Please read what I wrote. I'm not expecting all the missiles to get intercepted. I'm not really sure what the point of this argument is.
PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC
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Please read what I wrote. I'm not expecting all the missiles to get intercepted. I'm not really sure what the point of this argument is.
Yes, but I think you might be conveniently adjusting the number of successful strikes (of both hypersonic and subsonic CMs) to one that is low enough that it won't cripple your plan.
I'm expecting half of the hypersonic missiles to get intercepted, which really isn't that optimistic of an interception rate. I'm expecting almost all of the subsonic CMs to be intercepted, which given the multilayered air defense on naval ships and land based SAMs and CIWS + early detection by KJ-600s, is not unreasonable. If anything, land attack missiles are likely to not fly as low as AShM, which would make them a little easier to track and intercept.
160 missiles really isn't enough to overcome the air defense of 2 carrier groups + land based air defense. Consider that each USN carrier group is designed to handle saturation attacks of several hundred subsonic sea-skimmers.
@Blitzo @tphuang
On the usefulness of stealthy antiship missiles eg. Storm Shadow / LRASM.
The French Navy seem to think they have no advantage over a non-stealthy missile. Note that the French Navy actually have Storm Shadows in service themselves. See below.
We also see that the Chinese Navy and Russian Navy have skipped over stealthy antiship missiles in favour of hypersonic missiles. And that the US Navy is also going for hypersonic missiles as well.
Plus I recall an old article where a US Navy admiral publicly extolls how short/medium range SAM systems are highly effective against incoming cruise missiles.
On the usefulness of stealthy antiship missiles eg. Storm Shadow / LRASM.
The French Navy seem to think they have no advantage over a non-stealthy missile. Note that the French Navy actually have Storm Shadows in service themselves. See below.
We also see that the Chinese Navy and Russian Navy have skipped over stealthy antiship missiles in favour of hypersonic missiles. And that the US Navy is also going for hypersonic missiles as well.
Plus I recall an old article where a US Navy admiral publicly extolls how short/medium range SAM systems are highly effective against incoming cruise missiles.
I think such interception ratios are optimistic, just like the USN claim of being able to withstand "several hundred" AShMs. That's a marketing brochure. No IADS has demonstrated such interception capability in the real-world yet, and we've had many CMs pass through them without problems in multiple conflicts around the world at this point.
Regardless, the real question is the max launch capacity of either side, because all defenses can be saturated with a big enough salvo. Of course, the answer is subject to the target location as well, and whether it is in-range of land launched missiles + decoys (present and future.)
@tphuang
Previous post below which looks at how the cost of missile defence is higher than the cost of offensive ballistic missiles.
That's fine. In the past, we have seen Soviet make some extraordinary projections on how much backfire loss they would need to endure in order to even sink 1 USN carrier. In practice, maybe subsonic missiles will be able to penetrate air defense more frequently than what naval simulations/exercises have shown. I still think that very few JASSM in this scenario will get through air defense and actually cause damage. I think a good number of hypersonic missiles will, but they are inherently less accurate than subsonic missiles.
As long as the attacking force is 15 B-21s and single digit SSNs, I don't think there is enough firepower there to significantly degrade defending fleet + the island group infrastructure.
Yes, the main purpose of having something in Kiribati is so that it can launch full on attack from Hawaii and cripple USN supply line. And possibly even attack any carrier/ships under maintenance/repairs in San Diego.
I agree that you don't put 2 Carrier groups there + a good number of H-20s and UCAVs just to wait to be attacked.
@tphuang
I'll address start a clean post without the quotes.
We've established, and we both agree that in 2037 for this scenario, the PLAN has 8 CSGs in service (and 4 076s).
We both agree that we are talking about the initial first days/weeks of conflict -- lets call it the First Phase Operations (FPO for short).
I think we both agree in the FPO, the PLA should seek to defeat, destroy, and dislodge primary US military forces in the western pacific within and up to the second island chain (air bases, naval bases, CSGs, SAGs, small ACE air ops).
Due to maintenance/overhaul periods. it means the PLAN will only be able to surge deploy a fraction of its CSGs.
Lets be very generous and say they can surge 6 out of its 8 CSGs.
Your Kiribati strategy, is to build up Kiribati as a major air-naval station that is well defended, and able to be used as a forward position to conduct offensive operations against places such as Hawaii (or San Diego, or other US west coast CONTUS locations). Let's say Hawaii for now given it is less ambitious. This will be a set of island air bases, operating with 2 CSGs (of the PLAN's 6 CSGs operational).
Lets say they can deploy 2 CSGs to the Kiribati area prior to onset of hostilities (so those 2 CSGs don't have to fight through US forces).
The goal is to divide or delay US forces in the westpac region to operate in the central pacific region. This opens up two major theaters of operations -- lets call them westpac (up to second island chain), and centpac (around Kiribati and up to Hawaii).
PLA centpac forces will be 2 CSGs and the air bases (possibly with a small number of SSNs that were operating in the area already prior to conflict).
Dividing is achieved by forcing the US to split up its pacific forces between centpac and westpac, thus ideally allowing the PLA to achieve FPO in westpac faster or easier. This is dependent on the US recognizing the PLA's centpac forces as one that requires the US to dedicate a number of its most capable mobile forces -- CSGs -- to operate in centpac to defend against and defeat the PLA's 2 CSGs and Kiribati base, rather than reinforce its operations in westpac.
Delaying would be achieved by forcing the US to either pull back many of its westpac forces to more decisively defeat PLA centpac forces, allowing the PLA to achieve FPO in westpac much faster and easier and buy time to consolidate its positions while the bulk of US pacific forces are busy defeating PLA centpac forces. Alternatively, delaying US forces would be achieved by the PLA's centpac forces carrying out a strike against Hawaii able to significantly damage its logistical/support capabilities for US forces operating in westpac, causing the US pulling back from westpac.
Both of those are very logical goals, and I am supportive of the spirit and rationale of them.
The issue I have, is I don't think they are achievable with the force that we've been discussing -- i.e.: 8 CSGs, of which 6 CSGs the PLA have operational during FPO (4 CSGs in westpac, 2 CSGs in centpac).
This is because, in terms of the FPO, the PLA's strategy is not merely to "defeat, destroy, and dislodge primary US military forces in the western pacific within and up to the second island chain" -- but rather, it must also be able to achieve that mission in a manner where it experiences a sufficiently favourable exchange rate against US forces, such that the result is that the PLA has the capability to at minimum defeat a regrouped US counter attack against westpac.... and ideally, for the PLA to have the capability to carry out strategically significant offensive operations in centpac against regrouped US forces.
During the FPO, my belief, is that with only 2 CSGs and the Kiribati airbase for the PLA's centpac forces, I have significant doubts as to whether the PLA will be able to successfully carry out the divide or delay missions in centpac during the FPO, and I believe that regardless of whether they are able to carry out the divide or delay missions, the PLA's centpac forces will not survive their mission and will be destroyed. The Kiribati base will be destroyed. The 2 CSGs will be sunk.
Even if the PLA's centpac forces are successful in achieving the divide or delay mission prior to their destruction and sinking, I believe the PLA in westpac during the FPO will still suffer meaningful losses.
Specifically, of the PLA's westpac forces, even against a reduced US CSG presence in westpac, there is a very significant likelihood that a fleet of 4 PLA CSGs could lose 1 or even 2 CSGs in the westpac theater of the FPO. This is a result of the forward positioning of US air and missile forces at land in the westpac theater, as well as the capability of US SSNs, such that a degree of attrition against CSGs must be acknowledged.
I.e.: I believe the PLA could achieve a victory during the FPO with your strategy -- however it will result in significant losses, of 3-4 CSGs total (1-2 CSGs in the westpac theater, and 2 CSGs in the centpac theater). That would leave the PLA with only 2-3 CSGs in operation during the conclusion of FPO (with a total of 4-5 CSGs in the fleet in total).
After the conclusion of the FPO, those 4-5 total CSGs remaining in the fleet may be able to deploy 2-3 CSGs for active operations, but the rest would likely need significant repair or maintenance.
That is not enough to allow the PLA to defeat a regrouped US counter attack in the westpac theater -- and certainly not enough for the PLA to conduct a strategically significant operation in the centpac theater.
Now, the crux of our disagreement -- just what could the PLA centpac force achieve?
We both agree it's 2 CSGs and a few built up airbases on some of the Kiribati islands.
By all means it would be a capable force anywhere on the globe, but its survivability -- and thus its ability to successfully complete the divide or delay missions -- is significantly hampered by a number of strategic/military factors:
1: Unfriendly space: Kiribati is surrounded by water and airspace where the US or US allies control. Hawaii in the northeast, Guam in the northwest, Australia in the southwest, and further out there is CONTUS to the east. Those are all landmasses where bombers can operate from to credibly target Kiribati using standoff ALCMs (in particular Hawaii and Australia), and they are also able to support surface naval forces and subsurface naval forces as well to target Kiribati using LRHWs or LACMs. It also goes without saying that all of those locations will be heavily defended by their own organic air and missile defenses and anti-ship defenses, as well as deploying their own land based CAP, ISR, AEW. Kiribati will have to defend against multi-axis attacks, diverting its attention to threats in a 360 degree manner rather than having the luxury to focus its warfighting assets in one direction.
2: Distance and isolation: Kiribati and centpac as a theater of operations, is 8000km from the Chinese coast at the closest point. During the time in which the FPO is occurring, the PLA centpac force will essentially be operating in isolation. They will have no support from the PLA in westpac as they would be too busy fighting the primary battle in westpac, and they will receive no reinforcements or resupply either. The lack of reinforcements and resupply may not be as important as the lack of support due to the speed at which hostilities during the FPO are likely to occur.
3: Concentration of force: Kiribati, as a fixed location, can be well defended. However a fixed location that is surrounded by unfriendly waters and airspace and landmasses where air power and naval power can be deployed from, require substantial concentration of force to be successfully defended. The enemy can strike your fixed location without requiring substantial ISR, from multiple axes simultaneously. The nature of defended air bases is that if certain parts of your defenses or your air base is damaged from initial strikes, it creates a logjam in your ability to sustain defenses and air ops until the damage gets repaired or bypassed. The speed of repairs and the redundancy of your airbase and defenses is limited by your land mass to disperse repair equipment and disperse defensive capabilities.
You wrote before that conducting a first strike is important. I agree.
But, looking at the above three factors, I think the PLA's forces in centpac is at a first strike disadvantage.
The PLA's centpac forces as you describe not only at a disadvantage in offensive and defensive capability and positioning, but they are also at a disadvantage in ISR, in ability to repair and recover from strikes, and have far less bandwidth for suffering losses before they become combat ineffective and be destroyed, relative to its potential targets in the theater (namely Hawaii).
The Kiribati air bases are the most vulnerable to initial destruction.
Subsequently, lacking land based air support, 2 CSGs would be very vulnerable to US SSNs in the region and US land based bombers, especially if the 2 CSGs continue to try to complete their mission to strike Hawaii.
I believe that for your proposal to be viable, the PLA's centpac force must be one where centpac's CSGs are capable of surviving in a manner whereby that at the end of the FPO, the overall PLA has more CSGs in its fleet, than the number of CSGs the US has in its global fleet (on a global scale, as they would be redeployed to the westpac after the FPO).
Operating in the centpac theater with 2 CSGs there, with only 5-6 CSGs operational (8 CSGs in the fleet) during the FPO, is massive strategic overreach, because the losses would condemn the PLA to an unfavourable defensive posture afterwards.
In the next post I discuss your scenario.
I'll address start a clean post without the quotes.
We've established, and we both agree that in 2037 for this scenario, the PLAN has 8 CSGs in service (and 4 076s).
We both agree that we are talking about the initial first days/weeks of conflict -- lets call it the First Phase Operations (FPO for short).
I think we both agree in the FPO, the PLA should seek to defeat, destroy, and dislodge primary US military forces in the western pacific within and up to the second island chain (air bases, naval bases, CSGs, SAGs, small ACE air ops).
Due to maintenance/overhaul periods. it means the PLAN will only be able to surge deploy a fraction of its CSGs.
Lets be very generous and say they can surge 6 out of its 8 CSGs.
Your Kiribati strategy, is to build up Kiribati as a major air-naval station that is well defended, and able to be used as a forward position to conduct offensive operations against places such as Hawaii (or San Diego, or other US west coast CONTUS locations). Let's say Hawaii for now given it is less ambitious. This will be a set of island air bases, operating with 2 CSGs (of the PLAN's 6 CSGs operational).
Lets say they can deploy 2 CSGs to the Kiribati area prior to onset of hostilities (so those 2 CSGs don't have to fight through US forces).
The goal is to divide or delay US forces in the westpac region to operate in the central pacific region. This opens up two major theaters of operations -- lets call them westpac (up to second island chain), and centpac (around Kiribati and up to Hawaii).
PLA centpac forces will be 2 CSGs and the air bases (possibly with a small number of SSNs that were operating in the area already prior to conflict).
Dividing is achieved by forcing the US to split up its pacific forces between centpac and westpac, thus ideally allowing the PLA to achieve FPO in westpac faster or easier. This is dependent on the US recognizing the PLA's centpac forces as one that requires the US to dedicate a number of its most capable mobile forces -- CSGs -- to operate in centpac to defend against and defeat the PLA's 2 CSGs and Kiribati base, rather than reinforce its operations in westpac.
Delaying would be achieved by forcing the US to either pull back many of its westpac forces to more decisively defeat PLA centpac forces, allowing the PLA to achieve FPO in westpac much faster and easier and buy time to consolidate its positions while the bulk of US pacific forces are busy defeating PLA centpac forces. Alternatively, delaying US forces would be achieved by the PLA's centpac forces carrying out a strike against Hawaii able to significantly damage its logistical/support capabilities for US forces operating in westpac, causing the US pulling back from westpac.
Both of those are very logical goals, and I am supportive of the spirit and rationale of them.
The issue I have, is I don't think they are achievable with the force that we've been discussing -- i.e.: 8 CSGs, of which 6 CSGs the PLA have operational during FPO (4 CSGs in westpac, 2 CSGs in centpac).
This is because, in terms of the FPO, the PLA's strategy is not merely to "defeat, destroy, and dislodge primary US military forces in the western pacific within and up to the second island chain" -- but rather, it must also be able to achieve that mission in a manner where it experiences a sufficiently favourable exchange rate against US forces, such that the result is that the PLA has the capability to at minimum defeat a regrouped US counter attack against westpac.... and ideally, for the PLA to have the capability to carry out strategically significant offensive operations in centpac against regrouped US forces.
During the FPO, my belief, is that with only 2 CSGs and the Kiribati airbase for the PLA's centpac forces, I have significant doubts as to whether the PLA will be able to successfully carry out the divide or delay missions in centpac during the FPO, and I believe that regardless of whether they are able to carry out the divide or delay missions, the PLA's centpac forces will not survive their mission and will be destroyed. The Kiribati base will be destroyed. The 2 CSGs will be sunk.
Even if the PLA's centpac forces are successful in achieving the divide or delay mission prior to their destruction and sinking, I believe the PLA in westpac during the FPO will still suffer meaningful losses.
Specifically, of the PLA's westpac forces, even against a reduced US CSG presence in westpac, there is a very significant likelihood that a fleet of 4 PLA CSGs could lose 1 or even 2 CSGs in the westpac theater of the FPO. This is a result of the forward positioning of US air and missile forces at land in the westpac theater, as well as the capability of US SSNs, such that a degree of attrition against CSGs must be acknowledged.
I.e.: I believe the PLA could achieve a victory during the FPO with your strategy -- however it will result in significant losses, of 3-4 CSGs total (1-2 CSGs in the westpac theater, and 2 CSGs in the centpac theater). That would leave the PLA with only 2-3 CSGs in operation during the conclusion of FPO (with a total of 4-5 CSGs in the fleet in total).
After the conclusion of the FPO, those 4-5 total CSGs remaining in the fleet may be able to deploy 2-3 CSGs for active operations, but the rest would likely need significant repair or maintenance.
That is not enough to allow the PLA to defeat a regrouped US counter attack in the westpac theater -- and certainly not enough for the PLA to conduct a strategically significant operation in the centpac theater.
Now, the crux of our disagreement -- just what could the PLA centpac force achieve?
We both agree it's 2 CSGs and a few built up airbases on some of the Kiribati islands.
By all means it would be a capable force anywhere on the globe, but its survivability -- and thus its ability to successfully complete the divide or delay missions -- is significantly hampered by a number of strategic/military factors:
1: Unfriendly space: Kiribati is surrounded by water and airspace where the US or US allies control. Hawaii in the northeast, Guam in the northwest, Australia in the southwest, and further out there is CONTUS to the east. Those are all landmasses where bombers can operate from to credibly target Kiribati using standoff ALCMs (in particular Hawaii and Australia), and they are also able to support surface naval forces and subsurface naval forces as well to target Kiribati using LRHWs or LACMs. It also goes without saying that all of those locations will be heavily defended by their own organic air and missile defenses and anti-ship defenses, as well as deploying their own land based CAP, ISR, AEW. Kiribati will have to defend against multi-axis attacks, diverting its attention to threats in a 360 degree manner rather than having the luxury to focus its warfighting assets in one direction.
2: Distance and isolation: Kiribati and centpac as a theater of operations, is 8000km from the Chinese coast at the closest point. During the time in which the FPO is occurring, the PLA centpac force will essentially be operating in isolation. They will have no support from the PLA in westpac as they would be too busy fighting the primary battle in westpac, and they will receive no reinforcements or resupply either. The lack of reinforcements and resupply may not be as important as the lack of support due to the speed at which hostilities during the FPO are likely to occur.
3: Concentration of force: Kiribati, as a fixed location, can be well defended. However a fixed location that is surrounded by unfriendly waters and airspace and landmasses where air power and naval power can be deployed from, require substantial concentration of force to be successfully defended. The enemy can strike your fixed location without requiring substantial ISR, from multiple axes simultaneously. The nature of defended air bases is that if certain parts of your defenses or your air base is damaged from initial strikes, it creates a logjam in your ability to sustain defenses and air ops until the damage gets repaired or bypassed. The speed of repairs and the redundancy of your airbase and defenses is limited by your land mass to disperse repair equipment and disperse defensive capabilities.
You wrote before that conducting a first strike is important. I agree.
But, looking at the above three factors, I think the PLA's forces in centpac is at a first strike disadvantage.
The PLA's centpac forces as you describe not only at a disadvantage in offensive and defensive capability and positioning, but they are also at a disadvantage in ISR, in ability to repair and recover from strikes, and have far less bandwidth for suffering losses before they become combat ineffective and be destroyed, relative to its potential targets in the theater (namely Hawaii).
The Kiribati air bases are the most vulnerable to initial destruction.
Subsequently, lacking land based air support, 2 CSGs would be very vulnerable to US SSNs in the region and US land based bombers, especially if the 2 CSGs continue to try to complete their mission to strike Hawaii.
I believe that for your proposal to be viable, the PLA's centpac force must be one where centpac's CSGs are capable of surviving in a manner whereby that at the end of the FPO, the overall PLA has more CSGs in its fleet, than the number of CSGs the US has in its global fleet (on a global scale, as they would be redeployed to the westpac after the FPO).
Operating in the centpac theater with 2 CSGs there, with only 5-6 CSGs operational (8 CSGs in the fleet) during the FPO, is massive strategic overreach, because the losses would condemn the PLA to an unfavourable defensive posture afterwards.
In the next post I discuss your scenario.
Following from my above post... I'll address certain specific parts about my assumptions of US capabilities here.
- Between Hawaii, Australia and western CONTUS, I believe the US could deploy up to 40 B-21s total against Kiribati. This is not including 10-15 B-21s from Guam. That is a total of only some 50-55 B-21s out of 100 B-21s that the US would deploy in the overall western pacific, with significant bandwidth to replace aircraft lost in attrition.
- Of the 40 B-21s against Kiribati, most would be from Hawaii and Australia, with air refuelling on the return leg. I expect B-21 to be capable of carrying 8-10 JASSM-XR sized weapons internally -- B-2 can carry 16. I think that's a reasonable estimate. I.e.: in terms of aerial bomber single strike missions against Kiribati, I expect about 320-400 JASSM type weapons.
- In terms of LRHWs, against Kiribati the LRHWs deployed would be deployed primarily from SSNs. I agree with 8 SSNs, each carrying 12 LRHWs -- that is some 76 LRHWs. Zumwalts will be able to carry LRHW as well, 4 canisters (each with 3 LRHWs) replacing one AGS, that makes for 12 LRHWs. Let's say only one Zumwalt will be operational during this conflict -- that is some 88 LRHWs total.
- Additional standoff range weapons but that would contribute to the first wave strikes, would be Tomahawk ranged LACMs, that would be from a combination of SSNs (Block V Virginias can carry 12 LRHWs as well as 12 Tomahawks. 8 SSNs would put together 76 SLCMs), as well as a few surface action groups (lets say two SAGs of five ships, each with 4 Burkes each led by a Zumwalt or DDGX each, and lets assume a 20 LACM load each ship -- that's 2 x 5 x 20 which is 200 Tomahawks). So that's 276 Tomahawks.
So in terms of stand off range first wave strikes:
- 320-400 air launched JASSM-XR from B-21s
- 88 LRHWs mostly from SSNs
- 276 Tomahawk LACMs from SSNs and surface ships.
That is a total of 408-488 weapons that could be described as very difficult to defend against, and another 276 LACMs that would follow the JASSMs and LRHWs
Keep in mind, the above weapons are mostly against the "first wave strike" primarily against Kiribati, because of its vital role in providing land based air cover to the two CSGs and because as a fixed location, it is able to be targeted very easily with key logjam vulnerable facilities all long pre-identified in years before the conflict.
Also keep in mind that the above weapons will be deployed in a multi-axis attack manner, forcing the PLA to spread its land based air and missile defenses in a 360 degree manner, and also causing its combat air patrol and airborne early warning to have to spread itself thinly as well to cover all avenues of approach.
The distance from Hawaii to Kiribati is 3000km. B-21s would only need to travel 1000km to release 2000km range JASSM-XR on Kiribati. That's a 2000km round trip for the B-21 itself, and would be only a 2 hour sortie.
The distance from Australia to Kiribati depending on location is about 5500km. B-21s would need to travel 3500km to release 2000km range JASSM-XR on Kiribati. That's a 7000km round trip for the B-21 itself, a 7 hour sortie.
From both Hawaii and Australia (but especially Hawaii), the turn around time for repeat B-21 strikes on Kiribati is very fast.
After Kiribati is destroyed by US first strikes, it would be a relatively easy matter of hunting down the PLA CSGs in centpac with land based ISR, land based B-21s with LRASMs, and US SSNs, and their hours will be numbered.
I do not think the US needs CSGs operating from Hawaii or San Diego to defeat 2 PLA CSGs operating in the centpac region in that context.
They won't be able to achieve that.
Kiribati will be under extensive ISR in periods of tension leading up to conflict, and B-21s and SSNs will be at high readiness to sortie and to launch their payloads at the outset of conflict.
The first mover advantage in this conflict overwhelmingly goes to the US.
I think this is perhaps the most fatal of the assumptions you are making, and quite frankly it is assuming that the US will be stupid and handicap itself in a high intensity conflict against the most important theater of war involving another nation, that the US has ever faced in its history.
With much closer European and NATO integration thanks to Russia, I expect NATO and Europe to pool together their naval and carrier resources far more effectively than they've done so in the past.
By 2037, leaving the US out of it, NATO will have two British QE class carriers, 2 Italian STOVL carriers, 1 French nuclear powered carrier (CdG will be retired in 2038 to be replaced by PANG). The British and Italian carriers will operate F-35Bs as their standard complement.
Furthermore, European air forces will be very well equipped with F-35As, as well as possibly some emerging 5.5/6th gen fighters such as the Tempest or FCAS NGF.
In 2037, Russia's ability to maintain a competitive and large air force and military overall that is capable of offensive operations against NATO would be in doubt.
In 2037, the Middle East will likely not be a primary theater of operations for US CSGs. If an air presence is necessary, a LHA or LHD with F-35Bs will easily outclass what Iran could have in service.
Furthermore, the US is very aware of China and the western pacific as its primary pacing threat theater, and they've said so publicly as well.
Practically speaking, what this means is that in 2037, I expect that during the FPO, the US will seek to surge all of its operational CSGs to the overall pacific theater as possible (other carriers would be in maintenance or repairs or training). At the conclusion of the FPO, the US would seek to surge deploy as many of its carriers that were in maintenance/repairs/training, to the pacific theater, for a counter attack against the PLA's positions in the western pacific, to make up for its losses during the FPO.
In Europe and the Middle East, NATO would be called upon at high alert to maintain deterrence against Russia and Iran in the middle east, possibly supported by a slight US naval presence in the form of a ESG with LHA/LHD carrying F-35Bs.
Let's recall -- the PLA's requirements is to be able to achieve the FPO goals, while having the capabilities to at minimum defeat a regrouped US counter attack.
In 2037, sending 2 operational CSGs to Kiribati to their guaranteed deaths, with an unfavourable in-theater balance of forces, is not the best way for the PLA to use their valuable 8 total CSGs that they'd have in 2037.
Now, I will concede that your strategy will allow the PLA's westpac theater of operations to experience less bombardments from JASSMs and LRHWs from US bombers and SSNs, and delay US strike density.
However, that is at the cost of losing the aerial forces at Kiribati base and 2 PLA CSGs, all of which will have a very difficult time in actually achieving their mission, because they would be too busy fighting for their life in the opening hours of the conflict.
A total fleet of 8 CSGs in 2037 is simply not enough for the sort of mission you are envisioning -- it simply stretches PLA warfighting capabilities too thin.
- Between Hawaii, Australia and western CONTUS, I believe the US could deploy up to 40 B-21s total against Kiribati. This is not including 10-15 B-21s from Guam. That is a total of only some 50-55 B-21s out of 100 B-21s that the US would deploy in the overall western pacific, with significant bandwidth to replace aircraft lost in attrition.
- Of the 40 B-21s against Kiribati, most would be from Hawaii and Australia, with air refuelling on the return leg. I expect B-21 to be capable of carrying 8-10 JASSM-XR sized weapons internally -- B-2 can carry 16. I think that's a reasonable estimate. I.e.: in terms of aerial bomber single strike missions against Kiribati, I expect about 320-400 JASSM type weapons.
- In terms of LRHWs, against Kiribati the LRHWs deployed would be deployed primarily from SSNs. I agree with 8 SSNs, each carrying 12 LRHWs -- that is some 76 LRHWs. Zumwalts will be able to carry LRHW as well, 4 canisters (each with 3 LRHWs) replacing one AGS, that makes for 12 LRHWs. Let's say only one Zumwalt will be operational during this conflict -- that is some 88 LRHWs total.
- Additional standoff range weapons but that would contribute to the first wave strikes, would be Tomahawk ranged LACMs, that would be from a combination of SSNs (Block V Virginias can carry 12 LRHWs as well as 12 Tomahawks. 8 SSNs would put together 76 SLCMs), as well as a few surface action groups (lets say two SAGs of five ships, each with 4 Burkes each led by a Zumwalt or DDGX each, and lets assume a 20 LACM load each ship -- that's 2 x 5 x 20 which is 200 Tomahawks). So that's 276 Tomahawks.
So in terms of stand off range first wave strikes:
- 320-400 air launched JASSM-XR from B-21s
- 88 LRHWs mostly from SSNs
- 276 Tomahawk LACMs from SSNs and surface ships.
That is a total of 408-488 weapons that could be described as very difficult to defend against, and another 276 LACMs that would follow the JASSMs and LRHWs
Keep in mind, the above weapons are mostly against the "first wave strike" primarily against Kiribati, because of its vital role in providing land based air cover to the two CSGs and because as a fixed location, it is able to be targeted very easily with key logjam vulnerable facilities all long pre-identified in years before the conflict.
Also keep in mind that the above weapons will be deployed in a multi-axis attack manner, forcing the PLA to spread its land based air and missile defenses in a 360 degree manner, and also causing its combat air patrol and airborne early warning to have to spread itself thinly as well to cover all avenues of approach.
The distance from Hawaii to Kiribati is 3000km. B-21s would only need to travel 1000km to release 2000km range JASSM-XR on Kiribati. That's a 2000km round trip for the B-21 itself, and would be only a 2 hour sortie.
The distance from Australia to Kiribati depending on location is about 5500km. B-21s would need to travel 3500km to release 2000km range JASSM-XR on Kiribati. That's a 7000km round trip for the B-21 itself, a 7 hour sortie.
From both Hawaii and Australia (but especially Hawaii), the turn around time for repeat B-21 strikes on Kiribati is very fast.
After Kiribati is destroyed by US first strikes, it would be a relatively easy matter of hunting down the PLA CSGs in centpac with land based ISR, land based B-21s with LRASMs, and US SSNs, and their hours will be numbered.
I do not think the US needs CSGs operating from Hawaii or San Diego to defeat 2 PLA CSGs operating in the centpac region in that context.
They won't be able to achieve that.
Kiribati will be under extensive ISR in periods of tension leading up to conflict, and B-21s and SSNs will be at high readiness to sortie and to launch their payloads at the outset of conflict.
The first mover advantage in this conflict overwhelmingly goes to the US.
I think this is perhaps the most fatal of the assumptions you are making, and quite frankly it is assuming that the US will be stupid and handicap itself in a high intensity conflict against the most important theater of war involving another nation, that the US has ever faced in its history.
With much closer European and NATO integration thanks to Russia, I expect NATO and Europe to pool together their naval and carrier resources far more effectively than they've done so in the past.
By 2037, leaving the US out of it, NATO will have two British QE class carriers, 2 Italian STOVL carriers, 1 French nuclear powered carrier (CdG will be retired in 2038 to be replaced by PANG). The British and Italian carriers will operate F-35Bs as their standard complement.
Furthermore, European air forces will be very well equipped with F-35As, as well as possibly some emerging 5.5/6th gen fighters such as the Tempest or FCAS NGF.
In 2037, Russia's ability to maintain a competitive and large air force and military overall that is capable of offensive operations against NATO would be in doubt.
In 2037, the Middle East will likely not be a primary theater of operations for US CSGs. If an air presence is necessary, a LHA or LHD with F-35Bs will easily outclass what Iran could have in service.
Furthermore, the US is very aware of China and the western pacific as its primary pacing threat theater, and they've said so publicly as well.
Practically speaking, what this means is that in 2037, I expect that during the FPO, the US will seek to surge all of its operational CSGs to the overall pacific theater as possible (other carriers would be in maintenance or repairs or training). At the conclusion of the FPO, the US would seek to surge deploy as many of its carriers that were in maintenance/repairs/training, to the pacific theater, for a counter attack against the PLA's positions in the western pacific, to make up for its losses during the FPO.
In Europe and the Middle East, NATO would be called upon at high alert to maintain deterrence against Russia and Iran in the middle east, possibly supported by a slight US naval presence in the form of a ESG with LHA/LHD carrying F-35Bs.
Let's recall -- the PLA's requirements is to be able to achieve the FPO goals, while having the capabilities to at minimum defeat a regrouped US counter attack.
In 2037, sending 2 operational CSGs to Kiribati to their guaranteed deaths, with an unfavourable in-theater balance of forces, is not the best way for the PLA to use their valuable 8 total CSGs that they'd have in 2037.
Now, I will concede that your strategy will allow the PLA's westpac theater of operations to experience less bombardments from JASSMs and LRHWs from US bombers and SSNs, and delay US strike density.
However, that is at the cost of losing the aerial forces at Kiribati base and 2 PLA CSGs, all of which will have a very difficult time in actually achieving their mission, because they would be too busy fighting for their life in the opening hours of the conflict.
A total fleet of 8 CSGs in 2037 is simply not enough for the sort of mission you are envisioning -- it simply stretches PLA warfighting capabilities too thin.
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Alright, so if they cannot cripple Hawaii and West Samoa in the initial phase of war, then it doesn't make sense as a strategy. Having 2 CSG + 1 regiment of H-20 out there does not make sense unless they can take out the most immediate threats at the start of war. In my scenario, they would take out any warship around there. after that, the threat level dramatically decreases. They'd know where the attacks are most likely coming from. Depending on where the satellite/drone surveillance is available by then, they may or may not get tipped off on attacks coming from 5500 km away.
I would say that if you are throwing around numbers like 55 B-21s out of 100, you need to consider what is the typical availability of a fleet type. Based on what we've seen with F-22/B-2, it would be extremely hard to have even 50% of an advanced manned stealth aircraft ready for mission at any given time.
On top of that, the recent US military has been a full litany of example of aircraft programs that never came close to their procurement numbers. In fact, even F-35A looks like it will stop production before coming close to the originally projected numbers. I would estimate by 2037, only 30 to 40 B-21s would be available for operation at any given time. Whether they will all be available to fly for 8 hours back and forth from Australia would be an entirely different story. With that type of availability, deploying 15 B-21s along with tankers would be a herculean effort. I am far more concerned about nuclear subs than B-21s at this point. If PLAN isn't able to keep carrier groups safe from USN nuclear subs torpedoes, then they should not be anywhere close to the middle of the Pacific Ocean.
For example, for my initial attack scenario from Kiribati, I would assume they need to station 20 H-20s in Kiribati in order to just allow 10 to attack.
As for JASSM-XR
As for deploying all the carrier groups to pacific theater, that's also a logistics challenge. If you have 11 carrier groups and 3 of them are under repairs and the other 8 are stationed all across the world. The ones in Atlantic Ocean would need to go 15000 nm to get to West Pacific. Even if they can traverse 500 nm, it would take them a month to get to West Pacific. The one in Indian Ocean would like go through SCS and deal with Hainan and those islands first. Given how I've seen these things play out, the likelihood of the Atlantic Ocean being in place in Asia at the onset of a conflict is extremely low imo.
And also given what I know about domestic politics here, I would presume they will station carriers at Hawaii and San Diego to protect these 2 very precious bases at the start of a conflict. If there is even 30% chance that PLAN carriers could cripple Pearl Harbor, it would be way too high for USN commander.
Also, for first strike capability. I see that more as a political decision than anything else. I mean, if China makes the decision to attack first and think that it can overwhelm Pearl Harbor defense, then it will just direct its carriers to move into place to attack. If America makes the decision to attack first, then it can do that too.
I would say that if you are throwing around numbers like 55 B-21s out of 100, you need to consider what is the typical availability of a fleet type. Based on what we've seen with F-22/B-2, it would be extremely hard to have even 50% of an advanced manned stealth aircraft ready for mission at any given time.
On top of that, the recent US military has been a full litany of example of aircraft programs that never came close to their procurement numbers. In fact, even F-35A looks like it will stop production before coming close to the originally projected numbers. I would estimate by 2037, only 30 to 40 B-21s would be available for operation at any given time. Whether they will all be available to fly for 8 hours back and forth from Australia would be an entirely different story. With that type of availability, deploying 15 B-21s along with tankers would be a herculean effort. I am far more concerned about nuclear subs than B-21s at this point. If PLAN isn't able to keep carrier groups safe from USN nuclear subs torpedoes, then they should not be anywhere close to the middle of the Pacific Ocean.
For example, for my initial attack scenario from Kiribati, I would assume they need to station 20 H-20s in Kiribati in order to just allow 10 to attack.
As for JASSM-XR
I don't see how B-21 can carry more than 4 of these missiles at any given time. And they'd have to carry it externally.
As for deploying all the carrier groups to pacific theater, that's also a logistics challenge. If you have 11 carrier groups and 3 of them are under repairs and the other 8 are stationed all across the world. The ones in Atlantic Ocean would need to go 15000 nm to get to West Pacific. Even if they can traverse 500 nm, it would take them a month to get to West Pacific. The one in Indian Ocean would like go through SCS and deal with Hainan and those islands first. Given how I've seen these things play out, the likelihood of the Atlantic Ocean being in place in Asia at the onset of a conflict is extremely low imo.
And also given what I know about domestic politics here, I would presume they will station carriers at Hawaii and San Diego to protect these 2 very precious bases at the start of a conflict. If there is even 30% chance that PLAN carriers could cripple Pearl Harbor, it would be way too high for USN commander.
Also, for first strike capability. I see that more as a political decision than anything else. I mean, if China makes the decision to attack first and think that it can overwhelm Pearl Harbor defense, then it will just direct its carriers to move into place to attack. If America makes the decision to attack first, then it can do that too.
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