PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC

tphuang said:

I think if you have 8 CSGs, you need to always have 1 CSG on a long deployment overseas. And in this case, the deployment would not be as draining as a typical USN deployment since it will be spending most of the time in its port in centpac. I don't see how else you can train CSGs to be ready for blue water operation. There is no reason in a heightened security environment, you cannot dramatically shorten your surge time.

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Why do they always need 1 CSG on a long deployment overseas if they have 8 CSGs?

You don't need to permanently station a CSG at blue water distances just to be capable of conducting blue water operations -- that can be done by doing shorter duration deployments at long distance.

USN CSGs typically deploy for 6-9 months once every 18-24 months. For the sort of high intensity conflict air-naval-conflict in blue water distances that the PLAN will do with their CSGs, they don't need to be able to demonstrate the ability to spend 6-9 months at sea.

tphuang said:

if USN moves all its non-atlantic side CSGs (let's say 7 are on deployment or can be made available within 30 days worldwide and they have 5 in Pacific/Indian Ocean) to westpac and keep just a few surface combatants/SSNs at HI, the equation changes, since HI would become easier to cripple whereas USN in westpac is harder to beat. If USN has 2 CSGs + 2 LHDs in westpac and keep 2 carriers in HI on high alert, then the equation is entirely different.

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The US will counter by procuring systems and organizing their deployments in a manner where they are able to frontload the westpac with CSGs to destroy a weakened PLA westpac force, while optimizing regional strike and ISR capabilities against PLA forces in centpac where the US has the advantage of land based air power, ISR and the advantage in regional positioning and dispersal of forces.

tphuang said:

My proposal is that once you knock out HI, the front line combat unit has no supply line and cannot keep operational. It would be equivalent to knocking out 2 or 3 carriers since front line CSGs knows they would run out of fuel and missiles very quickly and have no where to replenish. As such, the natural move would be to retreat.

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I understand that you are aiming to cut off the major hub of support and logistics for the US forces in westpac. You are seeking to robustly defeat the "depths" of the enemy.

It makes sense to aim to do so, but only if you can guarantee that your high value maneuver forces are able to survive operations in the enemy's depths to successfully carry out their mission, keeping in mind that your maneuver forces will be dynamically monitored and experience counter-maneuvers by in theater enemy forces. They aren't stupid, they're going to position and ready their forces in a manner that is able to prevent you from getting the first shot off at all.

If you want to successfully defeat the enemy's depths, it generally requires degrading and ideally shattering the enemy's frontline forces first, so that your maneuver forces are able to travel relatively unimpeded and with difficulty being tracked and monitored by the enemy and to successfully carry out their mission to exploit the depths.

Alternatively, the other way of successfully defeating the enemy's depths without first degrading and shattering the enemy's frontline forces, is that your maneuver force is able to massively outgun the enemy's forces and able to make up for inferiority of positioning and dispersal through sheer concentration of combat capability.
In your strategy, I believe that the PLA will need a minimum of 6 CSGs +Kiribati in centpac to do what you suggested -- that's because even with 6 CSGs in centpac theater, I believe there's a good chance the PLA will lose 1-2 CSGs to US SSNs and/or land based airpower, and I think to be able to properly take out Hawaii while enabling the ability to destroy US surface naval forces guarding it and to have enough CSGs to survive to return home, will require at least 4 CSGs that can complete the mission successfully without being sunk.

2 CSGs +Kiribati is just target practice.


By the way, if the US chooses to reinforce Hawaii with CSGs, then the PLA will need correspondingly more CSGs in Kiribati.
6 CSGs in centpac is the force I believe the PLA will need against Hawaii where the US has no CSGs in centpac, where US naval forces in the theater is 2 SAGs and 8 SSNs.
For every one CSG that the US uses to defend Hawaii in theater, I believe the PLA will need to add two CSGs to maintain a favourable balance of in theater capabilities.

That is to say, if the US has 2 CSGs around Hawaii (with the baseline 2 SAGs and 8 SSNs), I think the PLA's centpac fleet will need to be at least 10 CSGs to be capable of successfully completing the mission and returning home with the majority of their CSGs intact.

@tphuang
So all your arguments have already been answered (repeatedly) by Blitzo, so I'll just respond to this:

tphuang said:

Even if they have like 10 long range missile launchers there (which would be crazy high), you just can't get enough missiles out before the retaliation comes. The attractiveness of having 6 055s is that they would have 6 x 128 = 868 VLS cells.

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Who stipulated that 10 CM launchers at a proposed missile base, is a "crazy high" number? If you can pack 868 VLS cells on 6 ships, you can most definitely pack an even larger arsenal of launchers on land. Your objection was the political concerns of doing this, not any technical limitation (which doesn't exist.) By the way, if you think the US isn't going to be packing CM launchers en-masse in your backyard, you're setting yourself up for a very rude awakening, unless you prioritize those sites as part of an effective 1st strike of your own, if that time ever comes, God forbid.

Blitzo said:

Why do they always need 1 CSG on a long deployment overseas if they have 8 CSGs?

You don't need to permanently station a CSG at blue water distances just to be capable of conducting blue water operations -- that can be done by doing shorter duration deployments at long distance.

USN CSGs typically deploy for 6-9 months once every 18-24 months. For the sort of high intensity conflict air-naval-conflict in blue water distances that the PLAN will do with their CSGs, they don't need to be able to demonstrate the ability to spend 6-9 months at sea.

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It doesn't have to be 9 months deployment. They do 3 months deployments to Gulf of Aden all the time and have no problem doing that to get all the fleet experience. I don't see why you have 8 CSGs and just have them all squat around westpac waiting for the next conflict. Going on long deployment is great experience for crew members. Even if they don't have a centpac base, they should do it. Even the British and French with their 1 or 2 carrier group navies do long deployment.

Blitzo said:

The US will counter by procuring systems and organizing their deployments in a manner where they are able to frontload the westpac with CSGs to destroy a weakened PLA westpac force, while optimizing regional strike and ISR capabilities against PLA forces in centpac where the US has the advantage of land based air power, ISR and the advantage in regional positioning and dispersal of forces.

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I disagree that 5 USN carrier groups can destroy 4 or 5 PLAN carrier groups + the entire land based air power and missile batteries. They may need to retreat closer to first chain to get full support of land based air power, but that's entirely something they can do. I don't see have 1 fewer carrier group will dramatically change the equation.

Blitzo said:

I understand that you are aiming to cut off the major hub of support and logistics for the US forces in westpac. You are seeking to robustly defeat the "depths" of the enemy.

It makes sense to aim to do so, but only if you can guarantee that your high value maneuver forces are able to survive operations in the enemy's depths to successfully carry out their mission, keeping in mind that your maneuver forces will be dynamically monitored and experience counter-maneuvers by in theater enemy forces. They aren't stupid, they're going to position and ready their forces in a manner that is able to prevent you from getting the first shot off at all.

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in your proposal, you are saying US Navy will move all their CSGs away from Pearl Harbour rather than to Pearl Harbour in order to reinforce it. So, they would not be positioning for deterrence.

Blitzo said:

If you want to successfully defeat the enemy's depths, it generally requires degrading and ideally shattering the enemy's frontline forces first, so that your maneuver forces are able to travel relatively unimpeded and with difficulty being tracked and monitored by the enemy and to successfully carry out their mission to exploit the depths.

Alternatively, the other way of successfully defeating the enemy's depths without first degrading and shattering the enemy's frontline forces, is that your maneuver force is able to massively outgun the enemy's forces and able to make up for inferiority of positioning and dispersal through sheer concentration of combat capability.
In your strategy, I believe that the PLA will need a minimum of 6 CSGs +Kiribati in centpac to do what you suggested -- that's because even with 6 CSGs in centpac theater, I believe there's a good chance the PLA will lose 1-2 CSGs to US SSNs and/or land based airpower, and I think to be able to properly take out Hawaii while enabling the ability to destroy US surface naval forces guarding it and to have enough CSGs to survive to return home, will require at least 4 CSGs that can complete the mission successfully without being sunk.

2 CSGs +Kiribati is just target practice.

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1 CSG + 1 Type 076 with 6 055s and 8 frigates will not be target practice if Pearl Harbour has just a couple of burkes/constellation class defending it.

2 of the possible scenarios here during heightened tension.
1) US military attacks first by moving its nuclear subs into position, declares war on China and start firing missiles. Takes off with B-21s, which willl take 2 hours to get close enough to fire JASSM-ER. Assuming that Chinese warship is on high alert, they can add this point start to launch retaliatory LACMs + hypersonic missiles against whatever is in Pearl Harbor. They will also be busy hunting down nuclear submarines that are launching missiles and giving away approximate position. Send J-35/J-15s/AEWs into air to intercept incoming aircraft. Try to see if they can get any H20 and UCAVs into the air on short notice. Maybe they can, maybe they can't. Depending on how good their counter stealth technology is by then, they may or may not be able to detect incoming B-21s in time. In this scenario, I think at minimum, they can launch off all the LACMs + AshM in their surface combatants. The success of reducing initial damage would be based upon how well they can prevent B-21s from getting close enough to do their launches. In this case, they would unlikely be able to take out Hawaii.
2) China get in position of a typical war game with the typical us military assets near by to monitor it. Declares war for real. Shoots down the surveillance aircraft, launches all the long range LACMs and AShM and H-20/UCAVs are already in the air. Now, move carrier closer to Hawaii. They are in great position here.

Blitzo said:

By the way, if the US chooses to reinforce Hawaii with CSGs, then the PLA will need correspondingly more CSGs in Kiribati.
6 CSGs in centpac is the force I believe the PLA will need against Hawaii where the US has no CSGs in centpac, where US naval forces in the theater is 2 SAGs and 8 SSNs.
For every one CSG that the US uses to defend Hawaii in theater, I believe the PLA will need to add two CSGs to maintain a favourable balance of in theater capabilities.

That is to say, if the US has 2 CSGs around Hawaii (with the baseline 2 SAGs and 8 SSNs), I think the PLA's centpac fleet will need to be at least 10 CSGs to be capable of successfully completing the mission and returning home with the majority of their CSGs intact.

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they can always abandon centpac base during peacetime and head back to westpac if they think war is imminent and they cannot cripple Pearl Harbour. Then, it would just continue to operate as a spying outpost.

Mohsin77 said:

Who stipulated that 10 CM launchers at a proposed missile base, is a "crazy high" number? If you can pack 868 VLS cells on 6 ships, you can most definitely pack an even larger arsenal of launchers on land. Your objection was the political concerns of doing this, not any technical limitation (which doesn't exist.) By the way, if you think the US isn't going to be packing CM launchers en-masse in your backyard, you're setting yourself up for a very rude awakening, unless you prioritize those sites as part of an effective 1st strike of your own, if that time ever comes, God forbid.

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No need to be condescending. If we disagree, then we disagree. No need to repeat the line of "we already repeated multiple times", why don't you understand anything.

You simply cannot install 866 launchers on Phoenix island chain. There isn't enough land for that. You would also need a huge team of specially trained PLARF soldiers to be able to operate that.

China had an estimated 42 MRBM launchers in 2013. By 2020, this figure had more than doubled to 94 launchers....

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The Rocket Force is likewise fielding more ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). Between 2013, and 2020, China’s inventory of GLCM launchers grew from 54 to 70.

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In fact, DOD estimated China had 700 IRBM/MRBM/SRBM/GLCM launchers in all of China.

tphuang said:

No need to be condescending. If we disagree, then we disagree. No need to repeat the line of "we already repeated multiple times", why don't you understand anything.

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All I said was that the arguments have been answered repeatedly. But you're right, we're getting to that point where we have to end on a disagreement. Because we're going in circles now, for the most part.

tphuang said:

You simply cannot install 866 launchers on Phoenix island chain. There isn't enough land for that. You would also need a huge team of specially trained PLARF soldiers to be able to operate that.

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I disagree completely.

You're proposing installing heavy infrastructure to support high value assets on the same islands, and yet you're imposing this strict limitation on packing VLS launchers. If you can pack VLS launchers on a small constricted surface area of a destroyer (and even destroyers are "small" relative to the land that they dock at), it is much easier to take the same surface area for VLS and place it on land if you need to. It would take much less work, cost and maintenance than the VLS present on ships.

tphuang said:

In fact, DOD estimated China had 700 IRBM/MRBM/SRBM/GLCM launchers in all of China.

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So get more by 2030s. And you already manufacture VLS launchers for your ships. You have all the pieces to solve this puzzle.

Don't limit yourself to dogmatic solutions. You're gonna need to think outside the box if you wanna take on the US.

Even the US is now thinking of innovative solutions to deal with its problems in Westpac.

Mohsin77 said:

All I said was that the arguments have been answered repeatedly. But you're right, we're getting to that point where we have to end on a disagreement. Because we're going in circles now, for the most part.



I disagree completely.

You're proposing installing heavy infrastructure to support high value assets on the same islands, and yet you're imposing this strict limitation on packing VLS launchers. If you can pack VLS launchers on a small constricted surface area of a destroyer (and even destroyers are "small" relative to the land that they dock at), it is much easier to take the same surface area for VLS and place it on land if you need to. It would take much less work, cost and maintenance than the VLS present on ships.




So get more by 2030s. And you already manufacture VLS launchers for your ships. You have all the pieces to solve this puzzle.

Don't limit yourself to dogmatic solutions. You're gonna need to think outside the box if you wanna take on the US.

Even the US is now thinking of innovative solutions to deal with its problems in Westpac.

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Yes, they will need to add more launchers on the mainland, there is no question about that. Even so, the ground version of the launchers just take more space. On top of this, staffing need for 800 launchers would require thousands of people which requires permanent housing there for those people. Now, if you factor in the need for a port, radar station, communication tower, a long air strip and hangars for spy drones and ships, there just isn't space for that many launchers. This is not a situation like naval ship where you can load ships with missiles before you start deployment and crew members are living on the ship itself. On top of this, even 800 missiles really isn't enough. I have been estimating 2000 missiles and pgms are needed.

tphuang said:

Even so, the ground version of the launchers just take more space..... On top of this, staffing need for 800 launchers would require thousands of people which requires permanent housing there for those people.

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If you can make it work on a ship (which is a much more complex and unforgiving environment) you can make it work on land, with the same space and probably less crew.

tphuang said:

On top of this, even 800 missiles really isn't enough. I have been estimating 2000 missiles and pgms are needed.

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In your calculation Pearl is a primary target. You want to completely destroy Pearl and take it out of action for "months" at the minimum. But you have not yet made a good case for making it a primary target that's worth forward deploying carriers.

Also, you can fit more than 800 VLS on those islands if you want. It would be a much better use of that real estate then building all the other heavy infrastructure there that you are proposing to support high value assets (for which you've not made a good case anyway.)

tphuang said:

It doesn't have to be 9 months deployment. They do 3 months deployments to Gulf of Aden all the time and have no problem doing that to get all the fleet experience. I don't see why you have 8 CSGs and just have them all squat around westpac waiting for the next conflict. Going on long deployment is great experience for crew members. Even if they don't have a centpac base, they should do it. Even the British and French with their 1 or 2 carrier group navies do long deployment.

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I have no issue with doing deployments for 1-2 months now and then for carriers to get blue water experience.
I am however very against the idea of permanently having 1 CSG on station at Kiribati all the time. The point is, if you want to have 1 CSG on station at Kiribati all the time, you will have to commit 3 CSGs of your 8 CSGs.

The reason why it makes sense for the US and British and French to send their carriers on long deployments is because they do not face high demands for carriers in their immediate home region.

tphuang said:

I disagree that 5 USN carrier groups can destroy 4 or 5 PLAN carrier groups + the entire land based air power and missile batteries. They may need to retreat closer to first chain to get full support of land based air power, but that's entirely something they can do. I don't see have 1 fewer carrier group will dramatically change the equation.

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If you have 2 CSGs at Kiribati, it'll be 3-4 CSGs for the PLA in westpac.
And yes, I am accounting for the entirety of both US and PLA land based air power and missile power in the region against each other.

5 US CSGs versus 3-4 PLA CSGs in westpac with each side's supporting land based air power and missile power is not a favourable balance of capabilities.

tphuang said:

in your proposal, you are saying US Navy will move all their CSGs away from Pearl Harbour rather than to Pearl Harbour in order to reinforce it. So, they would not be positioning for deterrence. 1 CSG + 1 Type 076 with 6 055s and 8 frigates will not be target practice if Pearl Harbour has just a couple of burkes/constellation class defending it.

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Yes, they will be target practice, because they're not fighting against only Burkes and Constellations.

They're fighting against superior US Hawaii based ISR, Hawaii land based B-21s with AShMs for long range maritime strike, Hawaii land based fighters and strike fighters for CAP and closer in maritime strike, Hawaii land based hypersonics, extensive US SSNs.
And they're fighting against the always present risk of multi-axis attacks from Australia and CONTUS as well that they have to position themselves for, both to guard themselves and to guard Kiribati.

I've said multiple times, I do not expect 2 PLA CSGs and land base Kiribati to be able to survive against a reinforced US Hawaii land based force + 8 SSNs and 2 SAGs. That is my definition of a deterrence force from the US, designed to be able to easily destroy 2 PLA CSGs and Kiribati.

For the US to counter a fortified Hawaii + 8 SSNs and 2 SAGs, I believe the PLAN needs at least 6 CSGs.

tphuang said:

2 of the possible scenarios here during heightened tension.
1) US military attacks first by moving its nuclear subs into position, declares war on China and start firing missiles. Takes off with B-21s, which willl take 2 hours to get close enough to fire JASSM-ER. Assuming that Chinese warship is on high alert, they can add this point start to launch retaliatory LACMs + hypersonic missiles against whatever is in Pearl Harbor. They will also be busy hunting down nuclear submarines that are launching missiles and giving away approximate position. Send J-35/J-15s/AEWs into air to intercept incoming aircraft. Try to see if they can get any H20 and UCAVs into the air on short notice. Maybe they can, maybe they can't. Depending on how good their counter stealth technology is by then, they may or may not be able to detect incoming B-21s in time. In this scenario, I think at minimum, they can launch off all the LACMs + AshM in their surface combatants. The success of reducing initial damage would be based upon how well they can prevent B-21s from getting close enough to do their launches. In this case, they would unlikely be able to take out Hawaii.
2) China get in position of a typical war game with the typical us military assets near by to monitor it. Declares war for real. Shoots down the surveillance aircraft, launches all the long range LACMs and AShM and H-20/UCAVs are already in the air. Now, move carrier closer to Hawaii. They are in great position here.

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Your proposal is basically to try and deploy multiple high value maneuver forces into the enemy's depths without degradation of the enemy's front lines or combat capabilities, and hope that you are able to pull off the first shot faster than the other guy, even though the other guy will have superior ISR, superior concentration of fires, superior dispersal of their platforms and strike forces.

tphuang said:

they can always abandon centpac base during peacetime and head back to westpac if they think war is imminent and they cannot cripple Pearl Harbour. Then, it would just continue to operate as a spying outpost.

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How about they just don't even plan for using Kiribati as a staging area for maneuver units (CSGs, extensive aerial contingents) to begin with?
Not with 8 CSGs.



If I had 8 CSGs for the PLA in 2037, what I would do is for peacetime have them all robustly stationed in westpac, occasionally going out for extended duration blue water distance training for up to 2 months at a time, but in a manner where the ships, crew and airwings are all well maintained and ready to surge at short notice. Ideally with the goal to be able to generate 6 CSGs able to operate in westpac region overall.
During a high intensity conflict, ideally those CSGs with land based PLA air and missile forces will be concentrated and mutually supporting enough to defeat the extensive US westpac land based air and missile forces as well as US CSGs that the US deploys -- ideally with the ability to achieve a favourable exchange ratio with US CSGs.
At minimum, a 1:2 ratio of PLA to US CSGs lost, ideally anything better than that like 1:3. That is to say, for every single CSG that the PLA loses in westpac, the PLA should be able to inflict at least two CSG losses or three CSG losses on the US.
Thus, at the conclusion of the FPO, ideally the PLA will have lost no more than 2 CSGs while the US will have lost at least 4 CSGs.

Such a force balance (6 CSGs in total for the PLA in service versus 7 CSGs in total for the US in service -- i.e.: a near equal post-FPO surviving CSG fleet) is a basis on which the PLA may be able to successfully defeat a US counter attack against. With the conclusion of the FPO, the PLA will be able to send SSNs into centpac relatively unmolested (as US forces in westpac will be largely destroyed), allowing for submarine launched strike missions against Hawaii and the like, as well as small scale H-20s conducting long range ALCM missions against Hawaii. Those submarines and H-20s strike missions after the FPO will be either to delay/complicate a US counterattack, or if the PLA have retained more of their CSGs to survive, then those strikes could even be used to prepare the battlefield to allow the PLA to conduct a larger overall offensive action against Hawaii to take it out long term.


But if the PLA only had 4 CSGs in westpac, against 5 US CSGs, they would need to achieve immensely favourable kill ratios to allow them to achieve near equal post-FPO surviving CSG fleet against the US, because your 2 CSGs in Kiribati aren't going to survive their mission.

Blitzo said:

I have no issue with doing deployments for 1-2 months now and then for carriers to get blue water experience.
I am however very against the idea of permanently having 1 CSG on station at Kiribati all the time. The point is, if you want to have 1 CSG on station at Kiribati all the time, you will have to commit 3 CSGs of your 8 CSGs.

The reason why it makes sense for the US and British and French to send their carriers on long deployments is because they do not face high demands for carriers in their immediate home region.

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So, you are in favor of each CSG taking 2 months deployment once in a while out in the ocean, but not in favor of each CSG taking 4 months deployment to Kiribati. The latter will spend large portion of deployment at port itself.

With 8 CSG, 4 months deployment by each CSG would result in 32 months cycle where 4 months are spent in deployment, 6 months spent in maintenance and period of not immediately. Yes, USN carrier go through longer maintenance and 30 to 90 day surge readiness, but they are deployed for 9 months at a time and spending most of that time not in port. 22 * 8 / 32 = 5.5. So, you would have 5 to 6 CSG that's available for surge in this scenario. If you think they need 8 months for maintenance and period of not immediate readiness, then you have about 5 CSG ready for surge. I don't think the time at sea differs that much between 4 months deployment to Kiribati vs 2 continuous month at sea.

32 months cycle where 2 months are spent in deployment, 6 months in maintenance and period of not immediately ready. 24 * 8 / 32 = 6 CSG available.

Type 76 led SAGs can take 1 to 2 months deployment to Kiribati from time to time or it can go visit other places. In a heightened environment, if USN leaves no CSG at HI, then moving 1 Type 076 led SAG to HI is a counter move.

Blitzo said:

5 US CSGs versus 3-4 PLA CSGs in westpac with each side's supporting land based air power and missile power is not a favourable balance of capabilities.

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Adding 1 CSG isn't going to change the balance of equation that much, when PLA land based power would be able to provide more strike power and air defense capabilities and ISR capabilities than 5 CSGs.

if PLA land base missile launchers cannot overwhelm US & allied military bases in first and second chain, then they have not built enough missile launchers. They have basically unlimited land to put missiles launchers vs the small real estate that US military can place missile launchers and runways and such. Even US military would agree with me that they cannot defend against mass Chinese missile strikes.

Blitzo said:

They're fighting against superior US Hawaii based ISR, Hawaii land based B-21s with AShMs for long range maritime strike, Hawaii land based fighters and strike fighters for CAP and closer in maritime strike, Hawaii land based hypersonics, extensive US SSNs.

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Aside from SSN, the other ones will not be usable in the event of a surprise first strike.

Blitzo said:

And they're fighting against the always present risk of multi-axis attacks from Australia and CONTUS as well that they have to position themselves for, both to guard themselves and to guard Kiribati.

I've said multiple times, I do not expect 2 PLA CSGs and land base Kiribati to be able to survive against a reinforced US Hawaii land based force + 8 SSNs and 2 SAGs. That is my definition of a deterrence force from the US, designed to be able to easily destroy 2 PLA CSGs and Kiribati.

For the US to counter a fortified Hawaii + 8 SSNs and 2 SAGs, I believe the PLAN needs at least 6 CSGs.

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how many ships are in your 2 SAGs?

Blitzo said:

Your proposal is basically to try and deploy multiple high value maneuver forces into the enemy's depths without degradation of the enemy's front lines or combat capabilities, and hope that you are able to pull off the first shot faster than the other guy, even though the other guy will have superior ISR, superior concentration of fires, superior dispersal of their platforms and strike forces.

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The decision on who to launch the first shot is a political one. The force I described will have enough ISR to be able to spy on Pearl Harbour and surrounding area 24/7. And after a successful initial strike, they will have a massive advantage in ISR since the runways won't be available. The key is for H-20/UCAV to be able to take off and B-21s not being able to. Hawaii is not CONUS or mainland China. It can be significantly degraded if there is not enough carrier groups there.

Blitzo said:

If I had 8 CSGs for the PLA in 2037, what I would do is for peacetime have them all robustly stationed in westpac, occasionally going out for extended duration blue water distance training for up to 2 months at a time, but in a manner where the ships, crew and airwings are all well maintained and ready to surge at short notice. Ideally with the goal to be able to generate 6 CSGs able to operate in westpac region overall.
During a high intensity conflict, ideally those CSGs with land based PLA air and missile forces will be concentrated and mutually supporting enough to defeat the extensive US westpac land based air and missile forces as well as US CSGs that the US deploys -- ideally with the ability to achieve a favourable exchange ratio with US CSGs.
At minimum, a 1:2 ratio of PLA to US CSGs lost, ideally anything better than that like 1:3. That is to say, for every single CSG that the PLA loses in westpac, the PLA should be able to inflict at least two CSG losses or three CSG losses on the US.
Thus, at the conclusion of the FPO, ideally the PLA will have lost no more than 2 CSGs while the US will have lost at least 4 CSGs.

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I think the firepower of land based missile launchers/6th gen/H20/J20s/H6s/J16s and even littoral assets like diesel subs will be more threatening than 8 CSGs combined even after factoring in the distance from mainland. So, I really don't see having 1 fewer active CSG will change this equation that much.

tphuang said:

So, you are in favor of each CSG taking 2 months deployment once in a while out in the ocean, but not in favor of each CSG taking 4 months deployment to Kiribati. The latter will spend large portion of deployment at port itself.

With 8 CSG, 4 months deployment by each CSG would result in 32 months cycle where 4 months are spent in deployment, 6 months spent in maintenance and period of not immediately. Yes, USN carrier go through longer maintenance and 30 to 90 day surge readiness, but they are deployed for 9 months at a time and spending most of that time not in port. 22 * 8 / 32 = 5.5. So, you would have 5 to 6 CSG that's available for surge in this scenario. If you think they need 8 months for maintenance and period of not immediate readiness, then you have about 5 CSG ready for surge. I don't think the time at sea differs that much between 4 months deployment to Kiribati vs 2 continuous month at sea.

32 months cycle where 2 months are spent in deployment, 6 months in maintenance and period of not immediately ready. 24 * 8 / 32 = 6 CSG available.

Type 76 led SAGs can take 1 to 2 months deployment to Kiribati from time to time or it can go visit other places. In a heightened environment, if USN leaves no CSG at HI, then moving 1 Type 076 led SAG to HI is a counter move.

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I'm in favour of the CSGs using time deployed to actually train for blue water high intensity flight operations, but not in favour of them having long durations. With 8 CSGs, I would plan for each year there to be 4 blue water distance 2 month long training deployments, with 4-8 closer distance regular training deployments around the first island chain lasting up to 1 month. I believe that would be optimal for ensuring a competent and ready flight deck, airwing and command staff and battlegroup, while minimizing down time and maximizing surge caspability.

Where exactly does Kiribati have maritime geography that can accommodate a port that is appropriate for stationing a CSG at for the majority of a 4 month period?

tphuang said:

Adding 1 CSG isn't going to change the balance of equation that much, when PLA land based power would be able to provide more strike power and air defense capabilities and ISR capabilities than 5 CSGs.

if PLA land base missile launchers cannot overwhelm US & allied military bases in first and second chain, then they have not built enough missile launchers. They have basically unlimited land to put missiles launchers vs the small real estate that US military can place missile launchers and runways and such. Even US military would agree with me that they cannot defend against mass Chinese missile strikes.

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You aren't adding only 1 CSG. You're adding 2-3 CSGs, if you don't have to commit to a Kiribati scenario.

The difference between 3-4 PLA CSGs and 5-6 CSGs is quite large.

3-4 PLA CSGs in westpac versus 5 US CSGs is one where I expect the PLA CSGs to almost all be destroyed. 5-6 PLA CSGs versus 5 US CSGs is one where possibly the PLA could achieve an exchange ratio slightly in its favour.


I agree that the PLA should build more land based strike capabilities, especially looking to be able to target up to the second island chain. However, the US will also have substantial land based strike capability as well, and with the benefit of forward positioning of strike staging areas closer to China's homeland and large air bases and missile bases on the mainland during peacetime. Meaning there may very well be parity in terms of land based strike systems, rather than superiority in favour of the PLA.

However, I believe that most all be complemented by the PLA having a local westpac theater parity of CSG count, ideally superior. A 1.5:1 or even 2:1 ratio of operational PLA CSGs to operational US CSGs in westpac during FPO will be desirable and optimal to ensure a favouralble exchange rateio.

tphuang said:

Aside from SSN, the other ones will not be usable in the event of a surprise first strike.

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The same goes for any PLA forces in centpac that relies on air power.
Overall, the advantage in first strike still lies with the US due to superior US ISR, superior US dispersion of forces.

tphuang said:

how many ships are in your 2 SAGs?

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Lets call it five ships each -- 1 DDGX leading 4 Burkes.

tphuang said:

The decision on who to launch the first shot is a political one. The force I described will have enough ISR to be able to spy on Pearl Harbour and surrounding area 24/7. And after a successful initial strike, they will have a massive advantage in ISR since the runways won't be available. The key is for H-20/UCAV to be able to take off and B-21s not being able to. Hawaii is not CONUS or mainland China. It can be significantly degraded if there is not enough carrier groups there.


I think the firepower of land based missile launchers/6th gen/H20/J20s/H6s/J16s and even littoral assets like diesel subs will be more threatening than 8 CSGs combined even after factoring in the distance from mainland. So, I really don't see having 1 fewer active CSG will change this equation that much.

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The decision on who launches first is a political one yes -- but even accounting for that, the US is at a significant first strike and first mover advantage.

All of the firepower that the PLA can deploy to centpac and Kiribati does not matter if they are at a first mover disadvantage and unable to defend against US strikes and re-attacks in a manner that allows them to

The force you described will barely have enough ISR to monitor the airspace and waters around Kiribati and the CSGs themselves to defend themselves, let alone spy on Hawaii and the airspace and waters around Hawaii 24/7.

We've talked about this back and forth for a few pages now -- but surely you can recognize to a degree that your proposal is a very, very very high risk wager, where mission success is reliant on substantially more going right for the PLA than for the US, and where the ability of the PLA centpac force to successfully survive its mission and to survive to be able to return home is low at best?
The forces you're giving to the PLA is just too few to be able to achieve the mission when considering realistic losses.


If you insist on having a capability designed to strike Hawaii at the outset of a conflict, using Kiribati as a forward resupply base for PLA SSNs and perhaps operating as a forward missile base makes much more sense., with far less risk.

Blitzo said:

I'm in favour of the CSGs using time deployed to actually train for blue water high intensity flight operations, but not in favour of them having long durations. With 8 CSGs, I would plan for each year there to be 4 blue water distance 2 month long training deployments, with 4-8 closer distance regular training deployments around the first island chain lasting up to 1 month. I believe that would be optimal for ensuring a competent and ready flight deck, airwing and command staff and battlegroup, while minimizing down time and maximizing surge caspability.

Where exactly does Kiribati have maritime geography that can accommodate a port that is appropriate for stationing a CSG at for the majority of a 4 month period?

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They will have to do a lot of construction there (like they've done in SCS) to reclaim enough land there to have such a port. They will need to help bring soil to Kiribati anyhow to help them with rising water level. Maybe they will find that is too challenging and they are only able to have a small port there for stopovers or for spy ships. I don't know, but I think they will look into having a larger port.

I think if they are already doing 3 months rotation to Gulf of Aden with occasional visits to Djibouti, there will be no problem doing 4 months rotations at Kiribati. I think the value of going for 10 days in the middle of Pacific Ocean and then staying 4 months there and training in the middle of nowhere will provide them many lessons they can't learn from 1 to 2 month deployment in West Pacific or to Indian Ocean.

Blitzo said:

You aren't adding only 1 CSG. You're adding 2-3 CSGs, if you don't have to commit to a Kiribati scenario.

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I showed you the math. Each of the 8 CSGs taking a 4 month deployment to Kiribati over a 32 months cycle and then a standard 6 months off for maintenance and then low readiness period and remaining 22 month in medium to high readiness. That works out to be 5 or 6 CSGs available at any given time for surge.

Blitzo said:

I agree that the PLA should build more land based strike capabilities, especially looking to be able to target up to the second island chain. However, the US will also have substantial land based strike capability as well, and with the benefit of forward positioning of strike staging areas closer to China's homeland and large air bases and missile bases on the mainland during peacetime. Meaning there may very well be parity in terms of land based strike systems, rather than superiority in favour of the PLA.

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US will have no shot to compete with China's land based strike capabilities unless China really messes things up. The amount of land available for US bases to build ground based launchers is quite fixed.

On top of that, US missiles cost way too much to be built in same quantity as China. I've listened to numerous people up top that have said the same thing. That's why they are looking into mass drone attacks and ACE as solutions rather than missile attacks.

Different militaries have different advantages. America is not going to try to out compete China in missiles. It will stick with areas that it's stronger in.

Blitzo said:

However, I believe that most all be complemented by the PLA having a local westpac theater parity of CSG count, ideally superior. A 1.5:1 or even 2:1 ratio of operational PLA CSGs to operational US CSGs in westpac during FPO will be desirable and optimal to ensure a favouralble exchange rateio.

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The likelihood of Chin's land based assets out powering US westpac military bases is far greater than that of PLAN carrier groups outpowering USN carrier groups. Aside from PLAN advantages in surface fleet and ASuW technology, USN currently has significant advantages in carrier air operation and nuclear submarines that China will likely narrow but not completely. As such, the closer PLAN carrier group operates to land based assets and littoral assets, the better they will do.

Fundamentally, you believe PLAN CSG will need to be stronger than USN CSG in open water. I think they need to stick closer to land base and get help from land based missiles and aerial assets to win.

Blitzo said:

Lets call it five ships each -- 1 DDGX leading 4 Burkes.

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If USN is willing to dedicate 20% of their active destroyers (let's say 50 in high readiness) and 25% of their active SSNs in defense of HI, then PLA would not be able to overcome it with the 1 CSG + 1 Type 076 SAG that I mentioned.

In which case, they may want to just leave a few 052Ds around there with H-6s, some drones and ground based launchers and blast everythings off as war starts. If they loose that, not end of the world.

Blitzo said:

The decision on who launches first is a political one yes -- but even accounting for that, the US is at a significant first strike and first mover advantage.

All of the firepower that the PLA can deploy to centpac and Kiribati does not matter if they are at a first mover disadvantage and unable to defend against US strikes and re-attacks in a manner that allows them to

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I was under the impression that you thought USN would just leave a couple of destroyers at Pearl Harbour, which would actually give the fleet I described enough of an advantage to overpower that small surface fleet and air defense/runway at Pearl Harbor before aerial based assets can get involved.

Blitzo said:

The force you described will barely have enough ISR to monitor the airspace and waters around Kiribati and the CSGs themselves to defend themselves, let alone spy on Hawaii and the airspace and waters around Hawaii 24/7.

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Completely disagree. The endurance of ISR drones will continue to improve in the next 15 years. China will likely have a true long endurance drone that can hang in the air for 30 to 40 hours at a time.

Blitzo said:

We've talked about this back and forth for a few pages now -- but surely you can recognize to a degree that your proposal is a very, very very high risk wager, where mission success is reliant on substantially more going right for the PLA than for the US, and where the ability of the PLA centpac force to successfully survive its mission and to survive to be able to return home is low at best?
The forces you're giving to the PLA is just too few to be able to achieve the mission when considering realistic losses.

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You and I have a fundamental disagreement about strength of USN nuclear subs vs PLAN nuclear subs. My strategy is fundamentally stationing carrier groups closer to land where they can be backed up missiles launchers, air cover, diesel subs, undersea network of sonar/glider and whatever else they can come up with that don't get lost in Pacific ocean. Your strategy is fundamentally about having more CSGs to push USN CSGs further out. I don't think having another CSG in Westpac will change things as much as just operating a couple of hundred kms closer to mainland.