PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

Bltizo said:

I'm going to break down my reply in parts.

1. I never said that the US would be able to "permanently take out" hundreds of Chinese factories. What I said was that the US would have the capability to strike at Chinese production facilities while China would not have the capability to do the same to the US.

2. In any sort of serious westpac conflict, the US will frontload its airbases in the region with aircraft yes (at both major air bases and dispersed air bases), and also have multiple CSGs in the region. Additionally, the US would deploy a large fraction of its SSN fleet (most if not all of which can launch LACMs) to the region, as well as additional surface combatants as part of surface action groups (SAGs) -- and those SSNs and SAGs of course can carry Tomahawk LACMs capable of quite long ranged strike. Furthermore, the US will be capable of launching long range bomber raids carrying long range ALCMs from Hawaii and CONTUS. And in the future, basing of IRBM/hypersonic weapons in the region during wartime is virtually a given as well.
Taking all of those capabilities together at a system of systems level, versus what the PLA can field in the near future at a system of systems level, I do not see the PLA having the capability to robustly and quickly smash US westpac capabilities and mobile units (CSGs and naval forces) in the region in a manner that will permanently cripple US capability to project air and naval power in the region, which would be the prerequisite for China to be capable of robustly protecting its key military industrial complex facilities from US attack.

3. The production pipeline for modern weapons systems is much more fragile than we often believe. Think about various key subsystems that modern fighters, warships, and missiles cannot function without. The most obvious are key avionics systems like radars, and the other are powerplants. Think about how many factories there are which are able to produce those key subsystems. If I were a competent adversary, I would focus my strikes on the small number of key production sites that produce those key subsystems, and sure maybe I'll launch some strikes against final assembly/production factories as well. Those together would greatly hinder and delay China's ability to replace losses of many military systems. Sure, over time we can argue that China will be able to build replacement factories, distribute their operations, and so on -- but over that same period of time the US will be able to greatly expand its production facilities in CONTUS and in Europe -- all on top of continuing to run its unmolested existing production facilities. Meaning that in a prolonged conflict, the US will almost certainly end up being able to outproduce China the longer that time goes on.

4. China has no capability in the foreseeable future to realistically to strike US production facilities that the US uses for the production of its military assets. Fairly simple.

5. SLOCs -- sure one can argue that in a "wartime economy" China might be self-sufficient in energy and materials. But you are talking about a war of attrition. In such a conflict, the side with secure SLOCs and superior resource lines will hold a significant advantage.


All of which, brings me back to the point I wrote in my previous post -- as the current balance of military power stands, a war of attrition would be unfavourable to China and the PLA.

That is simply because of two things:
1. The pre-positioning of US forces in westpac (air bases, facilities) and mobile US forces (CSGs, naval forces) are in close proximity to the Chinese mainland where they are capable of striking production facilities of China, while the PLA has no way of realistically doing so to the US. That combined with the US having greater freedom to rely on global SLOCs for maintaining its resources and denying those SLOCs to China, means that the longer a war goes on, the worse it is for the PLA.
2. The degree of military power the PLA holds is not sufficient to defeat and annihilate said US forces (both pre-positioned and mobile) described above, in a sufficiently comprehensive and rapid manner to allow the PLA to cripple US capability to project power in the western pacific and allow the PLA to take the strategic initiative in the pacific in general, and also to allow the PLA to secure its SLOCs in the key important area/s of the western pacific and Indian Ocean.


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Directed to everyone in general:

Now, let me describe a degree of PLA military power whereby a "war of attrition" might actually be a positive for them:
Such a PLA force (let's call it PLA XYZ) would be capable of doing two things:
1. Defeating a massive combined US force (including both their based forces and their mobile naval/air forces, which would make up over half of total US global forces) in the western pacific in relatively quick order (such that the US has no chance to wear down PLA defenses of the mainland let alone robustly strike at Chinese production facilities), AND
2. After the action described in 1., the remaining surviving PLA forces (air and naval) that they have, are able to significantly quantitatively and qualitatively outnumber the remaining surviving US forces in the world, enabling the PLA to take strategic advantage in the pacific in general (i.e.: not just the western pacific, rather including the central and eastern pacific) as well as in the Indian Ocean.

By achieving that, the PLA will be able to:
A. Secure the production facilities of their own home turf and to be capable of expanding production robustly
B. Secure SLOCs for efficient, expansive transport of resources in a way that provides both redundancy and capacity
C. Have a globally sufficient and quantitative balance of forces capable of placing the US on the geostrategic defensive, by placing Hawaii and Alaska at serious risk and also to have the capability to conduct a degree of strikes against the US western seaboard and force the US to reposition and suboptimize their own production facilities on CONTUS.


Needless to say, PLA XYZ would need to be very large and very powerful to be able to achieve such a mission -- at minimum it would require PLA XYZ's total high end military capability to be quantitatively larger than that of the US's total global force and to be at minimum qualitatively equal if not qualitatively superior.
Such an operation would require the PLA XYZ to be able to robustly defeat a frontloaded US force (composing of over half, or at least a major fraction of US total global forces in existence) in the western pacific while suffering minimal losses on its own, to result in the PLA having a quantitative correlation of forces on the scale of something like at least 3:1 against the US's total globally available forces that still survive.



.... Or, putting it another way, I believe for a "war of attrition" to be plausibly desirable for China, will require the PLA to at least be 50% larger than the US military in key mobile air-naval forces, and to have massive regional/westpac advantages to be capable of robustly defeating a forward deployed US force (composing of 50-60% of total US global forces) in the western pacific while suffering minimal PLA losses of its own, to seek a correlation of naval and air forces that is at least 3:1 in the PLA's favour by the time that the dust settles in the western pacific phase of the conflict.

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1. Do you see the PLA achieving the XYZ level by mid-century? More broadly, how do you interpret the CPC's goal of a "world class fighting force" by the centenary of the PRC in 2049?
2. What strategies do you see as effective for securing Chinese supply of militarily critical "brittle" materials like radars and avionics? I favour a combination of stockpiling and the tac-nuke intercontinental HGVs I discussed previously to deter strikes on Chinese military-industrial targets. Thoughts?
3. Even with forces at the XYZ level, do you think the PLA could achieve the 3:1 ratio of surviving global forces if it seizes the initiative with, for example, a bolt-out-of-the-blue attack on Westpac US forces?
4. What's the rationale for the 3:1 ratio of surviving forces? Why wouldn't 2:1 or some other ratio be sufficient?

ZeEa5KPul said:

The second part is very interesting. I have a few questions:

1. Do you see the PLA achieving the XYZ level by mid-century?
2. What strategies do you see as effective for securing Chinese supply of militarily critical "brittle" materials like radars and avionics? I favour a combination of stockpiling and the tac-nuke intercontinental HGVs I discussed previously to deter strikes on Chinese military-industrial targets. Thoughts?
3. Even with forces at the XYZ level, do you think the PLA could achieve the 3:1 ratio of surviving global forces if it seizes the initiative with, for example, a bolt-out-of-the-blue attack on Westpac US forces?
4. What's the rationale for the 3:1 ratio of surviving forces? Why wouldn't 2:1 or some other ratio be sufficient?

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Bltizo said:

1. It's a moving target, because the size and capability of the required XYZ force is inherently tied to total US capabilities.
2. No. You've mentioned the use of nuclear weapons as "deterrence" against Chinese MIC targets on the mainland before. Just no.
3. I don't know what you mean. Are you saying the PLA would conduct a bolt out of the blue attack on the US, and asking me what the ratio of forces would be after such an action?
4. It's partly gut based, partly based on the classic adage that an attacker needs a 3:1 local advantage of combat power to break through an enemy's defenses. 3:1 IMO is the minimum. It goes without saying that 4:1 or even 5:1 would be better. But obviously the higher we posit such a ratio the more unrealistic it gets. 3:1 to me is just at the edge of pushing the realm of possibility at the long term (pending what the evolution of US forces and capabilities is like).

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1. On this point, I'll note that China's PPP GDP is already something like 25% larger than America's. The fact that China spends 1.4% on defense compared to 3.5% by the US is a political decision I hope will change soon. But I can certainly see 25+ years of a Chinese economy already larger and growing faster than the US (with an expanding share of GDP appropriated to defense) being able to support the PLA XYZ level, no matter what the US decides to do. I'll also note that as time goes on, the US's legacy advantages are steadily eroded by obsolescence.
2. To elaborate on my idea for those unfamiliar with it, given the disadvantage China has in delivering a sufficient volume of fire on the CONTUS, I propose arming intercontinental hypersonic weapons with small nuclear weapons (on the order of 1 kiloton, around the same yield as the Beirut explosion) and aiming them at targets like Newport News Shipbuilding to deter US conventional strikes on targets like JNCX. Don't get too hung up on the physics of the weapon and consider instead the scale of devastation. The principle to keep in mind is parity with the scale of devastation that the US can inflict on China.
   
   Too much salt can make a dish unpalatable, but a little is necessary. It's the same way with crazy - you have to sprinkle just a little bit of crazy on the dish.
3. I mean if PLA XYZ were to launch a bolt from the blue attack, would that be sufficient to reach the >= 3:1 ratio in surviving forces? Leaving aside the political question of whether or not it would.

ZeEa5KPul said:

1. On this point, I'll note that China's PPP GDP is already something like 25% larger than America's. The fact that China spends 1.4% on defense compared to 3.5% by the US is a political decision I hope will change soon. But I can certainly see 25+ years of a Chinese economy already larger and growing faster than the US (with an expanding share of GDP appropriated to defense) being able to support the PLA XYZ level, no matter what the US decides to do. I'll also note that as time goes on, the US's legacy advantages are steadily eroded by obsolescence.
2. Too much salt can make a dish unpalatable, but a little is necessary. It's the same way with crazy - you have to sprinkle just a little bit of crazy on the dish. To elaborate on my idea for those unfamiliar with it, given the disadvantage China has in delivering a sufficient volume of fire on the CONTUS, I propose arming intercontinental hypersonic weapons with small nuclear weapons (on the order of 1 kiloton, around the same yield as the Beirut explosion) and aiming them at targets like Newport News Shipbuilding to deter US conventional strikes on targets like JNCX. Don't get too hung up on the physics of the weapon and consider instead the scale of devastation. The principle to keep in mind is parity with the scale of devastation that the US can inflict on China.
3. I mean if PLA XYZ were to launch a bolt from the blue attack, would that be sufficient to reach the >= 3:1 ratio in surviving forces?

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Yukiolweipqled51 said:

Let's pause for a moment and think.

A country merely two centuries old, with barely 25% of the population of China's. Sitting astride an ocean, thousands of miles away east of Shanghai and Beijing, they can decide to dissuade a Chinese takeover of its constituent renegade island in nearby Formosa/Taiwan more than four decades after supposed breakneck, unmatched, unprecedent speed of Chinese development.

I can't imagine China taking Hawaii from the US by force, let alone taking over Alaska or Southern California by force, not in the next 50 years at least. And that is with a 4 to 1 advantage in numerical terms. Speaks volumes.

To add insult to injury, all three developed East Asian technological powerhouses in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are firmly in US camp. Or you might call them American vassals. The fact that there is such an elaborate and considerable debate and discussion on how to go about taking over a renegade island only a short flight away from Fujian province and still the popular opinion, the opinion of the professionals who are tasked with this endeavour all unanimously suggest that the PLA will fail is a telltale sign of massive failures by the CCP and the PLA.

When can we expect the roles to be revesed and the Americans struggling for decades at a stretch to take Puerto Rico back if it were to rebel and backed by the PLA in case of a conflict?

Not in the lifetime of anybody reading this, I presume.

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Yukiolweipqled51 said:

You are right.

It merely provided a different perspective on the issue. How weak would China would have to be to be in such a precarious position. The fact that China taking Hawaii, Alaska or Southern California is inconceivable by anybody from anywhere in the world at this time goes to show the immense lead that the USA despite all its failings - which are too many to name - continues to enjoy and which are unlikely to diminish anytime soon due to some reasons I have mentioned elsewhere.

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Yukiolweipqled51 said:

You are right that it is essentially an insurmountable challenge at this time for the PLA to capture Taiwan with the US and its allies/vassals such as Japan intervening militarily.

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Yukiolweipqled51 said:

Not to mention other tools at its disposal such as banning access to SWIFT, cutting Chinese mainland from the internet cables that traverse the Pacific Oceans, blocking the Malacca, Sunda and other straits and chokepoints that are used for external trade, cyberattacks, biological weapons attacks of which COVID-19 may only have been a demonstration, propaganda warfare in which all segments of US and European society will uniformly side with the US over China any time, anywhere makes it nigh on impossible for the PLA to take over Taiwan anytime soon. Not in next three decades I reckon, at this incredible China Speed.

I agree with you on that.

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Bltizo said:

1. Take a more reasonable position and just acknowledge it for the significant challenge that it is and that we are so far out that the most confident assessment we can make is "it might be possible".
2. Please don't wax poetic to me on this matter. I am categorically saying that PLA first use of tactical nukes as a deterrent against US conventional strikes against Chinese MIC and mainland locations is out of the question. Factor that into your force and conflict planning. If or when a conflict occurs, nuclear decision making can be carried out by national command authorities, but prior to that, no.
3. I still don't understand -- are you saying that if the PLA XYZ force were to launch a bolt out of blue attack, that you think it would be easier or more difficult to reach the >=3:1 ratio in surviving forces?

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1. I inherently acknowledge the difficulty of the problem by the timescale I give for a solution; i.e., 25+ years. If I thought it was easy I would have said the PLA could reach it much sooner. The economic facts I gave inform my thinking, of course, as they should inform yours. Dismissing or downplaying them does not make one's conclusions more reasonable or credible, it just introduces a significant bias toward underestimating China.
2. What you're proposing I not factor into my force and conflict planning baffles me. It would be like if I were planning to go into a fight with Mike Tyson and then intentionally break one of my hands. Why would I do such a thing? I need every advantage I can get. Why would China not use an almost miraculous solution to one of its most vexing problems? Current PLA doctrine wouldn't entertain this, but that can be revised. 25+ years is a long enough time to contemplate its revision.
3. I'm asking whether it is necessary for China to completely seize the initiative to achieve the 3:1 ratio. In other words, must PLA XYZ launch a surprise attack to reach this ratio or could it do so even if the US were the one to initiate hostilities?

Yukiolweipqled51 said:

they can decide to dissuade a Chinese takeover of its constituent renegade island in nearby Formosa/Taiwan more than four decades after supposed breakneck, unmatched, unprecedent speed of Chinese development.

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Yukiolweipqled51 said:

The fact that there is such an elaborate and considerable debate and discussion on how to go about taking over a renegade island only a short flight away from Fujian province and still the popular opinion, the opinion of the professionals who are tasked with this endeavour all unanimously suggest that the PLA will fail is a telltale sign of massive failures by the CCP and the PLA.

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Yukiolweipqled51 said:

Not in next three decades I reckon, at this incredible China Speed.

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Bltizo said:

I'm not sure who you are agreeing with here, but it certainly isn't me.

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Yukiolweipqled51 said:

the opinion of the professionals who are tasked with this endeavour all unanimously suggest that the PLA will fail is a telltale sign of massive failures by the CCP and the PLA.

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Yukiolweipqled51 said:

When can we expect the roles to be revesed and the Americans struggling for decades at a stretch to take Puerto Rico back if it were to rebel and backed by the PLA in case of a conflict?

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Yukiolweipqled51 said:

all three developed East Asian technological powerhouses in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are firmly in US camp. Or you might call them American vassals.

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ZeEa5KPul said:

1. I inherently acknowledge the difficulty of the problem by the timescale I give for a solution; i.e., 25+ years. If I thought it was easy I would have said the PLA could reach it much sooner. The economic facts I gave inform my thinking, of course, as they should inform yours. Dismissing or downplaying them does not make one's conclusions more reasonable or credible, it just introduces a significant bias toward underestimating China.
2. What you're proposing I not factor into my force and conflict planning baffles me. It would be like if I were planning to go into a fight with Mike Tyson and then intentionally break one of my hands. Why would I do such a thing? I need every advantage I can get. Why would China not use an almost miraculous solution to one of its most vexing problems? Current PLA doctrine wouldn't entertain this, but that can be revised. 25+ years is a long enough time to contemplate its revision.
3. I'm asking whether it is necessary for China to completely seize the initiative to achieve the 3:1 ratio. In other words, must PLA XYZ launch a surprise attack to reach this ratio or could it do so even if the US were the one to initiate hostilities?

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ZeEa5KPul said:

No. What ensures a catastrophic conflict is America's psychotic messianism, not my language. If anything, my proposals ensure peace because the only thing Americans hold dearer than their nauseating self-righteousness is their primal desire to keep breathing.

I don't care what the US public thinks, they're the most heavily propagandized population on the planet. They think whatever their masters tell them to think. That "under 50%" number is nothing more than a thermostat setting that US elites can manipulate at will. China is not going to sit around reading polls, it's going to take steps much like I outlined to ensure its security by being too powerful to threaten.

Ultimately, it's a deeper and simpler issue than any opinion poll can get at. China has suffered the US's presence in its natural dominion and interference in its affairs since the PRC was founded because it couldn't do anything about it. Now those days are fast drawing to a close and the US confronts a very stark choice:

1. America can know its place in this new world and voluntarily withdraw to the eastern Pacific.
2. America can wage a war against China that it's certain to lose.

There is no option 3.

That's good. I like the posts you write here and I wouldn't want China's nuclear buildup to cause you personal discomfort.

That's a logically untenable position. Nuclear weapons by their very nature threaten other countries, that's why they exist.

People travelled the world quite extensively long before America existed, that isn't going to change. The death of the post WWII order doesn't mean the end of peace, quite the contrary. Instead of the fraying and unstable "peace" we have today with America trying to keep all the plates in the air like an exhausted juggler, we'll have a durable peace based on each great power respecting the others' core interests and red lines.

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