PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC

Blitzo · May 30, 2022

tphuang said:
Let's say 4 by the end of 2030. And then once every 2 years after that. 8 by 2037 and 12 by 2045.

Sure, let's go with that.

tphuang said:
if they actually have 8 CSG and 4 076s that are comparable in firepower to US CVGs, then resupplying island bases will be a lot easier than you state. The value of having a base that's around Hawaii will automatically mean that US cannot deploy as much force around first chain, which would make that area a lot easier to win. If USN needs to keep 4 carriers along west coast and Hawaii, then that significantly reduces the amount of force deployed to between first and second chain. If PLAN cannot defeat 3 CSG between first and second chain, then it has no shot of winning anything.

Why do we think the US needs to keep 4 CSGs along its west coast and Hawaii against a hypothetical PLA Kiribati force?
The US doesn't need CSGs to cripple/defeat a Kiribati base, and the US doesn't need CSGs to defeat PLAN CSGs operating from Kiribati.
Kiribati is thousands of kms away from PLA support, and is deep in a hemisphere of the world where the US and its allies has air and sea control that can be exerted from land, in terms of land based bombers, ISR, long range hypersonic weapons, SSNs.

That is to say, if the PLA deploys an air fleet to Kiribati and two of its eight CSGs to Kiribati, the US will very gladly simply surge or forward deploy 6-8 of its CSGs to westpac within the second island chain, and counter the PLA's base in Kiribati and its two Kiribati CSGs, by using B-21s with ALCMs, LRHW, SSNs with LACMs and LRHW.

Resupplying those islands requires the PLA to be able to secure air and sea control in a long patch of airspace and ocean space from the Chinese mainland.
That means the PLA not only has to secure the various island landmarks between the Chinese mainland and Kiribati (both to prevent them from being used against the PLA, and to use them to assist securing air and sea control) -- they also need to defeat the various US military westpac forces based on land in the first and second island chains, as well as naval forces (i.e.: primarily CSGs).

tphuang said:
Canton island is 3000 km from Pearl Harbor. It's basically the perfect distance away in terms of how much strike it can face and how much danger it can pose.

The distance from Canton island to Pearl Harbour is nice, sure.
But Canton island as a staging area is simply not survivable during onset of wartime because of its isolation -- it is 8000 km from China mainland -- that makes it vulnerable to large scale strikes from US and allied staging areas in the region (from Hawaii, CONTUS and Australia), and unable to be resupplied or reinforced by the PLA which will have to travel from the mainland to Kiribati.

tphuang said:
It's 5000+ km from Sydney to Kiribati. I'm not concerned about Australia in this scenario.

Australia is absolutely a factor.
That's a very normal distance for B-21s with ALCMs based in Hawaii and Australia and even CONTUS, and a small distance for SSNs with LACMs and LRHW from Hawaii, Australia and CONTUS.

tphuang said:
If there is a war and US military sends nothing to West Pacific, then all of US bases around first and second chain will get destroyed pretty quickly. And now China has succeeded in controlling first and second chain. If US sends just 2 carrier groups to Asia, then you are basically in a situation where China is trading 2 of its carrier groups for 2 of US's carrier groups.

I think this is the difference between our views on the usefulness of a Kiribati base and two CSGs in Kiribati.
I do not think a Kiribati base and CSG presence will deter the US from surging forces to westpac during wartime.
I believe the US would frontload multiple CSGs to within the second island chain, further fortify their bases in westpac (including Guam) with both air assets and air and missile defenses (on top of normal peacetime air and missile defenses that they are already intending to employ), and also deploy smaller more distributed air units to smaller islands in westpac.

Kiribati will be dealt with by regional US long range strike capabilities including land based bombers with LACMs from Hawaii, Australia and CONTUS, long range hypersonic strike weapons, and SSNs. The US will not be required to hold back CSGs near Hawaii or CONTUS to deal with Kiribati at all.

tphuang said:
The aerial assets can easily retreat. You try to retreat as much of your naval force as possible. You give up Kiribati base, but get all of the island in first and second chain including Guam. Now, the pressure against mainland is eased up.

Where can your air and naval assets retreat to?
It is 8000 km from the Chinese mainland, in hostile airspace and waters populated by US and their allied air and naval forces on all sides, and with the first and second island chain populated by US forward surge deployed air and naval forces.

A successful retreat (or resupply) is entirely contingent on the PLA being able to wipe out the bulk of US westpac forces to begin with, to provide a secure route.

tphuang said:
Your concern was always facing strikes on the mainland. This strategy would basically trade Kiribati for first/second chain islands. It would give the military industrial complex plenty of time to ramp up production. It would give them plenty of space now to be in a firm defensive position with maybe 10 carrier groups from second chain to mainland.

Yes, my concern around facing strikes on the mainland is in relation to US westpac warfighting capability -- in the form of mobile US air, naval and missile forces that can be forward deployed and surged to westpac.

Preventing strikes on the mainland is attained by neutralizing forward deployed and surged US westpac warfighting capability, during wartime.
I do not believe a forward deployed force in Kiribati will reduce or meaningfully mitigate the forward surged capabilities that the US can send to westpac during wartime, because it is a fixed location and so small and isolated from supporting friendly PLA forces and so isolated from reinforcements, and will be easily crippled by US long range bombers and strike capabilities, and doesn't require US CSGs to defeat.

A forward deployed force in Kiribati would simply be a sacrificial speedbump.
The forces on Kiribati island facilities are going to be destroyed fairly quickly, the only question is whether it will be within 12 hours or 24 hours of the onset of hostilities. A couple of PLA CSGs operating from Kiribati operating without significant PLA land based air support (because the Kiribati air facilities would have been crippled and disabled) will easily be hunted down by land based ISR, B-21s with AShMs and strike fighters and UCAVs, and SSNs.

It would be better to concentrate those hypothetical forward deployed PLA forces with the rest of the PLA's forces in the first and second island chains to enable a more robust and comprehensive ability to neutralize US westpac warfighting capability.... because that part of the conflict will easily be the most challenging and the PLA will need every CSG, H-20, and SSN they can in that theater.

Throwing a couple of CSGs and a combined air task force to Kiribati, during wartime will not be able to achieve anything apart from being a target for missiles and HGVs.

Your strategy of using Kiribati as a way of forcing the US to draw away forces in the western pacific, would be much more viable if the PLA had a much larger fleet of carriers (say, at least 12-14 CSGs) -- or even better, if they had 70+ high end SSNs as well. Using Kiribati as a major SSN hub would probably be much more viable and cost effective. If they can deploy 6-8 SSNs from Kiribati on a permanent rotating basis, that would be far more of a realistic card to play, to credibly place locations in Hawaii and CONTUS under a degree of threat.

However, with only 8 CSGs and 4 076s, that is not enough.

tphuang · May 31, 2022

Blitzo said:
Why do we think the US needs to keep 4 CSGs along its west coast and Hawaii against a hypothetical PLA Kiribati force?
The US doesn't need CSGs to cripple/defeat a Kiribati base, and the US doesn't need CSGs to defeat PLAN CSGs operating from Kiribati.
Kiribati is thousands of kms away from PLA support, and is deep in a hemisphere of the world where the US and its allies has air and sea control that can be exerted from land, in terms of land based bombers, ISR, long range hypersonic weapons, SSNs.

Kiribati is close enough to Hawaii, where PLA with 2 carrier groups + H20s could launch large scale missiles that destroy the military base/repair facility and everything else there if USN does not have credible force guarding that place. Similarly, Kiribati would be close enough to San Diego where H20 could launch surprise attack with long range missiles and knock out facilities.

It would be incredibly silly for USN to not defend its primary base in Pacific. Where else are its ships going to get replenished or repaired. As is, it's over 6000 km from Guam to Hawaii. A CSG will need to be constantly replenished. How is carrier group going to operate once it uses up aviation fuel after a few days of action? Even aside from that, the optics of letting Pearl Harbour getting destroyed and San Diego bombarded would be terrible for domestic audience.

America will not leave Pearl Harbour/San Diego unguarded if they think a Chinese carrier group can attack there.

Blitzo said:
That is to say, if the PLA deploys an air fleet to Kiribati and two of its eight CSGs to Kiribati, the US will very gladly simply surge or forward deploy 6-8 of its CSGs to westpac within the second island chain, and counter the PLA's base in Kiribati and its two Kiribati CSGs, by using B-21s with ALCMs, LRHW, SSNs with LACMs and LRHW.

Say goodbye to Pearl Harbour base and all the replenishment ships then. How is 6 to 8 carrier groups going to get replenished in the middle of Western pacific once all the US bases in first/second chain gets knocked out by ballistic missiles in the opening phase of the war? The replenishment ships will get targeted by Kiribati based air force/naval ships the moment they leave the port now that China has those ultra long range hypersonic anti-ship missiles.

How are you going to destroy a large Kiribati base with 2 CSG guarding it across multiple islands with decent size population on them doing repair work? It takes a lot of missiles to knock out large military bases and keep them down. The phoenix island chain contains many islands that you can build infrastructure and store fuel and missiles underground.

How many B-21s can be deployed to destroy Kiribati? How many LHRW can they carry per sortie? Where are they flying in from if Pearl Harbour base gets destroyed?

Blitzo said:
Resupplying those islands requires the PLA to be able to secure air and sea control in a long patch of airspace and ocean space from the Chinese mainland.
That means the PLA not only has to secure the various island landmarks between the Chinese mainland and Kiribati (both to prevent them from being used against the PLA, and to use them to assist securing air and sea control) -- they also need to defeat the various US military westpac forces based on land in the first and second island chains, as well as naval forces (i.e.: primarily CSGs).

Let's say that none of the Pacific island nations are willing to take sides and supply them with anything. The most obvious solution is to utilize all the islands in the Phoenix island chain ahead of time store large amount of fuel and missiles underground. The dug up soil would also allow them to expand on the island size a little bit. I'm assuming they thoroughly build up the infrastructure here.

Blitzo said:
Australia is absolutely a factor.
That's a very normal distance for B-21s with ALCMs based in Hawaii and Australia and even CONTUS, and a small distance for SSNs with LACMs and LRHW from Hawaii, Australia and CONTUS.

so in this case, first strike does matter. If there is nothing guarding Hawaii and that the runways are too damaged for something like B-21, where is B-21 flying from? It's 7000 km to CONUS and 5500 km to Australia. Let's say B-21 has 4000 km combat radius. What is the effectiveness of B-21 lobbing 1 LRHW at the edge of its engagement envelope?

Blitzo said:
I think this is the difference between our views on the usefulness of a Kiribati base and two CSGs in Kiribati.
I do not think a Kiribati base and CSG presence will deter the US from surging forces to westpac during wartime.
I believe the US would frontload multiple CSGs to within the second island chain, further fortify their bases in westpac (including Guam) with both air assets and air and missile defenses (on top of normal peacetime air and missile defenses that they are already intending to employ), and also deploy smaller more distributed air units to smaller islands in westpac.

I agree that they will frontloaid multiple CSGs, but they have to keep 4 CSG in Hawaii and San Diego. B-21s operating at edge of their engagement envelope + SSNs aren't going to be able to bring enough heat on a large Kiribati base that spans multiple islands and have. It takes a lot of missile strikes to disable air strip and command centers and also keep them disabled. The reason we think China can disable first/second island chain US bases is because they can keep lobbing a lot of missiles at them. US military cannot do that to Kiribati without attacking it with its own CSG.

Blitzo said:
Where can your air and naval assets retreat to?
It is 8000 km from the Chinese mainland, in hostile airspace and waters populated by US and their allied air and naval forces on all sides, and with the first and second island chain populated by US forward surge deployed air and naval forces.

H20s better have the range to go that far one way.

Blitzo said:
Yes, my concern around facing strikes on the mainland is in relation to US westpac warfighting capability -- in the form of mobile US air, naval and missile forces that can be forward deployed and surged to westpac.

Preventing strikes on the mainland is attained by neutralizing forward deployed and surged US westpac warfighting capability, during wartime.
I do not believe a forward deployed force in Kiribati will reduce or meaningfully mitigate the forward surged capabilities that the US can send to westpac during wartime, because it is a fixed location and so small and isolated from supporting friendly PLA forces and so isolated from reinforcements, and will be easily crippled by US long range bombers and strike capabilities, and doesn't require US CSGs to defeat.

A forward deployed force in Kiribati would simply be a sacrificial speedbump.
The forces on Kiribati island facilities are going to be destroyed fairly quickly, the only question is whether it will be within 12 hours or 24 hours of the onset of hostilities. A couple of PLA CSGs operating from Kiribati operating without significant PLA land based air support (because the Kiribati air facilities would have been crippled and disabled) will easily be hunted down by land based ISR, B-21s with AShMs and strike fighters and UCAVs, and SSNs.

where are these strike fighters/UCAVs coming from that have 3000 km combat radius while carrying large missiles?

There are numerous islands. The phoenix island chain is not that small and you can build underground infrastructure.

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This estimates 300 missiles are needed to just destroy China's 3 island bases in Spratleys.

There will be more air defense here with more repairs people and underground infrastructure around Phoenix island chain if China has the rights to fully build it up. It's really hard to disable that and keep it down.

Blitzo said:
It would be better to concentrate those hypothetical forward deployed PLA forces with the rest of the PLA's forces in the first and second island chains to enable a more robust and comprehensive ability to neutralize US westpac warfighting capability.... because that part of the conflict will easily be the most challenging and the PLA will need every CSG, H-20, and SSN they can in that theater.

Throwing a couple of CSGs and a combined air task force to Kiribati, during wartime will not be able to achieve anything apart from being a target for missiles and HGVs.

Your strategy of using Kiribati as a way of forcing the US to draw away forces in the western pacific, would be much more viable if the PLA had a much larger fleet of carriers (say, at least 12-14 CSGs) -- or even better, if they had 70+ high end SSNs as well. Using Kiribati as a major SSN hub would probably be much more viable and cost effective. If they can deploy 6-8 SSNs from Kiribati on a permanent rotating basis, that would be far more of a realistic card to play, to credibly place locations in Hawaii and CONTUS under a degree of threat.

However, with only 8 CSGs and 4 076s, that is not enough.

and by 2045, they will probably will have 12 CSG.

Blitzo · May 31, 2022

tphuang said:
Kiribati is close enough to Hawaii, where PLA with 2 carrier groups + H20s could launch large scale missiles that destroy the military base/repair facility and everything else there if USN does not have credible force guarding that place. Similarly, Kiribati would be close enough to San Diego where H20 could launch surprise attack with long range missiles and knock out facilities.

It would be incredibly silly for USN to not defend its primary base in Pacific. Where else are its ships going to get replenished or repaired. As is, it's over 6000 km from Guam to Hawaii. A CSG will need to be constantly replenished. How is carrier group going to operate once it uses up aviation fuel after a few days of action? Even aside from that, the optics of letting Pearl Harbour getting destroyed and San Diego bombarded would be terrible for domestic audience.

America will not leave Pearl Harbour/San Diego unguarded if they think a Chinese carrier group can attack there.

I never said that the US would leave Pearl or San Diego undefended.

What I argued is that US will not have to leave CSGs to defend Pearl or San Diego against the type of force that the PLA could generate from Kiribati. I'll describe what US forces the US will have in Hawaii and CONTUS later below. It is substantial. But doesn't need CSGs.

tphuang said:
Say goodbye to Pearl Harbour base and all the replenishment ships then. How is 6 to 8 carrier groups going to get replenished in the middle of Western pacific once all the US bases in first/second chain gets knocked out by ballistic missiles in the opening phase of the war? The replenishment ships will get targeted by Kiribati based air force/naval ships the moment they leave the port now that China has those ultra long range hypersonic anti-ship missiles.

I think we have very differing expectations as to what exactly a PLA Kiribati base + 2 CSGs can achieve.

At the onset of war, I believe that they will be too busy fighting for their lives for about 12 hours, at which point they will essentially be effectively annihilated and combat ineffective, and that they will not be able to mount any meaningful offensive operation towards Hawaii or San Diego at all.

tphuang said:
How are you going to destroy a large Kiribati base with 2 CSG guarding it across multiple islands with decent size population on them doing repair work? It takes a lot of missiles to knock out large military bases and keep them down. The phoenix island chain contains many islands that you can build infrastructure and store fuel and missiles underground.

How many B-21s can be deployed to destroy Kiribati? How many LHRW can they carry per sortie? Where are they flying in from if Pearl Harbour base gets destroyed?

I'm not sure if this is a trick question.

Kiribati is a fixed, relatively small surface area territory, that is 8000km from any friendly PLA support, and is surrounded on all four sides by ocean and airspace that the US and its allies dominate and exert control over, with multiple land masses within 5000km that the US has large comprehensive air bases to support comprehensive air fleets, with large surface area for organic air and missile defenses.
B-21s operating from Hawaii and Australia and CONTUS, carrying multiple JASSM-XRs each, supported by aerial refuelling on the return leg, conducting strikes in coordination with SSNs carrying LACMs and LRHWs (Virginia Block V can carry 12 LRHW), and some limited surface combatants with LACMs (or LRHWs on Zumwalts) will be very difficult for the PLA to defend against, at the onset of conflict.

Which is to say, Kiribati will be at a disadvantage of both offensive and defensive capabilities in terms of force concentration, and also at a massive disadvantage of geographical positioning as it is surrounded on hostile forces on all sides.

It is not impossible for that sort of geographical disadvantage to be overcome, but it requires a massive force and fires advantage to overcome.

If the PLA was able to deploy 10 air brigades with supports and 6-8 CSGs to Kiribati (while of course having enough to conduct operations in the Westpac within second island chain), then sure I agree that they would probably be able to exert a significant threat to Hawaii and/or san Diego in a manner where the base and CSGs overall are able to persist and operate continuously, just due to sheer concentration of force.

But as it stands, what you're suggesting is only 2 CSGs with an air unit that sounds like little more than a reinforced air brigade.

That's called a speed bump.

tphuang said:
Let's say that none of the Pacific island nations are willing to take sides and supply them with anything. The most obvious solution is to utilize all the islands in the Phoenix island chain ahead of time store large amount of fuel and missiles underground. The dug up soil would also allow them to expand on the island size a little bit. I'm assuming they thoroughly build up the infrastructure here.

I'm aware of how large Kiribati is and how extensively it can be built up.

I am saying that even if Kiribati was much larger -- even if it was the size of Guam -- that the PLA would have a very hard time defending it with the sort of force you've given them, in the geographical neighbourhood they exist in.

tphuang said:
so in this case, first strike does matter. If there is nothing guarding Hawaii and that the runways are too damaged for something like B-21, where is B-21 flying from? It's 7000 km to CONUS and 5500 km to Australia. Let's say B-21 has 4000 km combat radius. What is the effectiveness of B-21 lobbing 1 LRHW at the edge of its engagement envelope?

I never said there is "nothing" guarding Hawaii or San Diego.

I said that they don't need CSGs to guard Hawaii or San Diego.

The US knows that its success in a Westpac war is contingent on surge deploying and front loading a large combat force to the western pacific and concentration of force.
The US will naturally use economical and sensible measures to maintain its own security closer to home will preserving the ability to deploy as many of its CSGs to the western Pacific as possible.

Those economical and sensible measures will include building up air and missile defenses on Hawaii with relevant locations on CONTUS and Australia, hardening their airbases on land at those locations, land based ISR and CAP, deploying long range land based strike capabilities there (LRHW, B-21s), deploying distributed naval fires platforms (SSNs with LRHW and LACM, and some surface combatants).

tphuang said:
I agree that they will frontloaid multiple CSGs, but they have to keep 4 CSG in Hawaii and San Diego. B-21s operating at edge of their engagement envelope + SSNs aren't going to be able to bring enough heat on a large Kiribati base that spans multiple islands and have. It takes a lot of missile strikes to disable air strip and command centers and also keep them disabled. The reason we think China can disable first/second island chain US bases is because they can keep lobbing a lot of missiles at them. US military cannot do that to Kiribati without attacking it with its own CSG.

I think a strike package of a dozen B-21s with JASSMs, 6-8 SSNs with LRHW and LACMs, and perhaps one or two SAGs with LACMs and LRHW, will more than be able to cripple a Kiribati base sufficiently to enable follow on strikes with B-21s to permanently destroy it.
They don't need a CSG.

tphuang said:
H20s better have the range to go that far one way.

Let's say they have the range to do so.
In a westpac HIC, how will H-20s in Kiribati will be able to survive long enough to be fuelled up and fly back to the Chinese mainland -- let enough actually survive the journey?

-cont below

Blitzo · May 31, 2022

cont from above

tphuang said:
where are these strike fighters/UCAVs coming from that have 3000 km combat radius while carrying large missiles?

There are numerous islands. The phoenix island chain is not that small and you can build underground infrastructure.

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This estimates 300 missiles are needed to just destroy China's 3 island bases in Spratleys.

"Not that small" is relative.

Even if the PLA had an island as big as Guam to work with at Kiribati, they are still sitting ducks in that strategic geographical environment, and would require substantial force concentration (offensively and defensively) to be a viable staging area amidst a HIC.

UCAVs and strike fighters will be operating from land as part of the strike package against PLAN CSGs (in conjunction with land based B-21s carrying AShMs, SSNs, and potentially an anti ship capable LRHW in future, which I think will almost certainly be on the cards).
If we're projecting out to 2030s, strike UCAVs should be assumed to be part of the US inventory as much as for the PLA.

tphuang said:
There will be more air defense here with more repairs people and underground infrastructure around Phoenix island chain if China has the rights to fully build it up. It's really hard to disable that and keep it down.

Yes, it will require the US to dedicate perhaps 100-200 missiles to cripple it during an initial first wave strike and then a number of sorties afterwards with PGMs to permanently take it out of commission.
No, they won't require CSGs to do so, and you can bet the US will plan its strategy in a manner that allows them to both frontload their their westpac surge with as many CSGs as possible while still retaining a significant capability to strike and destroy an isolated PLA air-naval station in Kiribati 8000km from the Chinese mainland.

tphuang said:
and by 2045, they will probably will have 12 CSG.

I have nothing inherently against the idea of the PLA using Kiribati as a way of forcing the US to divide its forces

However I think any forward deployed presence to Kiribati (or other pacific island nations) must not simply be a sacrificial speed bump and act as a missile sponge.
It must have robust survivability, and clear capability or potential to carry out decisive offensive operations, all without detracting the PLA from being able to fight a comprehensive high end westpac conflict against frontloaded US forces.

That is to say, if the PLA was able to operate 8-10 CSGs within the second island chain/westpac to fight against a forward deployed US 6-8 CSGs, and if the PLA was able to operate 6-8 CSGs from Kiribati/central pacific to carry out offensive operations against Hawaii and/or San Diego (as well as to defend Kiribati itself from US strikes operating out of Hawaii, CONTUS and Australia), then I would agree that would be a very viable strategy.
To simultaneously operate 14-18 CSGs will likely require 20-25 CSGs in the fleet -- an enormous number. Not something that we can even entertain at this stage as a fantasy.

But if they only have 8 CSGs and 4 076s in the fleet by the late 2030s versus what the US will have by then... well sending 2 of those CSGs to Kiribati to operate, likely leaving only 3-4 CSGs operating within the westpac/second island chain at best.... that is just suicidal, and likely to see both the westpac/second island chain CSG force and the Kiribati CSG force suffer significant losses that result in at best a phyrric victory, or at worst an outright defeat.

If they have 8 CSGs, it would make far more sense to concentrate all of the operational CSGs (likely up to 5-6 of them, surged) in westpac to begin with, to be capable of comprehensively defeating US westpac forces and land based facilities in a rapid manner, rather than divide one's forces in the western and central pacific, where the central pacific would be so easily defeated by the enemy by virtue of strategic positioning and US offensive capabilities in the region, and where the US will not be required to commit any CSGs against a PLA base in Kiribati with 2 CSGs.

Mohsin77 · May 31, 2022

Quick note: When wargaming the Pacific in the decades to follow, keep in mind that the survivability of Carriers might not remain the same as it is today. The ability to track Carriers and the threats against them are increasing over time. It is possible that a decade or two from now, they'll be more of a liability than an asset, especially for the side that ends up defending against a conventional 1st strike. This, of course, applies to both the US and China.

tphuang · Jun 1, 2022

Blitzo said:
I think we have very differing expectations as to what exactly a PLA Kiribati base + 2 CSGs can achieve.

At the onset of war, I believe that they will be too busy fighting for their lives for about 12 hours, at which point they will essentially be effectively annihilated and combat ineffective, and that they will not be able to mount any meaningful offensive operation towards Hawaii or San Diego at all.

This is where I think the first shot does matter. Sending in 2 carrier groups with LACMs can disable the Pearl Harbor base and paralyze the base for some time while H20/UCAVs/J15s escorted by J31s come in and drop large amount of PGMs and destroy much of the Pearl Harbor base. There will be a lot of pressure on US military to pull CSGs to come back (from within US). As long as H20 is around Kiribati, it will be able to make repeat strikes.

Blitzo said:
Kiribati is a fixed, relatively small surface area territory, that is 8000km from any friendly PLA support, and is surrounded on all four sides by ocean and airspace that the US and its allies dominate and exert control over, with multiple land masses within 5000km that the US has large comprehensive air bases to support comprehensive air fleets, with large surface area for organic air and missile defenses.

1 base (Hawaii) that you can knock out with an initial strike. There is also American Samoa that would be much smaller and can also be knocked out with an initial strike. I don't see another major US air base that's within 5000 km. San Diego is almost 7000 km away.

Blitzo said:
B-21s operating from Hawaii and Australia and CONTUS, carrying multiple JASSM-XRs each, supported by aerial refuelling on the return leg,

You gave me a hard time when I proposed that they do H20 + Y20U combination to fly over Russia, Alaska, into Canada and then first some ALCMs at factories inside CONUS. What you are proposing here is same in nature. You are expecting B-21 to fly over 5000 km one way, launch all the missiles and then having tankers greet them 3000 km off CONUS. Is it possible? Sure, but this level of logistics significantly reduces sortie rates. Without Hawaii to fly off, the air threat over Kiribati is an order of magnitude lower.

Blitzo said:
conducting strikes in coordination with SSNs carrying LACMs and LRHWs (Virginia Block V can carry 12 LRHW), and some limited surface combatants with LACMs (or LRHWs on Zumwalts) will be very difficult for the PLA to defend against, at the onset of conflict.

Really, Zumwalts?

If there are some odd surface combatants at Pearl Harbor, they will be attacked in the same initial strike at onset of war with hypersonic AShM. After that, where are these surface combatants coming from? More importantly, they will be attack on their way to Kiribati by H20 if they don't have air cover.

SSNs will be a bigger issue. But let's not overstate the number of hypersonic missiles America will have. Frank Kendall said they will be very expensive and bought in limited numbers. And by late 2030s, the ability to pick up and intercept hypersonic missiles will be a lot better than now.

I'm making the assumption here that China retains a hypersonic missile advantage in quality and definitely in quantity.

Blitzo said:
I'm aware of how large Kiribati is and how extensively it can be built up.

I am saying that even if Kiribati was much larger -- even if it was the size of Guam -- that the PLA would have a very hard time defending it with the sort of force you've given them, in the geographical neighbourhood they exist in.

Kiribati is not as large as Guam, but there is nobody living there so the entire island chain infrastructure could be used to support Chinese projects (assuming Kiribati government allows it).

Blitzo said:
I said that they don't need CSGs to guard Hawaii or San Diego.

If not CSG, then the number of ships and aircraft guarding Hawaii and San Diego will not be usable in other scenarios. And as I laid out, I think the initial attacking force will be able to neutralize whatever aircraft and ships are protecting Hawaii.

Blitzo said:
Those economical and sensible measures will include building up air and missile defenses on Hawaii with relevant locations on CONTUS and Australia, hardening their airbases on land at those locations, land based ISR and CAP, deploying long range land based strike capabilities there (LRHW, B-21s), deploying distributed naval fires platforms (SSNs with LRHW and LACM, and some surface combatants).

Let's just focus on Pearl Harbor here. There are obvious targets that the initial wave of hypersonic missiles and subsonic LACMs from warships (let's say 150 missiles) will need to attack from probably 2000 km out followed by H-20s/UCAVs knocking out the degraded air defense that will have a hard time stopping VLO bombers launching gliding PGMs and then J-15s/J-31s doing repeated sorties to destroy as much of the runway and infrastructure as possible. I think they will need to drop at minimum 500 PGMs to completely cripple Pearl Harbor, probably more. That would be a major setback for US military and prompt people upstairs to bring back carrier groups to protect and attack Kiribati base.

Blitzo said:
I think a strike package of a dozen B-21s with JASSMs, 6-8 SSNs with LRHW and LACMs, and perhaps one or two SAGs with LACMs and LRHW, will more than be able to cripple a Kiribati base sufficiently to enable follow on strikes with B-21s to permanently destroy it.

I personally like the odds of 2 PLAN carrier group with H-20 and possible land based missile support against 2 SAGs and some B-21 operating at the edge of its envelopes.

Blitzo said:
In a westpac HIC, how will H-20s in Kiribati will be able to survive long enough to be fuelled up and fly back to the Chinese mainland -- let enough actually survive the journey?

In my scenario, they do the first attack and deal sufficient damage to Hawaii that they are not under this massive initial threat.

Blitzo said:
UCAVs and strike fighters will be operating from land as part of the strike package against PLAN CSGs (in conjunction with land based B-21s carrying AShMs, SSNs, and potentially an anti ship capable LRHW in future, which I think will almost certainly be on the cards).

again, where are these strike fighters and UCAVs flying from? Hawaii and American Samoa are out of commission after the initial attacks. It's one thing to say B-21 (if it has 4000 km combat radius in ideal situations) can somehow make 5500 km mission with refueling or even 7000 km mission with a lot of refueling (the refuel itself would have to go 3000 km for that). That would require a lot of refuellers. It's quite another thing to expect strike fighter with 1100 km combat radius to do that.

Remember, UCAV acting with B-21 are expected to be close to half the costs of B-21 but can only carry 2t payload. That's based on US military's own RFP. They are not going be able to carry large LACMs internally.

tphuang · Jun 1, 2022

Blitzo said:
Yes, it will require the US to dedicate perhaps 100-200 missiles to cripple it during an initial first wave strike and then a number of sorties afterwards with PGMs to permanently take it out of commission.

Let's go with your scenario. Let's say US military has unlimited number of LRHW in its inventory and that they end up getting 100 B-21s as currently planned. 15 B-21s carrying 4 JASSM-XRs each (10 ton payload + full fuel load seems like a stretch for a 5500/7000 km mission) and 8 SSNs carrying 12 LRHW. The target for that would be 4 islands, 2 carrier groups (6 055 variants, 10 frigates, auxiliary ships). Let's say they get to fire off all of their missiles without getting hunted down.

The technology for intercepting hypersonic missiles should be a lot better by then. Out of the 60 subsonic missiles, I would think the vast vast majority of the JASSM-XRs will get tracked pretty early by KJ-600s and intercepted. Maybe a couple gets through. Out of the 100 LRHW, let's say they are targeting a combination of warships themselves along with island infrastructure. I would be very surprised that they can't intercept at least half of those LRHW with the technology that's available by late 2030s and not all of the remaining ones are going to hit their target. Let's say you have 1/4 of the LRHW hitting island infrastructure and another few hits warships and takes a couple of them out of commission. You still have like 15 055/frigates along with 2 carriers to protect the naval base. How is 25 missiles going to disable 4 islands?

And after a 12 to 16 hour sorties, the B-21s are going to need several days of maintenance to be able to fly again. These modern bombers need a lot of TLC. The SSNs need to go back to Australia or San Diego to get reloaded with cruise missiles, since Hawaii is offline now. How long does it take SSNs to go 3000 to 4000 nm to get reloaded with missiles? The maintenance team will have days to repair runways, bring out replacement radar system, fix the command centers, etc...

Blitzo said:
I have nothing inherently against the idea of the PLA using Kiribati as a way of forcing the US to divide its forces

However I think any forward deployed presence to Kiribati (or other pacific island nations) must not simply be a sacrificial speed bump and act as a missile sponge.

Yes, I agree. That's why my idea is contingent on them having enough fire power to completely take out Hawaii (and nearby bases like American Samoa) in an initial strike. If they can achieve that, Kiribati is simply not under as much pressure as you are alluding to.

On the subject of not all CSG being available, that was another thought I had here. Assuming continued need to have 1 CSG on north Atlantic side (Russia remains a thorn to NATO) + 1 more for Africa/South America + 1 in Middle East/Indian Ocean, USN would have at most probably 4 or 5 CSG that it can deploy to WestPac with maybe 2 or 3 carriers at their ports for regular maintenance/down time. If the carriers are doing maintenance work in San Diego/Hawaii, they would be prime targets for H-20s from Kiribati. That's another advantage of having base in Kiribati. You can attack all the ships in their base doing regular maintenance.

Mohsin77 · Jun 1, 2022

tphuang said:
And by late 2030s, the ability to pick up and intercept hypersonic missiles will be a lot better than now.

By that point, producing hypersonic missiles will also get cheaper, and this happens at a faster rate than interception mechanisms.

Once saturation attacks with hypersonics would become available, you'll be back where you started, in the same situation we have currently with oldschool CM/BM/UCAV saturation attacks. Every IADS can be saturated at a cheaper cost than interception. A change in this dynamic would require new physics (not just new engineering) and it still may not be possible, as offense usually has an advantage.

tphuang · Jun 1, 2022

Mohsin77 said:
By that point, producing hypersonic missiles will also get cheaper, and this happens at a faster rate than interception mechanisms.

Once saturation attacks with hypersonics would become available, you'll be back where you started, in the same situation we have currently with oldschool CM/BM/UCAV saturation attacks. Every IADS can be saturated at a cheaper cost than interception. A change in this dynamic would require new physics (not just new engineering) and it still may not be possible, as offense usually has an advantage.

You may want to read my entire scenario there. I actually based my scenario on unlimited number of LRHWs. But given what we've seen in US MIC, I anticipate American hypersonic missiles to be significantly more expensive than Chinese ones and ordered in significantly lower numbers.

Mohsin77 · Jun 1, 2022

tphuang said:
You may want to read my entire scenario there. I actually based my scenario on unlimited number of LRHWs. But given what we've seen in US MIC, I anticipate American hypersonic missiles to be significantly more expensive than Chinese ones and ordered in significantly lower numbers.

The principle I outlined is scenario agnostic.

The claim that an interception solution will outpace saturation capability is unfounded.

PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC

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