PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency
- Thread starter pugachev_diver
- Start date
How Far Can We See?
our dear sleepy claims that the US will be untouchable for China for at least 50 years. I don't know how credible his claim is, because I can't see that far into the future.
here are anecdotes about the two recent untouchables:
London, 1897. the British Empire was celebrating Queen Victoria's diamond Jubilee. subjects from all around the world came to London to pay their respect for the queen. great pomps were thrown to celebrate the great empire, greater than the Roman Empire by any measure, where the sun never set.
100 years later, New York. people were celebrating the new Millenium under PAX Americana. history was declared ended, from now on the world would be ruled by the PAX Americana Eternal!
our dear sleepy claims that the US will be untouchable for China for at least 50 years. I don't know how credible his claim is, because I can't see that far into the future.
here are anecdotes about the two recent untouchables:
London, 1897. the British Empire was celebrating Queen Victoria's diamond Jubilee. subjects from all around the world came to London to pay their respect for the queen. great pomps were thrown to celebrate the great empire, greater than the Roman Empire by any measure, where the sun never set.
100 years later, New York. people were celebrating the new Millenium under PAX Americana. history was declared ended, from now on the world would be ruled by the PAX Americana Eternal!
antiterror13
Brigadier
I think America took over the British during and after the WW2, which is less than 50 yrs since the Jubilee
So, 50 yrs is a very long time, nobody knows what would happen
I actually had some discussions with a friend a few days back about how China and the US will react to a Taiwan emergency. First thing's first: A short conventional war within the first island chain will not be in the US's favor. Keep in mind that the US had conducted a number of wargames and as long as they are not using "future tech" (6th gen fighters in massive numbers, missiles that are still blueprints or concept, widely available DEWs), they lose most of their simulated engagements. Forward basing aircraft means that they will be destroyed by the opening IRBM salvo. Carriers are also not safe from ASBM
Thus, in a Taiwan emergency, if the US does not believe that a long war against China will be worthwhile, it will most likely not intervene.
If the US wants to fight a prolonged, multi-year war, the problem becomes industrial capacity. I understand that some members here are concerned about American bombing of Chinese factories and industrial targets. However, keep in mind that you will need to expend resources to conduct those attacks. Since China already has an edge in industrial production, it can build defensive systems quicker, replenish losses quicker, and repair structures more easily. This means that the effect of such a strike will be dubious at best.
Locking down SLOCs near China may sound like a good idea at first. However, implementing a blockade is difficult. Firstly, China is relatively close to South Korea and Japan. They are both reliant on an open strait of malacca for their survival. Moreover, they do not have the option to diversify their trade through land routes. They will not be able to survive a total lockdown with mines and submarine attacks. So in this case, the US will have to send its surface fleet into the region in order to verify/check/board commercial ships one by one to ensure that no one is transporting anything to China instead of Japan (which is a nightmare on its own but I digress). If a US carrier park itself somewhere in Andaman Sea, China can track it down by sending UAVs and aircraft that overfly Myanmar or Thailand. Then the carrier can be attacked with ASBMs/bombers launched from Yunnan. In short, it is very dangerous for US to deploy its fleet there. Thus, a blockade will likely cause heavy casualties for the US navy. In the long run, given the decline of American shipbuilding, the US may not be able to sustain such a blockade.
Finally, time for some war planning. In case of a hot war in Taiwan, China can start by telling the US that they will fight on until the US withdraws from the region. If the US decides to intervene, strike the American bases and fleet. Either way, it can be made clear to both ROC and any American allies in the region that the US will either be unable or unwilling to come to their aid. Meanwhile, the ROC navy and ROCAF need to be destroyed to further assert pressure to the island until they surrender. If they refuse to do so, blockade it and bomb it until it does. Keep in mind that Taiwan will not be able to sustain itself in terms of food production. The population will either starve to death or surrender.
While that is happening, depending on Japan and the US's choices, the PLA can breakthrough the first island chain (which is devastated by IRBMs and bombers) and head out to take Guam. Okinawa can be taken by amphibious assault as well. Not that it is necessary but if it helps to force Japan into giving up, that can be an option. By that point both China and the US can bunker down and wait for war economy to kick online. China's industrial capabilities will eventually grind the US down and force it to give up.
If the US is somehow fighting to the bitter end, then I suppose the PLAN can launch hit-and-run attacks against West Coast US to further shaken its resolve. Or to disrupt military production. Regardless, given time and industrial production, China has a very solid chance of victory.
Thus, in a Taiwan emergency, if the US does not believe that a long war against China will be worthwhile, it will most likely not intervene.
If the US wants to fight a prolonged, multi-year war, the problem becomes industrial capacity. I understand that some members here are concerned about American bombing of Chinese factories and industrial targets. However, keep in mind that you will need to expend resources to conduct those attacks. Since China already has an edge in industrial production, it can build defensive systems quicker, replenish losses quicker, and repair structures more easily. This means that the effect of such a strike will be dubious at best.
Locking down SLOCs near China may sound like a good idea at first. However, implementing a blockade is difficult. Firstly, China is relatively close to South Korea and Japan. They are both reliant on an open strait of malacca for their survival. Moreover, they do not have the option to diversify their trade through land routes. They will not be able to survive a total lockdown with mines and submarine attacks. So in this case, the US will have to send its surface fleet into the region in order to verify/check/board commercial ships one by one to ensure that no one is transporting anything to China instead of Japan (which is a nightmare on its own but I digress). If a US carrier park itself somewhere in Andaman Sea, China can track it down by sending UAVs and aircraft that overfly Myanmar or Thailand. Then the carrier can be attacked with ASBMs/bombers launched from Yunnan. In short, it is very dangerous for US to deploy its fleet there. Thus, a blockade will likely cause heavy casualties for the US navy. In the long run, given the decline of American shipbuilding, the US may not be able to sustain such a blockade.
Finally, time for some war planning. In case of a hot war in Taiwan, China can start by telling the US that they will fight on until the US withdraws from the region. If the US decides to intervene, strike the American bases and fleet. Either way, it can be made clear to both ROC and any American allies in the region that the US will either be unable or unwilling to come to their aid. Meanwhile, the ROC navy and ROCAF need to be destroyed to further assert pressure to the island until they surrender. If they refuse to do so, blockade it and bomb it until it does. Keep in mind that Taiwan will not be able to sustain itself in terms of food production. The population will either starve to death or surrender.
While that is happening, depending on Japan and the US's choices, the PLA can breakthrough the first island chain (which is devastated by IRBMs and bombers) and head out to take Guam. Okinawa can be taken by amphibious assault as well. Not that it is necessary but if it helps to force Japan into giving up, that can be an option. By that point both China and the US can bunker down and wait for war economy to kick online. China's industrial capabilities will eventually grind the US down and force it to give up.
If the US is somehow fighting to the bitter end, then I suppose the PLAN can launch hit-and-run attacks against West Coast US to further shaken its resolve. Or to disrupt military production. Regardless, given time and industrial production, China has a very solid chance of victory.
but why Okinawa? Seems pointless to strain logistics over an island if not several. If you want to force them to giving up. You have a better chance by lobbing missiles and bombing infrastructure and industrial assets rather than island hopping.
I do not follow your logic.
Of course expending munitions in any sort of conflict will consume resources, however the value of the targets that you are expending your munitions against is what matters.
The whole point of this discussion is that in a conflict, China's MIC facilities would be vulnerable to attack from the US, while US MIC facilities will not be vulnerable to attack from China.
How can China "replenish losses quicker" when their MIC production facilities are under being targeted and disrupted while US MIC production facilities remain unmolested?
Furthermore, the impression that China has an "edge in industrial production" is far too general of a statement.
Because in many domains of high end military assets, China does not have an edge and is in fact, behind.
In terms of aerospace production of stealth fighters, of large tanker aircraft, of stealthy strike missiles, helicopters, China is quite far behind.
In production of advanced nuclear submarines and carriers, China is also behind.
In producing advanced powerplants like high end turbofans, nuclear propulsion, China is also behind.
Yes, China does have certain strengths, such as shipbuilding for certain ship types, and it's aerospace production is advancing in qualitative technology.
But it is very incorrect to say that China has an advantage in industrial production in context of general military industrial capabilities.
No one is saying that a US blockade from the Indian Ocean will be costless to US allies or that China could not try to frustrate a US blockade.
What I am saying is that having air and naval forces in positions to control of SLOCs is important and if one suffers from a compromised SLOC, then it will adversely affect a nation's ability to wage a war of attrition.
Even if we try to suggest that the US will not be able to perfectly carry out a blockade or that the US blockade will also adversely affect their allies in the western Pacific, well that doesn't solve the problem that China's SLOCs will remain hindered while US SLOCs are unhindered.
Heck, this entire issue is could be simply evaded where the US could simply require shipping going to allied nations to have some government or military representative on board to check in with them and any ship lacking it will be boarded and/or simply sunk. How many nations would choose to quickly comply with US demands rather than risk military seizure or destruction of their shipping?
The idea of China being able to track US CSGs operating in the Andamans and being able to provide sufficient targeting data for an AShBM strike is also fanciful. The AShBM is not a silver bullet, and it should be considered as one element of a multidomain package.
Acting alone, unsupported, I do not expect AShBMs to be capable of defeating the defenses of a CSG unless they are somehow literally able to spam many dozens of missiles as part of a single strike.
Now, if it was part of a coordinated strike with SSGNs, a couple of CSGs worth of strike fighters and EW, coordinated with stealthy HALE UAVs and a formation of LEO satellites and a high resolution GEO satellite or two, then that's an entirely different question.
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So to summarize, in a war of attrition:
- China's production facilities will be degraded, by US strikes while US production facilities will not be degraded.
- The US will be capable of interdicting Chinese SLOCs outside of the western Pacific and China does not have sufficient capabilities to deny or contest this, meaning it will suffer from (at best) dubious SLOCs while the US will have fully functioning SLOCs.
A war of attrition as it currently stands would not be favourable to China and the PLA, not until they become far more capable.
It is an option. Not one that you have to take. There are definitely other alternatives.
On the contrary. The possibility of missing the target is high, even considering the C4ISTAR that China has implemented and there is a way to implement it in the SCS. Using submunitions on a conventional warhead on the DF-21D is simply more likely to hit and neutralize the CVN than a conventional direct-hit warhead.
A PLA which is 50% larger than the US in key mobile air-naval forces is financially feasible today.
The USAF budget is $204 Billion and the US Navy $163 Billion, for a total of $367 Billion. As per Pentagon statements, labour accounts for approximately 40% of spending, which leaves $221 Billion in non-labour spending.
If Chinese military spending doubles from a demilitarised 1.7% to 3.4% of GDP (which is still less than the 3.7% which a militarised USA routinely spends)
Apply that to the 2021 Chinese GDP of $18Trillion on an exchange rate basis and that works out as military spending of $306 Billion being doubled.
And if wages in China are roughly 4x lower than the USA (based on GDP per capita figures on an exchange rate basis), that $306 Billion increase in Chinese military spending splits out into $35 Billion in labour + $265 Billion for everything else. If you add that to the existing non-labour military spending for the [PLAAF+PLAN+PLARF], you would end up with non-labour Chinese military spending in excess of 50% larger than the combined [USAF+USN] non-labour spending. Note that this doesn't take into account that costs for equivalent military equipment in China is generally a lot lower than the US.
Of course, it would take some years to ramp up the military industrial base so that this extra money was usefully spent.
And US-China relations would have to get much worse before the Chinese government decides to embark on such a course.
You'd be talking about $3+ Trillion over a decade.
And going forward, if China is economically twice the size of the USA by 2035, then a demilitarised China (still spending 1.7% of GDP on the military) can still end up with 50% more spending in terms of key mobile air-naval forces for the Western Pacific. That military disparity would just be the natural consequence of Chinese economic growth.
the British became the hegemon after Trafalgar and Waterloo, they lost it after WWI, they "rule the wave" for about 100 years; the US initially was reluctant to inherit the hegemon, if you count from the end of WWI, it's about 100 years .