Taiwanese forces are an extension of American forces. Their air defences and air force must be destroyed. Fuel depots, weapon depots, civilian power stations, etc must be taken out to deny American’s situational awareness
PLA strike strategies in westpac HIC
- Thread starter SEAD
- Start date
I think most likely China would need to acquire them from Russia when its available for export like they have bought S400 through contracts. Although it might be slightly nerfed, but as long as it can shootdown hypersonic missile it should do well.
You do understand that the united states exists as a polity only because they largely exterminated one of the 5 races that inhabit this planet correct on their territory (the remaining four races being white, asian, african, potentially south asian/middle eastern). In a war against such polity, no sane defender would resist the use of strategic weapons at their disposal. A war of annihilation is the only war the United States wages, and to be responded in kind.
That is an entirely ridiculous thing to say.
Don't overestimate the significance of those deals with the pacific island nations.
Even if they hypothetically could be used to station military forces sometime in the future (which frankly is not a given), the scale of the military forces that would be needed to pose any sort of meaningful presence towards Hawaii, and the vulnerability of any bases and forces to strikes and the vulnerability of forces there to being cut off from resupply, is well beyond the scope of what the PLA could attain within the next decade or more.
For those pacific islands to be any sort of staging area that are able to check or threaten Hawaii, requires the PLA to successfully establish a defensible foothold all the way out from the first island chain to the second island chain (including Guam), and having defeated the bulk of US mobile air and naval forces in the pacific to begin with, first.
This of course is assuming that those nations would even consent to a significant Chinese military presence to begin with, because just as many nations in Asia are not keen to be major US military facilities with offensive missile capabilities, I suspect many of these pacific island nations will not be keen to host Chinese military facilities with power projection potential either. This isn't even considering US and Australian counter-diplomacy efforts either, which can easily change things quite rapidly.
I agree of course with the prerequisites of high capable nuclear deterrence and conventional warfighting capabilities.
However the viability of hypothetical bases in the pacific islands being able to field any sort of credible threat against Hawaii or CONTUS to force the US to hold back a couple of carriers, is entirely dependent on the PLA being able to prosecute a successful large scale high intensity conflict in the entirety of the western pacific to begin with (assuming the pacific island nations consent to a meaningful Chinese military presence at all), as a result of the relative isolation of those islands from supporting PLA capabilities during pre-conflict peacetime strategic geography.
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Well, a Russian millionaire did try to buy Canton island from Kiribati a few years ago for $350 million. For a country with 110k people where only like 20 live in that island group, you can probably overwhelm them with money on a long term lease deal. Now, it does not make sense to do this in the next 10 years when PLA would not have the ability to defend such a base. But 15 years from now when they have 6 carrier groups and maybe 4 Type 076s? Putting them all around first/second island chain doesn't make sense after a while.
I don't agree that you necessarily need a defensible foothold all the way out from first chain to second chain. The presence of 2 carrier groups in that area along with J-20/UCAV/H-20 base is a huge deterrence. It will take many years to build up the infrastructure, but they do have the time to do this. There are quite a few islands in that island group where they can develop and build the infrastructure. Of course, they need to put a lot of effort in to help the people of Kiribati in order to build that type of relationship. Kiribati is very far from Australia. Australia does not have the same influence there as it does with Solomon Island or Fiji.
The big thing to watch out for is climate change . If Kiribati itself is facing existential threat from climate change, it probably does not care about an island group with just 20 people. There has to be an amount that makes it worth it for Kiribati gov't to let China have large presence in that area which they can use to help their own people.
15 years from now, those 6 CSGs and 4 076s will probably be needed for the PLA just to wage a meaningful high intensity conflict within and up to the second island chain.
Heck, in 15 years, if they only have 6 CSGs in the fleet that would be somewhat alarming.
As for having a defensible foothold to make the islands a viable threat -- no, I'm saying that one needs a defensible foothold all the way from the first/second island chains and the destruction of the bulk of the US western pacific air and naval forces, for those pacific islands to be a viable threat or deterrence against Hawaii and/or CONTUS.
Relatively isolated island bases during wartime not only need consistent resupply to function, they also need extensive overlapping multi-domain supporting defenses and mobile naval forces (i.e.: CSGs) to survive strikes from the enemy.
If the PLA foolishly deploys two CSGs and a large air base's worth of J-20s, H-20s and UCAVs to Kiribati without having first defeated the bulk of the US air-naval forces in westpac, and without having successfully defeated and taken islands in the first island chain and second island chain including Guam (to enable a robust resupply and logistics chain to supply somewhere as deep in the pacific as Kiribati), then the US will simply be able to concentrate its air-naval-missile forces and defeat whatever forward deployed CSGs and land based air assets in a saturation attack in detail in a multi-axis manner in conjunction with forces in Australia.
PLA forces deployed there at the outset of a conflict would simply be a sacrificial speedbump that the US could easily sweep aside simply by virtue of the lack of large scale supporting PLA forces in the area and the inability of resupply -- i.e.: the tyranny of distance.
At most, such a forward deployed force would be a bit of an irritant to the US and Australia during peacetime, but they would be massively vulnerable and non-survivable during even the early stages of wartime.
I would agree with you if they had, say, at least 20 CSGs. Assuming 2/3 being at a state of high readiness (1/3 in maintenance, overhaul or workup), during high tension could perhaps forward deploy 4-5 of them to around the deep pacific island bases like Kiribati, while having 10 CSGs in the first and second island chain, to be able to try and rapidly sweep aside US forces in the first and second island chains, to try and rapidly reinforce and resupply those forward locations and the forward deployed 4-5 CSGs that would be immensely vulnerable to US strikes from Hawaii, CONTUS, Australia, and extensive submarines.
But even 20 operational high end CSGs may not be enough -- perhaps 25 may be necessary to overcome the tyranny of distance and the demands of speed for such a mission.
And it goes without saying a large number of SSNs and H-20s would be required as well to enable it to be successful.
Perhaps even approaching a triple digit high end competitive SSN fleet count.
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plawolf
Lieutenant General
I think trying to fight the USN deep in the Pacific is going to be really really unwise, and is the very definition of strategic overreach.
A base is only of use and value if you can supply, support and defend it. Otherwise you are just throwing valuable resources away on bases and assets the enemy could easily cut off and destroy piecemeal at their leisure.
Any PLAN base in Kiribati will be unsustainable and not defendable against the USN for at least two decades or more.
As things stand, a direct fight between China and the US will depend significantly on how well Chinese AShBMs work.
If they work well, 6-7 USN carriers won’t make much of a difference compared to 2-3, they will all get obliterated from orbit.
If the AShBMs don’t work as advertised and/or the USN develops effective counters, it will be a much harder fight, but it’s still a fight China has a good chance of winning. I personally think the much quoted 50% odds are what would be China’s chances if their AShBMs don’t work at all, since Chinese strategists generally prefer to assume the worst case scenario.
The other main areas of concern are the inevitable economic costs from sanctions and outright theft by western powers of Chinese overseas assets, as well as the possibility, likelihood even, of US nuclear blackmail as a means to stay China’s hand from obliterating their carriers. Thus I think the main deterrence now are economic and strategic rather than tactical military balance of power for China.
The point is a Kiribati base doesn’t change that calculus in any meaningful way. If anything, it shifts the odds against China since any assets deployed there will at best be cut off and out of the fight, or get obliterated at the start of the conflict for minimal US losses due to a lack of proper support and reinforcements.
It’s only after China can comfortably defeat the US in the first and second island chains and is looking to push the US even further into the pacific that places like Kiribati becomes relevant. But that’s still at a minimum two decades away barring some massive and unforeseen calamity befalling the US on the scale of another civil war
solarz
Brigadier
That's not supported by what we are seeing, and what we've seen in the past.
NATO was preparing to send their airforce into Ukraine before Russia paraded is nuclear missiles on the streets of Moscow.
US and Israel carries out regular airstrikes and assassinations against Iran, while not daring to do anything to NK.
I'm not saying China doesn't need to expand its navy, I'm saying the chances of a direct US-China conflict is slim to none.
Let's say 4 by the end of 2030. And then once every 2 years after that. 8 by 2037 and 12 by 2045.
if they actually have 8 CSG and 4 076s that are comparable in firepower to US CVGs, then resupplying island bases will be a lot easier than you state. The value of having a base that's around Hawaii will automatically mean that US cannot deploy as much force around first chain, which would make that area a lot easier to win. If USN needs to keep 4 carriers along west coast and Hawaii, then that significantly reduces the amount of force deployed to between first and second chain. If PLAN cannot defeat 3 CSG between first and second chain, then it has no shot of winning anything.
Canton island is 3000 km from Pearl Harbor. It's basically the perfect distance away in terms of how much strike it can face and how much danger it can pose.
It's 5000+ km from Sydney to Kiribati. I'm not concerned about Australia in this scenario.
If there is a war and US military sends nothing to West Pacific, then all of US bases around first and second chain will get destroyed pretty quickly. And now China has succeeded in controlling first and second chain. If US sends just 2 carrier groups to Asia, then you are basically in a situation where China is trading 2 of its carrier groups for 2 of US's carrier groups.
The aerial assets can easily retreat. You try to retreat as much of your naval force as possible. You give up Kiribati base, but get all of the island in first and second chain including Guam. Now, the pressure against mainland is eased up.
Your concern was always facing strikes on the mainland. This strategy would basically trade Kiribati for first/second chain islands. It would give the military industrial complex plenty of time to ramp up production. It would give them plenty of space now to be in a firm defensive position with maybe 10 carrier groups from second chain to mainland.