PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC

55 B-21s out of 100 would be most of the operational frontloaded B-21s that the US has available. The rest of the 40-45 B-21s in the fleet would be at CONTUS, not ready.
A 55-60% availability rate seems fairly reasonable to me for a mature B-21 in 2037.


As for JASSM-XR, if you want to change it to JASSM-ER (1000km range, entailing an additional 2000km of total transit distance and time) is fine as well. Either way, I'd be seeing 8-10 stealthy standoff ranged ALCMs internally per B-21 for this mission.
The US isn't going to handicap itself deploying only 4 missiles per B-21 and carried externally, and would be actively either pursuing a more sensible weapons loadout or intending for its under development weapons (like a conventional LRSO variant) that could enable a reasonable magazine size.


Redeploying carriers from the atlantic to pacific will of course be a logistical challenge and take a bit of time, sure.
Between now and 2037, I expect the US to make the logistical and support changes to enable repositioning US atlantic carriers to the pacific if needed.
I'm not saying the US will necessarily deploy all of its global carriers to the pacific at once -- rather that during FPO the US will surge deploy its pacific carriers to the westpac theater while simultaneously working up its atlantic carriers to be redeployed to the pacific at the same time.
I would envision the US would have its atlantic CSGs ready for operations in the pacific after the FPO.

That means the PLA probably has the luxury of not having to face all of the US' operational globally available CSGs during the FPO... but during the FPO the PLA will still have to face US westpac CSGs, and after the FPO the PLA will have to face what remains of US westpac CSGs + US redeployed atlantic CSGs.



@tphuang
With 8 CSGs in total, of which 5-6 CSGs operational, the only way I would support sending 2 CSGs to Kiribati for the mission you describe, is if the 2 CSGs can successfully complete their mission while not being destroyed at the end of the FPO --- and ultimately if the PLA's total remaining surviving and operational CSGs at the end of the FPO is at equal (ideally greater) than the US's total remaining surviving and operational CSGs at the end of the FPO.
I see the remaining/surviving/operational CSG count to be the most decisive factor in the conflict after the FPO, where whether the side with more CSGs will have a greater likelihood of successfully achieving their operation (whether it's offensive or defensive operations as it may be).
Surviving land based air and missile power and positioning at the end of the FPO of course is also important -- and in theory if one has less CSGs but is able to more comprehensively defeat the enemy's land based air and missile forces, that could potentially be a favourable exchange. However I also think surviving CSGs at the end of the FPO is probably a good indirect measure of how successful the overall conflict in the FPO had been waged for them.

... That is to say, I think with 8 CSGs, it would be far more sensible to concentrate all of the operational 5-6 CSGs in the westpac theater of operations to be able to more robustly finish the FPO in the westpac and enjoy the cover and support of land based air power and missile forces, to allow more of the 5-6 CSGs to survive to the end of the FPO.

I did a little more thinking of the logistics and procurement and things like that. The scenario is working out a lot different than I originally came up with. First, a big question would be the procurement of B-21s and H-20s and UCAVs. Based on what we know so far, H-20 will probably have higher payload (let's say 23t vs 14t) and possibly longer combat radius (let's say 4500 km vs 4000 km unrefueled). They are both probably having first flight at around the same time (2023). Achieving IOC at around the same time (let's say 2030 based on B-2 timeline). With that type of timeline, there would only be 8 years of production if we are working with a 2037 scenario. Imo, the number of available H-20 and B-21 will not be that high. In the beginning, maybe they'd be produced at 3 or 4 a year, which may increase to 1 a month after things are ramped up. Given the high cost and complexities of the platform, it's unlikely procurement/production rate will be higher than that. As such, I'd expect both countries to only have around 60 of each bombers during that time frame. Maybe even just 50 for H-20s. With that many bombers, they'd also likely need a few around for training and evaluation. It would be pretty extraordinary for China to even station 12 H-20s in Kiribati. And for USAF, I would expect a number of them in the mainland for training and evaluation and the rest spread out in CONUS, Hawaii, Japan and Australia. It would be a big deal if they had 30 B-21s stationed outside of CONUS. I think the mission availability rate for bombers is pretty low if you want H-20 to do 5 hour missions (as would be expected of an attack from Kiribati to Hawaii) and even lower if you want B-21s to do 9 hour missions from Australia (fly 4500 km, launch 1000 km LACMs, get refueled maybe 1500 km off the air base). If China stationed 10 H-20s in Kiribati, they might be able to muster an attack force of 5 H-20s + 15 UCAVs (if we assume the latter has higher availability).

Now, I'm just going to make a total guess at a battle scenario (probably entirely unrealistic). Let'say they have 10 H-20s, 30 UCAVs, a few surveillance aircraft, 2 carrier groups with full deck of J-35s/J-15s/UCAVs/helicopters, 6 055s (128 VLS each), 8 frigates (48 VLS each), 10 SSNs and some auxiliary ships. I'd imagine in a run up to a war, there will be large scale exercises by both navies. They would have spy aircraft and ships near to those exercises. I'd expect at least one USN CSG at Pearl Harbor with 4 or 5 burkes and some other surface combatants and 4 to 6 SSNs in nearby vicinity (maybe they'd be closer to Chinese carrier). So for any Chinese attack to succeed, they would need nuclear subs that are capable enough to hunt down USN SSNs with the help of their air wing before they get torpedoed. Now, let's say for the point of argument that they are that capable by 2037. A carrier group would be hard stretched to be moving at 30 knots. If they have hypersonic anti-ship missiles that can hit targets 2500 km away by then, they'd probably need to still move 300 km to get into position to be able to launch those missiles against Pearl Harbour targets and USN carrier group. And they'd be harassed by USN SSN along the way. Their movement would also be tracked along the way. It would not be surprising if in tense situations, war breaks out from close encounters. Anyhow, let's say that war is declared at a certain point, the main advantage PLAN at this point would have is the ability to launch a whole lot of hypersonic anti-ship missiles at USN surface combatants. I think due to the larger size of U-VLS than MK-41, they'd always have a range advantage in a surface ship to surface ship encounter. At this point, each air wing would still be too far from each other (2500 km away) to carry out ASuW against each other. So, the main USN counter will likely be nuclear submarines. And the largest threat from SSNs would be modern torpedoes from 50 km out rather. I think if SSNs start launching missiles from close to carriers, they will give away their position and putting themselves under intense pressure from helicopters or ASW UAVs. Once they launch most of their long range hypersonic AShM, I think the next step would be to launch all the subsonic and hypersonic LACMs that they have from the ships. The goal here would be to use the range advantage afforded by U-VLS and the large 055 size to hit USN fleet first. An attacking fleet with 5 055s and 5 frigates would have 880 VLS cells. The 055s could allow them to launch 100 hypersonic anti-ship missiles from 2500 km out and that would be very hard even for US carrier group to deal with. On top of that, they could launch maybe 300 hypersonic/subsonic land attack missiles to temporarily take the runways out of commission, destroy command centers and weaken air defense. After that, they can send in an attacking fleet of 5 H-20s and 15 UCAVs. Let's say they improve their PGM technology and can hold 80 250 KG PGM per H-20 and 16 100KG PGMs per UCAVs. This wave flying in close to 3000 km would be able to drop 400 250 KG PGMs and 240 100 KG PGMs. This would be able to severely damage the runways and most of the air defense, fuel depot and military installations. And after that, it will take another day for PLAN carrier group to move 1500 km closer to Hawaii to get within 1000 km of Pearl Harbour and do sorties with J-15s and J-35s to further degrade military facilities there. And they will need to take out all possible runways among Hawaiian islands. I've been to Hawaii many times. Believe me, they have a lot of runways across the many islands.

It would seem to me that the key here are:
1) they need to continually develop long range hyperonic missiles that can hit enemies from 2000+ km out. Maybe they need 11m cell for U-VLS on 055.
2) they need to be better at keeping surface combatants safe from modern nuclear submarines.
3) they need to have the right munitions to go with H-20 and loyal wingman to significantly degrade weakened air defense.
4) continued improvement in ISR from satellites and long endurance drones.

It is important who launches the first attack here. I do think ISR will improve to the point where it would be hard to hide aircraft and ship movement, so the buildup and movements won't surprise anyone. However, not everything will always be positioned in the best location. Ships have regular scheduled maintenance and need to move around. Aircraft units can't always be deployed overseas for long period of time during peace times. Service members will eventually come back to see their families. There are major training events that are not going to be located in West Pacific. Aircraft sometimes have to through long maintenance. Even a regularly service/functioning aircraft, they have to be maintained for long period of time in between flights. Recall that when Hurricane Michael came, they couldn't fly out any of the F-22s. There are significant advantage for the side that launches the attack when most of its assets are in the right places and available to be used.

Ships move very slow compared to aircraft. So while, you can tell a B-21 from Australia to attack Kiribati and get there in a few hours of preparation + flight time. If your submarine is sitting in Pearl Harbour, it will take a day and half for it to get close enough to attack Kiribati. If it's in San Diego, it would take 5 days. Anyhow, this is definitely too complicated to figure out. But I think there is definitely a lot of strategic value to have a base in Kiribati if they plan everything really well.

I doubt the H-20 will be built in such high numbers. Cost effectiveness, with a quad engine bomber, won't be there.

tphuang said:

I did a little more thinking of the logistics and procurement and things like that. -snip- Now, I'm just going to make a total guess at a battle scenario (probably entirely unrealistic).

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You seem to be giving the PLA every advantage in your scenario.

How is the PLA able to forward deploy 2 CSGs and that kind of reinforced air complement to Kiribati without the US having weeks of forewarning before the 2 CSGs were on station and raising their own alert level and forward positioning their own kill platforms close to Kiribati and the PLAN CSGs?
How would the PLA be able to attain a first mover/first strike advantage in the US's own backyard in the central pacific, on the doorstep of one of the most capable and well supported air-naval stations in the world, which would be a major hub of aerial strike and maritime bomber, and long range ISR capability?
Why would the PLA have anything like first mover/first shot advantage in this context, when they would be at a major ISR disadvantage given the role of Hawaii as the aforementioned air-naval hub, and at a disadvantage in terms of density of offensive fires and defensive capabilities? That is to say, why do we think the PLA CSGs and surface combatants would even know where the US naval forces in the region are at the outset of conflict? Chances are the US forces will be at a major ISR advantage. The PLA CSG's movements would be followed and tracked by US land based airpower and naval detachments, all the way from leaving the first island chain to reaching their mission area in the central pacific, up until the moment that the opening shots are fired.
How would the Kiribati base be able to even carry out air operations during the initial opening hours of the conflict, when US SSNs in the region would have been surge deployed with LRHWs specifically to target facilities on Kiribati base to logjam air operations and enable subsequent reattacks by things like LACMs or ALCMs, all in a multi-axis manner?


Sure, overall, the theoretically optimal way in which the PLA forces would slug it out and the weapons they would use is fair.

But you are describing 2 PLA CSGs + Kiribati base versus 1 USN CSG + US air/naval forces in Hawaii (but you also have to acknowledge the role of Australia and CONTUS in being able to contribute to multi-axis strikes against Kiribati).
That kind of force balance is one where I expect the 2 PLA CSGs and the Kiribati base to be destroyed, likely at best only being able to cause minimal damage to Hawaii and likely only scratching the USN CSG.


Given the disparity of geography, lack of friendly PLA support, the advantage of superior US land based air and missile forces from Hawaii (as well as bombers from Australia, CONTUS), I think the PLA would need at minimum 6 CSGs + Kiribati base to be able to successfully carry out your mission (crippling of Hawaii as a air-naval station and defeat of supporting USN forces), and to be able to return back to the western pacific with most of their mobile fighting forces (CSGs) intact.


With 2 CSGs and Kiribati base, the very best that they could achieve is a very minor pyrrhic victory where they suffer complete losses and only being able to cause minor damage to US military facilities on Hawaii.
But most likely is that the 2 CSGs and the base would be mission killed in the opening hours of conflict and then subsequently re-attacked and destroyed in the subsequent 6-12 hours.


Remember, the requirement is to achieve a decisive victory with minimal losses, and to be able to return home safely to westpac to be able to get ready for the next phase of conflict after the FPO.
If they can't do that -- either unable to achieve decisive results, or if they suffer significant losses, or both -- and if they can't achieve those goals with a high degree of redundancy and high likelihood of success, then why bother dividing out and risking 1/3 of the PLA's operational CSG force for such a long distance and complex foray at all??

tphuang said:

It would seem to me that the key here are:
1) they need to continually develop long range hyperonic missiles that can hit enemies from 2000+ km out. Maybe they need 11m cell for U-VLS on 055.
2) they need to be better at keeping surface combatants safe from modern nuclear submarines.
3) they need to have the right munitions to go with H-20 and loyal wingman to significantly degrade weakened air defense.
4) continued improvement in ISR from satellites and long endurance drones.

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I agree that those are all important, though not exclusive to a centpac/Kiribati strategy.

tphuang said:

Ships move very slow compared to aircraft. So while, you can tell a B-21 from Australia to attack Kiribati and get there in a few hours of preparation + flight time. If your submarine is sitting in Pearl Harbour, it will take a day and half for it to get close enough to attack Kiribati. If it's in San Diego, it would take 5 days. Anyhow, this is definitely too complicated to figure out. But I think there is definitely a lot of strategic value to have a base in Kiribati if they plan everything really well.

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If everything goes perfectly in your proposal, sure they could be able to achieve some measure of success. But with the forces that we are talking about -- 8 CSGs in service of which 5-6 CSGs are operational, of which 2 CSGs are sent to Kiribati -- the amount of slack and redundancy they have is next to nothing.

With such few forces, such a strategically risky move with a low chance of success is better avoided, and instead concentrating them in the westpac where at least they can enjoy mutual support with each other, as well as enjoy land based air support (CAP, strike, ISR, AEW&C) and missile support (hypersonics, AShBMs, etc).

Blitzo said:

How is the PLA able to forward deploy 2 CSGs and that kind of reinforced air complement to Kiribati without the US having weeks of forewarning before the 2 CSGs were on station and raising their own alert level and forward positioning their own kill platforms close to Kiribati and the PLAN CSGs?

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I think starting from about 2030, PLAN will first 004 and 095s start to move further out. Among the speculated base, Kiribati and Ream Cambodia seem like the most logical one. They'd probably station at least 1 Type 076 with surface combatants + a lot of drones/Y-9s/bombers and fighter jets there as a way of spying on USN, IN and RAN activity in that area and Indian Ocean. And during a conflict, it would be a huge road block for USN CSG coming over from Indian Ocean or Persian Gulf or Atlantic Ocean. Which might force USN to take the longer way around to the East side of Borneo or even the channel to the west of New Guinea island to avoid a less advantageous position battle situation.

If they do get a Kiribati base, I'd think the first step is to build command centers, radar stations, expanded runways, large port, fortified hangars, living quarters, underground facilities, air defense batteries. It'd make sense to start off by bringing over some surveillance aircraft and ships there and then add in some destroyers on regular patrol and then finally an entire carrier group that stations there all year round. This is going to take a few years to build up. I have no idea what the geopolitical situations will look like as they are building this up. Maybe US government will be threatening China so hard, that they will have to back off. I don't know, but this is not happening over a month while the 2 countries are already looking like they are about to face off. Growing the base will happen gradually during peace time.

Blitzo said:

How would the PLA be able to attain a first mover/first strike advantage in the US's own backyard in the central pacific, on the doorstep of one of the most capable and well supported air-naval stations in the world, which would be a major hub of aerial strike and maritime bomber, and long range ISR capability?

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Well, if they are stationing 2 carrier groups there with a full military base and bombers and long range ISR, why can't they? With a base in Kiribati, they could have long endurance drones about 500 km out from Pearl Harbour 24/7. On top of that, if they already have satellites that can identify USN carriers leaving port and moving around, just imagine what they will be capable of 15 years from now.

It's a political decision who fires first.

Blitzo said:

How would the Kiribati base be able to even carry out air operations during the initial opening hours of the conflict, when US SSNs in the region would have been surge deployed with LRHWs specifically to target facilities on Kiribati base to logjam air operations and enable subsequent reattacks by things like LACMs or ALCMs, all in a multi-axis manner?

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Well, if their initial barrage of 100 hypersonic and 300 to 400 subsonic missiles from 2500 to 2800 km out can cripple the surface combatants at Pearl Harbour and significantly degrade the infrastructure around there, then where would these attacks be coming from? Having a few H-20s doing take off/patrols should be quite a common sighting if they are stationed there year round. What's going to tip things off that this is a real attack vs a routine aerial/naval exercise? As I said, if they cannot cripple Hawaiian base, then they should not try this. The key here is to be able to degrade Pearl Harbor significantly in the opening hour followed by H20 strikes 2 to 3 hours later. Aircraft carrier won't be able to get close enough to attack with its air wing until a day after that.

There will be a few nuclear submarines busy trying to sink carrier fleet and avoid being detected between Kiribati and Hawaii. They are not exactly going to be firing CMs and give away their positions when carrier groups are looking to hunt them down. How many other submarines are going to be close enough to fire LRHWs? There aren't that many B-21s stationed at Australia that would be available in a few hours notice to come and do strikes. It would be even harder for B-21s stationed in CONUS. You are asking a bomber with 4000 km combat radius to go 6000 km, launch missiles and then fly back another 6000 km.

tphuang said:

I think starting from about 2030, PLAN will first 004 and 095s start to move further out. Among the speculated base, Kiribati and Ream Cambodia seem like the most logical one. They'd probably station at least 1 Type 076 with surface combatants + a lot of drones/Y-9s/bombers and fighter jets there as a way of spying on USN, IN and RAN activity in that area and Indian Ocean. And during a conflict, it would be a huge road block for USN CSG coming over from Indian Ocean or Persian Gulf or Atlantic Ocean. Which might force USN to take the longer way around to the East side of Borneo or even the channel to the west of New Guinea island to avoid a less advantageous position battle situation.

If they do get a Kiribati base, I'd think the first step is to build command centers, radar stations, expanded runways, large port, fortified hangars, living quarters, underground facilities, air defense batteries. It'd make sense to start off by bringing over some surveillance aircraft and ships there and then add in some destroyers on regular patrol and then finally an entire carrier group that stations there all year round. This is going to take a few years to build up. I have no idea what the geopolitical situations will look like as they are building this up. Maybe US government will be threatening China so hard, that they will have to back off. I don't know, but this is not happening over a month while the 2 countries are already looking like they are about to face off. Growing the base will happen gradually during peace time.

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I know that the base itself will already be constructed and already have regular PLA deployments to it by the time of our 2037 scenario.

I am saying that the US won't be caught with its pants down during a conflict, because for your strategy the PLA will have to deploy 2 CSGs and a reinforced aerial contingent to Kiribati, all of which would be very abnormal from usual peacetime deployments to Kiribati. The US will naturally respond by placing its own forces on high alert and forward deploying more aerial assets to Hawaii and westpac in anticipation, as well as surging SSNs into central pacific.


A normal peacetime operational Kiribati base with a 076 battlegroup and one or two airbases worth of UAVs, bombers, MPAs, and fighters, is not going to force the USN to alter its transit routes between Hawaii and westpac. All it might do is give USN CSGs a nice target to do simulated strike exercises on, as they transit to the western pacific.

tphuang said:

Well, if they are stationing 2 carrier groups there with a full military base and bombers and long range ISR, why can't they? With a base in Kiribati, they could have long endurance drones about 500 km out from Pearl Harbour 24/7. On top of that, if they already have satellites that can identify USN carriers leaving port and moving around, just imagine what they will be capable of 15 years from now.

It's a political decision who fires first.

Well, if their initial barrage of 100 hypersonic and 300 to 400 subsonic missiles from 2500 to 2800 km out can cripple the surface combatants at Pearl Harbour and significantly degrade the infrastructure around there, then where would these attacks be coming from? Having a few H-20s doing take off/patrols should be quite a common sighting if they are stationed there year round. What's going to tip things off that this is a real attack vs a routine aerial/naval exercise? As I said, if they cannot cripple Hawaiian base, then they should not try this. The key here is to be able to degrade Pearl Harbor significantly in the opening hour followed by H20 strikes 2 to 3 hours later. Aircraft carrier won't be able to get close enough to attack with its air wing until a day after that.

There will be a few nuclear submarines busy trying to sink carrier fleet and avoid being detected between Kiribati and Hawaii. They are not exactly going to be firing CMs and give away their positions when carrier groups are looking to hunt them down. How many other submarines are going to be close enough to fire LRHWs? There aren't that many B-21s stationed at Australia that would be available in a few hours notice to come and do strikes. It would be even harder for B-21s stationed in CONUS. You are asking a bomber with 4000 km combat radius to go 6000 km, launch missiles and then fly back another 6000 km.

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Your strategy relies on the US ignoring that the PLAN deploying 1/3 of its operational CSG fleet and a reinforced air contingent to Kiribati during a likely period of high tension -- and not carrying out its own counter-deployments and readiness in response.
This is all not considering that in the 15 years in which the PLA may seek to fortify Kiribati, you can bet that the US will have a much easier time to fortify Hawaii and permanently station more forces there as well (which they would be planning on doing as part of measures to wage a high intensity westpac war with the PLA to begin with!).

Assuming that the US is competent and responds naturally, the PLA will not be able to practically strike first because the US military in centpac will be at high alert with forward positioned and deployed land based airpower, naval power (surface and subsurface), and overall possess superior in-theater ISR, superior in-theater concentration of firepower, superior in-theater geographical positioning of fires and staging areas.



Australian and CONTUS B-21s be conducting longer range strike sorties to present a credible aerial multi-axis threat to Kiribati.
The bulk of US aerial strike capability in this scenario will be B-21s from Hawaii.

tphuang said:

If they do get a Kiribati base, I'd think the first step is to build command centers, radar stations, expanded runways, large port, fortified hangars, living quarters, underground facilities, air defense batteries.

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Don't place any high value assets here, they won't be survivable.

What you could do instead, is pack Kiribati with an arsenal of missiles (hypersonic + BMs + subsonic + decoys) with 3000km range. Use this base primarily as a forward missile station and not much else. It's only purpose would be to launch a saturation attack at the USN's rear flank (mainly at Pearl) in a general 1st strike scenario.

The US is likely doing the same thing right now, with some of its real estate in-range of China's mainland. Just make sure that Kiribati is expendable and used purely for offense. Don't try and defend it, because you can't.

Mohsin77 said:

Don't place any high value assets here, they won't be survivable.

What you could do instead, is pack Kiribati with an arsenal of missiles (hypersonic + BMs + subsonic + decoys) with 3000km range. Use this base primarily as a forward missile station and not much else. It's only purpose would be to launch a saturation attack at the USN's rear flank (mainly at Pearl) in a general 1st strike scenario.

The US is likely doing the same thing right now, with some of its real estate in-range of China's mainland. Just make sure that Kiribati is expendable and used purely for offense. Don't try and defend it, because you can't.

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This is a much more sensible strategy for that piece of real estate, if the host nation is accepting of it, of course.

Mohsin77 said:

Don't place any high value assets here, they won't be survivable.

What you could do instead, is pack Kiribati with an arsenal of missiles (hypersonic + BMs + subsonic + decoys) with 3000km range. Use this base primarily as a forward missile station and not much else. It's only purpose would be to launch a saturation attack at the USN's rear flank (mainly at Pearl) in a general 1st strike scenario.

The US is likely doing the same thing right now, with some of its real estate in-range of China's mainland. Just make sure that Kiribati is expendable and used purely for offense. Don't try and defend it, because you can't.

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As I said, don't place carrier groups there unless you can cripple Hawaii. H-20 can always fly back to China after the initial mission. If you do get Hawaii crippled and don't think you can defend Kiribati, you can always move the carrier groups back toward 2nd chain and use that to attack targets in between. They are at far less risk going through Pacific Ocean if Hawaii is not usable as a base. Then, you are basically dealing with CSGs vs CSGs in the open water.

It's a huge problem politically to installing ground based launchers Kiribati during peace time.

Blitzo said:

I know that the base itself will already be constructed and already have regular PLA deployments to it by the time of our 2037 scenario.

I am saying that the US won't be caught with its pants down during a conflict, because for your strategy the PLA will have to deploy 2 CSGs and a reinforced aerial contingent to Kiribati, all of which would be very abnormal from usual peacetime deployments to Kiribati. The US will naturally respond by placing its own forces on high alert and forward deploying more aerial assets to Hawaii and westpac in anticipation, as well as surging SSNs into central pacific.

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I think it would be normal to have 1 CSG + sufficient number of bombers stationed there during peace time. If they can get away with installing BM launchers and hypersonic anti-ship missiles launchers, they will likely do it too. Again, I have no idea what US military would consider a red line during peace time. From time to time, have a Type 076 with a few escort come by for visits. If it's not crazy to have 2 or 3 US carrier groups hold war games in SCS from time to time, then having 1 CSG + 1 Type 076 led SAG around Kiribati holding war games shouldn't be abnormal either.

During high tension, you can just deploy 1 Type 076 or carrier with more escorts than usual over there. The scenario I mapped off is more dependent on # of missiles that large surface combatants can launch in the initial burst + H20/UCAV bombing raid. I think 100 hypersonic missiles + 300 subsonic missiles against the main pearl harbour facility would be able to sting air defense there regardless of how much. If you follow that up with 5 H-20s + 20 UCAVs, that could be 400 250KG PGMs + 160 100 KG PGMs. With about 1000 missiles + PGMs, you can make the main Pearl Harbour area inoperable for a few days at least. The follow on strikes from carrier group will be easier even if bases , radar sites and air defense are on other 3 islands are still operable.

Blitzo said:

Your strategy relies on the US ignoring that the PLAN deploying 1/3 of its operational CSG fleet and a reinforced air contingent to Kiribati during a likely period of high tension -- and not carrying out its own counter-deployments and readiness in response.

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6 operational CSG + 4 operation Type 076 led SAG. If we pull 2 of that and plant it at Kiribati, that would be 20%. I also mentioned putting 20% of H-20s there.

Blitzo said:

This is all not considering that in the 15 years in which the PLA may seek to fortify Kiribati, you can bet that the US will have a much easier time to fortify Hawaii and permanently station more forces there as well (which they would be planning on doing as part of measures to wage a high intensity westpac war with the PLA to begin with!).

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They already have a very large presence there. Hawaii is not like Phoenix island strip. Oahu itself is a huge tourist destination. It's also a very mountainous terrain. There just isn't land to really expand it that much.

I've drove around Oahu, Maui and Kauai. It's the same in all these big islands. There is a few main roads that goes between major popular centers. There are already military facilities everywhere you can have them. The remaining places are either tall mountains or filled with locals and tourists. In America, the military can't just claim private land and built over them.

Blitzo said:

Assuming that the US is competent and responds naturally, the PLA will not be able to practically strike first because the US military in centpac will be at high alert with forward positioned and deployed land based airpower, naval power (surface and subsurface), and overall possess superior in-theater ISR, superior in-theater concentration of firepower, superior in-theater geographical positioning of fires and staging areas.

Australian and CONTUS B-21s be conducting longer range strike sorties to present a credible aerial multi-axis threat to Kiribati.
The bulk of US aerial strike capability in this scenario will be B-21s from Hawaii.

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If PLAN cannot take out Pearl Harbour with an initial strike, then they should not employ this strategy. I just don't see how you can have your entire fleet and air force positioned at correct places for months long stretches. IMO, if they were to move all CSG from Pacific fleet from centpac to west Pac, that alone would degrade the ISR/fire power they have in centpac.

If PLAN has a base in Kiribati, a base in Ream and a small base at Solomon or PNG, I would expect them to have spy ships and spy aircraft around Hawaii, northern Australia, American Samoa and East Australia at all times. Not unlike what USN has right now around SCS and Westpac.