensors.
2. Yes, submarines crossing chokepoints seeded with SQUID magnetometers would likely be detected
3. Naval task groups which have ASW helicopters will also see a significant improvement in capability against submarines trying to approach within torpedo range. That argues for submarines to attack with longer-ranged missiles or torpedoes. Or to act as targeting platforms tracking enemy ships. At the same time, the French Navy say stealthy anti-ship missiles "cannot by itself make a real difference in naval combat". However, MALD type decoys/jammers should help.
4. If individual torpedoes can be detected, it may allow for the development of effective anti-torpedo systems
Sources
cae.com/defense-security/what-we-do/mission-operations-support/magnetic-anomaly-detection-extended-role-mad-xr/
navalnews.com/event-news/madex-2021/2021/06/madex-2021-sensorpia-magnetic-field-detection-systems/
navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/05/feedback-on-french-navy-high-intensity-exercise-polaris/
Incredible, this is more than I could have hoped for. While I admit I only skimmed over the finer points of TACTOM employment, it's clear it's both an underrated weapons system for its complexity and somewhat overrated system for its destructive capability. My question is wouldn't that be also true of any initial operational fires generated by the PLAAF and the PLARF? Specifically I'm talking about DF-21s and DF-26s. How certain are we on the abilities of the PLARF to continually track and update mission strike data on US naval assets?
Also I'm sure that Japan will throw their hat in the ring for the US, I'm not quite sure on SK since it seems almost suicidal to me. Both assuming that the JSDF and the ROK armed forces join in, wouldn't their missiles also add to the US side of the equation and result in more disabled targets even considering the degraded capabilities of TLAM's directly after the intial salvos?
As a side note, it seems to me that if Japan is as in lockstep with the US as they seem to be, the best strategy would be shift the focus of the JSDF and make something equivalent to the PLARF, since I assume Japanese Naval assets will probably a nonfactor and Japanese airbases will also not survive. What do you think the US should have Japan and SK do in order to tip the scales more in their favor? Do you believe that there is political will for Japan (probably imo) and SK (probably not imo) to stomach the type of war that you envision?
Also it seems that all the scenerios that you are considering is some form of overwhelming preemptive strike by the PLA on US/Japanese/SK TACAIR targets followed by a barrage of ASH/ASBM on the 7th fleet. I assume this is because the PLA holds all the cards in this regard since this is their backyard, and also that there aren't nearly enough TLAM or LRASM assets in the Pacific to even consider launching a preemptive strike that would degrade PLAAF/PLARF/PLAN capabilities to any extent that matters. My question regarding those scenerios is that there will probably be a point where hostilies reach a boiling point before the PLA would consider such a strike. At that point wouldn't the 7th Fleet be pulled back far away from any range where these scenerios are possible? Or would the political ramifications of pulling back the 7th from the danger zone so great as to basically be conceding supremacy of the Pacific to the Chinese? Though I fail to see how allowing the 7th to be subject to the damage that you described is any better.
In the scenerio that TACAIR targets have all been knocked out and H6/JH 7A stories combined with DF-21/DF-26s are flying toward US ships, what would the PLAN be doing? Would they be participating in the strike and mopping up survivors? Or would they just be sitting back and and waiting until US naval assets have been expulsed from the area?
What would your response be to the below:
The outermost layer, in the 1st island chain, are US assets in the first island chain. Land based BMD radar and BMD batteries, land based fighters with AEW&C, and even naval ships with BMD capability.
The middle layer is between the 1st and 2nd island chain, composed of carriers, naval ships with BMD, and perhaps small islands with forward deployed smaller BMD radars and BMD batteries.
The final layer is in the 2nd island chain, including Guam and smaller islands that have their own land based comprehensive BMD and land based airbases with fighters and AEW&C, as well as escorting naval ships with BMD, perhaps carriers as well.
All of those layers will seek to track PLA land based missile and aircraft attacks launched towards Guam, as well as seek to shoot them down and thin them down as much as possible before they reach Guam. In other words, PLA attacks from land will have to go through three layers of defense, because at the commencement of hostilities, those land based weapons are naturally not forward deployed close to Guam.
This is great (borderline classified) data, lolz.
Knowing this, I'd think this would further encourage both sides to prepare a potent 1st strike. Because by the time they try and retaliate, their Kill Chains might already be broken, rendering their missile forces completely useless: Nav/UHF satellites might be destroyed, the EM spectrum would be saturated with EW-jamming, and SIGINT detection of salvos would be even more problematic.
Of course, there is also the possibility that the US simply withdraws from Westpac in the coming recession. Clearly, the requirements for front-loading 1st strike assets and missiles in theater (on forward land bases and seaborne) are going to be extremely expensive. Some are saying that the most likely outcome at this point is a complete breakdown of the Bretton-Woods system, and their associated global supply chains, which will divert attention of all countries (including China and the US) to domestic stabilization.
But then again, when things get chaotic and desperate, sometimes that increases the chances of conflict, which means China still needs to assume an aggressive US posture and prepare accordingly. And so far, they're just buying more Tomahawks.
Alright, I'll take your word for it, since the details are classified. I guess all the (many) billions spent on submarines are going to yield less than ideal return on investment for everyone. It should make naval warfare a little more interesting at least. These 15-knot subs really slow everything down.
Japan and ROK don't have that many missiles currently.
What you're suggesting is that Japan becomes an offensive missile appendage for the US military.
Japan would need constitutional amendments to allow for an official military to exist and also renounce the anti-war clauses. Then significant budget increases would be needed to pay for new missiles, which we might see arriving in 5 years time. But within the next 5 years , we'll likely see the 300+ ICBM silos in China comprise a sufficient deterrent against any country declaring war (and therefore a pre-emptive first strike) against China.
But let's say that Japan does militarise and field large numbers of land-based missiles.
What would be the Chinese response?
We see China running a lot of military training exercises in the East China Sea in peacetime, with the Japanese Navy, Coast Guard and Air Force exhausting themselves in trying to monitor this. Yet the Chinese military is much larger and still has huge scope to increase their operating tempo. Furthermore, overall Chinese military spending is still growing in tandem with the economy, so we can expect even more Chinese training exercises in the future anyway. That forces Japan to spend more on the Navy, Coast Guard and Air Force if Japan wants to assert sovereignty over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and is a competition that Japan can't win if China chooses to up the operating tempo. It also means the Japanese military has to get used to presence of Chinese military forces in the East China Seas as a matter of routine.
China's GDP is currently 6x larger than Japan, and China adds a Japan-sized economy roughly every 4 years. In a missile arms race, China would likely build even more offensive missiles than Japan, so that Japan comes off far worse off in any Japan-China conflict. It also raises the possibility of nuclear escalation and Japan doesn't have any nukes. The other thing to remember is that the Japanese Home Islands are geographically small and located on the fringes of Asia. Japan has to import almost all its natural resources and pay for these with manufactured goods, which will be difficult if it is at war with China. So Japan needs to maintain a significant Navy to escort its merchant shipping. In comparison, China is the world's largest trading nation and also sits in the middle of the Asian (and Global) trading network. China is also geographically the same size as a continent-spanning USA, so China could be largely self-sufficient just from the resources within its own borders. Plus China can rely on overland trade for many needs.
At the same time, look at the previous economic responses to THAAD deployments in Korea or when Japan arrested Chinese fisherman in the disputed islands.
Or China could be a lot more subtle. For example, China accounts for roughly 75% of the entire electric vehicle supply chain. If Japan is blacklisted or impeded from accessing the Chinese electric vehicle supply chain, Japan won't be able to leverage the lower costs and better technology available in China. Firstly, we would see Japanese carmakers displaced even faster by Tesla and the Chinese carmakers in China, then in overseas markets and then inside Japan to a greater degree than otherwise.
In Japan, approximately 20% of manufacturing employment is in the automobile industry and it accounts for $80 Billion of exports from Japan each year. In 2021, approximately half of all cars made in Japan were exported. So if Japan loses its car exports, the domestic Japanese auto industry should halve in size. Then if we start seeing significant imports of Tesla and/or Chinese electric cars, the domestic Japanese auto industry would shrink even further.
A similar analysis applies to many other industries in Japan and also to other countries in Asia and the rest of the world.
So if the China-Japan relationship gets worse, there potentially would be less tax revenue available to pay for an arms buildup against China. It's a Catch-22 for Japan.
Some other things to consider.
It's unlikely that the US military will be able to pre-position anywhere near enough assets for a really effective first strike against China.
And if China sees the US preparing to do this, will that prompt the Chinese military to strike first?
Plus if the US ever provides a concrete military guarantee to Taiwan, this will ensure that any China-Taiwan conflict results in a pre-emptive first strike by the Chinese military against the forward positioned elements of the US military.
But I see the window of a credible US military guarantee to Taiwan disappearing within the next 5 years, if it hasn't already. This would mainly be due to the expansion of China's nuclear arsenal.
It also means discussion of first strikes involving [China vs US] will definitely be redundant in the future.
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I wonder if superweapon-type deterrence weapons akin to the Poseidon nuclear torpedo and FOBS would be viable in given China an even definitive edge in terms of her deterrence capabilities, in case of any hot conflict in the Western Pacific?
The key of those superweapons would serve to enhance China's capability of punching through US-&-Lackeys Co.'s defense networks against China's nuclear delivery weapons, so much so that the US-&-Lavkeys Co. would rather choose to stand down and avoid as much confrontation as possible, in fear of being blasted out of existence by China should they dare to intervene while unable to do anything to stop it.
I know all nuclear powers today are de-facto practicing MAD policy, but with Japan, South Korea and Guam already stationing US ABM systems so up close to China's doorstep, I felt that China is at a disadvantage here. Not much different from Russia regarding NATO, really.
Should China pursue such kinds of weaponry as well? Or is China already in the process of/already acquiring such weaponry?
The key of those superweapons would serve to enhance China's capability of punching through US-&-Lackeys Co.'s defense networks against China's nuclear delivery weapons, so much so that the US-&-Lavkeys Co. would rather choose to stand down and avoid as much confrontation as possible, in fear of being blasted out of existence by China should they dare to intervene while unable to do anything to stop it.
I know all nuclear powers today are de-facto practicing MAD policy, but with Japan, South Korea and Guam already stationing US ABM systems so up close to China's doorstep, I felt that China is at a disadvantage here. Not much different from Russia regarding NATO, really.
Should China pursue such kinds of weaponry as well? Or is China already in the process of/already acquiring such weaponry?